19th - Commissioned for trials, her CO was Captain Cecil Halliday Jepson Harcourt, CBE, RN.

4th - Contractor’s Sea Trials.

9th - At 0600 hours, battleship DUKE OF YORK, escorted by the light cruiser PENELOPE, and the destroyers LIGHTNING, ICARUS, and VIVACIOUS departed the Clyde for Rosyth for DUKE OF YORK for final docking and completion.

(The reason for moving DUKE OF YORK to Rosyth was to reduce the risk of her being damaged by bombing. Whilst the Luftwaffe regularly bombed the Mersey and the Clyde they didn’t bomb Rosyth. The labour for the completion work was provided by her builders, John Brown of Clydebank)

10th – At 1600 hours in approximate position 56-12N, 2-15W, the destroyers LIGHTNING and ICARUS detached from the escort. LIGHTENING returned to Scapa and ICARUS proceeded to Immingham for a refit. At 1900 hours DUKE OF YORK, PENELOPE and VIVACIOUS arrived off Rosyth, VIVACIOUS then returned to Scapa Flow. DUKE OF YORK then entered Rosyth where she embarked Admiralty stores and completed with her full complement, which consisted of 85% "hostilities only" men

At Rosyth where the outstanding builder’s work was completed and Sea Trials were continued. (Note: Low forward sheer found to cause excessive flooding even in moderate sea conditions.) Whilst at Rosyth she was fitted with her radar outfit;

1 x Type 273/M/P Surface search
1 x Type 281 Long range air warning
6 x Type 282 Pom-pom directors
1 x Type 284/M/P Main armament director
4 x Type 285/M/P/Q HA directors

1st - Build completion and acceptance into service.

2nd - At 0800 hours DUKE OF YORK escorted by the heavy cruiser BERWICK and destroyers PUNJABI and ESCAPADE sailed from Rosyth for Scapa Flow to commence working up. At 1015 hours off the Isle of May the destroyer TARTAR, en route from Sheerness to Scapa Flow, joined the force.

3rd – At 0830 hours in approximate position 58-20N, 3W the destroyer IMPULSIVE from Scapa Flow joined the force to relieve the PUNJABI who then proceeded ahead for Scapa Flow. DUKE OF YORK, BERWICK and destroyers ESCAPADE and IMPULSIVE then steered for the west of the Orkneys to carry out trials. At 1800 hours DUKE OF YORK, BERWICK and destroyers ESCAPADE and IMPULSIVE arrived at Scapa Flow to commence working up.

6th - At Scapa Flow, Flag of Vice Admiral ATB Curteis, 2iC Home Fleet, was transferred from RENOWN until December.

At Scapa, work-up in continuation.

9th – At 1400 hours Vice Admiral Sir Alban Thomas Buckley Curteis CB RN, Vice-Admiral Commanding 2nd Battle Squadron & Second-in-Command, Home Fleet transferred his flag to DUKE OF YORK from RENOWN. Almost immediately Vice Admiral Curteis struck his flag and transferred it to the base ship DUNLUCE CASTLE. At 1600 hours DUKE OF YORK escorted by the destroyers FAULKNOR, FORESIGHT and MATABELE sailed from Scapa for the Clyde.

(On Sunday, December 7, 1941, Winston Churchill was dining at Chartwell with the US special envoy Averell Harriman and the US Ambassador John Winant. The radio was on, and the three men were suddenly attentive to the announcement of the newsreader that the Japanese, Axis allies of Germany and Italy, had attacked Pearl Harbour. Churchill immediately phoned the US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, asking for confirmation. "It's quite true," FDR said. The prime minister then said he would come to Washington for talks. DUKE OF YORK was en route to Greenock to embark the Prime Minster)

10th – At 1215 hours when DUKE OF YORK and escort were in the Firth of Clyde south of the Isle of Arran they received orders to immediately return to Scapa.

(When the Admiralty received the news of the sinking of the PRINCE OF WALES and REPULSE the immediate concern was that the Kriegsmarine would take advantage of the Royal Navy’s weakness and send the TIRPITZ on a raiding mission into the Atlantic. DUKE OF YORK was recalled to Scapa to be available if TIRPITZ should attempt a breakout)

11th – At 1015 hours DUKE OF YORK and destroyers FAULKNOR, FORESIGHT and MATABELE arrived back at Scapa. At 1630 hours DUKE OF YORK escorted by the destroyers FAULKNOR, FORESIGHT and MATABELE sailed from Scapa for the Clyde.

12th – At 1500 hours DUKE OF YORK and destroyers FAULKNOR, FORESIGHT and MATABELE arrived in the Clyde. At 1530 hours DUKE OF YORK anchored off Greenock.

13th – At 1100 hours whilst off Greenock the Prime Minster, Winston Churchill, embarked on DUKE OF YORK. Among those who embarked with Churchill were, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, The First Sea Lord; Field Marshal Sir John Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff; and Averell Harriman. At 1500 hours DUKE OF YORK and destroyers FAULKNOR, FORESIGHT and MATABELE sailed from the Clyde for the USA. The intention had been to take the great circle route but the weather forecast for the North Atlantic was so bad that the decision was made to first head south through the Irish Sea towards the Azores. This decision meant accepting the risk of possible U-boat attack as they crossed the main U-boat route from the French Biscay ports to the North Atlantic.

14th – The weather was a full gale and speed had to be reduced to enable the destroyers to keep in contact. Speed had to be reduced to 6 knots for some time.

15th – The gale continued.

16th - The weather abated but there was a heavy swell which continued to cause problems for the destroyers.

17th – The weather again deteriorated and at 0900 hours FORESIGHT experienced steering difficulties and had to heave to. After a short time FORESIGHT caught up with the main group who had been forced to reduce speed due to the weather. At 0930 hours DUKE OF YORK increased speed to 19 knots, which the destroyers were unable to maintain, so speed was again reduced. At 1800 hours the destroyers were released to refuel at Ponta Delgada. At 1830 hours in approximate position 38-30N, 23W DUKE OF YORK was joined by the destroyers HIGHLANDER, HARVESTER and LIGHTNING from Ponta Delgada.

20th – At 1800 hours in approximate position 35N, 40W, the destroyers HIGHLANDER, HARVESTER and LIGHTNING detached to Ponta Delgada.

21st – In approximate position 38N, 66-30W, DUKE OF YORK RVed with the USN destroyers BRISTOL, TRIPPE and WARRINGTON who then escorted the battleship to Chesapeake Bay.

22nd – DUKE OF YORK arrived in Chesapeake Bay. She then proceeded to Norfolk Navy Yard where Churchill and party disembarked and travelled to Washington for their series of meetings which became known as the ARCADIA conference.

(The ARCADIA conference and its outcome was arguably the most important conference of the war for Great Britain; for as General Marshall, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated, "notwithstanding the entry of Japan into the war, our view is that Germany is still the prime enemy and her defeat is the key to victory". FDR courageously endorsed this view and took the decision of ‘Germany first’, for at the time the US population were clamouring for revenge after Pearl Harbour and felt less urgency in securing the defeat of Hitler. So Churchill achieved what was his main priority for the conference.

The two leaders also called for the formation of a "grand alliance of the Allies" and between them they drew up a solemn declaration to be signed by all nations at war with Germany, as they had done with the Atlantic Charter.

On 1/1/42, representatives of 26 Allied nations signed the "Declaration by the United Nations". Pledging to support the Atlantic Charter, the signatories agreed to commit their full resources to the defeat of the Axis powers, promised to make no separate peace, and agreed to preserve idealistic virtues such as freedom and justice. Later it would be said that this signing was the birth of the United Nations. At a time when the Germans controlled the European continent and the Japanese were sweeping across the Far East the Philippines and the Pacific, the Declaration provided millions with an uplifting message of hope.

The conference also established a Joint Anglo-American Chiefs of Staff to control the future conduct of the war, the most complete unification of military effort ever achieved by two allied nations)

23rd – DUKE OF YORK remained at Norfolk, Va to re-embark the Prime Minster after the conference, which was scheduled to last a week

(In fact, the Prime Minster did not leave the White House until 14/1/42)

3rd – DUKE OF YORK departed Chesapeake Bay, escorted by destroyers HARVESTER, HIGHLANDER and LIGHTNING, the destroyers had arrived on 31/1/41, For Bermuda.

5th - DUKE OF YORK, HARVESTER, HIGHLANDER and LIGHTNING arrived at Bermuda, from where DUKE OF YORK continued her working up exercises while awaiting the arrival of Prime Minister for return to the UK.

13th – HARVESTER, HIGHLANDER and LIGHTNING departed Bermuda for St Johns, Newfoundland.

15th – Churchill and his party arrived by air at Bermuda from Washington.

16th – Churchill decided to return to the UK by commercial flying boat. The members of his party who were unable to travel on the aircraft returned on DUKE OF YORK.

17th – DUKE OF YORK departed Bermuda, escorted by the US destroyers LANG, EDISON and NICHOLSON, for the Clyde.

21st – In approximate position 53N, 38-30W, HARVESTER, HIGHLANDER and LIGHTNING joined and LANG, EDISON and NICHOLSON detached.

23rd – In approximate position 56-30N, 24W, the destroyers BADSWORTH, LAMERTON, and WIVERN joined.

25th – In the North Channel the destroyers BADSWORTH, LAMERTON, HARVESTER and HIGHLANDER detached. Later in the day DUKE OF YORK, LIGHTNING and WIVERN arrived in the Clyde.

29th – DUKE OF YORK escorted by the destroyers HARVESTER, VERITY and the Polish ORP BLYSKAWICA sailed from the Clyde for Scapa Flow.

30th - DUKE OF YORK escorted by HARVESTER, VERITY and BLYSKAWICA arrived at Scapa Flow to continue her working up exercises.

At Scapa Flow carrying out working up exercises.

(On 16/1/42 the German battleship TIRPITZ had arrived in F¾ttenfjorden, an inlet at the eastern end of Trondheimsfjorden, from BrunsbŸttel. Her presence at this location posed a serious threat to the Royal Navy, for she could attempt to break out into the Atlantic or attack the Russian convoys. Admiral Tovey the CinC Home Fleet, whose resources were as usual over stretched, was most concerned about the threat TIRPITZ posed. Tovey was also worried that the German heavy units at Brest would attempt to join up with TIRPITZ. Tovey’s worst fears were almost realised on 12/2/42 when the battle cruisers SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU and heavy cruiser PRINZ EUGEN returned to Germany via the English Channel. Fortunately both SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU were mined and damaged en route.

The Admiralty had been aware since 12/2/42 from the GAF Enigma and Traffic Analysis that further heavy units were to join TIRPITZ at Trondheim.

The Kriegsmarine had decided to assemble a striking force comprising the TIRPITZ, SCHARNHORST and GNEISENAU [both now damaged] the panzerschiff ADMIRAL SCHEER and the PRINZ EUGEN. The final orders for the assembly of this force were made by the Kriegsmarine during the 20th and 21st February, these signals were picked up by the British Y service but Bletchley Park was at that time unable to read the naval Enigma.

At 1110/21/2/42 a RAF Hudson H/53 sighted a German heavy unit off Jutland, steering north; this was ADMIRAL SCHEER and escorting destroyers.

At 0700/23/2/42 the submarine TRIDENT in position 63-12N, 7E, sighted ADMIRAL SCHEER and PRINZ EUGEN steering for Trondheim, TRIDENT fired torpedoes and hit PRINZ EUGEN in the stern and disabling her, she later made Lofjorden)

25th - With the build up of German heavy units at Trondheim and the imminent sailing of convoy PQ 12 the CinC Home Fleet terminated DUKE OF YORK’s working up and ordered her to Hvalfjord, Iceland.

28th – At 1830 hours DUKE OF YORK, light cruiser KENYA, escorted by the destroyers FAULKNOR, ESKIMO, PUNJABI and ECLIPSE sailed from Scapa for Hvalfjord, Iceland, to join the Home Fleet and carry out her first operational sortie.

(The Home Fleet was to cover the passage of convoys PQ 12 and QP 8. There was a strong possibility that the next arctic convoys might be attacked by Kriegsmarine heavy surface units the TIRPITZ et al striking from Trondheim. To counter this possibility the Home Fleet mounted an operation with all its heavy units to provide a heavy covering force. Admiral Tovey the CinC Home Fleet believed that the most dangerous area would be between Jan Mayer and Bear Islands. Therefore on 26/2/42 Tovey asked that the next outward and homeward Arctic convoys be sailed simultaneously so that they would pass through the danger area at the same time. For the first eight days of the operation the weather conditions were extreme with storms up to force 10, snow showers, icing and poor visibility. Convoy PQ 12 and QP 8 sailed on 1/3/42 from Reykjavik and Murmansk respectively)

2nd – At 1330 hours DUKE OF YORK, light cruiser KENYA and destroyers FAULKNOR, ESKIMO, PUNJABI and ECLIPSE arrived at Hvalfjord from Scapa.

3rd – At 0600 hours the 2nd Battle Squadron of the Home Fleet comprising RENOWN (Flag Vice-Admiral A. T. B. Curteis, CinC 2nd Battle Squadron and second in-command, Home Fleet), DUKE OF YORK, KENYA and destroyers FAULKNOR, FURY, ECHO ESKIMO, PUNJABI and ECLIPSE sailed from Hvalfjord northwards around Iceland to provide distant cover for convoy PQ 12.

4th - At 0700 hours the 2nd Battle Squadron was off the NW of Iceland, where FAULKNOR and ESKIMO were detached to refuel in Seidisfjord. At 1600 hours BERWICK detached to return to Scapa with engine trouble and was escorted by BEDOUIN.

5th – (At 1300 hours A Fw 200 reconnaissance aircraft of Gruppe 1, KG40 from Trondheim-Vaernes airfield, sighted and reported PQ 12 in position 69-22N, 08-27W, 100 miles south of Jan Mayen Island. The sighting was made after the KENYA had joined PQ 12 and was reported as 15 merchantmen, one cruiser and two destroyers. The signal was picked up by the Y service and passed to BP who, because they had broken the GAF Enigma, decoded it almost immediately. The information was then passed to Tovey)

(NB: in this account of the encounter between the Home Fleet and the TIRPITZ, German times are one hour ahead of British times. Also the weather was generally poor with low visibility and snow showers)

At 1200 hours the 2nd Battle Squadron was in position 66-45N, 06-30W about 100 miles south of PQ 12 and steering northerly.

At 1200 hours the Home Fleet was about 100 miles bearing 154¼ from the 2nd Battle Squadron and steering northerly.

At 2000 hours the 2nd Battle Squadron altered course easterly to affect a RV with the Home Fleet.

6th – At 1030 hours in position 71-00N, 4-30E the 2nd battle squadron RVed with the Home Fleet, the two forces joined together, continuing to steer northerly.

The Home Fleet now comprised KING GEORGE V, RENOWN, DUKE OF YORK, VICTORIOUS and destroyers ASHANTI, ICARUS, INTREPID, LOOKOUT, ONSLOW, FURY, ECHO, PUNJABI and ECLIPSE

(At 1200 hours the TIRPITZ (Flag Vice Admiral Otto Ciliax) sailed from F¾ttenfjorden on Operation SPORTPLAST.

At 1315 hours TIRPITZ was joined by the destroyers HERMANN SCHOEMANN, PAUL JACOBI and Z25.

At 1430hours the TIRPITZ squadron was joined by the destroyer FRIEDRICH IHN and torpedo boats T5 and T12.

At 1600 hours the TIRPITZ squadron entered the Frohavet Channel and turned NNE into the Norwegian Sea on an intercept course for the convoy reported by the Fw 200 reconnaissance aircraft at 1300/5/3/42.

At 1801 hours the submarine SEAWOLF sighted TIRPITZ in approximate position 64-15N, 9-44E, but was forced to dive and therefore unable to report until she surfaced.

At 1945 hours SEAWOLF surfaced and signalled the Admiralty reporting "a large warship, either a battleship or a heavy cruiser".

At 1935 hours the TIRPITZ squadron was in position 64-44N, 10-17E)

At 1400 hours the Home Fleet altered course to the south.

7th – At 0010 hours Tovey received a signal from the Admiralty giving him SEAWOLF’s sighting report. Tovey now knew that TIRPITZ was out but was unsure if TIRPITZ was intending to attack the convoy or break out into the Atlantic. The Home Fleet altered course to the north.

(Early in the morning Tovey planned that VICTORIOUS would launch reconnaissance aircraft to search out to 120 miles in the sector 065¼ to 115¼. However due to the severe icing conditions no flying was possible.

At 1000 hours TIRPITZ released destroyers FRIEDRICH IHN, Z 25 and HERMANN SCHOEMANN to carry out a sweep to the north.

At 1200 hours TIRPITZ in position 70-45N, 10-21E, who at the time was approximately 90 miles form Tovey, had planed to launch two Ar 196 aircraft to fly a reconnaissance, but had to abandon the reconnaissance for the same reason as VICTORIOUS’s reconnaissance)

At 0800 hours the Home Fleet increased to full speed.

At 1122 hours the Home Fleet altered course to the south, this put Tovey on a reciprocal course to TIRPITZ.

(At 1200 hours convoys PQ 12 and QP 8 passed each other 200 miles SW of Bear Island.

At this time TIRPITZ was crossing the mean course of the convoy’s, astern of PQ 12 and ahead of QP 8.

At 1630 hours in approximate position 72-35N, 10-30E, the German destroyers found a straggler from QP 8, the Russian freighter MV IJORA 2815grt, she was approximately 100 miles astern of QP 8. HERMANN SCHOEMANN fired a torpedo, which missed then FRIEDRICH IHN attempted to sink her by gunfire but failed. HERMANN SCHOEMANN and FRIEDRICH IHN then teamed up to sink her with their main armament. The Russian merchantman's distress signal was intercepted by Tovey, but the sender's position was not clear to him)

At 1750 hours the Home Fleet altered course to the east. At the same time the destroyers ICARUS and INTREPID detached to Iceland to refuel.

(At 1830 hours in approximate position 72-33N, 8-23E, the three destroyers rejoined the TIRPITZ.

At 2113 hours TIRPITZ released the destroyer FRIEDRICH IHN to refuel at Harstad)

At 2000 hours the Home Fleet was about 150 miles SW of the TIRPITZ and altered course to the north. Tovey was now on an interception course with the TIRPITZ. At the same time the destroyers ONSLOW (D17), ASHANTI, ECHO, ECLIPSE, FURY and PUNJABI were detached to sweep north between the Home Fleet and the Lofoten Islands along what Tovey considered to be the enemy’s most likely return route, before returning to Iceland to refuel.

(The 2000 hour course change was based on signal traffic analysis from TIRPITZ that was analysed almost simultaneously by the AID and the results passed to Tovey)

(At 2400 hours TIRPITZ was in position 72- 10N, 12-22E and steering east)

At 2400 hours, in approximate position 71-30N, 7-30E, the Home Fleet altered course to the south so that Tovey could be in position off the Lofoten Islands to launch an air strike at dawn. Tovey had been approximately 120 miles from TIRPITZ and was now steering away from her.

8th – At 0400 hours Tovey, who’s Fleet now comprised KING GEORGE V, VICTORIOUS, DUKE OF YORK, RENOWN and the destroyer LOOKOUT, decided that he had missed TIRPITZ and since he was without destroyers in dangerous waters, he turned SW towards Iceland to collect some destroyers.

(At 0740 hours TIRPITZ released destroyers Z25 and HERMANN SCHOEMANN to refuel at Tromso, which was approximately 125 miles distant)

At 0800 hours the destroyers ONSLOW (D17), ASHANTI, ECHO, ECLIPSE, FURY and PUNJABI, who were to the north east of Tovey, having sighted nothing set course for Seidisfjord to refuel.

At 1800 hours the Home Fleet was steering south westerly when Tovey received a signal from the Admiralty suggesting that TIRPITZ might be south of Bear Island and still searching for the convoys.

At 1820 hours the Home Fleet in approximate position 68 -20N, 01W, acting on Admiralty intelligence, altered course to the north east. The Home Fleet was again steaming towards the TIRPITZ.

(At 1730 hours TIRPITZ was in approximate position 72-54N, 13-24E and steering 255¼)

At 1830 hours Tovey broke radio silence with a signal to the Admiralty requesting destroyers and refuelling facilities for his destroyers.

(On receipt of this signal the Admiralty ordered 4 cruisers [heavy cruisers KENT and LONDON and light cruisers LIVERPOOL and TRINIDAD] to positions between Jan Mayer and Bear Islands to refuel destroyers and assembled all available destroyers which were then sailed to the aid of the Home Fleet)

(At 2130 hours TIRPITZ turned on to a southerly course and was now moving away from the convoys.

At 2352 Ciliax took the decision to abort his mission to find and destroy the convoys and return to Trondheim)

9th – At 0240 hours the Home Fleet was in approximate position 70-20N, 02-30E and steering north easterly, when Tovey received a signal from the Admiralty that Tirpitz was steaming south and not searching the waters off Bear Island.

At 0245 hours the Home Fleet altered course to 120¼, steering for Vestfjord, and increased speed to 26 knots.

At 0640 hours VICTORIOUS flew off a reconnaissance force of 6 Albacores on a diverging search between 105 and 155 degrees to a depth of 150 miles.

(At 0800 hours TIRPITZ was in position 68-15N, 10-44E, steaming south when she was joined by the destroyer FRIEDRICH IHN who took up position off TIRPITZ’s starboard bow)

At 0730 hours the Home Fleet was in approximate position 68-10N, 6-40E, a strike force of 12 torpedo-carrying Albacores, 5 from 817 Sqd and 7 from 832 Sqd, was flown off VICTORIOUS. At the time of launch TIRPITZ was approximately 115 miles to their south east.

(At 0830 hours TIRPITZ was in approximate position 68N, 10-45E, steering southerly at 25 knots)

At 0802 hours Albacore F of 832 Sqd sighted the TIRPITZ and the destroyer FRIEDRICH IHN sailing south, and made a sighting report.

(At 0910 hours TIRPITZ sighted two Albacores dead aft.

At 0931 hours TIRPITZ increased speed to 27 knots and turned on to course 130¼.

At 0932 hours TIRPITZ launched her Arado 196 aircraft for anti-submarine detection and makeshift fighter protection.

At 0934 hours TIRPITZ and FRIEDRICH IHN increased speed to 29 knots and turned on to course 82¼ heading for Vestfjord and Narvik)

At 0917 hours TIRPITZ was attacked by the strike force of 12 torpedo-carrying Albacores. The attack failed although one torpedo only missed TIRPITZ’s stern by 30 feet, 2 Albacores were shot down.

(TIRPITZ reported the torpedo attack by 24 Swordfish type aircraft taking place between1015 and 1024 hours. Three downings were claimed two on starboard and one on port side. Several aircraft claimed leaving the scene with smoke trails)

At 0940 hours the Home Fleet turned west then SW

At 1545 hours the Home Fleet was attacked by 3 Ju 88 bombers, one bomb landed close astern of VICTORIOUS but no damaged was caused.

At 1840 hours FAULKNOR, BEDOUIN, ESKIMO and TARTAR joined the Home Fleet.

(At 1957 hours TIRPITZ anchored in Bogen Bay, off Ofotfjord)

At various times during the Home Fleets return to Scapa the Fleet was joined by the destroyers that the Admiralty had assembled at Tovey’s request. These were the destroyers JAVELIN, INCONSTANT, VERDUN, LANCASTER, LEDBURY, GROVE, WOOLSTON and WELLS joined the fleet.

10th – At 2300 hours DUKE OF YORK, KING GEORGE V, VICTORIOUS, RENOWN, LOOKOUT, FAULKNOR, BEDOUIN, ESKIMO, TARTAR, JAVELIN, INCONSTANT, VERDUN, LANCASTER, LEDBURY, GROVE, WOOLSTON and WELLS arrived at Scapa.

(So ended what for both sides had been a frustrating operation. The appalling weather affected both sides operations. The Kriegsmarine were poorly served by the Luftwaffe who only sighted PQ 12 once and completely missed QP 8, and B-Dienst were completely unaware of the Home Fleets presence until Tovey broke radio silence. Even so TIRPITZ failed by a very narrow margin in finding the convoys. In contrast Tovey was well served by good intelligence from the Admiralty which was based on appreciations by OIC and decoded intercepts from BP. This intelligence led to air strike against TIRPITZ which almost succeeded and was the only time that the FAA were to attack TIRPITZ in the open sea)

(The next operation for the Home Fleet was to cover the passage of convoys PQ 13 and QP 9. The TIRPITZ was in Trondheim Fjord with the heavy cruiser ADMIRAL SCHEER and ADMIRAL HIPPER [arrived 21/3/42]. The Admiralty considered that another sortie by the Kriegsmarine heavy surface units was a possibility. So Tovey again had to provide heavy distant cover for the two convoys. What was not known by the Admiralty was that the Kriegsmarine heavy unit were limited by lack of destroyers and low fuel stocks. This operation again took place in exceptionally bad weather.)

22nd – At 1400 hours the Home Fleet comprising KING GEORGE V (Flag Vice Admiral Curteis 2iC Home Fleet), DUKE of YORK, RENOWN, VICTORIOUS cruisers KENT and EDINBURGH and destroyers ASHANTI, BEDOUIN, ECHO, ESCAPADE, ESKIMO, FORESIGHT, ICARUS, INGLEFIELD, LEDBURY, MARNE, MIDDLETON, ONSLOW, PUNJABI, TARTAR and WHEATLAND sailed from Scapa to provide distant cover for convoys PQ 13 and QP 9. Course was set for the north east of Iceland.

(At 0720/20/3/42 convoy PQ 13comprising 21merchants sailed from Reykjavik heading north through the Denmark Strait. When the Home Fleet sailed PQ 13 was north of Iceland in approximate position 67-35N, 16-40W. Convoy QP 9 sailed from Kola Inlet on 21/3/42)

23rd – Late in the evening the Fleet arrived off Seydisfjordour where the destroyers were detached turn to refuel.

24th – In the afternoon, all the destroyers having refuelled, the Fleet set course for 68N, 10W.

25th – Early in the morning the Fleet arrived in position 68N, 10W. Where, for two days, in temperatures of -35¼, they cruised for two days.

(Against convoys PQ 13 and QP 9 the Kriegsmarine deployed ten U-Boats and three destroyers. Using intelligence gained from Enigma the Admiralty was able to provide details of the U-Boat dispositions and to warn of the GAF and destroyer attacks. Most importantly the Enigma provided the Admiralty with evidence that none of the larger enemy units had moved north with the destroyers. The Admiralty was therefore able to assure Curteis that TIRPITZ was not going to sortie against the convoys)

27th – Aware from TRINIDAD’s signal, received late on 25/3/42, informing the CinC Home Fleet that convoy PQ 13 had been scattered by a full gale and with the Home Fleet itself experiencing gale force conditions that had caused damage to VICTORIOUS and TARTAR. Curteis decided that he would be unable to provide assistance to the convoy in its scattered state so therefore turned for Scapa. At 0600 hours the Home Fleet left its patrol area to return to Scapa.

28th – At 1400 hours the Home Fleet arrived back at Scapa. Shortly after arrival the flag of Vice Admiral Curteis 2iC Home Fleet was transferred from DUKE OF YORK.

At Scapa where she had 8 single 20mm Oerlikons added, 5 on forecastle, 3 on quarterdeck.

(The next operation for the Home Fleet was to cover the passage of convoys PQ 14 and QP 10. Their cover was required as the Kriegsmarine heavy units were still in Trondheim Fjord)

12th – At 0600 hours the Home Fleet, comprising KING GEORGE V (Flag CinC Home Fleet), DUKE OF YORK (Flag Vice Admiral, 2iC Home Fleet), VICTORIOUS, heavy cruiser KENT, light cruiser NIGERIA and destroyers FAULKNOR (D 8), ONSLOW (D 17), OFFA, ESCAPADE, MIDDLETON, LEDBURY, WHEATLAND and BELVOIR departed Scapa to cover convoys P Q 14 and Q P 10. Course was set north westerly for the Faroe Islands.

(At 1430/8/4/42 convoy PQ 14 comprising 26 merchant ships sailed from Reykjavik heading north through the Denmark Strait. When the Home Fleet sailed PQ 14 was south west of Jan Mayen Island and having encountered fog, snow and ice only 8 ships were in company with the commodore. Convoy QP 10 of 16 merchant ships sailed from Kola Inlet on 10/4/42)

At 1930 hours when the Home Fleet was south of the Faroe Islands the destroyers FAULKNOR, ONSLOW, ESCAPADE and OFFA were detached to refuel in Skaalefjord.

13th – At 0430 hours the destroyers SOMALI (D 6), BEDOUIN, ESKIMO, and MATCHLESS joined the Battlefleet after refuelling in Skaalefjord.

At 0500 hours, north of the Faroe Islands FAULKNOR, ONSLOW, ESCAPADE and OFFA rejoined the Battlefleet.

At 0500 hours the destroyers MIDDLETON, LEDBURY and BELVOIR detached to return to Scapa.

The Home Fleet then set course for north east Iceland.

At 1900 hours the Home Fleet arrived off Seydisfjordour where the destroyer WHEATLAND detached to escort the oiler RFA ALDERSDALE from Seydisfjordour.

The Home Fleet then set course for a patrol position 135 miles south west of Jan Mayen Island.

14th – At 1000 hours the Home Fleet arrived in position 62-50N, 6-15W where they patrolled for the next two days to be available should the Kriegsmarine heavy units sortie from Trondheim.

(Twice during the period that the Home Fleet were in the patrol area the Admiralty, from the lack of Enigma traffic, was able to assure Tovey that no German heavy units were at sea)

16th – In the AM the Home Fleet was about to leave the patrol area when Tovey received a report from the LIVERPOOL (with QP 10) that the convoy was being shadowed by four aircraft and one U-Boat, and that heavy air attack was expected. Tovey decided to remain in the area, to provide support should it be required.

At 0800 hours the KENT detached from the Home Fleet to proceed north to reinforce the escort of convoy QP 10.

At 1500 hours the Home Fleet set course for Scapa via north east Iceland.

17th – At 0400 hours off Seydisfjordour FAULKNOR, SOMALI, BEDOUIN and MATCHLESS were detached to refuel. The Home Fleet then set course for the north Faroes.

At 1500 hours in position 62-50N, 6-15W the Fleet was joined by the destroyers MIDDLETON, LEDBURY, LAMERTON, and HURSLEY from Skaalefjord. Following which the ESKIMO, OFFA and ESCAPADE detached to refuel at Skaalefjord.

At 1630 hours the Fleet was joined by FAULKNOR, SOMALI, BEDOUIN and MATCHLESS from Seydisfjordour.

18th – At 0500 hours the Home Fleet comprising KING GEORGE V, DUKE OF YORK, VICTORIOUS, NIGERIA, escorted by the SOMALI, FAULKNOR, ONSLOW (D 17), MIDDLETON, LEDBURY, LAMERTON, HURSLEY, BEDOUIN, and MATCHLESS arrived back at Scapa.

22nd – DUKE OF YORK escorted by the destroyers FAULKNOR (D 8), ESKIMO and ESCAPADE left Scapa for Hvalfjord, Iceland.

24th – At 1000 hours DUKE OF YORK and the destroyers FAULKNOR (D 8), ESKIMO and ESCAPADE arrived at Hvalfjord.

1st – At 1800 hours DUKE OF YORK (Flag Vice Admiral Curteis, 2iC Home Fleet), escorted by the destroyers FAULKNOR (D8) and ESCAPADE sailed from Hvalfjord to RV with the Home Fleet. Curteis had been ordered to sail by Tovey to relieve the CinC Home Fleet and the KING GEORGE V, following KGV’s collision damage.

(The Home Fleet had sailed from Scapa on 28/4/42 and had proceeded to a position of north east Iceland to provide cover for convoys PQ 15 and QP 11. The Admiralty, from Enigma evidence, had alerted the CinC Home Fleet the on 30/4/42 that the GAF had bought some units in north Norway to one hour’s notice for ant-shipping strikes. However this turned out to a German fear of an invasion of the Lofoten Islands)

2nd – At 2359 hours in position 67-32N, 10-25W, DUKE OF YORK (Flag Vice Admiral Curteis, 2iC Home Fleet), and the destroyers FAULKNOR and ESCAPADE RVed with the Home Fleet; and Vice Admiral Curteis took command of the Home Fleet.

3rd – At 0030 hours the KING GEORGE V escorted by the destroyers MARTIN, MARNE and ORIBI detached from the Home Fleet for Seydisfjordour. The Home Fleet remained on patrol between Iceland and Jan Mayen Island.

4th – At 0400 hours the destroyers MARTIN, MARNE and ORIBI rejoined the Home Fleet on patrol between Iceland and Jan Mayen Island. At 1000 hours the Home Fleet set course to return to Scapa, leaving US Task Force 99, comprising battleship WASHINGTON (Flag Rear Admiral Giffen CinC Task Force 99), heavy cruiser TUSCALOOSA and destroyers WAINWRIGHT, MADISON, WILSON and PLUNKETT in the patrol area.

5th – At 2100 hours the Home Fleet comprising DUKE OF YORK, VICTORIOUS, KENYA and destroyers INGLEFIELD, ESKIMO, FAULKNOR, ESCAPADE, MARTIN, MARNE and ORIBI arrived at Scapa Flow.

6th – Tovey transferred his flag, from KING GEORGE V to DUKE OF YORK.

(The USN Task Force 99 left the patrol area for Hvalfjord, where they refuelled from the oiler USN KAWEAH and re-provisioned from the supply ship the USN MIZAR)

15th – At 0345 hours he Home Fleet comprising DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC Home Fleet), aircraft carrier VICTORIOUS, heavy cruiser LONDON and destroyers FAULKNOR (D 8), FURY, MARNE, ECLIPSE, ORIBI, WHEATLAND, BLANKNEY, MIDDLETON and LAMERTON left Scapa for the south east of Iceland to RV with Task Force 99..

(The USN Task Force 99 comprising WASHINGTON (Flag CinC TF 99), TUSCALOOSA and destroyers MAYRANT, RHIND and ROWAN left Hvalfjord at the same time to RV with the Home Fleet)

16th – At 0400 hours, in approximate position 62N, 15W, the Home Fleet RVed with TF 99. The combined Force then carried out exercises before setting course for Hvalfjord.

17th - At 1200 hours the Force arrived at Hvalfjord.

23rd – At 0300 hours DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC Home Fleet), WASHINGTON (Flag CinC TF 99), VICTORIOUS, WICHITA, LONDON escorted by destroyers FAULKNOR (D 8), INTREPID, ICARUS, ECLIPSE, FURY, BLANKNEY, LAMERTON, MIDDLETON and WHEATLAND left Hvalfjord for a position between Iceland and Jan Mayen Island to provide distant cover convoys P Q 16 and Q P 12.

(21/5/42 convoy PQ 16 comprising 36 merchantmen sailed from Hvalfjord. On the same day convoy QP 12 comprising 15 merchantmen sailed from Kola Inlet)

24th – At 0100 hours in approximate position 67-20N, 17W, the Force was joined by the US destroyers WAINWRIGHT, MAYRANT, RHIND and ROWAN from Seydisfjordour. Following which the destroyers FAULKNOR, INTREPID, FURY, ICARUS and ECLIPSE were detached to Seydisfjordour to refuel. At 1900 hours FAULKNOR, INTREPID, FURY, ICARUS and ECLIPSE rejoined from Seydisfjordour, following which the destroyers MIDDLETON, LAMERTON, WHEATLAND, and BLANKNEY were detached to Seydisfjordour to refuel.

25th to 27th – On patrol, in approximate position 68N, 8W, covering the passage of convoy’s PQ 16 and QP 12.

(On 27/5/42 the Admiralty was able to inform Tovey from Enigma that the TIRPITZ was going to carry out exercises in Trondheim Fjord during the following two days)

28th – At 0300 hours the VICTORIOUS escorted by the destroyers FAULKNOR, FURY and ECLIPSE were detached from the Home Fleet for Hvalfjord. At the same time the remainder of the Force set course for Scapa. At 1500 hours, in position 66-50N, 11-25W the destroyers BLANKNEY, MIDDLETON, WHEATLAND and LAMERTON joined the Force from Seydisfjordour.

29th – At 0900 hours, off the Faroe Islands the destroyers INTREPID and ICARUS detached from the Force to refuel at Skaalefjord. At 2300 hours DUKE OF YORK, WASHINGTON, WICHITA, LONDON escorted by destroyers BLANKNEY, LAMERTON, MIDDLETON, WHEATLAND and US destroyers WAINWRIGHT, MAYRANT, RHIND and ROWAN arrived at Scapa.

6th – His Majesty The King arrived at Scapa flow aboard the destroyer SOMALI and was conveyed to DUKE OF YORK where he was met by the CinC Home Fleet and carried out an inspection of the flag ship. The King stayed onboard DUKE OF YORK from 6th to 8th June

7th - His Majesty The King carried out an inspection of the US battleship WASHINGTON.

(12/6/42 the WASHINGTON (Flag CinC Task Force 99), WICHITA, WAINWRIGHT, RHIND, ROWAN and MAYRANT sailed from Scapa for Hvalfjord, where they arrived on 14/6/42)

(25/6/42 the WASHINGTON (Flag CinC Task Force 99), escorted by the destroyers USS MAYRANT and RHIND and HMS MARTIN sailed from Hvalfjord and arrived at Scapa on 29/6/42)

29th – At 1700 hours DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC Home Fleet), WASHINGTON (Flag CinC TF 99), [WASHINGTON had embarked 50 British civilian shipyard engineering staff to study the battleship's engineering plant] VICTORIOUS (Flag Vice Admiral Bruce Fraser 2iC Home Fleet), heavy cruiser CUMBERLAND, light cruiser NIGERIA (Flag CS 10) and destroyers FAULKNOR (D 8), ONSLAUGHT, MIDDLETON, ESCAPADE, BLANKNEY, MARTIN, MARNE and WHEATLAND sailed from Scapa and steered for a patrol position between Iceland and Jan Mayer Island, to cover the passage of PQ 17 and QP 13.

(On 18/6/42, the British naval attache in Stockholm warned the Admiralty that the Germans were planning a major attack on the next Arctic convoy. This information came from a land line interception. The Kriegsmarine plan, which was in Admiralty hands, was for TIRPITZ to wait in Vestfjord and SCHEER and HIPPER in Altenfjord until the convoy passed 5¼E. The two forces would then sail for a position 100 miles north of North Cape. The convoy was then to be attacked between 20¼E and 30¼E. Following his assimilation of this intelligence, Tovey expressed his fears to the First Sea Lord, Admiral Pound, declaring that in his opinion it would be far safer if the valuable convoy were split into two parts thus making it easier to defend. Tovey was overruled and the First Sea Lord further informed, Admiral Tovey, that he might order the convoy to scatter if he thought it faced annihilation from TIRPITZ, which Tovey considered would be 'sheer, bloody murder')

(At 1600/27/6/42 convoy PQ 17 comprising 36 merchantmen sailed from Hvalfjord. One of the ships, the SS RICHARS BLAND, struck submerged ice off North West Iceland and had to return. On 29/6/42 the ships ran into heavy ice and 4 ships were damaged and one, the SS EXFORD returned to port. Convoy QP 13 comprising 35 merchantmen sailed in two parts, 12 merchantmen from Archangel on 26/6/42 and 23 merchantmen from Murmansk on 27/6/42. Joining together on 27/6/42)

30th – Through the day the Battlefleet continued on a northerly course.

(NB: in this account of the movements of Kriegsmarine and British forces, German times are one hour ahead of British times)

(At1650/30/6/42, the Kriegsmarine became aware from air and then U-boat reports that convoy QP13 was 180 miles north of North Cape. From this information they were able to assume that a PQ convoy was at sea)

1st – At 0640 hours in approximate position 67N, 8W, the destroyers ONSLOW (D 17), ASHANTI and USS MAYRANT and RHIND joined the Battlefleet from Seydisfjordour. Following which the destroyers FAULKNOR, ONSLAUGHT, MARTIN, MARNE and ESCAPADE detached from the Battlefleet to refuel in Seydisfjordour.

(During the morning of 1/7/42, U 456 sighted and reported the position of PQ 17. At 1300 hours a Luftwaffe Blohm & Voss BV 138 arrived over the convoy. The convoy was then continuously shadowed and reported. From these reports the Kriegsmarine calculated that PQ17 would pass longitude 5¼E during the forenoon of 2/7/42. At 1257/2/7/42 the executive order for the opening phase of Operation RÖSSELSPRUNG (KNIGHTS MOVE), the Kriegsmarine surface attack on PQ 17, was issued)

At 1432 hours the Luftwaffe signal reporting the sighting of PQ 17 was intercepted in the UK.

At 1900 hours the Admiralty signalled all ships with the news of the sighting.

At 2250 hours FAULKNOR, ONSLAUGHT, MARTIN, MARNE and ESCAPADE rejoined the Fleet.

At 2330 hours a Luftwaffe FW 200 sights and reports the Home Fleet, Hurricanes from VICTORIOUS fail to shoot it down.

(0300/1/7/42 the heavy cruisers LONDON [Flag Rear Admiral L.H.K. Hamilton CS 1], NORFOLK, USS WICHITA and TUSCALOOSA and destroyers SOMALI [Captain D6] and USS ROWAN and WAINWRIGHT sailed from Seydisfiord as the cruiser covering force for P Q 17 and Q P 13)

2nd – The Battlefleet continued to steer on a northerly course. Destroyer MIDDLETON detached from the Battlefleet to refuel at Seydisfjordour. Later in the day destroyers WHEATLAND and BLANKNEY detached from the Fleet to refuel at Seydisfjordour. At 1951 hours DUKE OF YORK picked up an aircraft on her radar.

(At 2000/2/7/42 TIRPITZ [Flag Admiral Otto Schniewind] sailed from F¾ttenfjorden on Operation RÖSSELSPRUNG. En route through Trondheimsfjorden TIRPITZ was joined by the heavy cruiser HIPPER and the destroyers FRIEDRICH IHN, HANS LODY, KARL GALSTER and THEODOR RIEDEL and torpedo boats T7 and T15. The Force set course for Vestfjord.

At 2130/2/7/42 the heavy cruisers LUTZOW [Flag Vice Admiral Oskar Kummetz] and SCHEER and the destroyers RICHARD BEITZEN, Z24, Z28, Z29 and Z30 and the oiler DITHMARSCHEN sailed from Bogen Bay, off Ofotfjord and set course for Gimsoystraumen off Vestfjord)

3rd – The Battlefleet continued on a northerly course.

(At 0130 hours off the entrance to Gimsoystraumen the LUTZOW Force detached the oiler DITHMARSCHEN the rest of the force then proceeded slowly in fog to make the passage through Gimsoystraumen. At 0242 hours, off Tjeldsund the LUTZOW ran aground, damaging her stern, Kummetz moved his flag to the SCHEER; the Force continued leaving LUTZOW behind and setting course for Alta fjord)

At 0112 hours the CUMBERLAND picked up an aircraft on her radar.

At 0210 hours a FW 200 was sighted and VICTORIOUS launched a Hurricane that crashed on takeoff.

At 1200 hours the Battlefleet was in approximate position 71-30N, 1-40E.

Convoy PQ 17 was at that time approximately 450 miles to the north east and the TIRPITZ was 470 miles to the south east.

(At 1400/3/7/42 TIRPITZ with HIPPER and the destroyers FRIEDRICH IHN, HANS LODY, KARL GALSTER and THEODOR RIEDEL arrived off the entrance to Gimsoystraumen where the destroyers refuelled from the DITHMARSCHEN and torpedo boats T7 and T15. After refuelling the Force set course to sail through Gimsoystraumen. When transiting the narrow Gimsoystraumen channel the destroyers HANS LODY, KARL GALSTER and THEODOR RIEDEL ran aground and all sustained damage that caused them to abort the operation. TIRPITZ, HIPPER the destroyer FRIEDRICH IHN and torpedo boats T7 and T15 continued north for Alta fjord. En route a message was received from Hitler ordering Schniewind to make for Alta fjord and remain there until further orders.

At 2200 hours the SCHEER Force arrived in Kaa Fjord)

(From 1200/1/7/42 to 1200/3/7/42 BP were reading Enigma so the Admiralty had established that the two German Forces had left their bases and had moved northwards up the Norwegian coast and had entered Alta Fjord.

The Admiralty kept Tovey informed of these movements)

4th – At 0015 hours a Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft sighted the Allied cruiser covering force, which was north west of the convoy, and reported it as including a battleship. The signal was intercepted and decrypted by BP. At the time the Admiralty believed that Kriegsmarine thought this was the main covering force. At 0400 hours DUKE OF YORK signalled "happy birthday" to the WASHINGTON. ASHANTI detached from the Battlefleet to refuel from Force Q, (Force Q was the oiler RFA ALDERSDALE escorted by the destroyer DOUGLAS) rejoining in the p.m.

(At 1010/4/7/42 the TIRPITZ Force arrived in Kaa Fjord)

At 1200 hours the Battlefleet was in approximate position 76-21N, 9-40E, steering easterly, where the light cruiser MANCHESTER and the destroyer ECLIPSE joined from Barentsburg, Spitzbergen, on completion of Operation GEARBOX. This position was approximately 516 miles North West of Kaa Fjord. At approximately 1300 hours the Battlefleet turned south.

(At 1918 hours the Admiralty was in possession of Enigma decrypts up to 1200/4/7/42 and became aware that TIRPITZ had arrived in Alta Fjord at 0900/4/7/42, joining SCHEER.

Since 1200 hours U-boats had reported at 1327 hours and 1458 hours that they had sighted "heavy enemy forces", this sighting was of the cruiser covering Force.

At 1455 hours the Luftwaffe reported the cruiser covering Force as "four heavy cruisers with destroyers".

The Luftwaffe also reported that an aircraft carried was near the convoy. This appreciation was based on sightings of aircraft from the cruiser force, including the American Curtiss Seagull biplane float plane, an aircraft with which they were not familiar.

At 2030 hours the First Sea lord Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound called a staff meeting to discuss the TIRPITZ which was attended by, amongst others, Commander Denning the head of the OIC. When Denning left the OIC for the meeting he was of the opinion that TIRPITZ had not sailed before 1200 hours. During the meeting the First Sea lord asked for Denning’s appreciation of why he believed TIRPITZ had not sailed. Denning’s answer was no orders clearing U Boats from the area, for fear of them attacking TIRPITZ in error, HF/DF clearly showed U Boats tailing the convoy still. There had been no signal traffic usually associated with Kriegsmarine surface movements and finally there had been no sightings from the Allied submarines deployed off the North Cape. Pound would only accept the fact that TIRPITZ had arrived in Alta Fjord had was of the opinion that TIRPITZ had now sailed to attack the convoy and could reach the convoy by 0200/5/7/42.

During the meeting on Pound’s orders and without any consultation with Tovey, the man on the spot, the following signals were sent;

2111 hours, to CS1, "Most Immediate. Cruiser Force withdraw to westward at high speed"

2123 hours, to CS1, "Immediate. Owing to threat from surface ships convoy is to disperse and proceed to Russian ports"

At 2108 hours and 2110 hours the Admiralty had signalled Tovey with the latest intelligence and the OIC assessment that TIRPITZ had not sailed from Alta Fjord.

At 2130 hours Denning returned to the OIC from the meeting and found that the UIC was still of the opinion that TIRPITZ had not sailed. But on Pound’s orders the following signal were sent;

2136 hours, to CS1, "Most Immediate. My 2123 Convoy is to scatter"

At 2230 hours in approximate position 75-40N, 28-30E the convoy scattered. The destroyer escort and the cruiser covering Force headed west away from the convoy)

At 2230 hours the Battlefleet was in approximate position 75N, 3E which was about 450 miles west of the convoy and steering north eastward.

5th – At 0500 hours a Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft sighted and reported the Battlefleet in approximate position 76-08N, 5-46E. At this time the Battlefleet turned south westerly moving away from the scattered convoy. The destroyers INGLEFIELD, INTREPID, ICARUS, FORESIGHT, BLANKNEY, MIDDLETON and WHEATLAND left Seydisfiord to join the Battlefleet.

(At 1200 hours Hitler gave his approval for the TIRPITZ Force to sail against the convoy.

At 1237 hours TIRPITZ, SCHEER, HIPPER and the destroyers FRIEDRICH IHN, RICHARD BEITZEN, Z24, Z27, Z28, Z29 and Z30 and the torpedo boats T7 and T15 sailed from Alta Fjord)

(At 1700/5/7/42, the cruisers and destroyers of Hamilton's Force were sighted by the Luftwaffe so Hamilton felt it safe to break radio silence. He reported course and position of his force to Tovey; this was the first that Tovey knew that Hamilton was not with the convoy)

At 1517 hours the Battlefleet was in approximate position 73-35N, 2E, steering south westerly, when the Admiralty signalled Tovey with the latest intelligence on TIRPITZ. This was timed at 1145 hours, stating TIRPITZ would be at Rolvsoeysund, one of the exit routes from Alta Fjord, at 1530 hours. Thus Tovey now knew that TIRPITZ had sailed.

(At 1800/5/7/42 the TIRPITZ Force was in approximate position 71-20N, 23-40E and steering northerly when they were sighted and reported by the Soviet submarine K 21. [The Soviet submarine K 21 claimed to have torpedoed and badly damaged the TIRPITZ, but Kriegsmarine records do not have any record of this event] At about this time the TIRPITZ Force turned easterly.

At 1816/5/7/42 the TIRPITZ Force was steering easterly when sighted and reported by an Allied aircraft.

At 2129/5/7/42 the TIRPITZ Force were sighted and reported by the submarine UNSHAKEN.

At 2219 hours the TIRPITZ Force was recalled, when it was realised how many ships the Luftwaffe and U-boats were sinking)

When the TIRPITZ Force turned to return to their base, the Battlefleet was approximately 160 miles north east of Jan Mayer Island and continuing to sail south westerly.

6th – At 0645 hours the Battlefleet was in approximate position 70N, 7W, when it reversed course and steered north easterly.

At 1035 hours in approximate position 71N, 4W, the Battlefleet, which was still steering north easterly, was joined by the heavy cruisers LONDON (Flag Rear Admiral L.H.K. Hamilton CS 1), NORFOLK and USS TUSCALOOSA and WICHITA and destroyers SOMALI, FURY, LEAMINGTON, KEPPEL, OFFA, LEDBURY, WILTON and USS WAINWRIGHT and ROWAN.

MANCHESTER detached from the Battlefleet to Scapa, LEAMINGTON detached from the Battlefleet to Londonderry

The destroyers INGLEFIELD, INTREPID, ICARUS, FORESIGHT, BLANKNEY, MIDDLETON and WHEATLAND joined the Battlefleet from Seydisfiord.

The destroyers ONSLOW, MAYRANT, RHIIND, MARTIN, MARNE, ONSLAUGHT, ESCAPADE and ECLIPSE detached from the Battlefleet to fuel at Seydisfiord.

At 1430 hours in approximate position 72N, 2W, the Battlefleet turned easterly. About one hour later the Battlefleet turned south for Scapa Flow.

At approximately 1900 hours the heavy cruisers NORFOLK, WICHITA, and TUSCALOOSA detached from the Battlefleet for Hvalfjord.

At approximately 2030 hours the destroyers MARTIN, MARNE and ESCAPADE detached from the Battlefleet to refuel at Seydisfiord.

The heavy cruiser LONDON detached from the Battlefleet for Scapa.

7th – The Battlefleet continued on course for Scapa.

At approximately 1600 hours the destroyers INGLEFIELD, INTREPID, ICARUS, FORESIGHT, BLANKNEY, MIDDLETON and WHEATLAND joined the Battlefleet from Seydisfiord.

At approximately 1615 hours the destroyers FAULKNOR and KEPPEL detached from the Battlefleet to fuel at Skaalefjord.

At approximately 1900 hours the battleship WASHINGTON and destroyers WAINWRIGHT, SOMALI, ASHANTI and ROWAN detached from the Battlefleet for Hvalfjord.

8th – The Home Fleet continued on course for Scapa.

At 1730 hours the CinC Home Fleet in DUKE OF YORK with the following ships in company, VICTORIOUS, NIGERIA, CUMBERLAND and destroyers FURY, OFFA, LEDBURY, WILTON, FORESIGHT, ICARUS, BLANKNEY, WHEATLAND, MIDDLETON, INGLEFIELD and INTREPID arrived at Scapa.

24th – At Scapa the flag of the CinC Home Fleet was struck and transferred to the battleship KING GEORGE V.

26th – The battleship DUKE OF YORK escorted by the destroyers HAMBLETON and USS RODMAN, EMMONS and MACOMB sailed from Scapa for Hvalfjord.

28th – DUKE OF YORK and the destroyers HAMBLETON and USS RODMAN, EMMONS and MACOMB arrived at Hvalfjord.

DUKE OF YORK at Hvalfjord for the whole month.

1st to 9th – DUKE OF YORK was at Hvalfjord.

(The next operation that involved DUKE OF YORK was Operation EV; this was the passage of Convoys PQ 18 and QP 14.

Following the debacle of PQ 17 the Russian convoys were suspended due to the Home Fleet having to supply units for Operation PEDESTAL. With the return of Home Fleet units from the Mediterranean, the CinC Home Fleet, Admiral Tovey, was under pressure from Churchill to resume the convoys.

The RAF provided dedicated assets for the next and subsequent convoys that were to be based in northern Russia. These were three PR Spitfires, nine Catalina’s of 210 Squadron and thirty two Hampden torpedo bombers of 144 and 455 Squadrons.

The Hampden’s took off on 4/9/42 from Sumburgh for Afrikanda airbase in North Russia. The route taken was across Norway, Sweden and Finland. Eight of the Hampden’s were lost en route. One which came down in Norway was carrying details of convoy PQ 18 and this information fell into German hands.

Tovey was of the opinion that future convoy’s must have an escort that was large enough to deter a surface threat. Tovey also reasoned that if the Home Fleet was to be a creditable deterrent to the heavy units of the Kriegsmarine it would have to stay much closer to the convoy. This would expose the Home Fleet to concentrated attacks from the Luftwaffe and U-boats and was an unacceptable risk. Tovey and his staff came up with the concept of the fighting destroyer escort, of upwards of 16 destroyers. These would remain with the convoy for the whole of its passage.

Tovey, who was disliked by Churchill and after the PQ 17 fiasco, he had lost faith in the First Sea Lord, Pound. So for PQ 18 Tovey decided that he would control the operation from Scapa Flow where he had a direct phone line to the Admiralty. In this manner he could control the politics and the tactical situation)

(Operation EV commenced on 2/9/42 when 39 merchant ships comprising the main section of convoy PQ 18 sailed from Loch Ewe)

(On 8/9/42 a Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft sighted and reported the convoy north east of Iceland. Enigma deciphered the sighting report and the CinC Home Fleet signalled Fraser with the news)

9th – The battleships ANSON (Flag 2ic Home Fleet Vice Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser), DUKE OF YORK, light cruiser JAMAICA and the destroyers CAMPBELL, MACKAY, BULLDOG, VENOMOUS and KEPPEL left Hvalfjord for Akureyri.

10th - ANSON, DUKE OF YORK, JAMAICA and destroyers CAMPBELL, MACKAY, BULLDOG, VENOMOUS and KEPPEL arrived at Akureyri.

11th - ANSON, DUKE OF YORK, JAMAICA and destroyers KEPPLE, CAMPBELL, MACKAY, MONTROSE and BRAMHAM sailed from Akureyri and headed for Jan Mayen Island to provide distant cover for convoy PQ 18. The escort for the Battlefleet was a scratch collection of destroyers normally employed on convoy escort. This was because the fleet destroyers were deployed as the ‘fighting destroyer escort’ for PQ 18.

(11/9/42 a Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft sighted and reported the Battlefleet north of Iceland. Enigma deciphered the sighting report and the CinC Home Fleet signalled Fraser with the news)

12th – The Battlefleet operated off Jan Mayer Island. The Luftwaffe continued to shadow the Battlefleet during the day. However the visibility deteriorated and the Battlefleet was able to loose the shadower. In Fraser’s judgement the Battlefleet could add nothing to any surface battle that might develop 1000 miles away. So leaving the enemy with the impression that the Battlefleet was still off Jan Mayer Island, they turned south for Iceland.

13th – The Battlefleet sailing south for Iceland.

14th - ANSON, DUKE OF YORK, JAMAICA and destroyers KEPPLE, CAMPBELL, MACKAY, MONTROSE and BRAMHAM arrived back at Akureyri.

19th - ANSON, DUKE OF YORK, JAMAICA and destroyers KEPPEL, MACKAY, CAMPBELL, MONTROSE and BROKE sailed from Akureyri to cover convoy Q P 14.

22nd - ANSON, DUKE OF YORK, JAMAICA and destroyers KEPPEL, MACKAY, CAMPBELL, MONTROSE and BROKE arrived at Hvalfjord.

24th – DUKE OF YORK, light cruiser JAMAICA escorted by the destroyers CAMPBELL, MONTROSE, MACKAY and BROKE sailed from Hvalfjord for Scapa.

26th – At 1100 hours DUKE OF YORK, JAMAICA and destroyers MACKAY, CAMPBELL, MONTROSE and BROKE arrived at Scapa.

29th – At Scapa Flow, where her new CO, Captain George Elvey Creasy, DSO, RN, relieved Captain Harcourt on his promotion to Rear Admiral.

15th – DUKE OF YORK and battle cruiser RENOWN, escorted by destroyers FAULKNOR, MIDDLETON, ESCAPADE, and MARNE left Scapa for Rosyth for docking.

16th - DUKE OF YORK and battle cruiser RENOWN, escorted by destroyers FAULKNOR, MIDDLETON, ESCAPADE, and MARNE arrived at Rosyth for docking.

17th – At Rosyth, where the Flag of Vice Admiral Sir Edward Neville Syfret, CinC Force H, was transferred to DUKE OF YORK from the MALAYA.

27th – DUKE OF YORK escorted by the destroyers ECHO, IMPULSIVE and LEDBURY left Rosyth for Scapa.

28th - DUKE OF YORK escorted by the destroyers ECHO, IMPULSIVE and LEDBURY arrived at Scapa.

(The next operation that DUKE OF YORK took part in was Operation TORCH the allied invasion of North West Africa. For Operation TORCH DUKE OF YORK was the flag ship of Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Neville Syfret CB RN the CinC Force H. The task of Force H was to hold off any attack by the Italian fleet and to provide cover for the Centre and Eastern Task Forces that would land at Oran and Algiers)

30th – At 1630 hours Force X comprising the battleships DUKE OF YORK (Flag Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Neville Syfret CB RN CinC Force H) and NELSON, battlecruiser RENOWN, light cruiser ARGONAUT and the destroyers MILNE, MARTIN, METEOR, ASHANTI, TARTAR, ESKIMO and HMAS QUIBERON sailed from Scapa to RV with carrier force from the Clyde.

31st – At approximately 1700 hours in position 55-30N, 10W Force X RVed with the carrier force comprising the aircraft carriers VICTORIOUS (Rear Admiral Aircraft Carriers, Home Fleet) and FORMIDABLE and the destroyers PATHFINDER, PARTRIDGE, PORCUPINE, QUENTIN and QUALITY. The combined force became Force H which then set course for Gibraltar.

5th – At 1400 hours Force H arrived off the approaches to the Strait of Gibraltar. At this point Force H split with DUKE OF YORK and RENOWN with a destroyer screen proceeding into Gibraltar to refuel. At 1900 hours they arrived in Gibraltar, anchored and immediately commenced refuelling.

6th – In the early hours the remainder of Force H passed through the Strait of Gibraltar and entered Gibraltar to refuel. At 0600 hours DUKE OF YORK and RENOWN with a destroyer screen sailed from Gibraltar and proceeded east into the Mediterranean to await the remainder of Force H to join the Flag. At about 1800 hours in approximate position 36N, 3W the remainder of Force H joined the Flag.

Force H now comprised the battleships DUKE OF YORK (Flag Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Neville Syfret CB RN CinC Force H) and RODNEY, battlecruiser RENOWN, aircraft carriers VICTORIOUS and FORMIDABLE, light cruisers BERMUDA and SIRIUS and the destroyers BEAGLE, BOREAS, BULLDOG, ESKIMO, TARTAR, MILNE, MARTIN, METEOR, PANTHER, PATHFINDER, PARTRIDGE, PENN, PORCUPINE, QUENTIN, QUALITY, HMAS QUIBERON and HNethMS ISAAC SWEERS. Force H then sailed east to their appointed patrol position.

7th – At 0535 hours Force H was in approximate position 37-34N, 0-01E, steering east, lookouts on DUKE OF YORK saw a distant explosion. This was the US transport THOMAS STONE, part of convoy KMF(A) 1, being torpedoed. At 1700 hours spasmodic air attacks took place on Force H. At 1830 hours in approximate position the destroyer PANTHER was subjected to a bombing attack and suffered a near miss forward, which caused flooding. She detached and returned to Gibraltar. Late in the evening RODNEY with destroyers BEAGLE, BOREAS and BULLDOG detached from Force H to provide support for the Central Task Force off Oran.

(The task of Force H was to patrol off the Algerian coast, along latitude 38-15N, as far east as 4-30E, provide distant cover to prevent any attempt by the Italian or Vichy French Fleets to interfere with the landings at Algiers or Oran. The assault over the beaches was due at H hour, which was set for 0100/ 8/11/42 for the landing at Oran.

Axis agents had observed the passage of large amounts of shipping thought the Strait of Gibraltar. The Kriegsmarine was expecting enemy landings at Tripoli or Benghazi, with the second possibility of Sicily or Sardinia so was not surprised by the reports of the shipping movements. To meet the assumed threat the Axis concentrated their submarines and light naval forces for an attack between Tunis and Sicily. The enemy was taken by surprise by the Algerian landings.

On the morning of 8/11/42, immediately following the landings Vichy applied to the Germans for troops and the re-armament of the French Forces. It also planned to use the French fleet at Toulon against the Allied landings. However these moves were curtailed on 11/11/42 by Admiral Darlan’s surrender of Vichy forces in North Africa)

8th – At 0100 hours the assault by the Eastern and Centre Task forces commences. Force H cruises along its covering position south of the Balearic Islands to longitude 4-30E.

At 0430 hours two enemy aircraft flew over DUKE OF YORK and dropped flares.

At 0545 hours the carriers VICTORIOUS and FORMIDABLE flew off fighter and anti-submarine patrols.

At 0930 hours a Martlet of 882 squadron, from VICTORIOUS, took the surrender of Blida airfield.

At 1130 hours the BERMUDA detached to carry out a bombardment of Battery du Lazart at Fort Matifu In this task BERMUDA was assisted by Albacores of 820 Squadron from FORMIDABLE.

At 1715 hours a group of German He 111 and Ju 88 torpedo bombers evaded the fighter patrols and in the gathering dusk they attacked Force H. No damage was caused; much of the credit for repelling the attack was down to the alertness of RENOWN’s anti-aircraft batteries.

9th – The weather was overcast with occasional showers, which helped to conceal Force H from the enemy. Spasmodic air attacks took place through the day. At dusk DUKE OF YORK was singled out for attack by three Ju 88’s but they were driven off by AA fire.

10th – At 0354 hours, in position 37-53N, 03-57E, U-431 fired four torpedoes at Force H and reported three hits on a Leander-class cruiser, which blew up and a destroyer damaged. However, the only ship hit was the destroyer MARTIN who blew up and sank with the loss of 161of her crew. The only survivors were four Officers and 59 Ratings who were picked up by the QUENTIN.

11th – Admiral Darlan surrendered all Vichy forces in North Africa to the Allies.

15th – Force H returned to Gibraltar. The flag of Flag Officer commanding Force H was transferred to the NELSON.

18th – At 2230 hours DUKE OF YORK, aircraft carrier VICTORIOUS (Flag R.A.A/C.) , escorted by the destroyers WESTCOTT, MALCOLM, GLAISDALE, BULLDOG, BEAGLE, OPPORTUNE sailed from Gibraltar for UK on release from Operation TORCH.

21st – At 1017 hours the Force was in approximate position 46N, 17W, steering north at 19 knots; when Albacore 817/1 from the VICTORIOUS depth-charged and sank the outbound U-517 in position 46-10N, 17-08W. The destroyer OPPORTUNE picked up 50 survivors.

22nd - At 0400 hours in approximate position the Force was joined by the destroyers MATCHLESS and LIMBOURNE from Scapa.

22nd – At approximate 2400 hours in position 55-35N, 7W the destroyers WESTCOTT, MALCOLM, GLAISDALE, BULLDOG and BEAGLE detached to Londonderry.

23rd – At 1100 hours DUKE OF YORK, VICTORIOUS and the destroyers OPPORTUNE, MATCHLESS, and LIMBOURNE arrived off Greenock.

25th – At 1030 hours DUKE OF YORK escorted by the destroyers LIMBOURNE, OPPORTUNE and MATCHLESS sailed from Greenock for Scapa.

26th – At 0930 hours DUKE OF YORK and the destroyers LIMBOURNE, OPPORTUNE and MATCHLESS arrived at Scapa.

8th – At 0120 hours DUKE OF YORK escorted by the destroyers FAULKNOR, FORESTER and ECLIPSE sailed from Scapa for Rosyth for refit. At 1230 hours they arrived at Rosyth where DUKE OF YORK was taken in hand for a refit. DUKE OF YORK was at Rosyth under refit for the rest of the month.

DUKE OF YORK was at Rosyth under refit for the whole month.

DUKE OF YORK was at Rosyth under refit for the whole month.

DUKE OF YORK at Rosyth under refit. During the refit she had 24 single 20mm Oerlikons added, 2 on after boiler room vents, 4 abreast B turret, 6 on No 1 platform, 4 on each side catapult deck, 2 on each side of deck forward of X turret.

14th – DUKE OF YORK sailed from Rosyth escorted by the destroyers FORESTER, BLANKNEY and ECHO.

15th - DUKE OF YORK with he destroyers FORESTER, BLANKNEY and ECHO arrived at Scapa to commence working up. For the remainder of the month DUKE OF YORK was at Scapa working up.

DUKE OF YORK at Scapa for the whole month working up.

14th – The flag of the CinC Home Fleet was transferred from KING GEORGE V to DUKE OF YORK.

1st to 30th - DUKE OF YORK at Scapa working up.

8th – At 0930 hours the flag of the CinC Home Fleet, Admiral Tovey was struck and transferred to the destroyer ONSLOW. At 1015 hours the flag of the new CinC Home Fleet, Admiral Bruce Fraser, CB, RN, was transferred from BERWICK to DUKE OF YORK.

(Due to the transfer of Home Fleet capital ships to the Mediterranean for Operation HUSKY, the Home Fleet only had two modern KGV class battleships. This was considered insufficient to counter the threat posed by the Kriegsmarine capital ships based in Norway. So the USN was asked to loan the Home Fleet some of its heavy units to compensate for the Home Fleet’s lack of capital ships.

On 19/5/43 USN Task Group 92.4, comprising the battleships SOUTH DAKOTA (Flag Rear Admiral Olaf M Hustvedt USN, Task Group 92.4) and ALABAMA and five destroyers arrived at Scapa)

31st – At 1600 hours the Battlefleet comprising the battleships DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC Home Fleet), USS SOUTH DAKOTA and ALABAMA, heavy cruiser BERWICK escorted by the destroyers MILNE (D3), OPPORTUNE, OBDURATE, OBEDIENT and USS ELLYSON, MACOMB, RODMAN, EMMONS and FITCH sailed from Scapa for Hvalfjord.

2nd – At 0900 hours the Battlefleet arrived at Hvalfjord.

(The next operation involving DUKE OF YORK was Operation FH, this involved :-

(a) Conveying relief personnel and stores to the Norwegian garrison in Spitzbergen [Operation GEARBOX III]

(b) Escorting the corvettes CAMELLIA and BLUEBELL back from North Russia.

(c) Conveying mail and stores to H.M. ships and establishments in North Russia.

The Battlefleet was to provide distant cover for the operation)

7th –At 0300 hours the Battlefleet comprising the battleships DUKE OF YORK, USS SOUTH DAKOTA and ALABAMA, aircraft carrier FURIOUS (with Seafires of 801 Sqd embarked), heavy cruiser BERWICK, light cruiser SCYLLA escorted by the destroyers MILNE, OPPORTUNE, OBDURATE, OBEDIENT, ECHO, MIDDLETON and USS ELLYSON, MACOMB, RODMAN, EMMONS and FITCH sailed from Hvalfjord for Akureyri. At 2300 hours the Battlefleet arrived at Akureyri.

(At 1900 hours, Force R consisting of heavy cruiser CUMBERLAND, light cruiser BERMUDA escorted by the destroyers ECLIPSE and HMCS ATHABASKAN left Akureyri for Operation GEARBOX III)

9th – At 0800 hours the Battlefleet comprising the battleships DUKE OF YORK, USS SOUTH DAKOTA and ALABAMA, aircraft carrier FURIOUS, heavy cruiser BERWICK, light cruiser SCYLLA escorted by the destroyers MILNE, OPPORTUNE, OBDURATE, OBEDIENT, and USS ELLYSON, MACOMB, RODMAN, EMMONS and FITCH sailed from Akureyri and headed north westerly for operations in connection with Operation F H.

10th – The Battlefleet continued on a north westerly course.

11th – At 0600 hours the Battlefleet arrived in approximate position 72N, 10E, at which point they turned southerly.

12th - At 0800 hours USN Task Group 92.4 detached and proceeded to Hvalfjord. The Home Fleet steered for Scapa.

13th – At 2200 hours the Home Fleet comprising DUKE OF YORK, FURIOUS, SCYLLA, and destroyers MILNE, OPPORTUNE, OBDURATE, ORWELL and OBEDIENT arrived at Scapa at the end of Operation F H. 

(21/6/43 USN Task Group 92.4 consisting of battleships SOUTH DAKOTA and ALABAMA and destroyers ELLYSON, RODMAN, FITCH, MACOMB, and EMMONS arrived at Scapa.

At 1200/22/6/43 the destroyer USS EMMONS sailed from Scapa for Invergordon. At Invergordon she embarked a party of officials including Admiral Stark, Commander US Naval Forces in Europe, Mr. Winant, the American Ambassador to Great Britain and the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr A Alexander and conveyed them back to Scapa. On arrival at Scapa the party carried out an inspection of Task Group 92.4)

DUKE OF YORK at Scapa.

(The next operation that DUKE OF YORK took part in was Operation CAMERA. The objective of the operation was to arouse enemy interest and focus attention on the South Norwegian coast by a simultaneous converging movement on that area by three forces, Force Q, R and S covered by the Home Fleet, all designed to simulate a large scale raid. By achieving its object it was hoped to increase the growing "war of nerves" against Germany and to pin down enemy forces in Norway before the launching of the Sicilian campaign, Operation HUSKY)

6th - Force S comprising heavy cruisers BERWICK and NORFOLK and destroyer SCORPION sailed from Hvalfjord for positions A (66-13N, 12-05W) and B (66-40N, 10-01W), for their part in Operation CAMERA.

7th - At 0700 hours destroyers OPPORTUNE and OBEDIENT sailed from Scapa with Force R. This Force was designed to simulate a convoy. Force R comprised the trawlers MACBETH, SKY, BRESSAY, HAMLET, CAPE NYEMETZKI, CAPE BARRACUTA, OAK, LARCH, HAWTHORNE and SYCAMORE and MLs 466, 276, 286, 345, 445 and 452. Course was set for positions W (61-15N, 01-25W) and X (61-40N, 01-00E) for their part in Operation CAMERA.

At 0900 hours Force Q comprising heavy cruisers KENT and LONDON, light cruiser BELFAST and the destroyer ONSLAUGHT sailed from Scapa for positions T (62-20N, 5-30W) where they arrived at 2300 hours and were joined by the destroyer OBDURATE from Skaalefjord. Course was then set for position V (62-20N, 01-00E).

At 1600 hours the aircraft carrier FURIOUS (with Martlets of 881 Sqd embarked) and destroyers MUSKETEER, METEOR and MAHRATTA sailed from Scapa for Operation CAMERA.

At 1700 hours the Battlefleet comprising battleships DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC Home Fleet), SOUTH DAKOTA (Flag Com. Task Group 92.4), light cruiser GLASGOW and destroyers MILNE (D3) and the USS ELLYSON, RODMAN, EMMONS, MACOMB and FITCH sailed from Scapa for positions Y (62-52N, 1-45W) and Z (61-20N, 01-00E) for their part in Operation CAMERA.

At 2100 hours in approximate position the Battlefleet was joined by the FURIOUS Force.

8th - At 1200 hours the Battlefleet arrived in position Y. They then turned on to a south easterly course steering for position Z. At around this time the Battlefleet was sighted by a Luftwaffe Blohm & Voss Bv 138 reconnaissance aircraft of 1./Agr125 from Billefjord, Finnmark. When it was certain that the Bv 138 had sent a sighting report it was shot down by a Martlet (Pilot, Lieut. Comdr. RA Bird, RN) from FURIOUS. At 2100 hours the Battlefleet arrived in position Z. Course was then set for Scapa.

9th - At 1000 hours the Battlefleet arrived back at Scapa.

(The next operation that DUKE OF YORK took part in was Operation GOVERNOR. The objective of GOVERNOR was similar to Operation CAMERA. Five Forces A, B, C, D & E were involved in the operation)

25th - At 2100 hours Force C comprising the destroyers SAVAGE and RIPLEY, trawlers SKY, SWITHA, CEDAR, LARCH, OAK, WILLOW, HAWTHORNE and LILAC and MLs 252, 286, 442, 473, and 445 and L C I (L) 167 sailed from Scapa for Sullom Voe to take part in Operation GOVERNOR.

26th - At 1200 hours Force A comprising battleships ANSON (Flag VA 2iC Home Fleet), USS ALABAMA, aircraft carrier ILLUSTRIOUS escorted by the destroyers MILNE (D3), MAHRATTA, MUSKETEER and METEOR and US destroyers RODMAN, FITCH, MACOMB, and EMMONS sailed from Hvalfjord for positions N (66-30N, 08-00W) and P (66-00N, 01-30E) for their part in Operation GOVERNOR.

27th - At 1200 hours Force D comprising light cruiser BELFAST (less destroyers) sailed from Scapa for position V (62-15N, 5-20W). Then after being joined by the destroyers ORWELL and ORIBI from Skaalefjord sail for position R (62-00N, 00-30E).

At 1600 hours Force B comprising battleships DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC Home Fleet), USS SOUTH DAKOTA (Flag Com. Task Group 92.4), aircraft carrier UNICORN, light cruiser BERMUDA escorted by the destroyers ONSLOW (D17), OBDURATE, OBEDIENT, GRENVILLE, ULSTER, MATCHLESS, SAUMAREZ, SCORPION, and IMPULSIVE sailed from Scapa for positions W (61-40N, 4-40W) and T (61-30N, 1-30E) for their part in Operation GOVERNOR.

Force E comprising heavy cruisers LONDON (Flag RA CS1), KENT and NORFOLK sailed from Hvalfjord for position M (67-20N, 02-00W) for their part in Operation GOVERNOR.

28th - At approximately 1000 hours Forces A and B joined. During the day four Luftwaffe Blohm & Voss Bv 138 reconnaissance aircraft were shot down. Three by Beaufighters of RCAF 404 Sqd and one by a Martlet (Pilot, Lieut. Comdr. JW Sleigh, DSC, RN) of 890 Sqd from ILLUSTRIOUS.

29th - From 0900 hours the vessels of Forces A and B, namely DUKE OF YORK, SOUTH DAKOTA and ALABAMA and destroyers MILNE (D 3), ONSLOW (D 17), OBDURATE, OBEDIENT, MUSKETEER, MATCHLESS, MAHRATTA, METEOR, GRENVILLE, ULSTER, SAUMAREZ, SCORPION, EMMONS, MACOMB, RODMAN and FITCH commenced arriving at Scapa on completion of Operation GOVERNOR.

For the whole of August DUKE OF YORK was at Scapa.

(On 2/6/43 Admiral Fraser received a KCB in the King's Birthday Honours)

6th - DUKE OF YORK’s new CO Captain Brian Betham Schofield RN took command.

DUKE OF YORK at Scapa.

(At 0015/6/9/43 the battleship TIRPITZ, battlecruiser SCHARNHORST and the destroyers KARL GALSTER, HANS LODY, ERICH STEINBRINK, THEODOR RIEDEL, Z27, Z29, Z30, Z31 and Z33 sailed from Altenfjord on Operation ZITRONELLA. Operation ZITRONELLA was an attack on the Allied, Free Norwegian manned, weather station at Barentsburg, Spitsbergen.

The German force approached the island flying the White Ensign. The weather station managed to get off a report of British ships approaching before their radio was destroyed.

At 0430/7/9/43 TIRPITZ and SCHARNHORST opened fire on the weather station and its two 3" guns, which were quickly put out of action, but not before causing damage to Z29 and Z33. The destroyers then landed troops to complete the destruction. At 0900/7/9/43 the German Force departed and returned to Altenfjord, where they arrived at 1730/9/9/43.

Photographic reconnaissance of Altenfjord on 7/9/43 [this was the first operational flight by a Spitfire XI of 543 Sqd from North Russia] showed only LUTZOW and 2 destroyers present which indicated that TIRPITZ and SCHARNHORST were probably in the attacking force)

8th - At 1700 hours the Battlefleet comprising battleships DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC Home Fleet), ANSON (Flag 2iC Home Fleet), aircraft carrier USS RANGER, heavy cruisers LONDON and USS AUGUSTA and TUSCALOOSA, screened by the destroyers ONSLOW, ROCKET, MAHRATTA, HMCS IROQUOIS and HURON, ORP ORKEN and USS BELL, ISHERWOOD, FORREST, CORRY and HOBSON sailed from Scapa and headed north for Spitsbergen to intercept the enemy force.

9th - At 1800 hours the CinC Home Fleet received information from the latest aerial reconnaissance of Altenfjord informing him that TIRPITZ was back. The mission was therefore aborted and the Battlefleet returned to Scapa.

10th - In the afternoon the Battlefleet comprising battleships DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC Home Fleet), ANSON (Flag 2iC Home Fleet), aircraft carrier USS RANGER, heavy cruisers LONDON and USS AUGUSTA and TUSCALOOSA, screened by the destroyers ONSLOW, ROCKET, MAHRATTA, HMCS IROQUOIS and HURON, ORP ORKAN and USS BELL, ISHERWOOD, FORREST, CORRY and HOBSON arrived back at Scapa.

(The next operation that DUKE OF YORK took part in was Operation LEADER. The objective of LEADER was to carry out an air strike on the Norwegian port of Bodo attacking German shipping in the port and in the Leads)

2nd - At 1100 hours the Battlefleet comprising the battleships DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC Home Fleet) and ANSON (Flag 2iC Home Fleet), aircraft carrier USS RANGER (with air group 4 embarked, consisting of VF-4, Wildcats, VB-4, Dauntlesses, VT-4, Avengers), light cruiser BELFAST, heavy cruiser USS TUSCALOOSA, screened by destroyers MILNE, VIGILANT, OPPORTUNE, TEAZER and USS FORREST, CORRY, HOBSON, FITCH and CAPP sailed from Scapa on Operation LEADER.

3rd - At 0020 hours east of the Faroes, the destroyers SAVAGE, SCOURGE and SCORPION joined the Battlefleet from Skaalefjord. Course was then set north easterly. At 1830 hours the Battlefleet was in position 67N, 2-30W at which point course was altered easterly to close the Norwegian coast.

4th - At 0618 hours in approximate position 67-09N, 6-12E, RANGER commenced launching her air strike force. The strike force was divided into two waves.

At 0618 hours, this was 18 minutes later than planned due to lack of wind over the deck, the Northern Attack Group consisting of 20 SBD Dauntless dive-bombers with an escort of 8 F4F Wildcat fighters, was launched, their targets were shipping and shore installations near the port of Bodo.

At 0640 hours the Southern Attack Group consisting of 10 TBF Avengers and 6 F4F Wildcats, was launched, their targets were in the Sandnessjoen area.

At 0800 hours the Battlefleet were in position 67-18N, 08-03E.

At 0905 hours RANGER commenced recovery of the strike force.

(The strike groups found numerous targets at Bodo and in the Leads. Ten merchant ships were attacked with bombs and strafing. The SS RABAT 2719grt and the SS VAAGEN 687grt were sunk. The MV TOPEKA 4991grt was set on fire and beached. The SS MALAGA 2146grt was run aground after 2 near bomb misses. The damaged ships were the SS KERKPLEIN 5085grt she had 1551 Russian POW’s embarked [39 killed or wounded] and the MV SKRAMSTAD 4300grt who had 834 German soldiers embarked [220 killed or wounded]. The tanker the SS SCHLESWIG 10234grt was loaded with fuel for the TIRPITZ was damaged by 2 bombs and 2 near misses as was the SS LA PLATA 8056grt was damaged by 2 bomb hits and 2 near misses. Three of RANGER’s aircraft were shot down, all by flak. One Dauntless crashed at Bodo and one made a forced landing in the water 12 miles west of Bodo. The third aircraft, an Avenger, was shot down off Alsten)

At 1255 hours RANGER’s radar reported four bogies approaching the Battlefleet, the CAP was vectored on to the bogies. Two F4F Wildcats piloted by Lt (jg) Boyd N. Mayhew and Lt (jg) Dean S. Laird shot down a Junkers Ju 88. Then four F4F Wildcats piloted by Mayhew, Laird, Lt Earle F. Craig and Ens Laurence A. Hensley shot down a Heinkel He 115.

A F4F Wildcat pilot, Ens Charles R. Hopson, returning from CAP, made an off centre landing that disengaged his tail hook, causing him to end up in the sea. He was picked up unharmed by the destroyer SCOURGE.

At 1300 hours following the sighting of the Battlefleet by the Luftwaffe, the CinC Home Fleet ordered the fleet to set course 260¼ and speed 18knots for Scapa.

5th - At 1650 hours the Battlefleet was east of the Faeroes where the destroyers SAVAGE, SCOURGE and SCORPION detached for Skaalefjord.

6th - At 0830 hours the Battlefleet arrived back at Scapa. The RANGER was the last ship into Scapa and was cheered in by all the ships in the anchorage. At 2000 hours DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC Home Fleet) escorted by the destroyers OPPORTUNE and TEAZER sailed from Scapa for Rosyth.

7th - At 0900 hours DUKE OF YORK and the destroyers OPPORTUNE and TEAZER arrived off Rosyth. DUKE OF YORK then entered ROSYTH for a short docking.

19th - At 2000 hours DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC Home Fleet ) escorted by the destroyers USS FORREST and CAPPS left Rosyth at 2000 for Scapa.

20th - At 0930 hours DUKE OF YORK and the destroyers USS FORREST and CAPPS arrived at Scapa.

For the whole of November DUKE OF YORK was at Scapa. During the month Admiral Fraser entertained Emir Abdul Illah, Regent of Iraq, on board DUKE OF YORK

9th - DUKE OF YORK at Scapa, where her new CO, Captain the Hon Guy Herbrand Edward Russell RN, took command.

(In the light of the action that was to come this was a fortuitous appointment. Captain Russell had been the CO of the NELSON during Operations HUSKY and AVALANCHE. During these operations he had gained valuable experience in the use of a battleship’s main armament at night and had developed advanced blind firing and plotting procedures. He was also aware of the necessity of proper eye drill to prevent temporary loss of vision when the main armament was fired at night. As soon as he took command of DUKE OF YORK, Captain Russell instituted drills to ensure the lessons learned in NELSON were put into effect. This included a live full calibre night shoot)

(The next operation that DUKE OF YORK was involved in was Operation FV. This was an operation to provide distant heavy cover for the passage of convoys JW 55 and RA 55.

Although TIRPITZ was out of action due to damage sustained in Operation SOURCE, the attack by X Class submarines, and the LUTZLOW had returned to Germany; heavy cover was still required due to the presence of the SCHARNHORST in Altenfjord)

12th - At 1300 hours DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC Home Fleet), light cruiser JAMAICA and the destroyers SAVAGE, SAUMAREZ, SCORPION and HNoMS STORD, all forming Force 2 for Operation FV, sailed from Scapa and set course north.

(Admiral Fraser the CinC Home Fleet sailed on 12/12/43 to coincide with the sailing of convoy JW 55A from Loch Ewe. It was this convoy that Fraser was sure the SCHARNHORST would attack. Fraser also decided that should SCHARNHORST sortie against the convoy he would break the sanctity of radio silence to ensure that all units knew where each were)

(14/12/43 Fraser received intelligence that convoy JW 55A had been sighted and reported. On receipt of the Fraser took the immediate decision to take DUKE OF YORK into the Barents Sea and on to Kola Inlet. This would provide close heavy cover to the convoy. Further, because he was now receiving reliable and rapid intelligence from Enigma decrypts and due to the weaken state of the Luftwaffe in northern Norway, he calculated it was an acceptable risk)

16th - DUKE OF YORK, JAMAICA and the destroyers SAVAGE, SAUMAREZ, SCORPION and HNorMS STORD arrived at Vaenga. On arrival the CinC of the Russian Northern Fleet, Vice Admiral Arseni Golovko paid a visit and was received with a guard and band. He later walked round DUKE OF YORK and appeared to be much impressed with the efficiency and cleanliness of the ship. Golovko was particularly impressed with the ships bakery and partook of some freshly baked buns which he praised. On leaving the ship Golovko was presented with a sack of freshly baked buns.

17th - In the afternoon Admiral Fraser visited the Royal Naval Auxiliary Hospital at Vaenga. On the evening Admiral Fraser gave an official dinner party for Admiral Golovko, members of his staff, the Air General, Rear Admiral Archer and officers from Polyarnoe and Murmansk. This was followed by a performance by the Russian Red Fleet Concert Party in DUKE OF YORK’s hanger.

18th - At 0830 hours DUKE OF YORK, JAMAICA and the destroyers SAVAGE, SAUMAREZ, SCORPION and HNorMS STORD sailed from Kola Inlet for Iceland.

(Convoy JW 55A had not, as Fraser had believed, drawn SCHARNHORST out of Altenfjord and the convoy arrived at Kola Inlet on 20/12/43. However Fraser still believed that SCHARNHORST would come out, so he sailed for Iceland to refuel and be ready to protect the next convoy JW 55B, that was due to sail from Loch Ewe on 19/12/43. However due to bad weather the sailing was postponed for 24 hours)

(On 19/12/43 during a conference held in Hitler's Wolfsschanze headquarters, Admiral Doenitz obtained Hitler’s agreement that the SCHARNHORST would, provided the chances of success seemed reasonable, attack the next convoy that could be located)

(At 0130/20/12/43 Fraser received a signal from the Admiralty OIC informing him of the contents of three Enigma decrypts:-

At 1823/18/12/43 the Admiral Northern Waters had ordered the SCHARNHORST Battlegroup from six to three hours notice.

At the same time the Air Officer Lofotens had been urgently requested for air reconnaissance against a convoy that is expected and against a heavy group which is probably at sea. Battlegroup is at three hours notice.

At 1030/19/12/43, from the Air Officer Lofotens reporting that reconnaissance on the 19th had been cancelled due to weather at operational airfield. One hour’s notice ordered for one radar equipped aircraft)

21st - At 1300 hours DUKE OF YORK, JAMAICA and the destroyers SAVAGE, SAUMAREZ, SCORPION and HNorMS STORD arrived at Akureyri. DUKE OF YORK led the way into Akureyri at high speed. The visibility on arrival was very poor and the ships of the Battlefleet had difficulty in seeing the next ahead. However greet confidence was placed on DUKE OF YORK as she had the best radar in Fleet.

(At 2330/21/12/43 Fraser received a signal from the Admiralty OIC informing him of the latest Enigma decrypt:-

At 1600/21/12/43 the Admiral Northern Waters had instructed SCHARNHORST o revert to six hours notice.

Fraser was given the OIC assessment of this intercept, which was that SCHARNHORST had reverted to six hours notice because of the failure of the Luftwaffe to locate a convoy)

22nd - Admiral Fraser and Captain Russell went ashore to Akureyri. When returning from Akureyri they saw the local’s ice skating under floodlight on the ice that had formed between the ships and the shore. When Fraser returned to DUKE OF YORK he asked the Royal Marine band to come on deck a play Christmas carols for the crew and the Icelanders.

(At 1200/23/12/43 the destroyer ONSLOW (D17), Senior Officer of the escort JW 55B, reported the position, course and speed of the convoy and that it was being shadowed by two Dornier Do 217’s)

23rd - At 1800 hours Admiral Fraser called a meeting of the six CO’s of the ships of Force 2 which was held on DUKE OF YORK. In the meeting Fraser stressed how vital it was that every officer and rating must be thoroughly familiar with his post and with his duties. If all went well he expected Force 2 would be presented with a night action against the SCHARNHORST in which Fraser's stated prime objective was to close on radar to a range of 12,000 yards, before opening fire with star-shell to illuminate the enemy. As soon as the gun action began the four destroyers were to form sub-divisions and take up positions for torpedo attacks, but must not close until the enemy’s fire power had been reduced and Fraser gave the order for them to go close. As for JAMAICA, Fraser wanted her to operate in close support of DUKE OF YORK, thus hopefully splitting the German fire, but if the cruiser should be heavily engaged she was to break away and open the range at once.

At 2300 hours DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC Home Fleet) with JAMAICA and the destroyers SAVAGE, SAUMAREZ, SCORPION and STORD, as Force 2, left Akureyri and set course north at 15 Knots to cover the passed of convoys JW 55B and RA 55A.

(At 2330/23/12/43 Fraser received a signal from the Admiralty OIC informing him of the latest Enigma decrypt:-

At 1045/22/12/43 a Luftwaffe Do 217 on a weather flight, sighted convoy JW 55B, in poor visibility, and reported it as a convoy of 40 troop transports in square 16 west 5410 [63-45N, 5-30W], course 045¼, speed 10 knots.

At 1330/22/12/43, following this sighting the SCHARNHORST was brought back to three hours notice.

At 1430/22/12/43 following the return of the Do 217 to its base, the SCHARNHORST was signalled that the troop transports were merchantmen)

(At 2315 hours ONSLOW (D17) reported that one shadowing aircraft had been in contact until 2305 hours and homing)

24th - In the early hours Force 2 carried out a rehearsal of Fraser’s battle plan. The JAMAICA was detached to represent the SCHARNHORST in a game of hide-and-seek, in the dark and appalling weather. In this practice interception DUKE OF YORK’s radar operators had no difficulty in distinguishing between the radar echo of JAMAICA and those of the even smaller destroyers. As JAMAICA had only a third of SCHARNHORST’s displacement and was over 200ft shorter than SCHARNHORST, this was an excellent result and a good omen. For the radar operators of Force 2 the exercise was a great success.

By 1200 hours Force 2 was in approximate position 68-15N, 13W and Admiral Fraser knew that he had a possible crisis on his hands. Convoy JW.55B was being shadowed by German aircraft and was now equidistant between the SCHARNHORST in Altenfjord, 400 miles to the east and Force 2, 400 miles to the south-west. If the SCHARNHORST were to seize this moment to strike at the convoy, both Fraser and Vice Admiral Burnett with Force 1 would be too far away to intervene. Admiral Fraser's late start from Akureyri, due in part to the unscheduled visit to Vaenga, was made more problematical by the limited fuel endurance of his destroyers. To obtain the maximum endurance for his destroyers he had planned a 15 knot approach to the anticipated battle area in the vicinity of Bear Island, where JW 55B and RA 55A were scheduled to cross. This approach speed would give his destroyers an operating time in the battle area of 30 hours. Fraser overcame his dilemma by doing what he had always planned to do in such an emergency, he broke radio silence to order a compromise.

At 1400 hours Fraser signalled to the convoy to reverse course for three hours and not turn back to the east until 1700 hours. At the same time he increased the speed of Force 2 from 15 to 19 knots.

(This signal was picked up by German radio stations and accurately D'Fed. Admiral Kluber the Admiral Commanding Northern Waters who was also doubling up as Admiral Commanding U-Boats North, assessment of this intercept was that none of the preconditions for a sortie by the SCHARNHORST existed. He signalled his assessment to Rear Admiral Bey on the SCHARNHORST. However Gruppe North at Kiel and the Naval Staff in Berlin took a different view, they decided to treat Fraser’s signal as originating from a convoy straggler and the DF as a poor fix.

The Luftwaffe commander Lofotens signalled his intention of sending out air reconnaissance on the 25/12/43 to search for a battle group approaching from the south west)

(When Fraser's order came through, Rear Admiral Boucher retd (Convoy Commodore) and Captain McCoy (D17) agreed that to attempt a course reversal would be unwise in the prevailing weather conditions. At best it would be sure to disperse the convoy even more; at worst, the plethora of coloured-light signals required to execute such a tricky manoeuvre would act like a beacon to the Luftwaffe. They agreed that the convoy's estimated position by 1700 hrs would have been about 20 miles closer to Vice Admiral Burnett’s Force 1 [BELFAST (Flag CS10), SHEFFIELD and NORFOLK] than provided for in the original sailing schedule. So Boucher and McCoy complied with the spirit rather than the letter of Fraser's order. They maintained convoy course, but reduced the convoy's speed to 8 knots. Though not as effective as a course reversal would have been, it resulted in narrowing the gap by about 100 miles, a small enough contribution, but one that would soon prove vital)

25th - Force 2 continued on a north easterly course at 17 knots in deteriorating weather; wind strength rose from Force 6 to a full Force 8 south westerly gale with a heavy following sea swell.

(Just after midnight Fraser became concerned about convoy RA 55A which would be crossing the danger area without any substantial heavy cover and due to convoy JW 55B’s reversal of course [sic] would not benefit from the support of JW 55B’s escort.

At approximately 0030/25/12/43 Fraser signalled RA 55A to alter course to the north westwards and at the same time detach four destroyers, Fraser left the choice to the SO of the escort, Captain Campbell who chose the four with the highest fuel reserves, these were the four destroyers of the 36th division, MUSKETEER, MATCHLESS, OPPORTUNE and VIRAGO who were then to join JW 55B. They joined JW 55B at 1250/25/12/43 in a force 8 gale)

(At 0900/25/12/43 convoy JW 55B crossed the U-Boat patrol line ‘Eisenbart’ and was sighted and reported by U 601.

At 1045/25/12/43 U 601 reported convoy in position 72-25N, 12-30E, course 060¼.

At 1420 hours U 601 again signalled the convoy’s position, course and speed and remained in contact until 1800 hours.

Convoy JW 55B was also sighted and reported by a Luftwaffe Dornier Do 18.

The Air Officer Lofotens had sent out three BV 138 Flying boats, one of which had radar, to search to the south west of the convoy. )

(At 1527/25/12/43 [Zone A time] the SCHARNHORST received the signal ‘Most Immediate, OSTFRONT 1700/25/12’ [Operation OSTFRONT was the code word for the attack on the convoy] When the signal arrived Rear Admiral Erich Bey was on the TIRPITZ in Kaa Fjord and was thus unable to execute the order at 1700 hours.

At 1955/25/12/43 [Zone A time] the SCHARNHORST [Flag Rear Admiral Erich Bey] sailed from Lange Fjord on Operation OSTFRONT. At 2040 hours in Altenfjord she was joined by the destroyers Z29, Z30, Z33, Z34 and Z38. When the Battle Group cleared Altenfjord at 2116 hours they turned into Soroy Sund and on clearing the Sund set course north.

At 2025 hours Doenitz signalled Bey with what was intended to inspire him but was ambiguous and probably had the opposite effect on Bey, the message read:-

1. Enemy attempting to frustrate the heroic struggle of our Eastern Armies by sending valuable convoy of supplies to the Russians.

2. SCHARNHORST and destroyers will attack convoy.

3. Tactical situation must be used skilfully and boldly. Engagement not to be broken off with only partial success achieved. Every advantage must be exploited. Best chance lies in SCHARNHORST’s superior fire-power. Therefore endeavour to deploy her. Destroyers to operate as seems suitable.

4. Disengage at your discretion but without question if heavy forces encountered.

5. Inform crew accordingly. I rely on your offensive spirit.

It was a message from a politician not a naval commander and shows Doenitz as covering his backside)

(From 2200/25/12/43 Fraser started to receive the Enigma decrypts giving the various moves of Kriegsmarine auxiliaries which were a precursor of the SCHARNHORST sailing)

26th - Force 2 continued on a north easterly course at 17 knots in a Force 8 gale and mountainous seas. Of the sea conditions Fraser wrote: ‘Our destroyers had a job to keep up with DUKE OF YORK, which was plunging under the huge waves of a following sea which made her look like a submarine breaking surface. A number of anti-aircraft weapons for close-range work had been fitted on the forecastle. All these were torn from their mountings, and water poured through the empty rivet holes on to the mess decks below’. At 0344 hours Fraser signalled Force 2 to raise steam for full speed.

(At 0339/26/12/43 Fraser received the Admiralty message timed at 0319 hours, ‘appreciation’ that SCHARNHORST is at sea)

At 0350 hours the weather improved and Fraser immediately ordered Force 2 to increase speed to 24 knots.

At 0401 hours Fraser broke radio silence and sent the following three part signal:-

1. McCoy (D17) was to swing JW 55B on to a northerly course. (Wherever SCHARNHORST was, this would make it harder for her to close the convoy)

2. Fraser stated his own position, (approximately 71-07N, 10-48E), course 080¼, and speed 24 knots. (This meant that both McCoy and Burnett knew precisely where he was)

3. McCoy and Burnett were ordered to state their own positions, courses and speeds. (This meant that Force 1, Force 2 and the convoy escort each knew where they were in relation to the others)

(At 0400/26/12/43 [Zone Z time] convoy JW 55B was in approximate position 73-31N, 18-54E, steering 070¼, nominal speed 8 knots but closer to 6 knots.

At 0400/26/12/43 Force 2 was approximately 237 miles south west of the convoy heading north east.

At 0400/26/12/43Force 1 was in approximate position 73-52N, 27-12E, steering 235¼, speed 18 knots. [This put Force 1approximately 162 miles east of the convoy]

At 0400/26/12/43 the SCHARNHORST and her destroyers were approximately 100 miles south east of convoy JW 55B, heading north at 25 knots. However Bey was not sure of the exact position of the convoy)

(After Fraser received the answers to his 0401, the positions of Force 1 and the convoy were added to DUKE OF YORK’s plot. Fraser then again broke radio silence:

At 0628/26/12/43 he signalled a compound order;

1. McCoy (D17) was ordered to turn convoy JW 55B on to an easterly course [to close the distance between the convoy and Force 1]. McCoy received the signal at 0705 hours.

2. Force 1 was ordered to close the convoy for mutual support. Burnett received the signal at 0651 hours. But Burnett chose to approach the convoy in a dog leg, south westerly, and then north westerly to avoid heading into the heavy swell)

(At 0720 hours the SCHARNHORST made a turn to the north, this caused her to loose contact with her destroyers who were on a south westerly course)

(At 0840 hours BELFAST [Flag CS10] was steering 325 degrees on the north westerly dog leg when she obtained a radar contact on her forward Type 273 surface warning set. At 0844 hours she signalled he other cruisers of Force 1, 'Jig' [unidentified radar contact] bearing 295¼, 35,000 yards. This turned out to be the SCHARNHORST who Burnett estimated to be in position 73-35N, 23-23E. At the time Burnett estimated that the convoy bore 287 degrees from BELFAST, range 48 miles, putting SCHARNHORST between Force 1 and the convoy.

At this time Force 2 was in approximate position 71-21N, 16-38E, bearing 040¼, 210 miles from SCHARNHORST.

Therefore Bey had pulled it off, and if he held his course and held his nerve he could go on to score the biggest victory of any German admiral of the war.

At 0840 hours McCoy [D17] estimated that the SCHARNHORST was about 36 miles, bearing 125¼ from the convoy.

At 0924 hours BELFAST opened fire with starshell and at 0929 hours NORFOLK and SHEFFIELD opened fire with AP. In the engagement NORFOLK registered two 8in hits on the SCHARNHORST; the first hit caused minor damage and failed to explode, the second hit was crucial it destroyed her ‘Seetakt’ radar aerial and put the port HA director out of action. During the engagement Force 1 had worked round and positioned itself between SCHARNHORST and the convoy.

SCHARNHORST increased speed to 30 knots and steered east then north and opened the range between herself and Force 1.

At 1020 hours with SCHARNHORST bearing 078¼ from BELFAST, range 36,000 yards, Force 1 lost contact with the enemy.

At 1044 hours Burnett signalled Fraser, ‘Have lost touch with the enemy who is steering north. Am closing the convoy’)

At 0905 hours DUKE OF YORK picked up three Luftwaffe shadowing aircraft at a range of 8½ miles, these were three radar equipped Blohm and Voss Bv 138’s, from Tromso.

(At 0912 hours one of the Bv 138’s signalled the Fliegerfuhrer Lofotens with a grid square and the message ‘several vessels located’.

At 1035 hours the Fliegerfuhrer Lofotens was again signalled with the message ‘contact maintained, apparently one large and several smaller vessels, believed high speed course south’.

At this time Force 2 was actually steering 080¼, speed 25½ knots)

(At 1050 hours the four destroyers of the 36th division, MUSKETEER, MATCHLESS, OPPORTUNE and VIRAGO joined Force 1and were ordered to scout ahead)

At 1150 hours Fraser ordered Force 2 to reverse course to the west. In the sea state this was a major task for the destroyers. The Force had to reduce speed to 18 knots and the manoeuvre took 15 minutes to execute. Force 2 then settled on course 260¼.

(Fraser had become concerned that the SCHARNHORST had given up on attacking convoy JW 55B and was instead going to make a bid to break out into the North Atlantic and he was positioning Force 2 to block this move.

At 1205 hours just as Force 2 had completed their change of course, BELFAST regained radar contact with SCHARNHORST who was steering 230 at 20 knots.

At 1220 hours BELFAST signalled ‘enemy in sight bearing 090¼’, range 11,000 yards, Burnett then ordered Force 1 to open fire.

SCHARNHORST concentrated most of her return fire on NORFOLK, this because she did not have flashless ammunition so every time NORFOLK fired she was lit up like day.

In the opening shots both NORFOLK and SHEFFIELD claimed hits.

By 1225 the range had dropped to 4,100 yards.

At 1227 hours the NORFOLK was hit by two 280mm shells, one exploded on X turret, killing an officer and four ratings. The turret rose about two feet in the air, and then dropped back on its mounting, the gun barrels slumped to the deck. The second shell struck amidships on the starboard side and exploded in the office flat above the engine room killing two stokers.

At 1241 hours Force 1 checked fire and the SCHARNHORST increased speed to 28 knots and steering 110¼ with Force 1 shadowing on her port quarter.

At 1300 hours SCHARNHORST altered course to 155¼ speed 28 knots)

At 1230 hours Force 2 reversed course back on to 080¼.

At 1300 hours Fraser signalled Burnett with the position, course and speed of Force 2 and added that one Luftwaffe shadower, a Bv 138, was still in contact with Force 2.

At 1318 hours Fraser signalled to Burnett ‘Report composition of enemy’

At 1325 hours Burnett replied ‘One heavy ship’

At 1416 hours, Fraser having decided that the forthcoming engagement with the SCHARNHORST would take place after tea, signalled by light to the other units of Force 2; ‘if enemy maintains present course and speed action should be joined at 1630’. The crew of DUKE OF YORK then had their tea.

At 1435 hours Fraser signalled Burnett ‘Have you destroyers in company’

At 1442 hours Burnett replied ‘No, they are following’

At 1449 hours Fraser signalled Burnett ‘If practicable intend to engage from the westward on a similar course’

(Burnett continued to keep Fraser informed of the SCHARNHORST’s course and speed)

At 1551 hours Fraser signalled ‘CinC to Home Fleet in company; the estimated bearing and distance of the enemy from me are 025¼, 25 miles.

At 1617 hours DUKE OF YORK’s Type 273QR radar located SCHARNHORST at a range of 45,500 yards, bearing 020¼. Fraser continued on course narrowing the range.

At 1632 hours DUKE OF YORK’s Type 274M (3) radar picked up the SCHARNHORST at a range of 29,700 yards.

At 1635 hours Fraser signalled BELFAST ‘prepare to fire starshell over enemy’.

At 1636 hours the range had closed to 14,000 yards and was closing.

(At 1637 hours the Force 2 destroyers, who were on station ahead of DUKE OF YORK; first Sub Division, SAVAGE and SAUMAREZ to port and second Sub Division, SCORPION and STORD to starboard; were ordered by Fraser ‘take up most advantageous position for firing torpedoes but do not attack until ordered’

At the same time DUKE OF YORK was picked up on BELFAST’s radar at 40,000 yards, bearing 176¼)

At 1644 hours Force 2 altered course to starboard on to 080¼ to open DUKE OF YORK’s ‘A’ arcs.

At 1646 hours Fraser ordered Force 2 to increase speed to 27 knots. At the same time he signalled BELFAST ‘open fire with starshell’.

(At 1647 hours BELFAST opened fire on the SCHARNHORST with starshell from a range of approximately 19,000 yards. However watchers on DUKE OF YORK didn’t see SCHARNHORST illuminated)

So DUKE OF YORK’s P2 and P3 portside 5.25in turrets were ordered to illuminate the enemy with starshell.

At 1650 hours the SCHARNHORST was perfectly illuminated by four starshells bursting behind and along the length of the ship. The enemy was caught completely by surprise; SCHARNHORST still had her turrets trained fore and aft.

At 1651 hours DUKE OF YORK fired her first 14in broadside at a range of 12,000 yards. The first broadside was a straddle with hits on SCHARNHORST’s Anton turret and Bruno turret handling room.

(At 1652 hours the JAMAICA who was approximately 1000 yards astern of DUKE OF YORK and conforming to the flagships movements, opened fire with a full broadside)

(At 1655 hours the biggest missed opportunity of the battle occurred. The destroyer SAVAGE was the leading destroyer of Force 2, she was ahead and to port of DUKE OF YORK and was so close to the SCHARNHORST that the flagships starshells were illuminating her. SAVAGE was in the perfect position for making a torpedo attack, but her CO Commander Michael Meyrick was constrained by Fraser’s 1637 signal. Fraser later conceded that his order had cramped the style of the destroyers)

(At 1656 hours the SCHARNHORST opened fire, firing starshell from a starboard side 150mm turret and a nine round broadside from Bruno and Caesar turrets [Anton turret out of action], at the same time she turned to port, and steered north then east. Her first salvo fell 2,500 yards short. However her following salvos began to straddle DUKE OF YORK.

At the same time Bey signalled Group North with his grid reference AC 4677and stating ‘heavy battleship, am in action’)

As SCHARNHORST turned away to port, Force 2 altered course to 060¼ to ‘comb’ the tracks of any torpedoes that the enemy may have fired in her turn away.

At 1708 hours a shell from DUKE OF YORK struck the SCHARNHORST between the Caesar turret and the airplane catapult damaging the aircraft hangar and starting a fire.

(At 1708 hours the SCHARNHORST settled on an easterly course and started to open the range from her pursuers as she increased speed.

At 1712 hours Force 1 ceased fire.

At 1720 Burnett signalled that he had ‘lost touch’)

(At 1713 hours Fraser signalled his destroyers ‘destroyers close and attack with torpedoes as soon as possible)

At 1715 hours a shell from DUKE OF YORK hit Bruno turret ventilation system making the turret unusable because of the smoke from the guns when fired.

At 1717 hours DUKE OF YORK, now 13,000 yards from the enemy, commenced firing broadsides under radar control and settled down to a stern chase on a parallel course, to the south of SCHARHORST.

(At 1725 hours Bey signalled Group North ‘SCHARNHORST is surrounded by heavy units and is being engaged by them)

(At 1800 hours Bey sent a signal to Group North stating, ‘SCHARNHORST ever onwards’. This was probably because Fraser around this time, believed that with SCHARNHORST’s 3 knot speed advantage she was going to escape)

At 1808 hours when the range had now opened to 16,000 yards and shell splash observation by radar became difficult; Fraser signalled the Force 2 destroyers to report DUKE OF YORK’s fall of shot.

(At 1819 hours Bey signalled Group north, ‘the enemy is firing by radar at a range of more than 18.000 meters [19620 yards]. Position AC4965, Course 110 degrees, Speed 26 knots’

At 1820 hours the range was now 21,400 yards and SCHARNHORST ceased fire. In 1½ hours due to her superior speed she had opened up the range by 7,400 yards.

At 1821 hours a shell from DUKE OF YORK struck the SCHARNHORST on her starboard side penetrating into No. 1 boiler room, severing the main steam-pipe to the turbines which immediately reduced her speed to 8 knots, but her chief engineer quickly carried out a repair that enabled her to steam at 22 knots)

(At 1825 hours Bey signalled Group North with the signal; ‘To the Fuhrer. We shall fight to the last shell’

At 1830 hours Bey signalled Group North with the signal, ‘steering for Tanafjord, position 71-57N, 28-30E, speed 20 knots)

A shell from SCHARNHORST’s last salvo passed through the foremast and damaged the Type 284M (3) gunnery radar set. Lieutenant H R K Bates RNVR, who was in charge of the 273 office, immediately climbed the mast and fixed the aerial, after which the set was again operational. Bates was awarded a DSC for his action.

Another shell from the same salvo hit the after mast damaging the cables to the Type 281 air warning radar.

At 1824 hours because of the damage to the Type 284M (3) radar DUKE OF YORK’s accuracy dropped. So after 52 broadsides, 31 of which were reported as straddles, fire was checked.

At 1840 hours Fraser signalled to Burnett "I see little hope of catching SCHARNHORST and am proceeding to support convoy" while ordering a turn to south for DUKE OF YORK and JAMAICA.

But before the change of course order was executed, the staff in DUKE OF YORK’s plotting room realized that SCHARNHORST was losing speed and Fraser cancelled the order and instead ordered a turn to the north east heading straight for the SCHARNHORST.

(At 1850 hours the SCHARNHORST turned on to a south westerly then southerly course)

(When SCHARNHORST lost speed it enabled the Force 2 destroyers to gain a favourable position for a torpedo attack. SAVAGE and SAUMAREZ were on SCHARNHORST’s starboard side and SCORPION and STORD on her port side.

SCORPION fired 8 torpedoes from an approximate range of 2100 yards, one probable hit.

STORD fired 8 torpedoes from an approximate range of 1800 yards, no hits.

SAVAGE fired 8 torpedoes from an approximate range of 3500 yards,

SAUMAREZ fired 4 torpedoes from an approximate range of 1800 yards. Just before she fired a 280mm shell, from SCHARNHORST’s Caesar turret, exploded close to SAUMAREZ’s starboard side, showering the deck with splinters, which also penetrated the side plating into the engine room. Her casualties were 11 killed and 11 wounded. SAVAGE and SAUMAREZ achieved 3 hits.

At 1852 hours SAVAGE signalled ‘am proceeding to attack’

At 1852 hours SCORPION signalled ‘attack completed’

At 1853 hours STORD signalled ‘attack completed’

At 1853 hours SAVAGE signalled ‘attack completed’)

At 1842 hours Lieutenant Bates completed his repair work on the Type 284M (3) radar. When the radar was restarted the range to SCHARNHORST was found to be 22,000 yards, bearing 070¼.

At 1854 hours DUKE OF YORK and JAMAICA turned easterly towards the enemy.

At 1900 hours DUKE OF YORK and JAMAICA turned southerly to open their A arcs.

At 1901 hours at a range of 10,400 yards DUKE OF YORK opened fire on the enemy. Several of the shells from the first broadside were seen to land on SCHARNHORST’s quarterdeck. In this phase of the action DUKE OF YORK fired 28 broadsides and obtained many straddles and hits.

(At 1911 hours Bey received his last communication from Group North assuring him that all U-boats, destroyers and aircraft were being sent to the area to help SCHARNHORST)

At 1915 hours DUKE OF YORK and JAMAICA turned easterly then north easterly.

At 1919 hours Fraser signalled BELFAST and JAMAICA ‘finish her off with torpedoes’.

At 1922 hours when observing the fall of shot from her 72nd broadside, it was noticed on the radar screens that the echo, after first appearing as a normal straddle, developed into a great bunch of width 800 yards either side of the target. At the same time a large explosion occurred at SCHARNHORST’s stern.

At 1929 hours DUKE OF YORK checked fire after 77 broadsides, achieving at least 13, possibly up to 30 hits. At this time SCHARNHORST was a blazing wreck and sinking by the stern.

When DUKE OF YORK ceased fire it marked the end of an era, it being the last time a Royal Navy battleship engaged an enemy battleship.

(At 1925 hours JAMAICA launched three torpedoes from her port tubes at the SCHARNHORST. No hits were obtained.

At 1926 hours BELFAST fired four torpedoes from her starboard tubes. No hits were obtained.

At 1933 hours the destroyers MUSKETEER, MATCHLESS, OPPORTUNE and VIRAGO went in to attack with torpedoes.

MUSKETEER and MATCHLESS attacked the port side, MUSKETEER fired four torpedoes, at a range of 1000 yards, three of which were claimed as hits. However MATCHLESS failed to fire any torpedoes because a high wave smashed on to the destroyer amidships cutting communications between bridge and tubes.

OPPORTUNE and VIRAGO attacked the starboard side firing a total of 15 torpedoes, at ranges of 2100 to 2800 yards, four of which were claimed as hits.

At 1937 hours JAMAICA went in to fire three torpedoes from her starboard tubes, at a range of approximately 3300 yards, claiming two hits)

(At 1945 hours, after a total of 55 torpedoes and 2,195 shells had been fired at her, the SCHARNHORST sank in approximate position 72-16N, 28-41E. The sinking was picked up on the sonars of the British ships.

[On 3/10/2000 the wreck of the SCHARNHORST was located 66 nautical miles north-northeast of North Cape, Norway. It lies in 160 fathoms in approximate position 72-10N, 24-24E. SCHARNHORST’s hull lies upside down on the seabed. Her main mast and her rangefinders are the right way up on the seabed some distance away. As is her entire stern with the anchor still in place. The hull shows extensive damage from both armour-piercing shells and torpedoes]

At 2012 hours the SCORPION commenced picking up survivors, rescuing 30.

MATCHLESS picked up six survivors.

Several hundreds survivors were left in the sea; officially this was due to risk of U-boat attack. A total of 1767 crew were lost from the SCHARNHORST)

[In this action, as with the engagements between the PRINCE OF WALES and BISMARCK ,and KING GEORGE V and BISMARCK the 14" gun turrets failed to perform to their optimum. The problem was again mechanical breakdowns in the complex loading arrangements. In the action DUKE OF YORK fired 450 x 14-inch shells in 77 broadsides, out of a possible 770. A shell cage defect in A turret, compounded by poor loading drill, resulted in one of the four guns (A3) being unable to fire in 71 of the 77 broadsides; while three guns in Y turret were unable to fire for a 15-minute period, missing 17 broadsides. The breakdowns in the loading mechanisms affected every single 14-inch gun during the action. The least affected was Bl gun, in B turret which only missed three firings.

She also fired 755 x 5.25-inch shells, 600 SAP shells and 155 starshell rounds.

However, as DUKE OF YORK’s gunnery narrative stated, the ship's armament and radar combined together to 'find, fix, fight and finish off the SCHARNHORST. Which was something of an over statement.

In his despatch Admiral Fraser gave the ship full credit, stating, ‘DUKE OF YORK fought hard and well having drawn, for over an hour and a half, the whole of the enemy's fire. She was frequently straddled with near misses, ahead, astern and on the beam. That she was not hit was probably due to masterly handling aided by accurate advice from the plot (everybody who saw it, and many of those who only appreciated its results, commented upon Captain Guy Russell's skilful ship-handling). There is no doubt that DUKE OF YORK was the principal factor in the battle. She fought the SCHARNHORST at night and she won. This is no way detracts from the achievements of the 'S' Class destroyers who with great gallantry and dash pressed in unsupported, to the closest ranges, to deliver their attacks, being subjected the while to the whole fire power of the enemy']

At 2100 hours Fraser signalled the Admiralty ‘SCHARNHORST sunk’. So ended the Battle of the North Cape; the last battleship action in the history of the Royal Navy.

At 2130 hours Fraser ordered all Force 1 and Force 2 ships including the 36th Division destroyers to head for Vaenga.

At 2351 hours the OIC signalled Fraser informing him of the contents of an Enigma decrypt:-‘at 0615 hours the Eisenbart Group of U-boats had been ordered to steer at top speed for an area bounded by 72N to 72-18N and 26E to 27E’

27th - At 1500 hours DUKE OF YORK arrived at Vaenga. The remainder of Forces 1 and 2 arrived during the next two hours. The badly damaged SAUMAREZ was the last to arrive at 2224 hours having been escorted in by SAVAGE and SCORPION.

At Vaenga the SCHARNHORST’s 36 survivors were transferred to DUKE OF YORK.

Before Fraser would allow DUKE OF YORK to sail he insisted that the Type 281 radar was repaired; so the mast was repaired by a Russian welder and Lieutenant Bates had to re-splice the cable.

28th - At 1800 hours DUKE OF YORK, JAMAICA and the destroyers MUSKETEER, SAVAGE, STORD, SCORPION, MATCHLESS, OPPORTUNE and VIRAGO sailed from Vaenga for Scapa.

1st - At 1000 hours DUKE OF YORK with her battle-ensigns flying, passed through Hoxa Gate and entered Scapa Flow leading JAMAICA and the destroyers MUSKETEER, SAVAGE, STORD, SCORPION, MATCHLESS, OPPORTUNE and VIRAGO. As they steamed through the ships in the flow each ship's company massed on deck cheering as the ships came abreast of them. After DUKE OF YORK had moored and picked up the telephone line there was a flood of congratulatory telegrams and signals from all parts of the world. It was a great homecoming. After mooring, DUKE OF YORK commenced Christmas Day routine.

5th - At 2330 hours DUKE OF YORK escorted by the destroyers MILNE (D3) and METEOR sailed from Scapa for Rosyth.

6th - At 1100 hours DUKE OF YORK and the destroyers MILNE (D3) and METEOR arrived at Rosyth. DUKE OF YORK and MILNE entered the dockyard and METEOR returned to Scapa. DUKE OF YORK was taken in hand for a short refit and repair to the damage suffered in the battle, most of which had been caused by the firing of her own guns; particularly the blast from Y turret when firing on forward bearings. Also she had to be re-ammunitioned but before this could take place the ‘empties’ had to be removed. Four railway wagons were filled with the empty Clarkson cases which had held the half-charges for the 14" shells, and another eight wagons were needed for the spent brass cylinders of the 5.25" fixed ammunition.

24th - At 2345 hours DUKE OF YORK sailed from Rosyth for Scapa.

25th - At 0200 hours off the Eyebroughy Buoy DUKE OF YORK was joined by the destroyers OBEDIENT and ORWELL who then escorted her to Scapa. At 1130 hours DUKE OF YORK and destroyers OBEDIENT and ORWELL arrived at Scapa.

For the whole of February DUKE OF YORK was at Scapa.

1st to 12th - DUKE OF YORK was at Scapa.

13th - At 1100 hours DUKE OF YORK escorted by the destroyer MATCHLESS sailed from Scapa for the Clyde.

14th - At 0800 hours DUKE OF YORK and the destroyer MATCHLESS arrived off Greenock.

16th - At 1000 hours DUKE OF YORK escorted by the destroyer MATCHLESS sailed from the Clyde for Scapa.

17th - At 0800 hours DUKE OF YORK and the destroyer MATCHLESS arrived at Scapa.

30th - At 1130 hours the battleships DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC Home Fleet), ANSON (Flag Vice Admiral Moore 2iC Home Fleet), aircraft carrier VICTORIOUS (with 827 & 829 Barracuda II Squadrons, and 1834 & 1836 Corsair II Squadrons embarked), light cruiser BELFAST, escorted by the destroyers ONSLAUGHT and JAVELIN, HMCS SIOUX and ALGONQUIN and ORP PIORUN sailed as Force 1 from Scapa on Operations FY and TUNGSTEN. Force 1 set course for the Cape Wrath firing range.

(Operation FY was the provision of heavy cover for convoy JW 58. [Convoy JW 58 comprising 49 ships, sailed from Loch Ewe on 27/3/44]. [The battleship cover was provided because OIC was aware that TIRPITZ had carried out trials on the 15 & 16 March. On 20/3/44 the Director of Naval Intelligence warned the Naval Staff that TIRPITZ was unlikely to proceed to sea for operations against a well-escorted convoy but might do so if she was sure that there was no heavy ships to contend with] Operation TUNGSTEN was the FAA attack on the TIRPITZ)

At 1600 hours off Cape Wrath the battleships carried out a calibration shoot and aircraft from VICTORIOUS carried out live bombing practice.

At 1800 hours Force 1 set course north.

(At 1900/30/3/44 Force 2, for Operation TUNGSTEN, comprising light cruisers ROYALIST (Flag Rear Admiral Bisset, RA escort carriers), JAMAICA and SHEFFIELD, aircraft carrier FURIOUS, escort carriers SEARCHER, EMPEROR, PURSUER and FENCER, RFA oilers BROWN RANGER and BLUE RANGER escorted by destroyers VERULAM, VIRAGO, VIGILANT, SWIFT and WAKEFUL sailed from Scapa)

31st - At 0600 hours west of the Faroes the destroyers MILNE (D3), MARNE, METEOR, MATCHLESS, URSA and UNDAUNTED joined Force 1 from Skaalefjord. At 0615 hours the destroyers JAVELIN, HMCS SIOUX and ALGONQUIN and ORP PIORUN detached from Force 1 to refuel at Skaalefjord.

1st - (In the afternoon Fraser received a signal from the Admiralty informing him that from Enigma decrypts that, ‘TIRPITZ was due to carry out full speed trials on 1/4/44, but shortly before noon on that day further intercepts disclosed that this had been postponed for forty-eight hours’.

Operation TUNGSTEN had been planned to take place on 4/4/44. On the morning of 1/1/44 convoy JW 58 was in the Barents Sea and making good progress and the Admiralty’s signal meant that there was now no danger of surface attack on the convoy. Fraser believed that the battleship's trials might present a great opportunity for the airmen since, when at anchor, TIRPITZ was well protected by torpedo nets and smoke screens. So Fraser advanced TUNGSTEN by 24 hours. The decision to move the timetable was communicated to Force 2 by the Leader of Air Operations [Lt Cdr Roy Baker-Falkner, DSC, RN] and the Leader of No. 52 TBR Wing [Lt Cdr (A) V. Rance, RN], who flew a Barracuda from VICTORIOUS to FURIOUS)

2nd - At 1620 hours in approximate position 71-18N, 9E, Forces 1 & 2 joined. At 1630 hours DUKE OF YORK with the destroyers MARNE and MATCHLESS detached from the Battlefleet and steered north to a covering position for TUNGSTEN.

(The Battlefleet under the command of VA2 in the ANSON then set easterly for the flying off position 71-30N, 19-00E for TUNGSTEN)

3rd - At 0230 hours DUKE OF YORK with the destroyers MARNE and MATCHLESS arrived in 74N, 12-30E, where they cruised until Fraser received a signal from Moore informing of the success of the first strike. At 0730 hours course was set to return to Scapa.

5th - At 0900 hours DUKE OF YORK with the destroyers MARNE and MATCHLESS arrived back at Scapa.

(As soon as DUKE OF YORK moored to the telephone buoy the First Sea Lord Cunningham telephoned Fraser, demanding a second attack on the TIRPITZ. Whilst Fraser endorsed the principle that a battered enemy should be aggressively kept on the ropes whenever possible, he disagreed in this case. Fraser took the view that the Home Fleet had made the most of a unique opportunity; the weather conditions were ideal and would unlikely to be encountered again, also the defences which had been caught by surprise once but which would be alert and ready for a second attack. Fraser insisted that a second attack would only mean the sacrifice of much-needed aircraft and aircrew, and further the FAA lacked a suitable weapon to do lethal damage. The stubbornness with which he held to his view prompted the First Sea Lord to some malevolent accusations in his private diary. Fraser argued that in the weeks before the cross-Channel assault the Home Fleet would be far better employed attacking German convoys in Norwegian coastal waters. On 21 April Fraser sent Moore to attempt a second strike on the TIRPITZ, with a strike on Bodo harbour and adjacent sea-lanes as a secondary objective)

6th to 30th - DUKE OF YORK was at Scapa.

6th - DUKE OF YORK was at Scapa where she received a visit from General Montgomery.

10th - 13th - DUKE OF YORK was at Scapa where Fraser played host to HM King George V1 during his visit to the Home Fleet. The King slept on board during his visit.

14th to 31st - DUKE OF YORK was at Scapa.

1st to 12th - DUKE OF YORK was at Scapa.

13th - Flag of Admiral Sir Bruce Austin Fraser, G.C.B., K.B.E. struck in DUKE OF YORK

14th - Flag of Admiral Sir Henry Ruthven Moore, K.C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O. the new CinC Home Fleet, hoisted in DUKE OF YORK

15th to 28th - DUKE OF YORK was at Scapa. Whilst at Scapa she had her AA armament modified by the fitting of two x twin 20mm Oerlikons on No 1 platform and 8 x single 20mm Oerlikons removed from No 1 platform

29th - At 1500 hours the battleships DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC Home Fleet), ANSON, light cruisers JAMAICA and BERMUDA escorted by the destroyers NUBIAN, WHELP and WESSEX sailed from Scapa on Operation TIGER CLAW.

(Operation TIGER CLAW was planned as a repetition of Operations BRAWN and CAMBRIDGE [repetition of Operation TUNGSTEN] In the event, both these operations were again cancelled owing to unsuitable weather, and Operation LOMBARD [strike on enemy shipping in the Aalesund area] was carried out instead.

The mission of DUKE OF YORK force was to act a decoy force)

30th - At 0330 hours north east of the Faroe Islands DUKE OF YORK force was sighted and reported by the daily Luftwaffe meteorological reconnaissance plane. When the reporting of the Force was confirmed course was reversed to return to Scapa. At 2000 hours DUKE OF YORK, ANSON, JAMAICA, BERMUDA and the destroyers NUBIAN, WHELP and WESSEX arrived back at Scapa.

1st to 13th - DUKE OF YORK was at Scapa.

14th - At 1400 hours DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC Home Fleet), aircraft carriers FORMIDABLE (Flag Rear Admiral McGrigor, RA First Cruiser Squadron), INDEFATIGABLE and FURIOUS, heavy cruisers DEVONSHIRE and KENT, light cruisers JAMAICA and BELLONA escorted by the destroyers MILNE (D3), MARNE, MATCHLESS, MUSKETEER, SCOURGE, VERULAM, NUBIAN, VOLAGE, VIRAGO and VIGILANT and HMCS ALGONQUIN and SIOUX and the frigates BURGES (SO 20EG), BULLDOG, INMAN and HOSTE sailed from Scapa on Operation MASCOT.

(Operation MASCOT was an air strike against the TIRPITZ and was a repeat of Operation TUNGSTEN)

16th - At 2400 hours the Home Fleet arrived in approximate position 71-30N, 18E.

17th - At 0100 hours the strike force of 44 Barracudas of the 8th Naval TBR Wing, loaded with 1,000 lb AP and 500 lb bombs and escorted by 18 Corsairs, 18 Hellcats and 12 Fireflies, commenced lifting off from the aircraft carriers FORMIDABLE, INDEFATIGABLE and FURIOUS.

At 0204 hours an observation post, that had been set up by the Germans following the TUNGSTEN attack, gave the alarm and by 0215 hours AA crews closed up and within 10 minutes the shore-based smoke screen, installed after TUNGSTEN, was well established.

At 0220 hours the first aircraft commenced their attack at which time the TIRPITZ was almost entirely obscured by smoke. The strike force attacked through the smoke scoring one near miss.

A Barracuda and Corsair were lost in the attack.

A second strike was cancelled owing to thick fog and the defensive measures taken by the enemy.

At 0530 hours The Home Fleet set course for Scapa.

18th - In the morning Admiral Moore received a signal from the Admiralty NIC informing him of the presence of several U-Boats, possibly up to 15, in the vicinity of the Fleet. (On 17/7 the RAF had sunk three and on 18/7 the RAF sank another).

Although the weather barely suitable foe flying, Lt Cdr. Baker-Falkner, CO of 827 Sqd and Wing Leader for No. 8 TBR, volunteered to fly off FORMIDABLE to carry out an A/S search. and sink the enemy subs. He was escorted by a Corsair of 1841 Sqd flown by Sub Lt Mattholie. In worsening weather Baker-Falkner’s Barracuda II squadron code 5K was lost. Mattholie forced landed in Norway.

19th - At 1630 hours the Home Fleet arrived back at Scapa.

18th to 31st - DUKE OF YORK at Scapa.

1st to 17th - DUKE OF YORK at Scapa.

(Operation MASCOT had been a failure and TIRPITZ was now operational again. [It was known that TIRPITZ had carried out exercises at sea on 31/7/44 and 1/8/44 with the destroyers Z29, Z31, Z33, Z34 and Z39]. TIRPITZ was now again a threat to the Russian convoys and the Admiralty were impatient to put her out of action.

But by now, Admiral Moore was convinced that the Barracudas were too slow to get from the coastline where they were reported, and be over TIRPIZ before the smoke obscured her.

However, Admiralty felt that a series of repeated blows over a short period of forty-eight hours would wear down the enemy's defences and, a practical point, exhaust their immediate supplies of smoke-making canisters. So a further air strike against TIRPITZ was planned)

18th - At 1200 hours DUKE OF YORK (Flag CinC Home Fleet), aircraft carriers INDEFATIGABLE (Flag Rear Admiral McGrigor, RA First Cruiser Squadron), FORMIDABLE and FURIOUS, heavy cruisers BERWICK and DEVONSHIRE, the destroyers MYNGS (D26), KEMPENFELT (D27), VIGILANT, ZAMBESI, HMCS SIOUX and HNorMS STORD sailed from Scapa as Force 1 for Operation GOODWOOD. Course was set northerly to pass to east of the Faeroe Islands. (Operation GOODWOOD was a further air strike against TIRPITZ with the objective of all the previous attacks, ie to put her out of action for the remainder of the war. Failing this to cover the passage of convoys JW 59 and RA 59A, against attack by TIRPITZ.

Three Forces were employed for the operation:

Force 1 comprising DUKE OF YORK and the fleet carriers.

Force 2 comprising the escort carriers NABOB and TRUMPETER escorted by the frigates BICKERTON (SO 5EG), AYLMER, BLIGH, KEATS and KEMPTHORNE.

Force 9, the refuelling group, comprising the RFA’s BLACK RANGER and BLUE RANGER escorted by the corvettes POPPY, DIANELLA and STARWORT)

(15/8/44 convoy JW 59 sailed from Loch Ewe. The convoy consisted of 34 merchant ships escorted by the 20th EG)

19th - At 0200 hours in approximate position 62N, 4W the destroyers SCORPION, SERAPIS, CAMBRIAN, VOLAGE, VERULAM, VIRAGO, SCOURGE, WHIRLWIND, WRANGLER and HMCS ALGONQUIN joined Force 1 from Skaalefjord. At 0215 hours the destroyers KEMPENFELT and ZAMBESI detached to refuel at Skaalefjord.

20th - The destroyer WHIRLWIND was detached and returned to Scapa with engine defects.

21st - At 0600 hours Forces 1 & 2 arrived in approximate position 71-15N, 19E. The plan was for the strike force to fly off in the late morning but the weather, seas breaking over the carrier’s decks, was not suitable for operating aircraft. Moore took the decision to abandon the operation for 24 hours and so Forces 1 and 2 steamed westward towards Force 9 to refuel the destroyers and cruisers. After refuelling Forces 1 and 2 reversed course and steered easterly for the flying off position.

22nd - At 1000 hours Forces 1 and 2 arrived at the flying off position. At 1100 hours the strike force lifted off, the strike and escort consisted of 32 Barracudas (of 820, 826, 827, 828 and 830 Squadrons), eleven Fireflies of 1770 and eight Seafires of 887 and 24 Corsairs of 1841 and 1842, and nine Hellcats of 1840. This attack became known as GOODWOOD 1. When the Barracudas arrived over the coast they found the area shrouded in dense cloud so the strike mission was aborted. The Barracudas and Corsairs returned to the carriers. However, the Hellcats and Fireflies managed to find and attack the TIRPITZ, achieving a measure of surprise; one hit with a 500 lb bomb was claimed but in fact no hits were achieved. Targets of opportunity were also attacked which resulted in damage to two small ships and TIRPITZ’s Arado Ar 196 sea-planes that were moored nearby. Five enemy aircraft were destroyed, for the loss of one Barracuda, one Hellcat and a Seafire.

(Because the visibility was poor, due to thick cloud, the minelaying, that was to be carried out by the Avengers of 846 and 856 Squadrons from Force 2, was cancelled. Therefore Force 2 with the KENT moved off to the west)

During the day Seafires of 894 Squadron from INDEFATIGABLE, who were flying CAP over the Fleet, shot down two Blohm & Voss Bv 138 reconnaissance aircraft. In the early evening a further strike by 6 Hellcat fighter bombers of 1840 Squadron, escorted by 8 Fireflies of 1770 Squadron from INDEFATIGABLE, (GOODWOOD II) was carried out against the TIRPITZ 2 hits with 500 lb bombs were claimed, but in fact no hits were achieved. Following recovery of the strike aircraft Force 1 moved away from the coast to refuel and await improved weather.

(At 1716/22/8/44 the NABOB, of Force 2, was torpedoed by U 354 and at 1724/22/8/44 the BICKERTON was torpedoed by the same U boat)

24th - With improved weather conditions Force 1 moved into the flying off position for a further air strike against the TIRPITZ (GOODWOOD III). At 1430 hours aircraft from the FORMIDABLE, FURIOUS and INDEFATIGABLE commenced lifting off. The 33 Barracudas carried 1,600 lb AP bombs, the 10 Hellcats each carried a 500 lb HE bomb, and 5 of the 24 Corsairs carried a 1,000 lb AP bomb, the remainder of the Corsairs with the 10 Fireflies were tasked with flak suppression.

At 1547 hours the German defences were alerted and the smoke screen was started. The aircraft approached from all directions at heights from 6,500 feet to 10,000 feet, diving low into the attack. The attack technique was devised from the lessons of Operation TUNGSTEN, this mode of attack made the directing of the enemy’s AA fire very much more difficult. By diving low through the smoke screen two hits were scored for the loss of two Hellcats and four Corsairs. A 500 lb bomb landed on top of Bruno turret causing minor damage to the top and temporarily damaging the elevating gear of the starboard gun and destroying the quadruple 20mm AA mounting on top. The other bomb proved to be the Fleet Air Arm's greatest disappointment. A 1,600 lb AP bomb hit just forward of the bridge on the port side and penetrated the upper deck and the armoured deck, coming to rest in No. 4 Switch Room on the lower platform deck, but it failed to explode and when the Germans finally removed the explosive they found there was only 100 lb instead of 215 lb there should have been. Had this bomb exploded it would have caused considerable damage.

After recovery of the strike force, Force 1 moved away from the coast and set course for Skaalefjord to refuel and obtain some respite from the weather.

(Following this attack the Germans ordered a reduction in the required time of notice for smoke production from 10 to 7 minutes)

26th - At 0200 hours east of the Faroes the FURIOUS, KENT and BERWICK and the destroyer SERAPIS from Force 1 and the frigates AYLMER, BLIGHT and KEATS from Force 2, detached from Force1 and returned to Scapa. The remainder of Force 1 entered Skaalefjord to refuel.

27th - At 1000 hours Force 1 sailed from Skaalefjord and steered northerly to return to the flying off position.

29th - With improved weather conditions Force 1 moved into the flying off position for a further air strike against the TIRPITZ (GOODWOOD IV). 26 Barracudas, 17 Corsairs, 7 Hellcats and 10 Fireflies were launched from FORMIDABLE and INDEFATIGABLE. Four of the 7 Hellcats carried target indicators but the Germans had sufficient warning and the battleship was completely obscured by smoke. The Hellcats bombed blindly and 2 hits were claimed but in fact none were achieved.  7 Seafires were launched from INDEFATIGABLE to carry out a subsidiary attack on Hammerfest harbour. One Firefly and one Corsair were lost. After recovery of the strike aircraft the INDEFATIGABLE with the destroyers SCORPION, WRANGLER and ALGONQUIN, detached and set course for Scapa.

(In the four GOODWOOD attacks two hits were made on the TIRPITZ, six radar and W/T stations were attacked and damaged, 19 vessels [including a U-boat, 3 destroyers, a tanker, and a large merchantman] were attacked and damaged, and various flak positions, oil tanks, and military buildings were set on fire. For the loss of nine aircraft and two damaged)

DUKE OF YORK, FORMIDABLE, DEVONSHIRE and the destroyers MYNGS, SIOUX, VIGILANT, VIRAGO, SCOURGE, CAMBRIAN, VOLAGE and STORD withdrew to cover convoy RA 59A.

(28/8/44 convoy RA 59A comprising nine merchant ships sailed from the Kola Inlet)

29th - The FORMIDABLE with the destroyers VOLAGE and STORD detached and set course for Scapa.

30th - DUKE OF YORK, DEVONSHIRE and the destroyers MYNGS, SIOUX, VIGILANT, VIRAGO, SCOURGE and CAMBRIAN set course to return to Scapa.

3rd - At 0700 hours DUKE OF YORK, DEVONSHIRE and the destroyers MYNGS, SIOUX, VIGILANT, VIRAGO, SCOURGE and CAMBRIAN arrived back at Scapa at the end of Operation GOODWOOD. Later in the day Captain Angus Dacres Nicholl, DSO, RN took command of DUKE OF YORK. Whilst at Scapa DUKE OF YORK was visited by HM King George VI.

17th - DUKE OF YORK at Scapa. The Staff of the Commander in Chief, Home Fleet, were transferred to FURIOUS.

18th - At 0800 hours the flag of the Commander in Chief, Home Fleet, was transferred to FURIOUS. At 1000 hours DUKE OF YORK escorted by the destroyers SAVAGE and HNorMS STORD sailed from Scapa for Liverpool.

19th - At 1600 hours DUKE OF YORK with the destroyers SAVAGE and STORD arrived at Liverpool. On arrival at Liverpool DUKE OF YORK entered Gladstone Dock where she was taken in hand for a refit and modernization by Cammell Laird. Following docking she paid off.

At Liverpool under refit.

At Liverpool under refit. The main purpose of the refit was to prepare her for service in the Pacific, to bring her radar fit up to date and to enhance her close range AA armament to counter the advent of the Kamikaze. The work carried out included:

Four Supermarine Walrus seaplanes and catapult removed.
The hangars were converted for use as cinemas and new crew space provided on catapult deck.
Her AA Armament was modified by the removal of 18 single 20mm Oerlikons and the addition of:
Six x 4 barrel pom-poms 2 on quarterdeck, 2 on sponsons abreast the bridge, 2 on upper deck abreast B turret
Six x twin 20mm Oerlikon mountings on the former boat deck.
The platform on the after funnel was extended forward, this distinguish her from the other ships of the class.

Her Radar fit was modified as follows:

Two x Type 274, one on the fore main director and one on the aft main director. The Type 284 removed.
One Type 281B with aerial on the mainmast, two IFF. 'Headache' with aerial on foremast, TBS types 86 and 87 with aerials on yard arms, D/F hut and aerial on quarterdeck. The Type 281 removed.
One Type 293 air warning, with aerial on foremast. Type 273 removed.
One Type 277 combined air/surface target indication radar, with aerial at top of foremast.
Type 282 with aerials on new pom-pom directors each side of after funnel.
Type 242 for use in conjunction with Type 281B.

Modifications were carried out to the boiler oil burners (atomisers). This was to combat the higher seawater content of the bunker oil then in use.

(The high seawater content was caused by a number of factors; the KGV class used fuel oil as part of the Side Protection System in the liquid layers of the SPS. As fuel was consumed, water was allowed to enter the bottom of the layer to maintain the defensive qualities. The low viscosity fuel used in the early part of war resisted mixing with seawater and what seawater contamination did occur was easily removed. After 1942 the Royal Navy was forced to use fuel oils with considerably higher viscosity and greater seawater content than the boilers in use could efficiently utilise. The poor quality of the oil fuel combined with the seawater contamination, [due to having to use old commercial oil tankers and from contact with seawater in the SPS system] reduced the efficiency of the steam power plant by 10% to 12% and increased maintenance which was becoming increasingly difficult to carry out.

The Admiralty was aware of this problem and designed new types of oil sprayers and burners that could burn the higher viscosity and ‘contaminated bunker oil much more efficiently and raise the boiler full-power capacity back to the design specification)

On completion of her refit the displacement of DUKE OF YORK rose to 39, 780 tons (standard) 44,790 tons (full load).

At Liverpool where the refit was completed. Re-commissioned under same CO, Captain Angus Dacres Nicholl, DSO, RN. Carried out harbour trials.

27th - Visited by HM King George VI and HM Queen Elizabeth

4th - DUKE OF YORK escorted by the destroyers CAVENDISH and HMCS HAIDA sailed from Liverpool for Scapa

5th - DUKE OF YORK and the destroyers CAVENDISH and HAIDA arrived at Scapa. On arrival DUKE OF YORK commenced working up exercises.

25th - The battleships DUKE OF YORK, ANSON, the heavy cruiser SUSSEX escorted by the destroyers CAPRICE and CARRON sailed from Scapa to join the British Pacific Fleet.

27th - The destroyers CAPRICE and CARRON detached for Falmouth.

30th - Arrived at Gibraltar, refuelled and sailed for Malta.

2nd- Arrived at Malta. At Malta, DUKE OF YORK entered the dockyard and was taken in hand to repair a major electrical defect.

26th - Sailed from Malta for Port Said.

27th - Carried out gunnery firings off Mersa Matruh during work-up after repair work.

28th - Arrived at Port Said.

30th - Arrived at Suez.

3rd - Arrived at Aden.

8th - Arrived at Colombo.

24th - Arrived at Fremantle.

26th - Arrived off Albany, Western Australia, for a short visit.

1st - Arrived at Sydney

4th - Entertained US visitors at reception on Independence Day.

11th - HRH the Duke of Gloucester, Governor General of Australia visited the ship.

17th - 0800 hours DUKE OF YORK sailed from Sydney to carry out, replenishment exercise, target indication and radar calibration, and an AA shoot. At 2100 hours DUKE OF YORK, anchored in Jervis Bay.

18th - Returned to Sydney harbour.

26th - DUKE OF YORK entered the Captain Cook Graving Dock, Garden Island, for a bottom scrape and paint.

30th - At 0900 hours DUKE OF YORK left dry dock.

31st - DUKE OF YORK escorted by the destroyers WAGER and WHELP sailed from Sydney for Manus.

5th - DUKE OF YORK and the destroyers WAGER and WHELP arrived at Seeadler Harbour, Manus. At Manus the Flag of the CinC of Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser CinC British Pacific Fleet was raised.

6th - (The first atomic bomb, code named LITTLE BOY, was dropped on Hiroshima)

7th - DUKE OF YORK, Flag CinC BPC, escorted by the destroyers WAGER and WHELP sailed from Seeadler Harbour, Manus for Guam.

9th - DUKE OF YORK and the destroyers WAGER and WHELP arrived at Guam for meetings with US Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz CinC Pacific Fleet and his staff.

(A second atomic bomb, code named, FAT BOY, was dropped on Nagasaki. Also the USSR declared war on Japan)

10th - On board DUKE OF YORK at Guam Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser invested Fleet Admiral Nimitz with the Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath, on behalf of HM King George VI.

(10/8/45 whilst at Guam, Fraser received the news that Japan was willing to accept the terms of the Potsdam meeting with adjustments)

13th - DUKE OF YORK, Flag CinC BPC, escorted by the destroyers WAGER and WHELP, now designated as Task Group 30.2, sailed from Guam heading towards Japan.

15th - At sea when the news was received that Japan had surrendered, at noon Tokyo time.

16th - DUKE OF YORK, with the destroyers WAGER and WHELP, TG30.2, arrived off the south coast of the Island of Honshu and joined units of the US 3rd Fleet commanded by Admiral "Bull" Halsey. After joining up with the US 3rd Fleet Admiral Fraser went on board the USS MISSOURI, which was the flagship of Admiral William Frederick Halsey the CinC US 3rd Fleet, and awarded Halsey the Order of the Knight of the British Empire.

18th - Off the south coast of the Island of Honshu DUKE OF YORK and the destroyers WAGER and WHELP joined the remaining units of the British Pacific Fleet, now known as the Token Force and designated Task Group 38.5, comprising the battleship KING GEORGE V, aircraft carrier INDEFATIGABLE, light cruisers NEWFOUNDLAND and HMNZS GAMBIA and the destroyers BARFLEUR, TEAZER, TENACIOUS, TROUBRIDGE, WAKEFUL, WRANGLER and HMAS NAPIER and NIZAM.

20th - Carried out a RAS (Replenishment At Sea)

23rd - DUKE OF YORK and the destroyers WAGER and WHELP were re-designated Task Group 30.2 for the entry into Tokyo Bay. The remainder of Task Group 38.5 were re-designated Task Force 37.

27th - DUKE OF YORK the US Third Fleet, including the British Token Force, anchored in Sagami Wan. The following day, sufficient berths had been swept inside to allow the entry into Tokyo Bay

29th - Early in the morning the entry into Tokyo Bay commenced, lead by the US Fleet Flagship Group, followed by Task Group 30.2 comprising DUKE OF YORK Flag CinC BPC, and the destroyers WAGER and WHELP, followed by US TF 35, followed by TF 37 which comprised the British Token Force and bringing up the rear was the US TF 31, which was the Yokosuka Occupation Force..

(The entry into Tokyo Bay had been scheduled for26/8/45 but was delayed for 48 hours due a typhoon that struck the Home Islands.

The entry into the bay of the task forces and groups was covered by an air umbrella of hundreds of planes from US TF 38 in case of last ditch Kamikaze attacks..

There was a strong feeling among the crews of the ships of the British Pacific Fleet that DUKE OF YORK, who had not fired a shot in anger in the Pacific, should not have had the honour of leading the Fleet into Tokyo Bay)

30th- (Admiral Fraser went aboard the destroyer WHELP that took him to the hospital ship USS BENEVOLENCE, anchored off the naval port of Yokosuka. The BENEVOLENCE was processing some of the first liberated Allied prisoners of war. Fraser listened to their grim stories and was clearly affected by what he saw and heard. When he returned to DUKE OF YORK he was mad at the Japanese for their treatment of the POW’s)

2nd - DUKE OF YORK was in Tokyo Bay for the official surrender ceremony.

(The surrender ceremony took place on the battleship the USS MISSOURI, which was anchored in berth F 71, Tokyo Bay. It commenced at 0902 hours with an introductory statement by General MacArthur after which he directed the representatives of Japan to sign the two Instruments of Surrender. At 0904 hours Foreign Minister Shigemitsu signed, followed two minutes later by General Umezu. General MacArthur then led the Allied delegations in signing, first Fleet Admiral Nimitz as United States Representative, then the representatives of China, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Australia, Canada, France, The Netherlands and New Zealand. The chairs that the delegates sat on were supplied from DUKE OF YORK.

At 0914 hours Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser signed for the United Kingdom;

General Sir Thomas Blamey signed for Australia;

Colonel Lawrence Moore Cosgrave signed for Canada;

Air Vice Marshall Leonard M. Isitt signed for New Zealand.

Following a few brief remarks by MacArthur, the ceremonies concluded at 0925 hours.

During the surrender ceremony a massive flight of Hellcats and Corsairs from the US Task Group 38.1, which was cruising off the south coast of Honshu Island, flew overhead)

5th - DUKE OF YORK and the remainder of the British Pacific Fleet reverted to RN control.

9th - DUKE OF YORK, Flag CinC BPF, sailed from Tokyo Bay for Okinawa and Hong Kong. 

14th - Arrived at Hong Kong with CinC

16th - At the formal surrender ceremony in Hong Kong.

(Rear Admiral C J Harcourt, former captain of ship, signed for Great Britain in his capacity as CinC Hong Kong and Head of Administration, Admiral Fraser as CinC BPF attended as an observer)

21st - Sailed for Sydney with call at Manila to refuel.

9th - Arrived at Sydney

At Sydney

3rd - Sailed from Sydney for visit to Tasmania.

21st - Arrived at Sydney from Norfolk Bay, Tasmania.

1st - Took passage from Sydney for Hong Kong with calls at Fremantle, Christmas Island and Singapore.

7th - At Fremantle.

14th - At Singapore.

21st - Arrived at Hong Kong after passage in extreme weather during which the First Lieutenant, Lieut. Cdr. May, RN was swept overboard with several other men from cable party during work to secure anchors. All the men were saved except the First Lieutenant.

26th - 1,200 of ship’s company were landed as part of KENNEDY FORCE, the temporary garrison of the Colony, pending the arrival of the Army and relieved the naval personnel landed from the battleship ANSON when the Japanese surrendered.

At Hong Kong

17th - Sailed from Hong Kong for a Flag Visit to Amoy.

21st - Returned to Hong Kong.

At Hong Kong

19th - Took part in exercises off Hong Kong which included US Navy ships.

At Hong Kong

10th - Admiral Fraser and staff left ship. (Note: BPF was being administered from Hong Kong pending transfer of Headquarters from Sydney)

11th - Passage from Hong Kong for visit to Japan.

15th - At Nagasaki

16th - At Kagoshima

19th - At Kure. (Note: British Commonwealth Base was at Kure and later used by RN and Commonwealth warships during the Korean War. Visits to Hiroshima to see results of Atom Bomb attack were arranged)

26th - At Yokohama. (Note: Ships company able to visit Tokyo which had been extensively damaged by allied bombing.)

27th - Took passage to Sydney.

Passage in Pacific.

10th - At Sydney for routine docking and leave.

At Sydney

15th - Sailed from Sydney for Hong Kong.

29th - Arrived at Hong Kong.

7th - Admiral Lord Fraser embarked for passage to Singapore.

11th - Arrived at Singapore. Admiral Lord Fraser relieved as CinC BPF by Admiral Sir Denis Boyd. Sailed from Singapore to UK with Admiral Lord Fraser embarked.

18th - Sailed from Colombo.

28th - Sailed from Port Said with calls at Malta and Gibraltar.

8th - Passage from Gibraltar to Plymouth.

11th - Arrived at Plymouth.

(Note: Ship has steamed 58,413 miles since leaving Scapa Flow in April 1945)