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Norwegian
Campaign Operations April to June 1940
Area of
Operations
SECRET
Subject: SINKING
OF H.M.S. GURKHA
From: Commanding Officer, H.M.S. GURKHA
Date: 11th April 1940
To: Captain (D) Fourth Destroyer Flotilla
(copies
to:
Secretary
of the Admiralty
Commander
in Chief, Home Fleet
Vice
Admiral Commanding, Eighteenth Cruiser Squadron
Rear
Admiral (D), Home Fleet
Commanding
Officer, H.M.S. AURORA)
When the air attacks on the cruiser and
destroyers under
Vice Admiral Commanding Eighteenth Cruiser Squadron,
started at about 1430 on 9th
April 1940, some thirty miles to the West of Kors
Fiord, H.M.S. GURKHA was in company with Captain (D),
Fourth Destroyer
Flotilla, and H.M. Ships SIKH and MOHAWK, two miles on the
starboard beam of
the cruiser squadron – course 025 degrees. Wind force 5
from the
Northward. Sea about 32.
2. The destroyers broke formation early in the
attack and
became somewhat separated. GURKHA's
courses were
adjusted as necessary to bring the guns to bear on enemy
aircraft. Control of fire and
fighting of guns being very much facilitated
when steering down wind. Ground was first made to
leeward and later
towards the rear of the cruiser squadron for which
position Captain (D) Fourth
Destroyer was seen to be making.
3. At 1507 when about five miles on the quarter
of the
cruiser squadron, steering 290 degrees, one of the several
enemy aircraft then
in sight, a four engined
bomber, was seen to be
approaching on a steady course from the starboard quarter,
at about 10,000 feet.
Course was altered to bring the aircraft on the beam so
that all guns could
bear, but after a few rounds were fired the angle of sight
became too great for
the limited elevation of the 4.7 inch
guns. (n.b.
this brings up a disputed fact. The only four engine
bomber that Germany
possessed at that time was the Kondor
FW 200, but
they were supposedly not in service in Norway for more
than another week).
4. The target was, however, kept abeam so that
the pom-poms
were able to bear in the event of the aircraft starting a
dive
bombing attack. It was soon clear, however, that
a high level bombing
attack was being made, and the rudder was then put to
'Hard a Starboard' in an
attempt to take avoiding action. Speed had been reduced to
15 knots on going
into a head wind, so that avoiding action actually taken
was small.
The policy of giving prior consideration to
control of fire
was deliberate.
Soon after the rudder had been put to 'Hard a
Starboard' a
'stick' of six bombs fell on the starboard side abreast
the gear room, from
about 150 yards to right alongside.
5. The gear room quickly filled followed shortly
by the
engine room, and by the majority of the after
compartments. The steering
compartment remained intact. What appeared to be an oil
fuel fire started in or
under the after superstructure, and the ship listed to
starboard bringing the
upper deck to within about two feet from the waterline
amidships, and one foot
aft.
6. The wireless installation and large signal
projectors failed immediately after the explosion, and
efforts were made to attract the attention of the
remaining destroyers and cruisers with the 6" Aldis
lamp, siren, flag signals, and 'Not under control'
balls, but without success. GURKHA was about five miles on
their quarter and
they were busily engaged repelling aircraft.
7. During the subsequent five and a half hours
that the ship
remained afloat the H.A. director, T.S.
, foremost
guns, and supply parties remained in action in primary
control and engaged
approaching enemy aircraft on about twelve separate
occasions. This fire was
sufficient to deter them from making further attacks
except one
which, like the first, carried out a high level
bombing attack at about
10,000 feet. A 'stick' of about six bombers missed ahead
by about 200 yards.
8. The remainder of the men were employed on
placing the
collision mat, jettisoning all weighty articles and
fittings on the starboard
side and high up in the ship, preparing boats and rafts
for lowering, preparing
to tow forward, and baling out boiler room bilges.
Unfortunately, the torpedo tubes were jambed
fore and aft so that the torpedoes could not be placed
overboard.
9. Attempts were made to deal with the fire
after, but no
fire main pressure being available, and access being
impossible, due to dense
fumes, the after compartments were battened down. The risk
of
fire spreading to the after magazines were
accepted, it being considered
undesirable to surrender further buoyancy by flooding
them.
10. The technical details of action taken in the
engine room
and boiler rooms were not available without further
enquiry from the ratings
concerned. The Engineer Officer reported at the time that
the engine room could
not be cleared by the main circulators and that the Downton
pump could not be usefully employed.
After discussion with the Engineer Officer, it
was decided
to clear the foremost oil fuel tanks on the starboard side
(Nos. 1 – 3)
and this was done.
11. Meanwhile, Telegraphist
rigged
jury aerials, provided spare batteries from the fore
store, repaired fuses,
etc., and about 1600 were able to transmit on 366 kc/S
(low
power) a message stating that GURKHA was in danger of
sinking from bombs,
giving her position 60-29 degrees North, 3-20 degrees East
(Based on Vice
Admiral Commanding Eighteenth Cruiser Squadron's reference
position at 1300).
No reply was received for some time, but after
altering
settings and length of aerials, at 1715, AURORA answered
saying 'coming to your
assistance.'
12. A signal
was then made stating GURKHA's
position would be indicated
by firing H.E. bursts. This was done at about 1830, and
the burst
were apparently observed by AURORA who was thus
able to make contact. She
was sighted at about 1855.
13. It was, at first, decided to continue
preparations for
towing forward, while disembarkation of personnel
proceeded with AURORA's
boats, but as the fire aft developed into a blaze,
and the ship was clearly sinking, these preparations were
discontinued.
14. Boatwork was
slow and
difficult in the prevailing wind and sea, and only about
half the ship's
company had been taken off when the ship sank at 2045. The
remainder jumped
from the forecastle and nearly all were able to swim or
paddle in rafts to
AURORA who was brought close abreast of them to windward.
The accurate placing
of AURORA in this position at the correct moment was
responsible for the large
number of men able to reach her.
15. When AURORA was lying to windward of GURKHA
while
operating boats, GURKHA swung round so that the wind was
brought from port to
starboard, causing her to right and then list over to
port. When finally
foundering she listed right over on her port side and then
went down stern
first, bows vertically in.
It is feared that some officers and men remained
on the
forecastle a few seconds too long and were probably sucked
under.
16. Ships of the Sixth Destroyer Flotilla
appeared just
after the ship had sunk and assisting in searching for
survivors in the failing
light. H.M.S. MASHONA picked up six.
17. Of the 215 officers and men originally on
board 199 were
picked up alive; five officers and ten ratings are
missing. One rating was
picked up dead.
The three ratings injured in the original
explosion were
successfully rescued.
18. Confidential and secret books were taken
below and
stowed at the bottom of the ship before sinking.
19. The behavior of officers and men as a whole
was
excellent. I wish to commend Lieutenant Commander (E) I.C.
Howden,
Royal Navy, unfortunately among the missing, for the
untiring efforts made by
him in endeavouring to save
the ship, and Acting
Petty Officer Telegraphist
Rainer for the
determination and resource shown by him in successfully
repairing the damaged
wireless installation without which assistance would not
have been forthcoming
in time to save life.
(sgd)
A.W. Buzzard
Commander
(date
stamped Commander in Chief, Home Fleet, 18 April 1940)
SECRET
LOSS OF H.M.S. GURKHA
(H.M.S.
GURKHA's
letter dated 11th April 1940)
No. 819/H.F. 490
ADMIRALTY
(copies to: The
Rear Admiral (D), Home Fleet
The
Captain
(D) 4th Destroyer Flotilla
Forwarded
for information
2. At 1100 on 9th April 1940, the Battlefleet
was in position lat. 60-05 degrees N., long. 02-57
degrees E. steering 180 degrees at 20 knots. The
First, Eighteenth, and Second Cruiser Squadrons were
spread in pairs 7 miles
ahead to form an A.K. line.
3. At 1100 the Vice Admiral Commanding the
Eighteenth
Cruiser Squadron received my 1045/9 ordering the
Eighteenth Cruiser Squadron in
company (the MANCHESTER, SOUTHAMPTON, GLASGOW, and
SHEFFIELD), and the Fourth
and Sixth Destroyer Flotillas (consisting of Captain (D)
IV in the AFRIDI, the
MOHAWK, SIKH, and GURKHA, Captain (D) VI in the SOMALI,
the MATABELE and
MASHONA) to proceed and attack Bergen when ordered. This
force was ordered to
proceed at 1125 and the Eighteenth Cruiser Squadron and
destroyers altered
course at 025 degrees, speed 20 knots, at 1140. This speed
was subsequently
reduced to 16 knots as
destroyers could not keep up on
account of weather.
4. At noon the course of the Battlefleet
was altered to 360 degrees, speed of advance 16 knots. The
weather at this time
was wind N.N.W. force 5, sea 33. Sky, b.c.,
visibility very good.
5. At 1410, the Vice Admiral Commanding
Eighteenth Cruiser
Squadron, received Admiralty message 1347/9 canceling the
operation against
Bergen and altered course to rejoin the Battlefleet
whose position at 1410 was lat 60-20 degrees N., long.
02-53 degrees E., course
360 degrees, speed of advance 16 knots.
6. At 1425, heavy air attacks on the Eighteenth
Cruiser
Squadron and destroyers in company developed and air
attacks on the Battlefleet
were also made. The 4th and 6th
Destroyer Flotillas had dropped astern of the Eighteenth
Cruiser Squadron
during the attempt to make high speed towards Bergen and
were further scattered
by their alterations of course during the air attacks.
7.
When GURKHA was damaged by bombs at 1507, she was about five miles on the
quarter of the
cruisers and in the heat of the action the fact that she
was damaged was not
observed by the cruisers or destroyers.
8. Captain (D) IV in paragraph 1 of minute II
has generously
accepted the responsibility for allowing GURKHA to become
detached, but his
minute was written on the 22nd April by which
time all or most of us
had realised that to remain
concentrated was the best
defence against air attack,
whereas on the 9th
April, when the attack took place this was not generally realised.
Destroyers escorting Norwegian convoys when under air
attack had often been out
of supporting distance from each other and no harm had
come to them. I knew
this and had issued no instructions on the matter. I do
not, therefore,
consider that Captain (D) IV,
is any more to blame
than I am, except for the omission to notice that the
GURKHA had detached
herself completely as opposed to taking independent
avoiding action.
The Commanding Officer of the GURKHA was unwise
in his
decision to steer down wind in order to facilitate gunfire
and thus become totally
detached from his Captain (D). Unless definite orders to
scatter had been given
he should only have taken individual avoiding action
whilst remaining in
company.
9. I concur in the remarks of paragraph 3 of
minute II and
consider that AURORA did extremely well to pick up the GURKHA's
W/T signal, find her, and rescue nearly all her crew.
10. I do not consider either a Board of Enquiry
or a Court
Martial is necessary.
(sgd) C.M.
Forbes,
Admiral
of the Fleet
H.M.S.
RODNEY
15th
May 1940
SECRET
SINKING OF H.M.S. GURKHA
(Commanding
Officer, GURKHA's report
dated 11th April 1940)
II
No. 73/169
Rear Admiral (D) Home Fleet
GURKHA was in the hands of an inexperienced
Commanding
Officer and became detached; he should not have been
allowed to
have become detached; the
responsibility for failure to call
him in is wholly mine; I have not, I regret to report, any
explanation worth
recording to account for this omission.
2. I endorse the commendations contained in the
final
paragraph of Commander Buzzard's report, and have noted
the name of Petty
Officer Telegraphist Rainer
for further action.
3. The discipline and steadiness in adversity of
the ship's
company of GURKHA reported by the Commanding Officer,
H.M.S. AURORA, in his
letter 00291 of 10th April 1940, reflects
credit on Commander
Buzzard, and provides a pleasant feature in an incident
which
was otherwise regrettable.
(sgd)
Philip Vian,
Captain (D), Fourth Destroyer Flotilla
AFRIDI
22nd
April 1940
III
No. H.D. 00571A
Commander in
Chief, Home Fleet
(Copy to Captain (D) IV)
Forwarded concurring in paragraph 3 of minute II
(Sgd) R.H.C. Hallifax,
Rear
Admiral (D), Home Fleet
WOOLWICH
26th
April 1940
(date
stamped Commander in Chief Home Fleet 29 April 1940)
SECRET
Enclosure
to AURORA's
No. 00291 dated 10th April 1940
Loss of GURKHA – SIGNALS EXCHANGED
S.O.S.
From:
GURKHA
Position 60-29 degrees North, 3-20 degrees
East
T.O.R.
1700
To:
Scapa
From:
GURKHA
IMMEDIATE
Have been badly damaged by bomb my position 012
degs. TPTS 26, Danger of
sinking. 1515
T.O.R.
1653
To:
GURKHA
From:
AURORA
Am coming to your assistance. (No reply from
GURKHA)
1715
T.O.D.
1720
To:
GURKHA
From:
AURORA
IMMEDIATE
Make smoke.
1757
T.O.D.
1800
To:
AURORA
From:
GURKHA
Am about to open
fire
T.O.R.
1802
To:
AURORA
From:
GURKHA
Can you D/F
me.
T.O.R.
1840
To:
GURKHA
From:
AURORA
Reply No. Fire two more rounds.
1844.
T.O.D.
1848
To:
AURORA
From:
C.in C. Home Fleet
IMPORTANT
Report
reason your 1715 to GURKHA and present situation.
1959.
T.O.R.
2155
To: C.in C.
H.F.
From:
AURORA
Your
1959. GURKHA sunk by bombs. Have saved most of crew. Details will
be reported
later. Am in company with GLASGOW.
2224/9
T.O.D.
2308
SECRET
Subject.
LOSS OF H.M.S. GURKHA
From: The Commanding Officer H.M.S. AURORA
Date: 10th April
1940
No.
00291
To: The Commander in Chief, Home Fleet
(copies to: The Vice
Admiral
Commanding, Second Cruiser Squadron.
Rear
Admiral (D) Home Fleet
Captain
(D) 4th Destroyer Flotilla
The following report is forwarded with reference
to my
2224/9th April.
2. At 1705 on 9th April 1940, I
intercepted a
signal from GURKHA to say that she had been bombed and was
in danger of
sinking. I altered course for the position given,
increasing to 29 knots, but
owing to discrepancies in navigational positions there was
no sign of GURKHA in
position indicated. I swept in the direction shown on
track chart and endeavoured
to D/F GURKHA but her low power W/T was so weak
that this was unsuccessful. I told GURKHA to make smoke
and she fired a series
of smoke shell, one of which was sighed by Arthur
Frederick Wilcocks,
Leading Seaman, P/JX 134465 in the D.C.T. I altered course
towards this smoke
burst and came up to GURKHA some 18 miles away, visibility
at that time being
extreme. I wish to emphasize that the survivors of GURKHA
owe their lives to
the vigilance of Leading Seaman Wilcocks.
3. On arrival in the vicinity of GURKHA she had
a heavy list
and was on fire aft. I decided that towing was quite out
of the question and
proceeded to hoist out the cutter and lower two whalers
which
were mainly responsible for the rescue of GURKHA's
Ship's Company.
4. Wind, Force 5 – 6, and sea (31 – Douglas
scale) made the process of transferring GURKHA's
Ship's Company a lengthy operation and I regret to report
that GURKHA sank
before the completion of this operation, which act was
largely responsible for
15 lives being lost. Some of these were actually lost
alongside AURORA which again
draws attention to the fact that lines
thrown to men in the water must have a bowline already
tied in them.
5. I should like to stat that the discipline and
steadiness
of GURKHA's Ship's Company
right up to the last when
the ship sank vertically by the stern, was in accordance
with the best
traditions of the service and reflects great credit on the
Captain, Officers,
and Men concerned.
(sgd)
L.H.K.
Hamilton
Captain
Enclosures:
Track Chart (to Commander in Chief, only)
Relevant signals.
(date
stamp
Rear Admiral (D) Home Fleet 11 April 1940)
SECRET
CYPHER
MESSAGE
CONFIDENTIAL
Received S.1 (Tele. 1735 hours –
8/5/40
To: C.in
C. Mediterrean 927. C.in
C. East Indies 900
C.in C. China 849. C.in
C. South Atlantic 933
C.in
C. America and West Indies 668. F.O.C.
North Atlantic 716
R.A. South America Division 508. F.O. Narvik,
R.A. 3 601.
C.in C. Portsmouth 569. C.in
C. Nore 971. C.in
C. Western Approaches 51.
C.in C. Rosyth 808. V.A. Dover 723. A.C.O.S. 147
N.O.
Melbourne 767. N.O. Wellington 361. N.S. H.Q. Ottawa 950
Repeated
C.in C. Home Fleet 769.
From: Admiralty
The following is a summary of the experience so
far as it
can at present be ascertained, against aircraft during
three weeks off the
Norwegian coast. Technical improvements are in hand, but
there is wide
recognition of the imperative need to make the best use of
the experience of
those who had had to conduct operations and meet strong
and persistent air
attacks, for it is only by this means that our present
equipment can be used to
the best advantage.
2. It has been necessary to operate ships within
easy reach
of enemy shore based aircraft working from Stavanger,
Oslo, and from Danish
aerodromes. Ships have been constantly bombed at sea,
also when approaching the Trondheim area with convoys and
whilst in the fiords
where anti aircraft ships, destroyers and sloops have had
to remain for A/A
protection of the bases. No base could be established for
operating own shore
based aircraft in support.
3. It is difficult yet to estimate the scale of
attack but
it appears that between 9th April and 3rd
May well over
1400 shots were made at ships, many of which were sticks
of bombs. It is
estimated by the Air Ministry that the enemy used 470 Long
Range Bombers and 40
Dive Bombers of which approximately 300 long
range
bombers and all the Dive bombers were used against the
Fleet, convoys and ships
in the fiords. The initial landings in the Trondheim area
were affected without
interference from the air and it has to be recalled that
enemy did not usually
fly over the areas concerned before 0500 or after 2100,
apparently because the
aerodromes available were unsuitable for night flying.
4. As a result of this air effort the Allied
suffered the
following casualties:
(a). Sunk,
four destroyers and one sloop, of which two destroyers
were sunk whilst
escorting convoys returning from the evacuation. One of
the destroyers was sunk
at Narvik. Ten trawlers were
also lost, nearly all
beached as a result of near misses.
(b).
Damaged, two cruisers, three destroyers, two sloops,
nearly all in inshore operations.
(c). There
has been minor damage to RODNEY by a direct hit and to
other ships by near
misses.
(d). The
F.A.A. lost about 18 aircraft, but fortunately many of the
crews are accounted for.
(e). No
transports were appreciably damaged at sea or in the
Norwegian bases.
5. During the same period the gunfire of the
Fleet destroyed
at least 30 enemy aircraft at sea or near the bases whilst
the F.A.A. show down
at least 9 aircraft and destroyed 8 on the ground.
6. Generally speaking when an A/A ship or sloop
was able to
cover the base the enemy flew high, concentrated on the
warship and the
intensity of the attack on the base was reduced. The more
serious damage to the
bases was done in each case when no A/A ship was present.
At sea the enemy has shown marked preference to
attack ships
with the weaker A.A. armament.
7. As a result of attacks on ships at sea it
appears that
about 75% of the hits and near misses have been from dive
bombers and that about 75% of these were unfired
at mainly due to
surprise gained by cloud or sun or to attention being
directed to other
aircraft.
8. Before 3rd May when returning from
the
evacuation dive bombing was generally shallow and at about
35 degrees and the
enemy rarely attempted to synchronize attacks, usually
attacking independently
using clouds and sun to screen approach. On 3rd
May steep dive
bombing at 65 degrees by about 30 JU 87 (b) was
experienced. AFRIDI and BISON
were damaged by these attacks which
seem to have
developed as soon as Trondheim aerodrome became available
for these shorter
range aircraft after damage done by the F.A.A. attacks
which delayed its use
during a vital period. On this day the attacks were
greater in strength and
consequently appeared more concerted.
9. It appears that enemy aircraft wait about
overhead where
they are impossible targets for destroyers and difficult
for any ship. Steps
are being taken to strengthen the short
range armament
of destroyers who have to operate within the range of dive
bombers. It is to be
recalled however that except for special aircraft for
steep dive bombing and
level bombing from considerable heights enemy aircraft
must come within the
envelope of a 40 degree gun
when approaching for an
attack.
10. In High Level attacks enemy generally turn
away when
fired at and may repeat this procedure 10 or 20 times,
apparently hoping to gain
an unfired at approach. This results in great expenditure
of A/A ammunition an
the only answer is to place the first salvo so close to
him that he dare not
repeat the procedure. Experience indicates that if this
result can be obtained
the enemy takes an early chance to complete his bombing
run, or unloads his
bombers harmlessly at once, or sheers off to attack a less
menacing target. There
is general agreement that our material and training can
produce such a result,
and that it can only be ensured by frequently testing
height finders and
practicing control personnel against aircraft; careful
attention to the
ballistic adjustment for wear of guns and other factors
being also essential. Accuracy
of fire has often been greatly improved by occasional
flank marking reports.
11. A four cornered ship like VALIANT, RENOWN,
or ARK ROYAL
is particularly disliked because of her ability to watch
simultaneously the
more dangerous directions of approach and the consequent
rapidity with which
the enemy can be engaged by weapons whose shell burst he
can see.
12. Against Dive Bombers, it is essential, with
our present
equipment, to fire immediately even if only with
approximate accuracy, because
the enemy is inclined to pull out early and thus reduce
his accuracy. When cloud
and sun conditions favour
dive bombing it is
therefore of first importance, that in addition to using
short range weapons to
the best advantage all ships should try to emulate the
four cornered ship and
develop the ability to fire rounds bursting ahead of the
enemy within, say 5
degrees or 10 degrees, immediately he appears in the dive.
Enemy aircraft
except the JU 87 (b) have generally tried to attack within
about 30 degrees of
the fore and aft line in a dive of about 30 degrees.
The above remarks also apply to low level
bombing (2 to 3000
feet) in conditions where surprise can be effected.
13. Experience confirms that where practicable
the course
and speed should be shaped to favour
development of
gunfire and so that the related wind is high and if
possible across the
probable direction of the dive. It follows that if a ship
is stopped she is a
more favourable target for dive
bombers.
14. It is a frequent experience that on the
first occasion
of being bombed, particularly if a heavy attack,
excitement causes a loss of
accuracy, reduction of fire discipline and wastage of
ammunition. If this
likely result is widely known its effect may well be
reduced.
15. Although some attacks have been well pressed
home this
has not so far been the case generally, neither have they
usually been
synchronized. To prevent such development by the enemy
particular attention is
necessary to the points referred to in paragraphs 10 to
14.
16. R/DF which has already given valuable
warning at sea
should go far to militate against surprise when fitted
generally, and other
developments should contribute much to effective long and
short range A/A fire.
Meanwhile it has to be recalled that on the Norwegian
coast ships have been
working at great disadvantage, in most arduous conditions
where fatigue has
been a serious factor and after a period when it has been
particularly
difficult to afford facilities for practices.
Copies to:
C.A.S.
V.C.A.S.
D.C.A.S.
A.C.A.S. (G)
A.C.O.
D. of Plans
D.H.O.
D.N.O.
D.D. Plans Ops
D.M.C.
D.D.W.O.
F.O.
6 Sigs1.a.(S/L
Weston)
F.O. 7
(Action) A.I.1(W)
F.O. 2.b (3)