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Introduction
This
is a short introduction to the HMS Amethyst
incident in the Yangtse River when she was fired
on by Communist forces with heavy losses to
herself and those ships that attempted to rescue
her. The London Gazette lists the honours
awarded but did not include an official
despatch. In its place the proceedings of the
House of Commons as recorded in Hansard have
been quoted. These cover events in some detail
until around the arrival of Commander Kerans to
take over command. His own account - from "The
Naval Review" - continues the story until her
escape and rejoining the Fleet.
The
source of the images is Photo Ships unless
otherwise captioned. The source of the maps are
listed. My thanks to all.
A
problem with this account is that the name of
the locations in use in the 1940/1950's are no
longer used. Most of the modern day Chinese
names have been identified, with two exceptions
and the variations are noted on the Google map.
There is still the question of the name of the
river itself. Maikel
of the Old Weather project, which has
edited the log books of British gunboats on the
Yangtze lists nearly 20 English variations. In
the event, both Yangtse and Yangtze has been
used according to the sources quoted.
Contents
Hansard
Parliamentary Proceedings (right)
Events
in Outline
Background
Maps
Main
Ships Present and Images
Casualties
British Honours and Awards
The
Film
EVENTS
IN OUTLINE
April-July
1949
HMS
Amethyst (Lieutenant-Commander Skinner)
sailed from Shanghai on 19th April to
relieve HMS Consort at Nanking. Fired at
on 20th at around 0900, 60 miles from
Nanking and grounded on Rose Island with
heavy casualties, about 60 crew landed
and many made their way to Shanghai with
Chinese help
Consort ordered from Nanking to assist
Amethyst; Black Swan ordered from
Shanghai to Kiang Yin, 40 miles short of
Amethyst. Consort arrived around 1500,
but heavily hit (20th) and unable to
take Amethyst in tow. Continued
downstream. HMS London ordered to
proceed up the Yangtse and meet Black
Swan and Consort at Kiang Yin around
2000. Consort too damaged and ordered to
Shanghai.
On the 21st at c0200, Amethyst refloated
and anchored two miles above Rose
Island. Later in the morning, London and
Black Swan tried to close Amethyst but
came under heavy fire, which was
returned, and there were some
casualties. Both ships returned to Kiang
Yin where they were fired at again.
Damaged and with more casualties, they
proceeded to Shanghai. That evening, a
naval officer and RAF doctor reached
Amethyst by Sunderland flying boat.
On the night of 21st/22nd April Amethyst
evacuated more wounded and moved ten
miles up river to evacuate more. She now
had three naval officers, one RAF
doctor, 52 ratings and 8 Chinese on
onboard. On the 22nd, in the PM, Lt-Cdr
Kerans, Asst Naval Attache at Nankin
arrived to assume command. Also on the
22nd, another attempt was made to land
by a Sunderland but she was driven off
by artillery fire. Amethyst moved a
further four miles up river.
She
remained there for three months before
escaping on the night of 30/31st July.
HMS Concord was present at this time.
BACKGROUND
MAPS
Yangtse
River from Nanking down to Shanghai and
out to Saddle Islands
(Google)
Sketch
showing successive positions of HMS
Amethyst
from Rose Island up river to
Chiangking area (inland south of
river)
MAIN
SHIPS PRESENT and IMAGES
(with
links to some ship histories, mainly
World War 2)
in
order of action:
HMS
Amethyst (Navy Photos)
HMS
Consort
HMS
London
the handsome three-funnelled County-class
reconstruction
HMS
Black Swan
HMS
Concord
HMS
Amethyst after the "Incident"
The
following images and their captions are
courtesy of Maritime
Quest. Click
here to go direct to the complete
collection
"April
27, 1949: Crewmen on HMS Amethyst
F-116 seen while trapped on Rose
Island during the Yangtze Incident.
Note the battle damage to the flag."
The names of the crew can be found on
Maritime Quest.
"July
31, 1949: This rare photo shows HMS
Amethyst F-116 shortly after emerging
from the Yangtze River after making her
escape. The photo was taken by Derek
Hodgson from HMS Concord R-63 about
08:00. (Photo courtesy of Derek Hodgson,
R.N., HMS Concord) 1949 Derek Hodgson
all rights reserved"
"July
31, 1949: HMS Amethyst F-116 seen
alongside HMS Concord R-63 after her
escape from the Yangtze River.
(Photo from the collection of
Leading Seaman Les Belton, R.N.)
Courtesy of Julie Newman"
HMS
Amethyst, seen it is believed from HMS
Jamaica
"August
1, 1949: HMS Amethyst F-116 seen from
HMS Jamaica.
'After AMETHYST escaped, she was
escorted towards Hong Kong by HMS
CONCORD. At the same time HMS Jamaica,
flying the Flag of Admiral Madden,
Second in Command Far East Station, and
HMS COSSACK, were sailed to meet
AMETHYST and CONCORD. These photographs
show these ships meeting AMETHYST. It is
of note that after JAMAICA joined us we
started to take in water from one of the
shell holes and we hove to and
shipwrights from JAMAICA came over and
fitted a cement box over the hole.
CONCORD was detached and sent to Japan,
and I think she was sad not to be with
us when we made our entrance into HONG
KONG Harbour." - Lt. Cdr. K. Stewart
Hett, M.B.E., R.N. (ret.) (Photo from
the collection of Chief Yeoman of
Signals Leonard William Willis, R.N.
Courtesy of Leonard Willis)'"
CASUALTIES
Wednesday,
20 April 1949
YANGZTE
‘INCIDENT’
Amethyst, sloop (Hansard, 19 killed,
27 wounded as of 26th)
ALDERTON,
John M, Surgeon Lieutenant, killed
AUBREY,
Owen F C, Chief Petty Officer Stoker
Mechanic, P/KX 80496, killed
BAKER,
Thomas O, Sick Berth Attendant,
D/SMX 817098, killed
BARNBROOK,
Maurice J E, Boy 1c, D/JX 836255,
killed
BARROW,
William, Leading Stoker Mechanic,
P/SKX 790306, killed
BATTAMS,
Charles W, Ordinary Seaman, D/SSX
837992, killed
CRANN,
Leslie, Stoker Mechanic, D/KX 93630,
killed
DRISCOLL,
Albert E, Ordinary Seaman, D/SSX
815835, killed
GRIFFITHS,
Dennis J, Ordinary Seaman, D/SSX
855416, killed
HICKS,
Sydney P, Electrician's Mate 1c,
D/MX 802832, killed
MASKELL,
Victor D, Stoker Mechanic, C/KX
118897, killed
MORGAN,
Dennis H, Stoker Mechanic, D/SKX
770391, killed
MULDOON,
Patrick, Stoker Mechanic, D/SKX
833831, killed
SINNOTT,
Patrick J, Ordinary Seaman, D/SSX
815697, killed
SKINNER,
Bernard M, Lieutenant Commander, DOW
20th/21st
TATTERSALL,
Edmund, Writer, D/SMX 815173, killed
THOMAS,
David G, Ordinary Seaman, D/SSX
855432, killed
VINCENT,
Albert A J, Able Seaman, D/JX
162775, killed
WRIGHT,
Reginald J, Ordinary Seaman, D/SSX
831955, killed
(Note:
the above list totals 19 killed
including the CO who died later
that day. One more DOW on the 2nd
gives a total of 20 died)
Consort, destroyer (Hansard, 10 killed, 4
seriously wounded as of 26th)
AKHURST,
John C, Petty Officer Telegraphist, D/JX
146838, killed
GIFFORD, Raymond G, Stoker Mechanic,
D/KX 134757, killed
GURNEY, Maurice J, Chief Petty Officer,
D/JX 126455, killed
HUTTON, Christopher N D, Able Seaman,
P/SSX 660881, killed
IREDALE, Dennis, Ordinary Telegraphist,
P/SSX 660921, killed
JENKINSON, Sidney, Ordinary Seaman,
D/SSX 840980, DOW
MOIR, William, Leading Seaman, D/JX
150273, DOW
MORTON, Albert, Petty Officer, D/JX
161232, killed
THEAY, Charles V, Ordinary Seaman, D/SSX
852996, killed
TOBIN, John, Electrician's Mate, D/MX
844428, killed
Thursday,
21 April 1949
CHINESE CIVIL WAR, Yangzte River crossed
on this date
Black Swan,
frigate, (Hansard, 7 wounded as of 26th)
London, heavy
cruiser (Hansard, 13 killed, 15 wounded as
of 26th)
ARKELL, James H, Leading Seaman, C/JX
804754, killed
ELLWOOD, Arthur W, Able Seaman, C/JX
371567, killed
FOLEY, James P, Able Seaman, D/JX
552734, killed
HARRISON, Edgar G W, Act/Able Seaman,
C/JX 174555, killed
JARVIS, Lawrence H V, Marine, CH/X
43488, killed
JONES, Sidney O, Ordinary Seaman, C/SSX
818150, killed
LANE, John C, Ordinary Seaman, C/SSX
815537, killed
PULLIN, William G, Able Seaman, C/JX
319158, killed
ROPER, Alec B, Petty Officer, C/JX
153283, killed
SHELTON, Harry, Able Seaman, C/SSX
818928, killed
STOWERS, Patrick J, Chief Petty Officer
Writer, P.MX 59958, killed
WALSINGHAM, Stanley W A, Ordinary
Seaman, C/SSX 661463, killed
(Note:
the above list totals 12 killed plus
one seaman DOW on the 23rd; two more
crew later DOW)
Friday,
22 April 1949
Amethyst, shore
gunfire
WINTER, George, Ordinary Seaman, D/SSX
818706, DOW
Saturday,
23 April 1949
London, shore
gunfire
WARWICK, Geoffrey G, Ordinary Seaman,
C/JX 820226, DOW
Thursday,
5 May 1949
London, shore
gunfire
FISHER, William, Marine, PO/X 3600, DOW
Friday,
6 May 1949
London, shore
gunfire
GRICE-HUTCHINSON, Charles R, Lieutenant
Commander, DOW
BRITISH
HONOURS and AWARDS
Recorded
in The London Gazette, issue 38604,
6th May 1949
ADMIRALTY,
Whitehall,
SW1,
6th
May, 1949.
The KING has been graciously
pleased to approve the following
awards in recognition of
outstanding services when HMS
AMETHYST was fired upon by Chinese
military forces when proceeding to
Nanking.
Bar
to the Distinguished Service
Cross
Lieutenant
Geoffrey Lee WESTON, D.S.C., Royal
Navy,
for gallantry and outstanding
devotion to duty. Although
dangerously wounded, he continued
to exercise command of HMS
AMETHYST after the death of her
Commanding Officer, until relieved
in his command some 56 hours
later. He refused to leave his
ship until his relief had been
ordered.
Distinguished
Service Medal
Telegraphist Jack Leonard FRENCH,
D/JX 671532,
for outstanding devotion to duty.
After the early hours of 21st
April, he was the only
Telegraphist left in HMS AMETHYST,
and from then onwards his efforts
kept the ship in almost continuous
communication with the outside
world. He carried on
single-handed, continuously and
unsleeping, receiving and
transmitting vital wireless
messages with accuracy and speed
for a considerable period before
arrangements could be made to give
him periods of rest.
Posthumous
Mention in Despatches
Lieutenant-Commander
Bernard Morland SKINNER, Royal
Navy,
for utmost gallantry and devotion
to duty in command of HMS AMETHYST
until he succumbed to his wounds.
Recorded
in The London Gazette,
issue 38683,
5th August 1949
ADMIRALTY,
Whitehall,
S.W.1,
5th
August, 1949.
The KING has been graciously
pleased to give orders for the
following appointment to the
Distinguished Service Order:
To be a Companion of the Distinguished
Service Order.
Lieutenant-Commander John Simon
KERANS, Royal Navy,
for gallantry, skill and
determination while in command of
HMS AMETHYST in the planning and
execution of her daring passage
down the Yangtse River when she
escaped from Chinese military
forces.
When proceeding to Nanking in
April, HMS AMETHYST was fired on
and damaged and was forced to
remain for three months under the
constant watch of shore batteries
which frequently threatened her
destruction. On the night of 30th
July, HMS AMETHYST silently
slipped her cable and, following
astern of a Yangtse steamer, made
her way down the river under heavy
flre from the shore batteries.
Lieutenant-Commander Kerans,
without the help of a pilot, took
his ship down the 140 miles of
river, negotiating varying
currents, sandbanks and turns
without suffering damage or
casualty. HMS AMETHYST finally
reached safey with only nine tons
of fuel remaining.
Recorded
in The London
Gazette, issue 38751,
1st November
1949
ADMIRALTY,
Whitehall, S.W.1.
1st
November, 1949.
The KING has been graciously
pleased to give orders for the
following appointment to the
Distinguished Service Order and to
approve the following awards:
For outstanding courage and
devotion to duty in HMS AMETHYST
when she was fired upon by Chinese
military forces while she was
proceeding to Nanking on 20th
April, 1949; and subsequently when
forced to remain for three months
in the Yangtze River under the
constant watch of shore batteries
until she made her daring escape
down the River on the night of
30th-31st July, 1949:
Distinguished
Service Cross
Lieutenant Peter Egerton Capel
BERGER, Royal Navy.
Distinguished
Service Medal.
Acting Petty Officer (QM.1) Leslie
FRANK, D/JX 667520.
Engine Room Artificer Second Class
Leonard Walter WILLIAMS, D/MX
55557.
Posthumous
Mention in Despatches.
Surgeon Lieutenant John Michael
ALDERTON, M.B., B.S., Royal Navy.
Ordinary Seaman Reginald Jack
WRIGHT, D/SSX 831955.
Mention
in Despatches.
Lieutenant Keith Stewart HETT,
Royal Navy.
Electrical Artificer Third Class
Lionel Harry CHARE, D/MX 55237.
Petty Officer (C.1) William Henry
FREEMAN, D/JX 149820.
Boy First Class Keith Cantrill
MARTIN, D/JX 836190.
Stores Petty Officer John Justin
Mccarthy, D/MX 57988.
(Other
awards to HMS AMETHYST were
published in the London Gazette
No. 38604 of 6th May, 1949; and
No. 38683 of 5th August, 1949.)
For great courage when he was
flown to HMS AMETHYST on 21st
April, 1949, and joined her under
heavy fire. With great skill and
untiring devotion to duty he
rendered invaluable services to
HMS AMETHYST's wounded:
Distinguished
Service Cross.
Flight Lieutenant Michael Edward
FEARNLEY, 59425, Royal Air Force.
For outstanding courage and
devotion to duty while serving in
HM Ships London,
Consort, and Black Swan during
their attempts to assist HMS
AMETHYST while under very heavy
gun-fire on 20th-21st April, 1949:
Bar
to the Distinguished Service Order
Captain Peter Grenville Lyon
CAZALET. D.S.O., D.S.C., Royal
Navy, H.M.S London
To
be a Companion of the
Distinguished Service Order
Commander Ian Greig ROBERTSON,
D.S.C., Royal Navy, HMS Consort.
Distinguished
Service Cross.
Mr. Reginald SMITH, Senior
Commissioned Gunner, Royal Navy,
HMS London.
Distinguished
Service Medal
Able Seaman Alan Earle DUDLEY,
D/JX 315663,HMS London
Bandmaster Frederick George
HARWOOD, R.M.B.X. 368, Royal
Marines. HMS London.
Leading Stoker Mechanic Tony
Arthur Oliver JOHNSON, D/KX 98914,
HMS Consort.
Chief Petty Officer Henry William
ROBINSON, G.M., D/JX 133428, HMS
Consort.
Posthumous
Mention in Despatches
Chief
Writer Patrick Joseph STOWERS,
P/MX 59958, HMS London.
Mention
in Despatches
Lieutenant
William Henry BONNER, Royal
Navy,HMS Consort
Commander Richard George Wyndham
HARE, O.B.E., Royal Navy
Surgeon Lieutenant William Lewis
OWEN, M.B., Ch.B., Royal. Navy,
HMS Black Swan
Surgeon Commander Wilfred Bertram
TAYLOR, L.R.C.P. & S., L.D.S.,
Royal Navy, HMS London.
Ordinary Seaman Ivan Rees
BENNETT-BOUND, D/JX 818261, HMS
Consort.
Chief Petty Officer Stoker
Mechanic Henry Charles FLETCHER,
C/KX 80918, HMS London,
Ordinary Seaman Graham Leslie
FOWLER, D/JX 847810, HMS Black
Swan.
Corporal William Frank HART, Po.X.
2455, Royal Marines, HMS London.
Chief Petty Officer (Temporary)
Thomas Alexander LEARMOUTH, C/JX
150825, HMS London.
Able Seaman Albert Mckee, D/JX
423392, HMS Consort.
Acting Leading Telegraphist Robert
Kenneth John MILLER, C/JX 371938,
HMS Consort.
Chief Petty Office Telegraphist
Reginald Gordon STOVELL, D/JX
134322, HMS Black Swan.
THE
FILM
Commander Kerens with actor
Richard Todd
(PegasusArchive.org/Mark
Hickman)
An
excellent film was released in
1957 as "The Yangtse Incident",
which by those who were there seems
to have been accepted as an
authenitc portrayal of events.
Amethyst was actually brought out of
reserve to play her own part. According
to Mason, she was holed by an
explosive charge during filming
and had to be withdrawn from use.
According to Wikipedia her main
engines were not operational and
sloop HMS Magpie stood in for scenes
were she is under way.
British actor Richard Todd played
the part of Commander Kerans with
the usual aplomb that characterised
his war film roles. But then this
was based on real experience. As a
captain in the 7th Parachute
Battalion, he dropped near Pegasus
Bridge on D-day to help defend it
against German counter-attacks.
A
number of short films about HMS
Amethyst can be found in Youtube.
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HANSARD
the report of proceedings of the House of
Commons (HC) and the House of Lords (HL)
available
under the Open Parliament Licence
THE
YANGTSE INCIDENT
HL Deb 26 April 1949 vol 162 cc23-35 23
3.46 p.m.
THE
FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (VISCOUNT HALL)
My Lords, I ask leave of your Lordships to
intervene to make a statement on the
circumstances in which His Majesty's ships were
fired upon in the Yangtse River
(Yangtze Kiang).
The statement is similar to one now being made
by the Prime Minister in another place.
The House will wish to have a full account of
the circumstances in which His Majesty's ships
were fired upon in the Yangtse River,
with grievous casualties and damage. I will
first explain what our position is with regard
to the civil war in China. It has been
repeatedly stated in this House that our policy
has been governed by the Moscow Declaration of
December, 1945, in which the United Kingdom, the
United States and the Soviet Union declared a
policy of non-intervention in China's internal
affairs. In view of the considerable British
interests in China and of the presence of large
British communities, His Majesty's Government
decided some months ago that His Majesty's
Ambassador and His Majesty's consular officers
in China should remain at their posts, and this
was announced to the House by my right
honourable friend the Foreign Secretary on
December 9. We were not alone in the decision to
remain at Nanking (Nanjing).
Other Powers represented there, with the
exception of the Soviet Union, reached the same
decision, and there has since been full
consultation between the members of the
Diplomatic Corps at Nanking.
In the disturbed conditions which have prevailed
in recent months, warships of various Powers
have been at Shanghai and Nanking so that in the
event of a breakdown of law and order as the
result of hostilities they would be able to
assist in the evacuation of their nationals.
When the Chinese Government decided to move to
Canton, it is true that a warning was issued
about warships in the Yangtse. Nevertheless it
is a fact that since that time the movements of
our warships in the Yangtse have taken place
with the full knowledge and consent of the
National Government of China. I want to make the
point, therefore, that, when the incident took
place to which I am about to refer, H.M.S.
"Amethyst" was proceeding on her lawful
occasions, and that there was no other properly
constituted authority to whom His Majesty's
Government were under an obligation to notify
her movements even had they been in a position
to do so.
The House will wish to know whether any steps
were taken by our authorities in China to make
contact with the Communist authorities. Some
time has lapsed since Communist forces overran
Mukden, Peking and Tientsin where we have
consular posts. His Majesty's consular officers
at these posts have been endeavouring for some
time past to reach day-to-day working
arrangements with the local authorities. Their
approaches have, however, been rejected on every
occasion, without any reason being given for
such a rejection. The same policy was followed
in rejecting a letter from His Majesty's Consul
in Peking about the "Amethyst" when the incident
had occurred.
In conformity with the decision to remain at
Nanking, His Majesty's ships had been relieving
one another at that port at regular intervals
for some months past. On this occasion the
object of the passage of H.M.S. "Amethyst" was
to relieve H.M.S. "Consort" at Nanking. Opposing
Chinese forces had been massed along the banks
of the Yangtse for a considerable time and there
were repeated rumours for some weeks that the
Communists were about to cross the river. H.M.S.
"Consort" was already overdue for relief, but
this relief was postponed in view of a Communist
ultimatum which was due to expire on April 12
and which might have been followed by the
crossing of the Yangtse. On April 12 His
Majesty's Ambassador learned that the ultimatum
had been extended to April 15. The relief had
therefore still to be postponed. Only on April
18 was it learned that the final expiry of the
ultimatum might lead to the crossing of the
Yangtse by the Communist forces on April 21. The
necessity for relieving H.M.S. "Consort" as
early as possible remained. She was running
short of supplies after a long stay at Nanking
and in any case a frigate was considered more
suitable than a destroyer to be stationed at
that port.
The Flag Officer therefore decided, with the
agreement of His Majesty's Ambassador, that the
passage should be timed to allow "Amethyst" to
reach Nanking a clear twenty-four hours before
the expiry of the latest Communist ultimatum.
Had there been no incident, "Amethyst" would
have reached Nanking on April 20. It was in the
light of these known facts that the decision was
made for "Amethyst" to sail, and this decision
was in my opinion correct.
Thus early on Tuesday, April 19, the frigate
H.M.S. "Amethyst" (Lieutenant-Commander Skinner)
sailed from Shanghai for Nanking, wearing the
White Ensign and the Union Jack and with the
Union Jack painted on her hull. When "Amethyst"
reached a point on the Yangtse River some sixty
miles from Nanking, at about nine o'clock,
Chinese time, in the morning of the 20th, she
came under heavy fire from batteries on the
north bank, suffered considerable damage and
casualties and eventually grounded on Rose
Island
(Leigong Dao). After this, the captain
decided to land about sixty of her crew,
including her wounded, who got ashore by
swimming or in sampans, being shelled and
machine-gunned as they did so. We know that a
large proportion have, with Chinese help,
arrived at Shanghai.
Vice-Admiral Madden, the Flag Officer Second in
Command Far Eastern Station, ordered the
destroyer H.M.S. "Consort" (Commander Robertson)
from Nanking to go to "Amethyst's" assistance,
and the frigate H.M.S. "Black Swan" (Captain
Jay) from Shanghai to Kiang Yin, forty miles
down river from the "Amethyst." "Consort"
reached "Amethyst" at about three in the
afternoon and was immediately heavily engaged.
She found the fire too heavy to approach
"Amethyst" and therefore passed her at speed
down river. She turned two miles below and again
closed "Amethyst" to take her in tow. But she
again came under such heavy fire that she was
obliged to abandon the attempt, although she
answered the shore batteries with her full
armament and signalled that she had silenced
most of the opposition. Half an hour later her
signals ceased, though in fact she was making a
second attempt to take "Amethyst" in tow, having
turned downstream again. This attempt also
failed and she sustained further damage and
casualties during which her steering was
affected. She therefore had to continue
downstream out of the firing area.
Meanwhile, the cruiser H.M.S. "London" (Captain
Cazalet), wearing the flag of Flag Officer
Second in Command, was also proceeding up the
Yangtse at best speed. The three ships "London,"
"Black Swan," and "Consort" met at Kiang Yin (believed
to be Jiangyin) at about eight that
evening. It was found that "Consort" was
extensively damaged; she was ordered to proceed
to Shanghai to land her dead and wounded and
effect repairs. At about two o'clock in the
morning of the 21st, the "Amethyst" succeeded in
refloating herself by her own efforts and
anchored two miles above Rose Island. She could
go no further, as her chart was destroyed. Her
hull was holed in several places, her captain
severely wounded, her first lieutenant wounded,
and her doctor killed. There were only four
unwounded officers left, and one telegraphist to
carry out all wireless communications.
Later the same morning the "London" and the
"Black Swan" endeavoured to close the
"Amethyst," but met with heavy fire causing some
casualties. The fire was, of course, returned,
but the Flag Officer then decided that it would
not be possible to bring the damaged "Amethyst"
down river without further serious loss of life
in all ships; he therefore ordered the "London"
and "Black Swan" to return to Kiang Yin. At
Kiang Yin they were fired upon by batteries, and
suffered considerable casualties and damage.
Both ships afterwards proceeded to Shanghai to
land their dead and wounded and to effect
repairs.
That afternoon a naval and a Royal Air Force
doctor, with medical supplies and charts, were
flown by a Sunderland aircraft of the Royal Air
Force to the "Amethyst." Both the aircraft and
the "Amethyst" were fired upon. The ship was
hit, but the Sunderland managed to transfer the
R.A.F. doctor and some medical supplies before
being forced to take off. The "Amethyst" then
took shelter in a creek.
During the night of the 21st-22nd, "Amethyst"
succeeded in evacuating a further batch of her
wounded to a nearby town. After doing so, she
moved ten miles up river under cover of
darkness, though under rifle fire from the
banks, and again anchored; she then completed
the landing of all her more seriously wounded,
including her captain. I regret to say that this
very gallant officer, who had insisted on
remaining with his ship up to this time, died of
his wounds soon after. There remained on board
three Royal Navy officers, one Royal Air Force
doctor, fifty-two ratings and eight Chinese. At
about this time Lieutenant-Commander Kerans, the
Assistant Naval Attaché at Nanking, reached the
ship and assumed command.
Another courageous effort to reach "Amethyst"
was made by the R.A.F. in a Sunderland on the
afternoon of the 22, but the aircraft was driven
off by artillery fire without succeeding in
making contact. The "Amethyst" then moved a
further four miles up river. She was in close
touch with the Flag Officer, and after a number
of courses had been considered, it was decided
that she should remain where she was.
Perhaps I may at this point anticipate two
questions which may possibly be asked: first,
how was it that His Majesty's ships suffered
such extensive damage and casualties; and
second, why they were not able to silence the
opposing batteries and fight their way through.
In answer to the first, I would only say that
warships are not designed to operate in rivers
against massed artillery and infantry sheltered
by reeds and mudbanks. The Communist forces
appear to have been concentrated in considerable
strength and are reported as being lavishly
equipped with howitzers, medium artillery and
field guns. The above facts also provide much of
the answer to the second question, only I would
add this. The Flag Officer's policy throughout
was designed only to rescue H.M.S. "Amethyst"
and to avoid unnecessary casualties. There was
no question of a punitive expedition and His
Majesty's ships fired only to silence the forces
firing against them.
I will at this point briefly summarise the
losses and damage which resulted. The casualties
were: H.M.S. "London," 13 killed, 15 wounded;
H.M.S. "Consort," 10 killed, 4 seriously
wounded, H.M.S. "Amethyst," 19 killed, 27
wounded; H.M.S. "Black Swan," 7 wounded. In
addition, 12 ratings are still missing. Of the
damage to the ships, the "London" suffered the
most severely, having been holed repeatedly in
her hull and upper works. The damage to the
"Consort" and the "Black Swan" was less serious.
"London" and the "Black Swan" have already
completed their emergency repairs. The
"Amethyst" suffered severe damage but was
repaired by the efforts of her own crew to be
capable of a speed of seventeen knots.
When H.M.S. "Amethyst" was fired upon by
Communist forces, His Majesty's Ambassador
instructed His Majesty's Consular Officer in
charge at Peking to communicate to the highest
competent Chinese Communist authority, by
whatever means possible, a message informing
them of this and seeking the issue of immediate
instructions by them to their military
commanders along the Yangtse to desist from such
firing. A subsequent message emphasised the
urgent need of medical attention of the
casualties and reiterated the request for
instructions to prevent further firing upon
these ships of the Royal Navy engaged in
peaceful and humanitarian tasks. The local
Communist authorities, however, refused to
accept the Consul's letters.
At this time Mr. Edward Youde, a Third Secretary
in His Majesty's Foreign Service who has a good
knowledge of Chinese, volunteered to try and
contact the Communist forces north of Pukou in
the hope of reaching some commanding officer
with sufficient authority to stop the firing.
His Majesty's Ambassador agreed to this attempt,
and Mr. Youde passed through the Nationalist
lines on the night of April 21. Thanks to his
courage and determination, Mr. Youde succeeded
in reaching the forward headquarters of the
People's Liberation Army in the Pukou area on
April 23. He described the situation as he knew
it when he left Nanking on April 21, and pointed
out to them the peaceful and humanitarian nature
of the mission of H.M.S. "Amethyst," and
requested that she be allowed to proceed to
Nanking or Shanghai without further molestation.
Their headquarters took the line that clearance
had not been obtained from the People's
Liberation Army, and that she had entered the
war area. They also complained of heavy
casualties incurred by their troops as a result
of fire from His Majesty's ships. They refused
to admit justification of self-defence. After
consulting higher authority, the headquarters
stated that in the circumstances they would be
prepared to allow the ship 29 to proceed to
Nanking, but only on condition that she should
assist the People's Liberation Army to cross the
Yangtse. Such a condition was obviously
unacceptable.
My attention has been drawn to a communiqué
broadcast by the Communists which said that on
the date in question warships on the Yangtse
opened fire to prevent its crossing by Communist
forces. It further stated that it was not until
the following day that they learned that these
ships were not all Chinese but that four British
ships were among them. The Communists state that
their forces suffered 252 casualties as a result
of this firing, and claim that His Majesty's
Government have directly participated in the
Chinese civil war by firing on Communist
positions. These claims are, of course, so far
as they relate to His Majesty's Government or
the Royal Navy, as fantastic as they are
unfounded.
If there was any initial misunderstanding as to
the nationality of H.M.S. "Amethyst." this would
have been speedily resolved had the authorities
in Peking acted on His Majesty's Ambassador's
message. Moreover, had the Communist authorities
objected in the past to the movement of British
ships on the Yangtse, it was always open to them
to raise these through our consular authorities
in North China. It is the fact that for reasons
best known to themselves the Communists have
failed to notify any foreign authority present
in areas which they have occupied of the
channels through which contact can be
maintained, and that they have rejected all
communications made to them. In these
circumstances, His Majesty's Government can only
reserve their position.
The House will wish to join me in expressing
sympathy with the relatives of all those who
have been killed or wounded in this action, and
in expressing admiration of the courage of all
those who took part in it. Five names deserve
special tribute. Lieutenant-Commander Skinner,
R.N., the captain of the "Amethyst," behaved
with the utmost gallantry till he succumbed to
his wounds. The first lieutenant, Lieutenant J.
C. Weston, refused to leave the "Amethyst,"
although dangerously wounded, until relieved in
command by Lieutenant-Commander Kerans fifty-six
hours later. Telegraphist J. L. French showed
superlative devotion to duty. He was the only
telegraphist left in the "Amethyst" after the
early hours of April 21; and from then onwards
his efforts kept the ship in almost continuous
communication with Shanghai. The name should
also be mentioned of Flight-Lieutenant K. H.
Letford, D.S.O., D.F.C., who landed a Sunderland
aircraft under fire to convey the naval and
R.A.F. doctors to "Amethyst." The fifth name is
that of Mr. Youde, whose one-man mission through
the Communist armies I have already mentioned.
Without a doubt many other cases of bravery and
devotion will be revealed when all the facts are
known. But we already have ample evidence that
the conduct of the whole ship's company of
H.M.S. "Amethyst" was beyond all praise, though
a considerable proportion were young sailors
under fire for the first time. We have had
reports of seamen and marines remaining at their
task for up to twenty-four hours, though badly
wounded, and of men declining to have their
wounds treated until cases they considered more
urgent had been dealt with. I have heard too
that in H.M.S. "London" and "Black Swan," when
there was a possibility of volunteers being
flown to "Amethyst," there was almost
acrimonious rivalry for selection to take on
this heroic task.
I should mention that the United States naval
authorities at Shanghai placed their resources
unstintingly at our disposal, and the kindness
and help of the British communities at Shanghai
have been beyond all praise. Finally, the
Chinese Nationalist forces in the Chinkiang area
were most helpful in providing medical aid and
stores which they could ill afford. The House
will join with me in expressing our gratitude to
all of these. I should like, in concluding this
statement, to pay a tribute to the British
communities in China, who have shown such
steadfast behaviour in the difficult conditions
in which they find themselves, and whose
decision to remain in China in spite of the
uncertainties created by the civil war is in
accordance with the best British tradition.
The House is now in full possession of the facts
known to His Majesty's Government, and we shall,
of course, continue to keep the House informed
of developments as they occur. It will be
realised that the situation is at present very
fluid, but if, at a later stage, there is a
general desire for a debate on this matter, I am
sure that this can be considered through the
usual channels.
Commander
Kerans own account now takes over the story
from
THE
NAVAL REVIEW
1950 edition, Part 1
with
permission of Roger Welby-Everard, Assistant
Editor (On-Line)
H.M.S.
AMETHYST
by
Commander
J.
S. Kerans.,
R.N
Commander Kerans
(enlargement
includes actor Richard Todd)
Much has already been written concerning H.M.S.
Amethyst and her detention by the Communists'
People's Liberation Army in the Yangtse Kiang,
not only in the Press but in official documents;
a detailed account would now be redundant.
Political considerations debar certain details
and, in addition, publication of other matter
might be prejudicial to the safety of certain
people still in Communist-occupied China.
It is intended to attempt, in the following
paragraphs, to try and elaborate on some of the
less publicized points and bring out certain
salutary lessons learnt. There will, therefore,
be no co-ordinated and co-related "story" in the
strict sense.
CO-OPERATION
This was in evidence right from the start when
the Embassy in Nanking became aware of the
disaster which had overtaken one of H.M. ships
whilst in pursuit of "their lawful occasions" No
crossings of the Yangtse River had up to this
time taken place, and uncertainty had prevailed
for some weeks as to Communist intentions and
ultimatums which so far had meant little in a
war of "nerves." The Commander-in-Chief of the
Chinese Nationalists' Navy, Admiral Kwei
Yung-chin (now in Formosa) offered every
facility and help that he could to assist in
succouring Amethyst's wounded; his orders were
quickly conveyed to the Nationalist Army
authorities in the immediate neighbourhood of
Rose Island, where the ship had grounded.
Based on a Reuter's report that a number of
wounded had reached a hospital in Chingkiang
(subsequently found to be incorrect) I reached
there by jeep (loaned by the Australian Military
Attache) with our Assistant Military Attache on
the 21st of April, 1949, with medical supplies.
The Chinese Naval Headquarters offered us all
assistance possible in the circumstances, and
before dark that day we were at the village of
Tachiang, the headquarters of the local Regional
Commander; here stretcher-bearers and coolie
carriers were organized, since the roads to the
banks of the Yangtse petered out as far as
vehicular traffic was concerned.
We had by now the Medical Officer (United States
Navy) from the American Embassy at Nanking and
his sick berth assistant with us, and the
Chinese Naval Chief of Staff from Chingkiang;
with this heterogeneous "team" we moved off to
reach the nearest point to the Amethyst. After
many and various tracks and considerable delays
we intercepted some wounded shortly after
midnight not far from the coast. It was here
that it was learned that a Chinese National Army
medical officer with two orderlies had been
onboard the Amethyst that day to render first
aid. In spite of language difficulties and
intermittent sniping he stuck to his job and did
invaluable work. After evacuating her wounded,
except her first lieutenant, the Amethyst moved
upstream during the night towards Chingkiang (Zhenjiang);
it was impossible to reach her and by dawn the
following day the dead and wounded were embarked
for Chingkiang from Tachiang (modern
location not identifed).
It is here at Chingkiang that Admiral Kwei
Yung-chin's authorization to myself worked
wonders and after some hesitations we managed to
solicit a sleeping coach on the last train to
Shanghai. Every assistance to the wounded was
given by the American-run Stevenson Mission
Hospital at Chingkiang. The matron in charge was
an United States subject - one of the many
gallant women who devote the greater part of
their lives endeavouring to improve the
well-being of the Chinese for so little in
return.
These brief words show that many people were
concerned in the evacuation of the Amethyst's
wounded from her difficult position. Later in
Shanghai the U.S. authorities placed the United
States naval hospital ship Repose from Tsingtao
at the Royal Navy's disposal. By this time the
Chinese Nationalist Army had successfully
evacuated by train from Changchow (about fifteen
miles due south of Rose Island - modern
location not identifed) some sixty
ratings who had been ordered to evacuate the
ship when under fire to avoid further loss of
life; due to minefields they could not rejoin
her. Thus it can be seen that co-operation was
much in evidence in the very early stages; this
continued in all the ways that were practicable
throughout our enforced immobility.
The very ready assistance of the Royal Air Force
in Sunderlands from Hongkong was of the highest
order. The Yangtse is not an easy place to land
in, and Communist gunfire did not assist
matters; the help of the R.A.F. medical officer
was invaluable and things might well have been
difficult without his presence (but see later).
It is perhaps not generally known that the first
R.A.F. Sunderland to close the Amethyst had two
army ranks on board; they were trained "droppers
" and if all else failed it was intended to
parachute medical supplies to as close to the
Amethyst as was possible.
MORALE
There is no doubt that this was the most
important point of all to consider from the word
"go"; an incident of this nature which came with
such suddenness is bound to affect those
concerned in various ways. From all the evidence
that I have gathered, there is everything to
show that morale was of a high order, in spite
of the extreme youth of many ratings. When I
joined eventually p.m. on the 22nd of April,
1949, though, it was near breaking point; after
three days under fire and with little rest, this
was not surprising; in addition the presence of
seventeen dead onboard for over fifty-six hours
was a depressing influence. In spite of all,
they were prepared for the last rites by a
valiant team of petty officers and a few junior
ratings. Eventually, when the ship's company
realized the situation and the hopelessness of
movement either way, there was a distinct
hardening of determination to stick it out and
face the future with equanimity and confidence.
It was thus from the very start that orders were
given to sandbag the habitable messdecks and
vital spaces such as the W/T office and bridge.
This did much to help. Early on I decided that a
strict Service routine must, and would be,
adhered to from the beginning. This continued
throughout and with watchkeeping every day and
night on the bridge as well as considerable
damage repairs being necessitated, this kept men
fit and physically tired.
Non-working hours were hard to fill; there was
little to find to do. We were lucky to have had
an unbroken S.R.E. (sound
recording equipment?) except of
course when power was shut down) and a fairly
plentiful supply of gramophone records. No
attempt by officers was ever made to institute
recreational games for ratings. This bore fruit
and it was not long before they made their own
entertainment; I have felt that there is nothing
more a sailor dislikes than being "organized"
into whist drives or other such ideas which
eventually finish up as a dismal " flop".
The ship's company were always kept fully
informed (as far as was possible) of the outcome
of all my meetings with the C.P.L.A. (China
People's Liberation Army); I did, however, never
at any time give them any assurance that events
would be speedy - it was a personal opinion,
which became truer as time unfortunately wore
on. Certain selected chief and petty officers
were given access to the ship's signal log each
day; this did much to help morale and gave petty
officers a clearer knowledge of the issues at
stake, and acted as a deterrent to the
proverbial false "buzzes."
In addition, the knowledge that everything
possible was being done by all authorities
elsewhere to extricate the Amethyst gave the
ship's company added assurance and confidence.
The ability to receive and send telegrams helped
immeasurably (265 were despatched during our 101
days internment). Inability to send an outgoing
mail was unfortunate but we did receive three
bags towards the end of June; for reasons best
known to the C.P.L.A. it was well censored and
pilfered. The presence of two domestics, and a
cat and a dog onboard who had somehow survived
the shelling, tended to produce an air of
normalcy in messdeck life.
VICTUALLING - This was an important problem from
the beginning and needed much care and attention
as it was considered essential to provide a
balanced diet, with as much additional variety
as stocks permitted, to give some compensatory
advantage in the circumstances we had found
ourselves. Fortuitously the Amethyst was well
stocked, having just left Hongkong, and in
addition was carrying flour and frying-oil and
other provisions for the Embassy at Nanking to
replace their emergency stocks which the
lengthened stay of the Consort up-river had
depleted.
Mercifully the forward galley remained intact
and was in constant use throughout; there was
thus no difficulty in baking bread and the
provision of hot meals. Casualties amongst the
cooks (whites as well as Chinese) were nil,
which was salutary. By bartering with surplus
flour, frying-oil, soap, duffel coats, seaboots
and other articles we were able to augment our
fare with eggs and potatoes (albeit small, but
better than dehydrated). Later on we were able
to obtain Communist money (Jen Min Piao, which
translated means People's Money) and increase
our purchases.
For large amounts I was able on occasions to use
Hongkong currency. Whichever way one looks at it
we lost heavily on the rate of exchange, and
their prices were as the opposition wished;
perhaps I reached the limit when after three
months I discovered Shanghai-brewed beer was
available in Chingkiang, by paying approximately
12s. 6d. per bottle; I was determined that the
ship's company would have some amenities,
leaving final payment until later. The
Commander-in-Chief kindly allowed public money
to be used and eventually the Station Central
Amenities Fund re-imbursed the Crown. This gave
morale a great boost. The daily issue of rum
continued as usual - stocks of this were
sufficient for many months ahead; this is not
surprising when 25 out of the 68 eligible were
under twenty years of age.
When I went on to half rations at the beginning
of July the seriousness of the situation was
very quickly brought home to many ratings. This
mainly concerned conservation of cold room
stocks and butter, milk, sugar and tea. Looking
back on it now there was sufficient calorific
value at each meal not to cause undue anxiety;
the main trouble was lack of variety. A careful
tally was kept on every item each week and the
limiting dates of each article were re-assessed.
By the end of August it was estimated that
starvation would have been very close. Still I
was preparing to go on quarter rations early in
August; it would have been then that difficulty
in maintaining morale might have been hard. In
view of this contingency, lack of food was one
of my reasons for the "breakout."
MACHINERY
I take this item next as everything ultimately
depended on damage control and refitting and
maintenance of all machinery. Amongst the
wounded who were evacuated were the Amethyst's
engineer officer and chief E.R.A.; in addition
the chief stoker was drowned and others were
killed, wounded or evacuated. It was a depleted
engine room staff that remained, but mercifully
the majority were petty officer stoker mechanics
backed up with sufficient hands to run
machinery. Considerable credit is due to the
senior E.R.A. who kept up the efficiency of his
department, with the electrical officer in
over-all command. It is interesting to note that
this E.R.A. had been a prisoner-of-war of the
Japanese for three and a half years in Sumatra.
Without going into details here I cannot stress
too highly how important knowledge of damage
control is when disasters such as this
occur—especially ship knowledge. It was
unfortunate that large drafting changes had
taken place in the Amethyst only a few days
previously. The important points which come to
my mind here are accurate damage control
markings and dispersion of lockers and
fire-fighting equipment. A more simplified form
of markings on doors and fans should, I feel, be
introduced. Young ratings are inevitably going
to forget what the various letterings stand for
in time of emergency. The dangers of ratings
painting over rubber on hatches and doors is
still too evident wherever one looks and in
spite of all that has been said in training.
Only time and constant supervision will
eradicate this very important detail. There is
no doubt that our peace-time damage control must
be maintained as near to the war-time scale as
habitability allows.
FUEL
The vital factor throughout our detention was
over fuel, on which everything depended. The
Amethyst left Shanghai on her fateful journey
with full tanks. A small amount was lost by
pumping to refloat after grounding; by the time
I joined her on the 22nd of April approximately
270 tons remained on board. No attempt was made
in the early days at conservation since the
situation was dangerous and fluid. On April 28th
contact had been made with the Communists
ashore, and with the realization that time meant
little to the C.P.L.A., steps were initiated to
curtail consumption. As time wore on the hours
without power became greater - at the end we
were shut down for as long as 59 hours without
steam.
This was grim and was accentuated by the extreme
heat which the Yangtse experiences in July. The
limiting factors were (a) the cold rooms and (b)
the magazines: the former temperatures rose very
little, and the latter had some way to go before
danger point was reached. I consider we could
have exceeded this period and existed shut down
for 72 hours at a time with strict rationing of
fresh water.
The only power available during these periods
was a 24-volt battery supply from the lower
power room for the emergency W/T set and a few
pin-points of lights in my cabin and on the
messdecks. To live in a "dead ship" is an
experience which none of us are likely to
forget. Our lowest average daily consumption of
fuel for the week was a ton a day. Isolation of
one side of the engine room helped considerably,
and at the same time allowed refitting to
continue. Employment of engine room ratings when
shut down was difficult, but eventually
sufficient items on the upper-deck with
departmental affinity were found to keep them
fully employed in chipping. From the health
point of view this was beneficial in the case of
some of the younger ratings.
The outstanding success perhaps of all our time
in the River was the receipt of 54 tons of
Admiralty oil fuel in 294 drums from Hogee
Wharf, Nanking. I shall never know why the
Communist authorities were so ready to accede to
the entry of this invaluable oil fuel. I should
explain here that this was a reserve of fuel
built up at Hogee (where H.M. ships lie
alongside) in the event of a prolonged stay
being necessary at Nanking due to the Civil War.
Over the months each ship had filled up so many
drums before departure. The Naval Attache's
foresight paid handsome dividends in the end.
This was the one mistake of Colonel Kang
Mao-Chao (the Political Commissioner and chief
negotiator against me); for a long time he
thought we burned coal!
Embarkation of this fuel in drums was an
interesting, though strenuous, operation. Due to
shortage of man-power no steam was possible. All
this fuel was pumped and poured into the three
fuelling connections. No pumps being available
and the fuel line being on the port side an
excessive list to port was necessitated;
fortunately the weather was fine, but I
experienced a few anxious moments until steam
was raised and we could level off.
The other miracle was the evaporator, which
never let us down (only one in this class of
ship). One amusing incident I recall was when an
extremely harassed and worried E.R.A. reported
that the rocker arm on the evaporator was
fractured. Inspection by myself and the
electrical officer left no doubt at the time.
Signals were made and Hongkong Dockyard over a
week-end was quickly at work making another;
some time later the E.R.A. reported that this
fracture had now developed into a very thin
streak of cotton waste heavily impregnated in
lubricants! Relief was great.
STABILITY
Stability had some interesting problems and a
close study of the Ship's Book was made. When
the light condition was reached it was approved
to flood the forward ballast tank and X magazine
(X gun was destroyed, anyway) instead of
flooding oil fuel tanks; the two after ones were
flooded earlier on. I hoped to keep as many
tanks free of Yangtse water and its large amount
of sand whilst there was any hope of fuel
replenishment. For the passage out of the
Yangtse Nos. 1, 2, 7 and 8 O.F.T. and the
ballast tank and magazine previously mentioned
were flooded. All fuel remaining for the
break-out was previously transferred to Nos. 3
and 4 O.F. Tanks to avoid losing too much by
loss of suction.
Training in damage control was not overlooked
and the boys were put through a course; the many
weeks spent in shoring and cutting away damage
provided a useful instruction for the great
majority.
The world has never seen a good deal of the
damage caused to the Amethyst's upperworks since
all that was practicable was cut away. To
increase stability many heavy weights were
struck below - the best examples of this were
the damaged Bofors and certain radar equipment
(but more of this later).
A blackboard was kept in my cabin throughout
with details of fuel of all types remaining in
each tank, fresh water, main items of food and
limits of endurance in each case.
NEGOTIATIONS
In all, nineteen meetings took place with the
Communist military authorities; of this number
eight were preliminary "skirmishes" with the
opposition ashore near the Amethyst or onboard.
The remainder were all on shore and for the most
part held in Chingkiang at the General's
headquarters.
These meetings were held with a very thin veil
of amicability and rigid formality. The
convening authority was the Area Commander,
General Yuan Chung-hsien, whose appearances at
the table were few and always of short duration.
In spite of everything that was said the
negotiating powers on his behalf were handed
over to the Political Commissioner, Colonel Kang
Mao-Chao; he also is alleged to have been the
Battery Commander at Sang Chiang Ying who
originally fired on the Amethyst.
Kang had two interpreters who were both former
students and well indoctrinated in Communist
ideologies. It is of interest that everything I
have ever said at all these meetings has been
religiously taken down in full, in English as
well as in Chinese. At some meetings I had the
attention of the Press and propaganda section of
the C.P.L.A.; thus I am well documented. The
keenest photographer was a female who one day
actually ventured out in a sampan from the local
village nearby to photograph the Amethyst at all
angles. The local garrison commander, Captain
Tai Kuo-liang, who acted as my personal
bodyguard, also attended each meeting; but apart
from writing reams he was never allowed to say a
word. Funnily enough we used to converse in
French.
The progress of the meetings can fairly be
summed up as representing a sine curve; at one
meeting some hope for safe conduct was given,
but the next would speedily dash it to the
ground. By July it was evident that the
Communists were deliberately protracting the
course of proceedings and that safe conduct
would only be given provided H.M. Government
acceded to damaging admissions which were, of
course, quite unacceptable. At no time was any
assistance to aid me allowed to enter the area
by the C.P.L.A.; every excuse, artifice and
device was made to put pressure on myself to
assume high-level responsibility to negotiate as
a pre-requisite to safe conduct assertion.
COMMUNICATIONS
That the main W/T office was undamaged in the
initial shelling was indeed fortunate and even
more so that an electrical officer was onboard.
This officer belonged to the senior officer's
frigate at Shanghai and was on passage to
Nanking in order to repair the Amethyst's radar.
(No sooner had he done this than circumstances
were such that destruction of classified radar
equipment was ordered for security reasons).
Some while after many ratings had been ordered
to evacuate the Amethyst this officer, having
reason to believe that the emergency transmitter
was again working, found there were no W/T
ratings left onboard. It is coincidence, or
perhaps chance, that Telegraphist French was a
volunteer to man the whaler ferrying wounded and
others to the mainland. He was quickly hauled
out of this and thus it was that this rating
became the sole wireless operator left in the
Amethyst. He did well, and it speaks highly of
West Country physique and guts that he stood up
to continuous watchkeeping for so long.
Two electrical ratings were eventually trained
to read our call-sign and simple procedure. By
special arrangements with the flagship or
Hongkong continuous watch was always maintained,
and the telegraphist rested accordingly. The
Type 60 W/T was used when without power and
proved itself reliable; the last valve went,
however, soon after the Hogee fuel arrived at
the beginning of July. This necessitated raising
steam for transmission and was therefore costly
in fuel. We were able to maintain continuous
listening watch with a B.28 receiver.
Having to resort to plain language or other
insecure means severely limited the reporting of
the outcome of my meetings and imparting my
intentions to my Commander-in-Chief. The net
result was that we nearly succeeded in deceiving
each other as to our ideas. In the end, all was
clear.
The volume of traffic throughout our period
up-river was fairly high and of necessity
signals were extremely lengthy. Excellent
co-operation at Stonecutters reduced repetitions
to a minimum. It is fairly certain that the
opposition were eventually reading our messages;
and considering we were on the same wavelength
for many months, it is perhaps not surprising.
The need for caution was paramount. Lack of
codes and cyphers was undoubtedly my severest
handicap, and in the end a reasonably secure but
limited method was adopted.
Rising temperatures in July began to tell on the
telegraphist, and there is no shadow of doubt
that physically his mental capacity in reading
traffic was falling rapidly. There was
unfortunately little we could do when shut down
to alleviate conditions. This was one of my
paramount reasons that escape was the only
solution.
THE
BREAK-OUT OF THE YANGTSE
The most difficult aspect of this operation was
to make the decision; having obtained political
clearance for such an eventuality the final move
was left to me, which of course it had to be in
the circumstances. It was clear that Colonel
Kang had little intention of allowing entry of
fuel from Shanghai for a long time, if at all.
Moon conditions at the end of July were
favourable and I could not risk awaiting another
opportunity, since the time was drawing near
when operational immobility to get out of the
Yangtse would have been reached, even with
further very drastic curtailment of fuel
consumption.
The climate was at its worst; and though the
physical condition of all onboard was reasonably
high, no one could have expected such a state of
affairs to continue. The Yangtse was at its
highest peak so the risk navigationally was
worth taking, and if I was hard pressed or badly
damaged the channel out to the open sea north of
Tsungming Island had hopes of success; there was
plenty of river water to pump overboard from the
oil fuel tanks and ammunition to jettison to
reduce our draught.
As early as May, 1949, I had always considered
in my mind that escape would have to be faced
eventually. How this could be achieved without
disaster I was unable to fathom - but while
negotiations gave some hope of eventual
agreement I considered it my duty to continue at
them to the best of my ability. One thing I felt
essential was to reduce the Amethyst's
silhouette and increase stability by reducing
top-weight. Accordingly a systematic reduction
of damaged superstructure and equipment was put
in hand. No officer or rating was ever aware of
the real object; my "cover" was occupation for
the hands and increase of stability by striking
below. I was considered somewhat "eccentric" on
this score by many! In this way the mast was
stripped of many items, radar aerials, aids to
gunnery and a host of other items on the upper
deck. It was hoped to reduce splinter damage in
addition. As could be seen in Hongkong, this was
excessive in the initial shelling and caused
many casualties, especially electrically.
My object finally was to build up the Amethyst's
silhouette to simulate an L.S.T., a number of
which had been seen plying the Yangtse
commercially. These were former U.S. landing
craft which still retained a radar set. For this
reason I left an aerial intact and partly
because of the risk due to shelling in
dismantling it. Black canvas suitably positioned
heightened the silhouette and in addition a
quantity of dark paint was thrown on to
paintwork to gloss it over.
The only armament available that could be fought
was one 4-inch gun and an Oerlikon (port side).
X gun was destroyed and A gun was intact. The
starboard Bofors was also destroyed and most of
it had been dismantled and struck below. The
port Bofors was never onboard, being in Hongkong
dockyard for modifications. The starboard
Oerlikon was completely shot away. Bren guns and
Lanchesters made up the available armament. In
the weeks prior to the break-out all R.U. (ready
use) ammunition was ditched to reduce
fire risk; certain fireworks and "dangerous"
ammunition were also thrown overboard for this
reason. Sufficient detonators were, however,
held back for eventual destruction of the ship
if disaster had necessitated it.
The only aid to navigation was the echo-sounder
which proved itself reliable and accurate
throughout. Experienced Yangtse pilots had, I
later learnt, stated that an echo-sounder in the
Yangtse could not give a true and accurate
sounding due to the fast flow of the river in
spate. From this experience it seems that
soundings gave me sufficient warning in time to
sheer over to deeper water. Lowest recorded
reading on the passage out was three fathoms.
We had no charts of the area from where we
started to just beyond Rose Island; but a
Chinese Admiralty Chart Folio which the Nanking
Chinese naval authorities had lent me gave
sufficient indication of the courses. The
remaining charts we had; but of course over four
months out of date. It was found later that
about fifty per cent, of the buoys were roughly
in place and the remainder non-existent.
My "intention" signal was passed to the
Commander-in-Chief and the Concord at the Saddle
Islands in the dog watches on the 30th of July,
1949, and at dusk certain selected ratings were
briefed in my cabin. The ship's company were
later told by word of mouth in view of possible
Chinese reaction onboard. It was planned to slip
the cable at 2200; but I decided to wait a few
minutes to allow the moon (moon set 2315) to
disappear behind a bank of clouds. At this
precise moment a fully-lighted merchant ship
appeared ahead coming down river from
Chingkiang. This was fortuitous, and I decided
to follow astern of her hoping that I should not
be observed by the control points and that in
following her I should be navigationally
assisted over a difficult portion of the river
of which I had no knowledge. What happened later
makes it quite certain that the presence of this
passenger ship completely confused the Communist
batteries.
This ship, now known to be the Kiangling
Liberation, was quickly challenged by flares,
and rightly replied with the appropriate siren
signals. Almost immediately the Amethyst
likewise was challenged but made no reply. An
H.D.M.L. or L.C.I.(L.) on our port bow,
obviously part of the "set-up" waiting for such
an eventuality, for reasons best known to
herself opened fire at their own batteries
across our bows. My immediate impression was
that she was endeavouring to stop us and would
board if she could. In a matter of seconds the
Amethyst came under heavy and reasonably
accurate fire from four well placed batteries
(three to starboard and one to port). We were
quickly hit on the waterline amidships just
forward of the bridge; by this time full ahead
both had been rung on; for reasons I cannot yet
explain the Amethyst took an unaccountable list
to starboard and steering was well nigh
impossible - nor, of course, would B gun bear.
(I remember vividly feeling sure that we had
been badly hit and that one shaft was out of
action; in my mind I was making initial plans to
beach in a suitable place if I could get clear
of the batteries to evacuate my ship's company
and then blow up the ship. I prayed that the
Commander-in-Chief would have received my
initial "under fire" signal; it was with extreme
relief we received his reply some minutes later.
By then we had passed the first hurdle.)
The Kiangling Liberation soon lost his head and
turned to port, switched off his lights, and
blew his siren vociferously. The Amethyst began
to gather headway at speed and made black smoke;
weaving heavily we finally slipped past the
Kiangling Liberation with about two feet to
spare. On looking astern later it was somewhat
surprising to see her on fire and the batteries
pounding away in all directions. The use of
smoke was advantageous (and again at Kiangyin)
and seemed to provide a good aiming mark for the
opposition.
The remainder of the passage has been fully
told; but I should make it clear that the "boom"
which the Press continue even now to make much
of did not exist. (This was a relic of Press
stories in April, 1949, and no Intelligence has
ever found anything to support any pontoons or
obstructions being "strung across." In that
current it would be beyond the capabilities of
Chinese from either side). The Kiangyin Boom (or
Kiang Yin = Jiangyin) is a relic of the
Sino-Japanese War in 1937 and was a line of
sunken merchant ships across the river; all are
now below the surface. There is a narrow gap
cleared at present and it was normally marked by
two flashing buoys. Only one was in place when I
passed by and the area was covered by Oerlikon
batteries and a small patrol craft; fire from
both was ineffectual.
The greatest danger on the passage down was my
leaking tiller flat; by strenuous efforts the
pumps held and all was well. I might mention
here that the initial damage very nearly put
paid to the telemotor steering leads running
through the depth charge store; rust was so bad
that a sharp pencil would nearly penetrate them
and there were no spares held onboard.
The sheer guts of those onboard below decks
speaks highly for all, especially the
youngsters. Engine room temperatures were
extremely high and of course there were no
reliefs; it was difficult in the circumstances
to pass round a steady flow of information from
the bridge. Those whose action station was below
decks in the early part of the last war will
know the strain of waiting only too well.
LEADERSHIP
One small but important point was fully borne
out by this tragic incident. There is absolutely
nothing wrong in the leadership of the chief and
petty officer of to-day. A good many had
undertaken disciplinary courses (exact
proportion I do not now know - January, 1950)
and the merit of these is most fully justified.
Chief and petty officers are the important "link
in the chain," and no stone should be left
unturned to encourage these men to remain on in
the Service; so many excellent "types" fail to
continue after their "Twelve" that a greater
pecuniary incentive should be offered.
PUBLICITY
Considerable publicity was given to our "escape"
and eventual passage to the United Kingdom, and
again at Plymouth and London. Some quarters have
voiced disapproval of this course - especially
as the Black Swan and Consort did not come home
too. However, it took place, and we had to face
it; taking an over-all view it has really done
the Royal Navy little harm, and perhaps our
recruiting figures may show an increase.
I have received between 700 and 800 letters and
cables from all parts of the United Kingdom, the
British Commonwealth and many foreign countries.
Many and diverse peoples have written, and in
this country of ours it evinces an unswerving
loyalty and faith in the hope for a resurgence
of more amenable times. This in itself gives
much encouragement for the future.
The final honour we were accorded was to appear
in Buckingham Palace before His Majesty the King
and the Royal Family. Each rating had one friend
or relation present (those with gongs, two). Two
comments by parents which appeared in the Press
are a fair summing up: "The Queen smiled at me,
it was all I wanted," and the other: - "Our …..
joined up just two years ago. I never could have
dreamed that he would get us inside the Palace
in that time."
CONCLUSION
The last nine months have been difficult but
unforgettable times. It was a situation which
has had no parallel in history and, it is hoped,
will not occur again. From the youngest to the
oldest the situation was faced with poise and
confidence, which was indeed salutary. This was
my greatest asset. The spirit of leadership and
devotion to duty by those under my command was
fully exemplified throughout; this after all is
the fundamental basis of all our training and
everything that the Royal Navy has stood for in
the past and stands for in the present and the
future.
Co-operation was predominant from the start to
the finish; and that no link in the "chain" was
broken augurs well for the future, and speaks
much for the Royal Navy's basic training.
Prayers to Almighty God were not overlooked in
our routine during those weary and trying days
last summer. There is an ingrained sense of
religion deep down in most of us, apparent more
in some than in others; how easy it could have
been as the empty days wore on to be discouraged
and adopt a fatalistic outlook.
In conclusion I quote the final paragraph of my
covering letter to the Report on The Yangtse
Incident of 1949:
"Our prayers were answered, and escape was
achieved without loss of life and serious
damage. FAITH is not the least of the lessons to
be learnt when in adversity."
Let us not forget this very true statement.
J.
S. Kerans.
Commander,
R.N.
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