CHAPTER XIII

 

THE DARDANELLES — FAILURE OF THE ATTACK ON THE NARROWS AND THE CHANGE OF PLAN — MARCH 18-24

 

By the operation orders, which had been completed before Admiral Carden had to resign the command, the fleet had been reorganised in three divisions. In the first were the four modern ships, under Admiral de Robeck's immediate command, with his flag in the Queen Elizabeth; in the second were eight of the older British battleships, under Captain Hayes-Sadler of the Ocean, for whom the rank of Commodore had been asked; and in the third were the four French battleships and two British, under Admiral Guepratte.

 

This was designated the " Fourth Organisation." Its detail was as under: —

FIRST DIVISION

1st Sub-Division – Queen Elizabeth, Inflexible

2nd Sub-Division – Agamemnon, Lord Nelson

 

SECOND DIVISION

3rd Sub-Division – Ocean, Irresistible, Albion, Vengeance

4th Sub-Division – Swiftsure, Majestic

5th Sub-Division – Canopus, Cornwallis

 

THIRD DIVISION

6th Sub-Division – Suffren, Bouvet, Gaulois, Charlemagne

7th Sub-Division – Triumph, Prince George.

The " General Idea " was to silence the defences of the Narrows and of the minefields simultaneously. The destruction of the forts at 8,000 yards was not expected, but it was hoped to dominate them sufficiently to prevent their interfering with sweeping operations. The scheme of attack was based on two lines. In the first (known as Line A) were the four ships of the First Division. (See Plan, P.230 (below))

 

Plan - The Dardanelles, the Attack on the Narrows

(click plan for near original-sized image)

Taking station in line- abreast, 14,000 yards from the Narrows (that is, about opposite Eren Keui, and at the extreme range of the Narrows forts), they would engage the principal forts on both banks (that is, Nos. 16, 17, 13, 19 and 20) and carry out the long-range bombardment. The second line (known as Line B) was for closer action, and the honour of forming it in the first instance was accorded to Admiral Guepratte's division. The four French battleships were to take station astern of the First Division on the 16,000 yard line, while the two British battle- ships attached to them, Triumph and Prince George, would advance to the 15,000 yard line to act as covering force against the barrage guns. Taking station on either quarter of the First Division, they would first deal with the Messudieh battery (No. 7) and Yildiz (No. 9), and on the Asiatic side with Dardanos and the White Cliff battery, which had by this time received part of its intended armament. (Three 5.9" guns on the higher level of the battery at its left end, with a maximum range of 8,000 yards. Its official designation was Djevad Pasha.)

 

 

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From Dardanelles Naval Campaign in Outline

includes British Despatches, Casualties and Gallantry Awards

 

Ranging from the European side to the Asiatic in line abreast, these were (ships in italic CAPITALS sunk, and italic lower case damaged. All images are Photo Ships, unless otherwise identified):

Line A, 1st Division - Queen Elizabeth, Agamemnon, Lord Nelson, Inflexible to go in first to bombard  and dominate the Narrows forts.
HMS Queen Elizabeth, Queen Elizabeth-class	HMS Agamemnon, Lord Nelson-class	HMS Lord Nelson, Lord Nelson-class (Maritime Quest)	HMS Inflexible, Invincible-class battlecruiser
Line B, 3rd Division - French ships Gaulois, Charlemagne, BOUVET, Suffren to pass through Line A and engage the forts more closely; cover by Prince George on the European side and Triumph on the Asiatic
FS Gaulois, Charlemagne-class	FS Charlemagne, Charlemagne-class	FS Bouvet, Bouvet-class	FS Suffren, Suffren-class  (Maritime Quest)
	HMS Prince George, Majestic-class (Pat Gariepy)	HMS Triumph, Swiftsure-class
2nd Division ships Vengeance, IRRESISTIBLE, Albion, OCEAN to relieve the French Line; Majestic & Swiftsure to take over from Prince George & Triumph.
HMS Vengeance, Canopus-class	HMS Irresistible, Formidable-class (Maritime Quest/Robert W Green)	HMS Albion, Canopus-class	HMS Ocean, Canopus-class
	HMS Majestic, Majestic-class  (Pat Gariepy)	HMS Swiftsure, Swiftsure-class
Minesweeping cover - Canopus and Cornwallis reserved for that night
	HMS Canopus, Canopus-class	HMS Cornwallis, Duncan-class  (Maritime Quest)

 

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If unable to silence them they were to be assisted by the wing ships of the French division, and afterwards to devote themselves to the concealed howitzers. As soon as the First Division began to dominate the main forts, the four French ships would pass through the intervals and engage the same targets, gradually advancing to the limit of the swept area, that is, 8,000 yards from Rumili. As they progressed the First Division would follow in support up to the 12,000 yard line, and when they had reached the limit of their advance the Inflexible would engage Fort Anadolu Medjidieh (No. 24), the main work beyond the Narrows, and if necessary close to decisive range. (No. 24 was a low-level work of old type armed with fourteen short-range Krupp guns—three 11", four 10.2", two 9.4", two 8.2", three 6.9". Being very conspicuous and open to enfilade from the south, it was regarded by the Turks as of little importance, and most of the guns were afterwards removed to strengthen the barrage, but it had, of course, to be destroyed before the passage could be freely used for transports, etc.)

 

The opposition, at any rate to begin with, was likely to be severe. Through the airmen and other sources it was now ascertained that the six main forts to be attacked contained forty-two guns of 8" and over, of which six were 14", besides the guns in the intermediate batteries and an increased number of mobile howitzers and field guns on both banks. It was possible therefore that the enemy's fire might prove too powerful for the second line to advance as arranged. An alternative method of attack was therefore provided, under which Admiral Guepratte's division was to keep circling round the first line, and attack in a series of runs at gradually

 

March 17-18, 1915

THE NEW PLAN OF ATTACK

 

decreasing ranges till the forts were sufficiently dominated for the first method to be resumed. In any case the final close work was not to be put upon the French division. After four hours it was to be relieved by Captain Hayes-Sadler with his 3rd and 4th Sub-Divisions, the two ships of his 5th Sub-Division being reserved for supporting the minesweepers during the night. As for the guns not in the forts, those defending the minefield were to be dealt with by the centre ships of the second line, while the dispersed howitzers and field guns were to be the business of the wing ships of both lines. By these arrangements it was hoped that sweeping could begin two hours after the bombardment commenced. The trawlers were then to be ready to clear a passage 900 yards broad past Kephez Point into Sari Sighlar Bay, and as the work proceeded the advanced line would move on into the bay and endeavour to complete the destruction of the forts at decisive range.

 

Finally, by way of diversion, and as a means of distracting the attention of the mobile guns on the European side, the Royal Naval Division, with seven transports, was to make a demonstration of landing on the western side of the peninsula. There also the Dartmouth would endeavour to silence any batteries that might be firing at the ships inside the Straits, and the Dublin would operate similarly in Bashika Bay and watch Yeni Shehr.

 

Observation of fire was left entirely to the airmen, and the Ark Royal was to arrange for one seaplane to go up every hour. To provide against the danger of floating mines an armed picket boat was to attend each battleship, ready to sink any that might be seen.

 

Such was the well-thought-out plan by which the great question of the fleet's capacity to achieve the work assigned to it was at last to be put to the test. In the afternoon of March 16 the whole scheme had been communicated and explained to all Commanding Officers at a conference on board the Queen Elizabeth, over which Admiral de Robeck presided, and which Admiral Guepratte attended, and on the evening of the 17th, as the weather promised well, the operation orders were issued to the fleet. Nor did the morning of the 18th belie the promise. Dawn came up with a warm southerly breeze and a cloudless sky in all the jewelled serenity for which the Aegean is famous at its best.

 

At an early hour the British minesweepers could report that during the night they had seen all clear between the White Cliff and Kephez Bay, that is, to within 8,000 yards of the Narrows forts, while the French had made good as far as the White Cliff. Nothing therefore stood in the way of the great effort being made. As the sun rose the haze over the land cleared, the southerly wind died away and at 8.15 the signal to carry on was flying from the flagship.

 

Shortly before 10.0 the fleet was approaching the entrance, and at 10.30 the Agamemnon began to lead the First Division into the Straits, with destroyers sweeping ahead and the Prince George and Triumph on either beam. Within half an hour they came under howitzer fire from the back of Kum Kale. The ships returned it, but the annoyance continued to increase as they advanced to their firing position. In another half-hour they had reached it, and as they proceeded to take up their assigned positions and opened fire (about 11.30) vessels could be seen moving in the Narrows off Chanak. There were one large merchant ship, two small tugs and a destroyer, but little notice was taken of them at the time, for as soon as the ships opened fire they made off hastily up the Straits and disappeared.

 

Attention was now absorbed with the scattered guns and howitzers, which seemed more numerous and better directed than ever, but in spite of the galling fire, the first half-hour of the bombardment gave good promise of success. The Queen Elizabeth, which was the wing ship on the European side, took for her first target the formidable Hamidieh I on the opposite shore, but, owing probably to the great range, its German garrison seems to have given no reply. Next to her was the Agamemnon on Rumili, the fort she had previously punished. Then came the Lord Nelson on the other main European fort, Namazieh, while the Inflexible, on the starboard wing, took the small battery between them, Hamidieh II.

 

Ten minutes after the flagship opened all the first line ships were in action, and seemed soon to be making good practice. From the forts there was little or no reply, but the barrage fire increased in volume and intensity. Hits, however, continued to be reported in spite of it, and about noon the Queen Elizabeth, who had just shifted to Chemenlik (No. 20), now a fine target against the sunlit houses of Chanak, saw a tremendous double explosion in that fort. At the same time the Triumph was putting shell after shell into Dardanos, the most formidable of the intermediate batteries, and using her secondary armament against the barrage guns. For some minutes longer the deliberate long-range fire continued, but with what precise effect it was difficult to see, for the light southerly breeze had freshened and was rolling the smoke straight down the range. Still it was clear that Chemenlik must have suffered badly by the explosion; the other forts had also sustained obvious damage, and by 12.6 enough seemed to have been done for Admiral

 

March 18, 1915

THE GREAT ATTACK

 

de Robeck to signal the French division to pass through the British line and begin closer work.

 

All this time the concealed guns and howitzers had been getting more and more troublesome. As yet, however, none of the ships had been badly hit, but the Agamemnon and Inflexible in Line A soon began to suffer. Ten minutes after the bombardment began, a battery of four 6" howitzers somewhere south of Eren Keui concentrated upon the former, and at 12.45 got her range. In the next twenty-five minutes she was hit twelve times, five times on the armour without injury and seven times above it. So much structural damage was done that Captain Fyler turned 32 points to throw out the range and then resumed his original position.

 

The Inflexible was also in serious trouble. Being the outermost ship of Line A on the Asiatic side, she had been receiving the main attention of the Eren Keui howitzers. At 12.20, as the French division was passing through the line, she was hit on the forebridge and had her wireless put out of action. Within the next ten minutes she was hit three times more and her picket boat was sunk alongside her. The first hit had set fire to her forebridge and it was burning fiercely. Twice again she was hit, but since the French were now closing the forts and required all the support Line A could give Captain Phillimore stuck to his target, Hamidieh II. The Admiral, however, seeing his plight, signalled him to shift his berth. About the same time it was seen that the flames had spread to the fore top. It was full of wounded, and in order to save them from being burnt alive Captain Phillimore, having silenced his battery, decided to fall out of the line.

 

This he could do with less scruple, for the French had ceased to advance. On receiving the signal Admiral Guepratte had steamed up the Asiatic coast with the Suffren and Bouvet, while the Gaulois and Charlemagne conformed on the opposite side, so as to leave an open field of fire for the British line in the middle of the Straits. Even before they reached their firing position they were received with a heavy fire both from the Narrows forts and the barrage. Still, with great gallantry. Admiral Guepratte led them in to 10,000 yards, concentrating on the forts with his heavy guns and making apparently good practice. For a time the struggle for mastery was very severe. It was evident that although the intermediate batteries were now silent, the Narrows forts had been far from dominated by the morning's bombardment.

 

A seaplane which had passed up the Straits reported that Dardanos and Chemenlik were no longer manned, but that the other principal targets were all firing. The bombardment of the eight battleships engaged now began to tell. By 1.45 the enemy's fire had so far slackened that Admiral de Robeck considered the time had come for calling up the minesweepers to clear a passage for closing to decisive range. To cover the operation he also ordered Captain Hayes-Sadler's division, which had not yet been engaged and was quite fresh, to relieve the French line, which had naturally been suffering. At the range to which they had closed — about 9,000 yards — the fire of the forts was fully effective. The ships had been hit again and again, and the Gaulois had just been so badly holed forward that Admiral Guepratte called to the Dublin to come inside and stand by her.

 

Still up to this time things had gone as well as could be expected, and there was good promise of the new scheme of attack proving a success. But before the relief had been carried out a startling incident suddenly gave the fortunes of the day an ugly turn. It was nearly two o'clock when the Suffren was coming out at high speed on the Asiatic side, with the Bouvet following. Admiral Guepratte's method of attack was for the ships of each pair to take alternately the most exposed position, and when the recall was made the Bouvet was engaging Namazieh. Early in the action she had suffered a good deal of damage, mainly from Messudieh (No. 7). Two of her casemates had been put out of action, and her bridge and steering compartment were on fire before she effectually silenced the battery.

 

On the other shore were the Charlemagne and Gaulois, the Gaulois, who had gamely declined the Dublin's offer of a tow, coming along as best she could with a list to starboard and down by the bows, and clearly unfit for further action. The French flagship had just passed through the British line, and the Bouvet was about to do so, when a huge column of reddish black smoke shot up from under her. Whether it was a shell or a mine could not be seen. It was followed almost immediately by another, higher and more dense, which seemed to tell a magazine had gone. As the smoke cleared she was seen to have taken a heavy list, and then in two minutes she turned turtle and went down. A rush to the spot was made by the nearest destroyers and the picket boats that were attending the British ships. The Agamemnon and the French ships also closed to the rescue, but so sudden and complete was the disaster that out of her whole complement little more than a score could be saved. As many more had been

 

March 18, 1915

LOSS OF THE BOUVET

 

left at Tenedos in charge of her boats, and of the rest over 600 must have perished.

 

Such was the tragic spectacle which greeted Captain Hayes-Sadler as he led his ships up to take the place of the retiring French. Sudden and terrible as was the disaster, it did nothing to check the British advance. Captain Hayes-Sadler, in the Ocean, was on the right of the line, that is, on the Asiatic side, the Vengeance (Captain Bertram Smith) on the left. Between them were the Albion (Captain Heneage) and the Irresistible (Captain Dent). In support were the Swiftsure (Captain Maxwell-Lefroy) and the majestic (Captain Talbot) who were coming up to relieve the Prince George and Triumph. At 2.39, when the range was 12,000 yards, they opened fire, and gradually closed to 10,600, using their secondary armament against guns that were firing on the boats rescuing the Bouvet's crew and at the mouth of the Soghanli Dere, for one of the torpedo tubes was reported to be there, and, as some thought, might have caused the Bouvet disaster. The reply from the forts was not formidable. The only one that was firing briskly was the German-manned Hamidieh I (No. 19), which, though the nearest of the Chanak group, had proved the most baffling target.

 

Though the Vengeance, whose target it was, kept dropping shells right into it, the seaplane, whieh was observing, reported that most of them fell into the centre of the fort and did no damage. Chemenlik, the fort behind it, was still not manned, and two of its guns were pointing at a sharp angle upwards. On the European side the Irresistible enraged Namazieh, which for the moment made no reply; the Ocean had five hits out of her first seven shots on Hamidieh II, and shortly after 3.0 the Vengeance set a large fire burning at the back of Rumili. A few minutes later Hamidieh II ceased fire. From that time it was silent, and the Ocean shifted to Rumili, which was still firing. It is difficult to state with certainty what effect our bombardment was producing.

 

Several commanding officers speak of forts which had been reduced to silence, but the Admiral asserts that at a quarter past three all forts were firing rapidly but inaccurately. It is quite clear, however, that Hamidieh I was undamaged. It was as active as when she first opened fire, and was concentrating salvoes of four on the Irresistible, in spite of line A, which was keeping up the bombcurdment from the 14,000 yard line. At 3.14 there was a heavy explosion alongside her, and then the Queen Elizabeth began to treat the obnoxious fort with salvoes in reply. A quarter of an hour later (3.32) it could be seen that the Irresistible had taken a slight list, and as the enemy's fire did not slacken the Admiral signalled the advanced line to open out the range.

 

Though the forts ceased firing from time to time, it was evident they were not really out of action, and obviously the projected attack on the minefield could not yet take place. (The Turks state that the periodical silence of the forts was mainly due to the need of cleaning the mechanism of their guns, which became choked with dust thrown up by shells exploding in front on the emplacements, Those which burst behind the guns did no harm.)

 

But danger had already been found. On reaching line A the trawlers had got out their sweeps and were proceeding up stream when they exploded three mines. For a time it seemed that the ships, though far short of Kephez, were themselves in the midst of mines, some of which at least were believed to be of the floating Léon type. (The Léon mine is one that is unmoored and oscillates between certain set depths below the surface.)

 

Between 3.30 and 4.0 the ships had from time to time to go astern to avoid them, the sweepers exploded one close to where the Bouvet went down and apparently brought two others, horned carbonite mines, to the surface, which the Ocean, Agamemnon and picket boats tried in vain to destroy. A floating mine was soon reported as far down as the Admiral's division, which was still on the 14,000 yard line, and at 4.5 the Lord Nelson's picket-boat thought she had destroyed one by gunfire. Immediately afterwards the Inflexible, which since 2.30 had resumed her station in Line A, struck a mine which took her on the starboard bow by the fore submerged flat, every man in it was killed, it flooded immediately and the ship began to list and settle by the head. She at once made for Tenedos, but it was doubtful whether she could reach it. The water continued to increase on her, her bulkheads were straining badly, and so critical was her condition that the wounded were got into the cutter.

 

Those on the spot had little doubt what had been the business of the vessels seen at work in the Narrows when the attack began, for in the opinion of the Admiral the time of the mines' appearance pointed to their having been released from Chanak after the ships entered the Straits. Shortly afterwards came another shock. About 4.15 the Irresistible, which, in opening out the range, had reached the 11,000 yards line, was drifting with engines stopped, when she was struck. At first her Captain was uncertain whether or not it was a torpedo, but he soon realised that it was a mine, and that it was moored. The results were disastrous.

 

March 18, 1915

REPULSE OF THE ATTACK

 

It took her under the bilge of the starboard engine-room, very near the centre line of the ship, and the engine-room flooded so quickly that only three of the men who were in it were able to escape. Then under the pressure of the water the midship bulkhead buckled, the port engine-room flooded in its turn and the engines were completely disabled.

 

With a list of 7 degrees to starboard and down by the stem, her condition was easily visible to the enemy, and their fire on her redoubled as the destroyer Wear and a picket boat hurried to her assistance. The Admiral, who was then ignorant of the extent of the damage or of its cause, ordered the Ocean to stand by and tow her out of action if necessary. The remaining vessels did all they could to keep down the new outburst of fire from the forts and batteries. By the time the Wear came up, Captain Dent, seeing it was impossible to save his ship, decided to abandon her. It was no easy matter; shells were raining on her deck, causing many casualties, but by a fine display of seamanship Captain Christopher Metcalfe of the Wear managed to take off 28 officers and 582 men. Only ten volunteers were left on board to get out a wire to the Ocean.

 

It was not till 4.50 that the Wear got back to the flagship with the rescued crew, and only then did Admiral de Robeck learn that it was a mine that had caused the trouble. He at once signalled the advanced line to fall back. At 5.10 the Irresistible's crew were disembarked from the Wear, which was then ordered to close on the Ocean and instruct her to withdraw if the Irresistible could not be towed. The Ocean had by this time approached the mined ship, and Captain Dent went on board to confer with Captain Hayes-Sadler, but the Irresistible' s list had increased so much, and she lay so awkwardly bows on to the Asiatic shore, that it soon became obvious this was impossible, and as the Ocean was under a considerable cross fire, it was decided to remove the remainder of the crew and carry out the Admiral's orders.

 

At 5.50 the ship was abandoned 10,000 yards from Rumili, the intention being to make an attempt to save her after dark with destroyers and minesweepers. As soon as he saw that the Irresistible had been abandoned the Admiral hoisted the " General Recall " and began to return to Tenedos for the night. It was clear, in view of the unexpected danger and the losses sustained, that battleships could not be left inside the Straits after dark to cover the minesweepers, so that all idea of clearing the Kephez minefield that night had to be abandoned.

 

How real the danger was was quickly demonstrated. The Ocean began to withdraw under a heavy fire from Dardanos and Suandere. At about five minutes past six she was a mile from the Irresistible, when a heavy explosion on her starboard side announced that she also had struck a mine. (Her exact position at the time could not be determined, as the standard compass and upper bridge had been completely destroyed (Captain's report March 24).)

 

The adjacent coal bunkers and fore and aft passages flooded and the helm jammed hard a-port. Almost at the same moment a shell got home on the same side aft and so flooded the tiller-room and starboard steering engine-room that they could not be reached and repairs were impossible. In spite of a prompt flooding of the port wing compartments the ship rapidly took a list of 15 degrees. So critical was the situation that Captain Hayes-Sadler signalled the destroyers, Colne, Jed and Chelmer, which were passing at the time, to close. With neat skill and pluck, under a crossfire from Dardanos and the barrage batteries on both sides, they removed the whole crew, and the Ocean, being well out in the channel, was abandoned to drift out of danger if she continued to float. Till dark Captain Hayes-Sadler lay off a mile away in the Jed, and then returned to the ship and was able to remove four men who had been left by accident on board. It was obvious, however, that nothing more could be done, and she was then finally abandoned about 7.30 p.m.

 

After reporting to the Admiral at Tenedos, Captains Hayes-Sadler and Dent went back to join the destroyers, which, with six minesweepers, had been ordered to go in and endeavour to tow the Irresistible into the current and prevent the Ocean drifting out of it. But though they searched till nearly midnight not a trace of either ship could be found. Their end was unseen. In the silence of the night they settled down quietly somewhere in deep water and no man knew their resting-place. (On Turkish information it was stated that the Ocean drifted into Morto Bay and sank there about 10.30 p.m. The Irresistible, they said, was caught in a cross current and carried back within range of the Narrows forts. After being fired on by them and by Dardanos she was believed to have sunk about 7.30.)

 

No other ship was lost. In spite of the Inflexible's perilous condition, thanks to the devotion of the engine-room, who had to work almost in the dark and with the ventilation fans stopped. Captain Phillimore succeeded in getting her to Tenedos, and an hour and a half after she was struck he anchored her safely on the north side of the island. But

 

March 18, 1915

THE COST AND RESULT

 

that was all that could be done. It was soon evident she would have to stay where she was till a coffer dam had been constructed to enable her to proceed to Malta. It was also found that both the Suffren and Gaulois would have to be docked before they were fit for further service. The Suffren had a bad leak forward caused by a shell, and the Gaulois, when she left the Straits, was in so serious a condition that for some time it was doubtful whether she could be saved, but eventually she was beached successfully on Drapano Island, in the south of the Rabbit group.

 

Not till long after was the real cause of the disasters ascertained. The truth was, that on the night of March 8, the Turks, unknown to us, had laid a line of twenty moored mines in Eren Keui Bay parallel to the shore, and our sweeping craft had missed them. They had been deliberately placed in our usual manoeuvring ground, and, in spite of all our precautions, they had achieved a staggering success. (See footnote, p. 225)

 

The great attempt to force the Narrows with the fleet had ended in what could only be regarded as a severe defeat. Out of the sixteen capital ships engaged three had gone down and three more, including the only battle cruiser, had been put out of action for an indefinite period. Of the whole Allied battle fleet, therefore, one-third was spent in the one day's operation. At such a rate of loss, with results apparently so meagre, it looked extremely doubtful whether the navy unaided could ever force a passage.

 

Long afterwards reports that were received from Constantinople went to show that the day's work had had as serious an effect on the Turks as on the Allies. So terrible was said to have been the havoc of the heavy ship guns, and so far spent the moral and ammunition of the garrisons, that further resistance seemed hopeless. The impression prevailed that, had the attack been renewed, nothing would have induced the men to stand to their guns, and all the forts must have been abandoned. Such reports are not unusual under similar conditions, and later inquiries made in quieter circumstances tended to show they were at least exaggerated.

 

The Turkish official returns admit that the fabric of all the main forts had been seriously damaged. In Hamidieh II the barracks were destroyed and both its guns knocked out, but Rumili, they say, had only one gun put temporarily out of action. Namazieh lost one gun, and its barracks were burnt. The barracks at Hamidieh I were also burnt, but it only lost one heavy gun. In Chemenlik a magazine was exploded. They insist, however, that the damage did little to destroy the general confidence. So little had the defences of the minefield been touched that the General Staff were confident it could not be cleared, and felt sure that, if the attempt to pass the Straits was repeated, the forts and the Turkish fleet could deal with any ships that might scrape through.

 

Their confidence was probably justified. It is now known that, before the ships could reach Sari Sighlar Bay, they would have to run the gauntlet of five lines of mines besides the new Eren Keui line. Once in Sari Sighlar Bay, the surviving ships would have been within 3,000 to 4,000 yards of the Narrows forts, whose ammunition, though much of it was of inferior quality, was by no means exhausted. Enough at least appears to have been available for continuing the resistance. (An impression seems to have prevailed in Constantinople that the ammunition was practically exhausted on March 18 (see Morgenthau, Secrets of the Bosporus pp. 147, et aeq,). The official statement of the Turkish War Office, however, says " modern ammunition for heavy guns was very short, but there was a plentiful supply of older ammunition. Ammunition for medium and light guns was so plentiful that many attacks could have been repulsed." Possibly this was a sanguine view, but a further statement was furnished which purports to give the actual number of rounds per gun remaining after the action was over. This shows an average for the heavy guns of about seventy rounds; for 6-inch, 190 rounds; and for the smaller mine defence guns 160 rounds— a proportion which in view of our own shortage of ammunition was far from negligible. For the howitzers and barrage guns there is no return.)

 

Further, it must be borne in mind that only one of the fort guns had been permanently damaged. Some that had been put out of action were repaired during the night, and the volume of fire would have been as great as ever had the struggle been renewed. On the other hand, our own ships at so decisive a range would have had a fair chance of knocking out the fort guns without too much delay, although the barrage fire would probably have been little less difficult to deal with than before. Assuming, however, they could have avoided serious trouble from the guns by continuing the rush, there were still five more lines of mines to pass before they reached Nagara, where the Narrows and their defences end. It is true the Nagara group of forts was obsolete and practically negligible, but the chances against getting so far through the unswept minefields, which in all contained nearly 350 mines, are calculated to have been 15 to 1 — that is, out of sixteen ships only one could have hoped to reach the Sea of Marmara. Though the mines themselves were of inferior type, they had proved themselves capable of sinking the old type battleships

 

March 18, 1915

GENERAL HAMILTON'S VIEW

 

of which the fleet was mainly composed and of disabling a vessel so modern as the Inflexible. (Information furnished by the Turks after the Armistice leaves practically no doubt that the damage was done by the newly-laid mines in Eren Keui Bay and not by the floating mines. These were not of the Leon type, but " Ramis " mines attached to floats. Some forty of this type had been manufactured at Constantinople, and about a dozen of them had been let go from time to time during the afternoon operations, with no effect. On March 18 the steamer Bulair was ready below Nagara with twenty of them, but the Turks state that they were not dropped.)

 

The whole of these facts could not be known at the time, but enough had been seen to indicate that an immediate renewal of the attack was scarcely to be thought of. It was fully believed that the main mischief had been done by floating mines, and until some means had been found for dealing with them, another attempt to force the minefield in open daylight could scarcely be regarded as a fair risk of war. It seemed clear that if disaster were to be avoided, different methods must be tried, and even before the results of the day were known a radical change in the plan of operations was in contemplation.

 

On the eve of the attack General Sir Ian Hamilton reached Tenedos. On the same day the last group of the French division arrived, under General d'Amade, who had been selected for the command as being an officer experienced in oversea expeditions. During the South African war he had been Military Attache at the British headquarters, he had won a high reputation for his campaign in Morocco, and in the early days of the war he had had committed to him the difficult task of holding the line between Dunkirk and the British army with a group of Territorial divisions known as " L'Armee d'Amade." The British General's first conversation with the Admiral and a personal reconnaissance on March 18 impressed him with the difficulty which the mobile guns presented to the success of the fleet, and the impossibility of dealing with them without landing troops in strength.

 

Success, therefore, could not be looked for unless the force was reorganised for the operation. The French contingent was no better prepared for a contested landing than his own, and, after a conference with Admiral Wemyss, General d'Amade and other senior officers, he had come to the conclusion that the best and quickest way of reorganising was to send all the troops to Alexandria, since Mudros had no facilities for dealing with so large a force. This difficulty had been foreseen and reported by General Maxwell a week earlier. It had been referred to Admiral Wemyss, and, two days before the attack, he had pronounced in favour of the proposed change of base, but a final decision by the Government at home had been postponed till General Hamilton could see for himself.

 

When, therefore, the day after the attack on the Narrows, the War Council met, they had before them a momentous decision. That the base must be changed, in spite of the delay it would entail, was certain. It was further indisputable that if the troops were to be employed in forcing the passage of the Straits, instead of proceeding direct to their original objective in the wake of the fleet, the enterprise meant a much more serious commitment than had hitherto been contemplated. Naturally, therefore, there was a pronounced tendency to cling to the idea of forcing the passage with the fleet alone, and the main question was whether or not Admiral de Robeck should be instructed to make another attempt.

 

As yet there was nothing from him beyond an announcement of the defeat and loss he had sustained, but General Hamilton, in telegraphing his decision that the base must be changed, had stated that, while the Admiral did not minimise the difficulties of the task, he was clearly determined to exhaust every effort before calling for military assistance on a large scale. This was before the attack took place, and now, in view of the military appreciations on the spot — to say nothing of all previous experience — it was more than doubtful if a renewal of the naval operations could do any good. On the other hand, our information was that the Turks were short of ammunition and mines, and, until we knew better what damage had been done to the forts, it was impossible to say that another attempt would not be decisive. Furthermore the political reasons for carrying on were very strong.

 

To wait for the reorganisation of the army would involve probably a month's delay, and at the moment it was of crying importance not to admit even a check by suspending operations. In Italy especially the effect was likely to be very bad. It was only a fortnight since she had made her first overtures towards joining the Entente Powers, delicate negotiations were in progress, and Italian opinion seemed about equally divided on the desirability of breaking her neutrality. No less serious was the probable reaction on the Mohammedan world. In that quarter it seemed essential not to disturb the impression which had been produced by the defeat of the attempt on Egypt and our successes in Mesopotamia. Still, in view of the meagreness of the ascertained facts of the situation at the Dardanelles, it was impossible to send the Admiral a direct order to carry on. The man on the spot alone could judge, and

 

March 19-21, 1915

ADMIRAL DE ROBECK'S VIEW

 

the final resolution was that he should be authorised to continue the operations if he thought fit. (Dardanelles Commission Report I, p.38)

 

In order to give him at least a chance of doing this and at the same time create an impression that we did not mean to accept the rebuff, the Admiralty at once decided to make good his losses. The Queen and Implacable were already within a day's steaming of Malta, and an hour or two after the meeting, the last two ships of the 5th Battle Squadron, the Prince of Wales and London, were ordered to follow them. Thus the Channel Fleet finally disappeared. As Admiral Bethell was senior to Admiral de Robeck, they were sent out under Admiral Stuart Nicholson, who had been commanding the 6th Battle Squadron at Sheerness, and Admiral Bethell took his place. At the same time the French were asked, if only for the moral effect, to announce that they intended to replace the Bouvet and Gaulois, and their reply was to order the Henri IV, from the Suez Canal, to join Admiral Guepratte's flag.

 

In informing Admiral de Robeck of the resolution that had been come to and of the reinforcement he was to expect, the Admiralty impressed upon him the importance of not giving the enemy time to repair the forts or encouraging them by any apparent suspension of operations. It was entirely the Admiral's own view. What he wanted to do was to resume the bombardment over the land with the Queen Elizabeth. If she could be provided with proper air reconnaissance, he still believed he could dominate the forts sufficiently to allow of the minefield being swept. For this reason he was opposed to the change of base. Although he concurred that for military reasons it might be necessary, yet he believed that if the troops were used at once to make feints at various points, they would attract so much of the noxious mobile artillery that his sweepers would be able to work in spite of it. So eager indeed was the Admiral to carry on that had the heavens been propitious, this expedient might have been tried, but again the weather had the last word. Day after day it blew strong north-easterly gales, with a visibility so low that firing was out of the question. On the night of the 21st, torpedo-boat 064 was wrecked on the east side of Lemnos, and still the gale blew relentlessly. Nothing could be done, and, before the weather abated, the Admiral had reason to modify his views.

 

General Hamilton had come out with the idea that he was to land his force near Bulair, and that nothing but a feint was to be attempted at the south end of the peninsula. His main aim was to to cut off the Turkish army on the peninsula; but the General's first conference (March 17) with the Admiral had raised doubts in his mind as to the wisdom of the plan. It admittedly depended for its success on the fleet being able to force its way into the Sea of Marmara, and when the Admiral explained the unexpected difficulties of the mobile guns the General began to realise the practical impossibility of dealing with them, except by a landing in force on the peninsula. Clearly a landing at Bulair would not help. It would not lead to the occupation of the forts when they were dominated, nor would the seizure of the neck alone force an evacuation of the peninsula, since the main line of supply was by sea.

 

From a military point of view, a landing at Bulair was no less objectionable, since any force disembarked there would be in the precarious position of having to face two fronts—one towards the Bulair lines and one in the opposite direction against an attack from the mainland. As for a direct attack on the lines from the sea, it was obvious that precautions had been taken to render such an attempt extremely hazardous. Convinced, therefore, as General Hamilton was, that the fleet could not succeed by the help of mere demolition parties, he turned to the possibilities of landing all his force in the peninsula, and, whilst the great attack on the Narrows was in progress, made a close reconnaissance of the whole coast in the Phaeton accompanied by his French colleague. From Bulair to Suvla he found that the precipitous fall of the hills left no practicable beaches except at a few narrow gullies where deployment after landing was impossible. Beyond Suvla as far as Tekke Burnu, at the end of the peninsula, there were several serviceable landing-places, but all of them appeared to be heavily entrenched and wired. Only at the southern end of the peninsula, between Tekke Burnu and Morto Bay, did a disembarkation in force seem practicable. (See Plan No. 4. (below))

Plan No. 4 The Dardanelles
(click plan for near original-sized image - 9.5Mb)

As for a landing inside the Straits, the reception he met with when the Phaeton entered them put that out of the question, and if any doubt remained in his mind as to how he would have to employ his force, it was removed by what he saw of the results of the great attack. His view of the situation was not immediately conveyed to the Admiral. In the flagship it was still taken for granted that the main landing would be near Bulair, and feeling, as he and his staff did, how hopeless was such an operation if the German-Turkish fleet was left in command of the Sea of Marmara, they saw only a fresh necessity for repeating

 

March 22, 1915

SHIFT OF ARMY BASE

 

their effort to break through at all costs. There was a belief that it could still be done when the reinforcing ships arrived and the destroyers were equipped for sweeping, if only the General would make feints of landing to occupy some of the attention of the mobile guns, and for this purpose would postpone for a few days his change of base. It was a matter not to be settled in a moment, and it was arranged that a decision should be taken at a conference of the principal flag and general officers, to be held on March 22.

 

Meanwhile, as we have seen, the Admiral had informed the Admiralty that he intended to persevere with the fleet alone. But by the time the conference met, the few days that had elapsed since the attack on the Narrows had brought home the full significance of what had happened, and Admiral de Robeck now agreed with the General's view that the whole military force would have to be employed. Reluctant as he had been—in accordance with his instructions—to call for military assistance in force, he had felt from the first, like every one else, that the right way of doing the work was by combined operations. He now knew not only that the General was ready to employ his whole force in assisting the fleet to get through, but, after hearing the military views, he was convinced that the object of the campaign could only be attained by the continuous co-operation of the two services, the main reason being that even if the fleet got through, transports and supply ships could never follow it unless the Gallipoli peninsula was held. By this means alone could the mobile guns on the Asiatic side be held in check and the channel kept clear of mines.

 

The delay involved was greatly to be regretted, but the Admiral understood it would not extend beyond April 14, and to this he was reconciled by the bad weather; for it was now only too plain that it would be extremely hazardous to land any large body of troops before the spring was further advanced. Nor need it involve the fleet being idle. The ships could be well employed in searching out concealed batteries and sweeping the area in which they would have to manoeuvre. The aeroplanes had just arrived, a practicable aerodrome had been prepared at Tenedos, and as soon as the weather moderated he intended to begin. The Queen Elizabeth was also to resume her bombardment of the Narrows over the land. The French squadron would operate in the Gulf of Xeros and endeavour to attack Gallipoli and the Bulair camps with their aircraft, while his own seaplanes would, if possible, attack the Turkish depots at Maidos and some vessels, reported to be full of mines, which were lying above the Narrows. In this way he felt he could keep the enemy occupied till the middle of April, when the General expected the troops to be ready.

 

At home some disappointment was felt at the Admiral's change of attitude. The Admiralty pointed out how the delay might mean the appearance of enemy submarines on the scene, and expressed their unwillingness to call on the army for operations which must necessarily be costly. But, as the Admiral explained, the conditions of the case had now entirely changed. The General on the spot had confirmed his own view that troops were necessary to enable him to get through. Until March 18 experience had not conclusively revealed how inadequate were high-velocity guns for the destruction of forts at long range. Their own failure and recent reports from Tsingtau showed that the operation was far more difficult than had been thought. Not that he accepted the check of March 18 as decisive — he had been quite ready to try again. But when he found that General Hamilton regarded a landing in force as a sound operation, and that he was ready to co-operate in forcing the Narrows, there could no longer be any question of making another attempt with the fleet alone.

 

Nor was this all. For, as he pointed out in his appreciation, it was now clear that even if the fleet could force the passage into the Sea of Marmara, it could not maintain itself there unless its communications were secured by the occupation of the Gallipoli peninsula. It was only, therefore, by a combined operation that the ultimate object of the campaign could be attained. This being so, his obvious course was to husband his ships for the combined effort. His intention, therefore, till the troops were ready, was to confine himself to the preparatory work. To renew the attack on the Narrows single-handed could hardly lead to any decisive result, while it would certainly cripple his power of co-operating with the army and jeopardise the execution of the sounder and larger scheme.

 

So it was decided. All the troops, except the 3rd Australian Brigade and the Marines, began at once to leave for Egypt, the General sailed on March 24, and with the departure of army headquarters, the first stage of the ill-fated enterprise came to an end.

 

 

---

 

 

CHAPTER XIV

 

PROGRESS OF THE OVERSEA EXPEDITIONS AND COMMERCE DEFENCE IN THE OUTER SEAS DURING THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1915

 

To appreciate justly all that was involved in the decision to change the plan of the Dardanelles campaign, the conflicting anxieties which led up to it must be seen in the light of the general naval situation. In the outer seas, as will appear directly, it had been cleared of its original embarrassments, but, although the battle of the Falklands had broken the back of the enemy's cruiser efforts against our commerce, the trouble had not been finally eradicated without prolonged operations and the occupation of a considerable proportion of our cruiser force. The difficulty had been increased by the needs of our combined expeditions against the German oversea possessions. Nowhere, except in the Pacific, had they attained their end. In Africa we had still three in hand — the Cameroons, German " South-West " and German " East "; all of them were causing a drain upon the navy, and in none had progress been as rapid as had been hoped.

 

Duala and the Cameroons Estuary (link to first use of Map)

 

In the Cameroons, since the beginning of December, when we had captured Baré and the railhead of the northern railway, no substantial advantage had been obtained. At the end of December General Dobell had pushed two columns forward from this point, and with the assistance of a naval gun party they had destroyed the German fort at Dschang, thirty miles north of Baré early in the new year, but owing to the difficulty of the communications, they were then ordered to fall back and establish themselves at Baré and the railhead. To the westward ot this point the forces in Southern Nigeria were in contact with the enemy, but could not advance, and in the north the troops acting with the French from Lake Chad could do no more than watch Garua and Lere. (See Map No. 16, Vol. I.)

 

The French were occupying the midland railway as far east as Edea, at the crossing of the Sanaga River, and in the south and south-east General Aymerich, assisted by Belgians, by continuous activity was preventing the enemy concentrating for operations in the main theatre. But the failure of the French to clear the coastal area south of Edea put a heavy strain on Captain C. T. M. Fuller and his slender blockading force, which consisted at this time of the light cruiser Challenger, the gunboat Dwarf, a picket boat and a steam pinnace which the Cumberland had left with him, and about a dozen vessels of the Nigerian Marine:

(Ivy, Government steamboat - 1-12 pdr., 1-7 pdr. M.L., 2-6 pdr., Q.F.

Alligator, Motor launch - 1 Maxim.

Crocodile, Motor launch - 1 Maxim.

Manatee, Motor launch - 1-3 pdr, 1 Maxim.

Remus, Paddle tug ­- 3-12 pdrs, & W/T.

Porpoise, Paddle tug - 2-12 pdrs, 1-3 pdr.

Vigilant, Steam launch - 1-3 pdr, 1 Maxim.

Moseley, Steam lifeboat - 1 Maxim.

Walrus, Steam tug (German prize) -1 Maxim.

Balbus, Steam tug - 3-37 mm.

Mole, Dredger - 1-6" B.L. & W/T.

Lighter (300 tons) - 1-6" B.L.

Also about half a dozen German ships, tugs and motor boats.)

Seventy miles south of Edea the French were holding the little port of Kribi. It was frequently attacked, and to assist in its defence the Ivy or Dwarf was constantly there, and Captain Charon's cruiser, the Pothuau, as well. Towards the end of January, as the French required more troops at Edea, part of the garrison was transferred there, and was replaced by four companies of our West African Regiment and a detachment of our Marines, that had been stationed at Kampo, in the extreme south, in order to control the passage of supplies to the enemy through the Spanish enclave.

 

Between Kribi and the Jabassi River the coast was open, and incessant activity was necessary to prevent supplies being thrown in from the Spanish island of Fernando Po. Posts had to be established at various points from which the flotilla patrols could work, nor was the work confined to the sea. The enemy were constantly appearing in small bodies on the coast, and whenever they did so landing-parties had to be organised to drive them off and prevent them establishing themselves. In this work the Dwarf (Commander F. E. K. Strong, R.N.) was especially active, and more than justified her existence. (She was completed in 1899 under the Naval Defence Act programme of 1889, 710 tons, 2-4", 4-12-pdrs, 6 Maxims.)

 

The whole position was very unsatisfactory and promised no visible conclusion. Although the Allies greatly outnumbered the Germans, the vast distances and the number of troops that were absorbed in maintaining necessary posts and defending the long lines of communication, made concerted

 

Feb. 1915

THE CAMEROONS

 

movements, such as a general offensive required, extremely difficult to arrange. In the middle of January the French Government proposed a conference for establishing a closer co-operation between the Allied forces, and by the end of the month this was agreed to, but as the commanders concerned were separated by the whole length of the Cameroons, it could not take place before March. Something, however, was done on our side. Colonel Cunliffe, commanding the forces in Nigeria, came down to Duala at the end of January to confer with General Dobell, and it was then decided to push on the northern operation against Garua in concert with the French and to send up another naval gun party to batter the place. Both the French and the British Generals received reinforcements early in February from West Africa, but nothing serious could be done till after the March conference.

 

During the period of inactivity ashore the work of the navy became more exacting than ever. It was of the utmost importance to intercept traffic from Fernando Po, where the Germans had succeeded in landing supplies, and owing to the Spanish Governor's lax interpretation of his responsibilities as a neutral they were practically establishing a base. When, therefore, on February 21 an intimation came that the Admiralty wanted to replace the Challenger by the Astraea from the Cape, General Dobell protested, as he had done before when the Cumberland was withdrawn. (Vol. I., p. 370)

 

The Challenger had, in fact, just been instrumental in preventing a land attack on Duala. Rumour was about that enemy ships were off the coast, and the Germans seem to have believed that a naval force had reoccupied the estuary of the Cameroon River and that Duala would be an easy prey. Their intention to attack was detected. On February 17 Captain Fuller sent ashore half a company of small-arm men with a 12-pounder and field-gun party, and at dark turned his searchlights on the approaches to the town. It was all that was necessary. The enemy quickly dispersed, and the attack never developed. There were, however, further causes of anxiety. In addition to the constant threats to our patrol bases, parties of Germans with native troops had begun to appear on the coast, evidently on the look-out for supplies.

 

In these circumstances General Dobell urged that the naval operations were more important than ever, and begged that Captain Fuller and his ship should remain till his own active operations were concluded. Reports were still being received of intercepted German wireless signals which seemed to be passing between the Karlsruhe, Kronprinz Wilhelm and Dresden. Fernando Po was very strictly watched by our patrol vessel, and Captain Charon, in the Pothuau was cruising on its northern approaches. Though Captain Fuller discredited the reports. Captain Charon thought it prudent to pick up a party of his marines whom he had landed at Kribi, and he left his patrol to proceed there.

 

The result was that the moment his back was turned a German supply ship came up and slipped into Fernando Po with a quantity of provisions and ammunition. The stoppage of this kind of work was obviously of the last importance, but the Admiralty did not alter their decision about the Challenger, though there was no suggestion of withdrawing Captain Fuller. It was even decided to increase his force in order to justify the declaration of a regular blockade. For this purpose the old light cruiser Sirius and the sloop Rinaldo, which since their work on the Belgian coast had been serving as guardships on our Eastern coast, were ordered to be prepared for foreign service (March 21), and the Astraea came up from the Cape and relieved the Challenger at the end of April.

 

There the operations against German South-West Africa had opened as early as September 1914 by the occupation of Luderitz Bay and the landing of the southern force at Port Nolloth in Namaqualand; but Walfisch Bay, which we had evacuated in September, had not been re-occupied, and the northern force had not commenced operations. Further development had been arrested, first by the rebellion, and secondly by the need of keeping Vice-Admiral H. G. King-Hall's squadron concentrated till Admiral von Spee was dealt with, and the consequent inability of our squadron to protect two bases so far apart as Walfisch Bay and Luderitz Bay. (The ships which Admiral King-Hall had with him were the cruisers Minotaur (flag) and Defence, the light cruiser Astraea, Hyacinth and Weymouth and the battleship Albion. The armed merchant cruiser Armadale Castle remained at Simon's Bay. After the battle of the Falklands the Minotaur and Defence were ordered home to join the Grand Fleet, the Admiral transferring his flag to the Hyacinth; the Weymouth after refitting was to relieve the Chatham for the operations against the Koenigsberg in the Rufiji River.)

 

It was possible, however, to begin preliminary operations at once, and as soon as the squadron was concentrated it left Table Bay for Luderitz Bay, escorting three transports with Union troops. They sailed while the Battle at the Falklands was being fought, and landed on December 10 as the news of the victory reached them. There was now no reason for not re-occupying Walfisch Bay; and a new plan was

 

Dec. 1914-Feb. 1915

GERMAN SOUTH-WEST

 

devised, the main idea of which was that the troops should operate in overwhelming force in four columns. The northern force, which was the main one, was intended to operate from Walfisch Bay and seize Swakopmund, the port from which started the northern railway and that to Windhuk. A central force was to operate from Luderitz Bay on the line of the southern railway. A southern force of mounted troops was to cross the frontier and seize Warmbad, while a small eastern force was to strike in from Rietsfontein in Bechuanaland and seize Keetmanshoop, the railhead of the Luderitz Bay line.

 

Accordingly Admiral King-Hall ordered the Albion to Walfisch Bay as guardship and returned himself to Table Bay, with the Hyacinth, Astraea and Weymouth, to fetch the advanced troops of the northern force, and on Christmas day 5,000 of them were landed at Walfisch Bay without opposition. The Albion, after docking at Simonstown, sailed to join the squadron that was being formed for the attack on the Dardanelles, while the troops advanced on Swakopmund, which they occupied on January 14. It was found to have been abandoned, but the wells had been poisoned and everything of use in the port and the railway terminus had been destroyed. We ourselves had destroyed the pier in the earlier days of the war, and as the place was consequently useless as a base, a railway had to be begun to connect it with Walfisch Bay.

 

All had now to stand fast till the northern force was complete, and during the next three weeks, while the last embers of the rebellion were being stamped out, troops were continually pushed up. Before the end of the first week in February all was ready, and on the 6th General Botha left Cape Town to take command. He was brought up by Admiral King-Hall in the Armadale Castle, and after arranging on the spot what was required of the navy, the Admiral returned to Simon's Bay. Now that all was in order for the operations to begin in earnest, the Admiralty considered his presence was more requisite at the other end of his station, where the Koenigsberg was still in being in spite of all attempts to destroy her. Accordingly, waiting only till the Goliath, which had arrived from Mombasa to refit, was ready for sea, he sailed in her on February 25 for German East Africa, whither the Hyacinth had preceded him; and Rear-Admiral O. F. Gillett, commanding the Armadale Castle, was left in charge at the Cape.

(Admiral Gillett's force was the Astraea, and the two armed merchant cruisers Armadale Castle and Laconia, The Laconia was a new Cunarder of 18,000 tons, and 16 knots speed, and armed with 8-6'' quick-firing guns. Armadale Castle was 13,000 tons— 17 knots— 8-4-7'' guns.)

Nov. 1914

DAR-ES-SALAAM

 

Of all the oversea attacks that had been planned, that against German East Africa had proved the most unsatisfactory. Since the ill-judged attempt on Tanga in November had met with so sharp a reverse, land operations had been at a standstill and the control of military operations had been transferred from the India Office to the War Office. It was obvious that the strength and preparedness of the enemy had been entirely miscalculated, and General Wapshare, who took over the command in December, was instructed to confine himself to a defensive attitude, with liberty to undertake such minor offensive operations as he might find practicable pending the provision of further force. Certain operations of this character were undertaken, and a post in German territory across the lower Umba — the frontier river — was occupied. The post had to be abandoned next month, and finally, at the end of January, we had retired to the line of the Umba itself.

 

Naval operations showed little better progress. The most active work was at Dar-es-Salaam. Towards the end of November there was reason to believe that the floating dock which had been sunk in the harbour no longer closed the exit, and there was danger that the ships inside might slip out and block our harbours at Mombasa and Kilindini. It was therefore decided to destroy them, and remove all coal lighters and small craft that could be used to supply the Koenigsberg. The idea was to do the work with a couple of small armed craft under threat of bombardment by the Fox and Goliath.

 

On November 28, when they appeared off the port, the white flag was flying on the flagstaff, and the acting Governor came off to the Fox. What was intended was explained to him. He returned without giving a definite reply, saying he must consult the military authorities. After waiting an hour and seeing the white flag had not been hauled down. Captain F. W. Caulfeild of the Fox, who was in command, ordered the boats to proceed. Three vessels and some harbour craft were disabled and their crews taken off without opposition, but as the boats were coming out they were fired on, though the white flag was still flying on the harbour flagstaff. The resulting casualties were one man killed, three officers and eleven men wounded and four officers and eight men missing. In reply to the treacherous attack the Fox and Goliath opened fire, and before dark the Governor's residence was burned to the ground and many other buildings demolished. Still in view of what had occurred further punishment seemed necessary. Having landed the wounded at Zanzibar the two ships returned on

 

Dec. 1914

THE KONIGSBERG BLOCKADE

 

and, after waiting all the morning flying a flag of trace without any reply, they began a systematic bombardment which so far as could be ascertained was of doubtful efficacy.

 

After the bombardment the Fox and the armed tugs Adjutant and Helmuth joined the Chatham in the blockade of the Koenigsberg, and the squadron was joined on December 8 by the Kinfauns Castle with another seaplane. Since there seemed no present possibility of getting at the Koenigsberg to destroy her, Captain S. Drury-Lowe's immediate object was to ascertain whether she was securely blocked in. For this a reconnaissance was necessary with his small craft or a seaplane. Our armed tugs were sent into the river, but were received with such heavy fire from hidden quick-firing and machine guns on the banks that they could not proceed. As for the seaplane, being unable to carry an observer, her work gave no very definite results, and finally, on December 10, she came down out of control in the estuary. Her pilot was taken prisoner, and though the machine was gallantly towed out under fire it was no longer serviceable. Enough, however, had been done to make it certain that besides the channel in which the Newbridge had been sunk there were two others by which the Koenigsberg could reach the sea. There was nothing for it, therefore, but to maintain the cruiser watch, and as the Admiralty wished to recall the Chatham for urgent service nearer home, they had to order the Weymouth up from the Cape to relieve her.

 

Nor was the Koenigsberg the only consideration. The deadlock ashore threw further burdens on the sea service. Thorny as was the situation, there was no thought of letting go when we had once taken hold. If assault was for the present out of the question, we could still fall back on investment. There was at least a hope that by establishing an effective blockade the 4,000 Germans in the colony could be starved into submission. This task the Admiralty agreed to undertake in the middle of December, but it was long before they could collect the necessary force. The coast to be watched extended for over 400 miles from our own East African territory to the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. The work of blockade, however, was facilitated by our possession of the islands of Pemba and Zanzibar, off the northern section of the coast. Half-way down was another large island, Mafia, which was a German possession. As it lay off the mouth of the Rufiji it formed a convenient base for operations against the Koenigsberg, and as a first step Captain Drury-Lowe had suggested its occupation by a small combined expedition.

 

Jan.-Feb. 1915

THE KOENIGSBERG BLOCKADE

 

This was approved. General Wapshare furnished six companies of native troops (one half-battalion King's African Rifles, and a quarter battalion of ths 10lst Indian Grenadiers), and on January 10 they sailed from Mombasa in the Kinfauns Castle, escorted by the Fox. As the German garrison consisted of no more than six Europeans and forty native police, there was little opposition, and two days later the island surrendered.

 

For the present, however, no blockade could be declared, as the ships available were too few in number to make it effective. By the middle of January, when Captain W. D. Church of the Weymouth took over the duties of Senior Naval Officer, the Chatham, Kinfauns Castle and Fox had left for Bombay to refit, and there was nothing but the Weymouth watching the Rufiji, with the two armed tugs, Duplex and Adjutant, and the Pyramus of the old New Zealand squadron, which had arrived to relieve the Fox. At the end of the month, however, the Hyacinth joined from the Cape in time to take over the watch on the Ruflji from the Weymouth, who was wanted elsewhere.

 

So unhealthy had the posts on the Umba proved to be that in the first week in February it was decided to evacuate them, and the assistance of the Weymouth was required for withdrawing the troops. By February 10 the work was successfully carried out, and she was able to return to the Rufiji. In her absence the tugs had attempted another reconnaissance, during which the Adjutant had been lost. Coming under a severe fire which cut her steampipe she was obliged to surrender. Her crew were made prisoners, but she herself was destroyed later by the Pyramus. (She was salved by the Germans and taken to Lake Tanganyika).

 

It was clear nothing more could be done till the seaplanes arrived, which the Kinfauns Castle was to bring on her return. In their impatience to get rid of the burden of the obnoxious cruiser the Admiralty had offered to provide 2,000 Marines if the General thought with their assistance she could be cut out by means of a combined operation. But the General regarded the plan as impracticable, and the Marines went to the Dardanelles instead, to provide Admiral de Robeck with a demolition force.

 

It was the middle of February when this idea was abandoned, and by that time the blockading force was nearly complete. The Australian light cruiser Pioneer had arrived, and also four steam whalers which had been taken up at the Cape and armed.

(Pioneer was a " P " class cruiser, like the Pyramus. The whalers were two German prizes detained at the outbreak of war — Seeadler and Sturmvogel and two British vessels Barrowby and Norvegia - they had been renamed respectively Pickle, Fly, Echo and Childers and were each armed with two 3-pounders from the Goliath. They were from 160 to 180 tons.)

The Kinfauns Castle arrived shortly

 

March 1915

THE KONIGSBERG BLOCKADE

 

afterwards with the seaplanes, and the blockade was formally declared to begin on March 1.

 

Before it had been in operation a week it had to be modified. On March 7 Admiral King-Hall arrived at Mafia in the Goliath to find signs of so much activity in the Rufiji region as to indicate a probable attempt by the Koenigsberg to break out on the equinoctial tides. He therefore thought it prudent to proceed there himself, and to keep both the Weymouth and Hyacinth, as well as two of the whalers, off the river, and leave the rest of the ships to do the best they could with the blockade. His own hope was to have destroyed the hidden cruiser with the help of aerial reconnaissance or bombing, but the seaplanes proved unfit for the work, and the idea had to be abandoned. Both by sea and land, except for a short bombardment of Lindi by the Goliath, the operations remained at a standstill, and the Germans could enjoy the spectacle of their impotent ship holding up a battleship and two light cruisers. On March 25, however, orders came for the Admiral to shift his flag to the Hyacinth, and a week later the Goliath sailed for the Dardanelles.

 

Far more serious than the drain caused by the oversea expeditions during the first quarter of the year had been that caused by the German raiders still at large. Their existence, indeed, had been the chief cause why the cruisers engaged in protecting the South African and Cameroons expeditions could not be reduced in number. Fortunately, however, by the time it had become apparent that the Dardanelles enterprise must be conducted as a combined operation, sufficient progress had been made in clearing the outer seas to set free most of the ships originally devoted to the work for service elsewhere.

 

It will be recalled that after the Battle of the Falklanda three enemy cruisers were at large: the Dresden had escaped from the action, the Prinz Eitel Friedrich had been left behind in the Pacific, and the Kronprinz Wilhelm, another armed merchant cruiser, was beginning to make herself felt in the Pemambuco area, in which the Karlsruhe had done so much mischief. For practical purposes the Karlsruhe herself was still in existence. Her loss was still unknown; both by ourselves and the German cruisers she was believed to be somewhere in the North Atlantic. She had, indeed, become another " Flying Dutchman," being continually reported in various directions, and we have seen how the return of the

 

Dec. 1914

REMNANTS OF VON SPEE

 

Princess Royal to the Grand Fleet was consequently delayed by several weeks. (Within a week of her loss, on November 4, there had been a report in the Canaries that she had sunk, but it was not credited, and can only have been a rumour. After the arrival of her survivors in Norway, at the end of November, it was whispered in Germany that she too had reached a home port. These reports continued throughout January, but on February 17 Admiral von Koester announced that she was " continuing her activities in American waters, with success." It was not till about March 19 that our Admiralty had definite evidence that she had been sunk for over four months.)

 

Phantom as she was she could not be ignored, and directly after the battle the Admiralty set about providing a special squadron for dealing with her. The idea was to separate the West Indies Station from North America, and reconcentrate at Jamaica the original Australian squadron (that is, the Australia, Melbourne and Sydney) under Vice-Admiral Sir George Patey. (The Melbourne and Sydney had already been ordered to the Atlantic. See Vol. I., p. 401.) On its being represented to the Commonwealth Government that it was in the Atlantic the ships could be most effectively employed for the common good, they agreed with their usual readiness.

 

Admiral Patey, it will be recalled, had been on the west coast of America with the Newcastle and the Japanese ships on the look-out for Admiral von Spee; and he was now directed to leave the station under the command of Admiral Moriyama and proceed to Jamaica in the Australia by way of the Panama Canal. The instructions for the Japanese Admiral — now that Admiral von Spee was disposed of — were to sweep south in search of the Prinz Eitel Friedrich and the German supply ships which were known to be on the coast. But it was soon found that this arrangement could not be carried out. The Australia was too long to pass through the canal locks, and she was consequently ordered to make for the Atlantic by way of the Strait of Magellan. On her way, in concert with the Newcastle, she would do the sweep south as far as Valparaiso, where the Kent and Orama from Admiral Sturdee's squadron would meet her sweeping north.

 

Admiral Moriyama was to remain north to watch the coast of Equador and the Galapagos Islands, and maintain wireless touch with Jamaica. From Valparaiso Admiral Patey would make direct for his new station, but, until he arrived, the rearrangement of the North Atlantic area was not to take effect, and Rear-Admiral R. S. Phipps Hornby would continue to command the whole of it. This was on December 12, and next day the news came from our Consul at Punta Arenas that the Dresden had put in there on the 11th, three days after the battle. Admiral Sturdee's

 

Dec. 1914

THE DRESDEN

 

squadron was still at the Falklands, and the Bristol, which was the only ship ready for sea, was sent off at once. She arrived on the 14th, only to find the bird had flown. (See Plan No. 5. (below))

The Search for, and Destruction of S.M.S. Dresden
(click plan for near original-sized image - 8.9Mb)

As the Dresden was reported to have gone south from Punta Arenas, the Bristol carried on to the western entrance of the Straits, and with the Glasgow, who caught her up on the 15th, went up through Smyth's Channel and held on north to the Gulf of Penas. There on the 17th they met Captain Phillimore in the Inflexible, who had swept round the Horn. Having been placed in charge of the search, he intended to send the Kent and Orama to work up the coast while he himself made a cast out to the Juan Fernandez Islands, which the Germans had been using so freely as a rendezvous. But this same day the Admiralty sent out the peremptory recall of both battle cruisers, and Admiral Sturdee ordered Captain Phillimore to return to Port Stanley. He himself had started for home on the previous day.

 

The station was now left in the hands of Admiral Stoddart. By Admiral Sturdee's orders he had been searching the Patagonian coast in company with the Cornwall. On taking over the command he sent his consort to examine Staten Island in the extreme south, and went himself into the Straits. Besides his flagship, Carnarvon, he had at his disposal for the Magellan area only the Glasgow and Bristol. The Kent and Orama were definitely engaged upon the Chilean coast, while the Newcastle, after her sweep down to Valparaiso with the Australia, went north again on the lookout for the Prinz Eitel Friedrich, and the Cornwall, after her search of the Staten Island, was allotted, with the Otranto, to watch the Falkland Islands.

 

In the maze of half-charted channels and inlets that made Tierra del Fuego and its confusion of desolate islands an ideal hiding-place, his means were slender enough for finding a cunning enemy, and in default of any intelligence it was difficult to know how to disperse his ships. He began himself, while the Glasgow and Bristol were completing their examination of the Chilean islands outside the Straits, by making a thorough search of Admiralty Sound, the great fjord which opens from the Strait south-east of Punta Arenas. Thence he turned back and entered the next inlet to the westward. This was Magdalen Sound, whence the Cockburn Channel leads out into the Pacific. Some ten miles within the Sound was a small bight known as Sholl Bay. It was a well-known charted anchorage, and here on the night of December 10 the Dresden had anchored, for it was by

 

Dec. 11-26, 1915

THE DRESDEN

 

the Cockburn Channel she had made for Punta Arenas after rounding the Horn. On reaching Punta Arenas it is said the German Consul tried to persuade her commander. Captain Luedecke, to suffer internment, but to his high credit, though he had already learned he was the sole survivor of the squadron, he refused, and resolved to carry on. Unknown to the Government at Santiago, he was permitted by the local authorities, against all law, to take in a large supply of coal, and to remain over thirty hours in order to complete his arrangements for a regular flow of supplies. He then, after dark on the 18th, disappeared to the southward, and, as we have seen, the Glasgow and Bristol followed in his wake in the afternoon of the 14th. But he was not making for the Pacific, as they assumed, for instead of following the westward turn of the Straits he continued south, either by Magdalen Sound or the less-frequented Barbara Channel, the next passage to the westward which separates Santa Ines and Clarence Islands. In any case the hiding-place he chose was Hewett Bay, close to the southern end of this little-known passage. There he anchored on December 14, and began cleaning his ship and repairing his engines as best he could.

 

He was thus occupied when, a week later, the Carnarvon reached Sholl Bay on the 22nd. Admiral Stoddart, however, did not carry his search further south, but went out again into the Straits, and after making a cast to the eastern entrance he turned back to meet his two cruisers at the Pacific end. The movement brought him on the direct tracks of what he sought. In the afternoon of the 26th, as he was proceeding westward, he found in Snug Bay the Sierra Cordoba, which was known to be a German supply ship, for it was she who, a month earlier, had brought the crew of the Kronprinz Wilhelm's prize. La Correntina, into Montevideo. She was now actually engaged as tender to the Dresden, but he could not touch her. She was in a neutral anchorage, and as the Admiral found a Chilean destroyer was watching his proceedings, it was to be presumed that the Sierra Cordoba was equally under observation to prevent unneutral service. After boarding her, he therefore went on to Fortescue Bay, opposite the northern entrance of Barbara Channel, and anchored there for the night. At the same time, whether by accident or design, the Dresden, at the southern end, slipped out of Hewett Bay, and proceeded to a still more secluded anchorage to the westward, on the south shore of Santa Ines Island. It lay behind the little Pleiades group in Stokes Bay, in waters which, as far as we knew, were uncharted, and was known as Port Loberu.

 

Dec. 27, 1914-Jan. 5, 1915

THE DRESDEN

 

There it would seem the Sierra Cordoba proceeded to join her, when Admiral Stoddart's back was turned.

 

This she could do with impunity, for he now went on to the western end of the Straits. After meeting his two light cruisers he turned back, and, leaving the Bristol to examine Xaultegua Gulf, went on with the Glasgow to search Otway Water, the great inlet which opens out of the middle of the Straits to the northward. Finding nothing there he returned to Sholl Bay, and spent next day in a thorough search of the Cockbum Channel, in company with the Glasgow. Once more the scent was hot, for his search took him within fifty miles of the Dresden's new hiding-place, and within thirty of her old one. But again he turned back to Sholl Bay, and there the Bristol joined.

 

It was now the last day of the year, and his fortnight's search had led to nothing. Having thoroughly examined the Straits and all its main outlets, he decided to send away his light cruisers to the southward to work out the Beagle Channel and the coasts of Tierra del Fuego. He himself went on to Possession Bay, to guard the eastern outlet of the Straits, and on his way spoke Admiral Patey, who was then passing through the Straits in the Australia to take up his new station. After coaling at the Falklands he carried on north, keeping a sharp look-out for the Eleanore Woermann, a ship notorious for her activities in supplying German cruisers, which was known to have left Buenos Aires on December 1 renamed the Anna. On January 6, the first day out. Admiral Patey had the luck to fall in with her, and as the evidences of her guilt were plain, and he could neither spare a prize crew nor drag her along with him without great delay, she was sunk. The Australia then passed on her way, and on reaching the Abrolhos rocks to coal found orders to proceed to Gibraltar to dock.

 

Meanwhile the Glasgow and Bristol had rejoined Admiral Stoddart at Possession Bay on January 5 without having found a trace of the enemy to the southward, and leaving the Glasgow to patrol the eastern entrance, and sending the Bristol to the western end, he went to the Falklands to coal.

 

He was entirely baffled. The Dresden had covered her tracks apparently with complete success, but there was one man who had found her out. This was our Consul at Punta Arenas, Mr. Milward. After following the sea in his youth, he had been carrying on business there for seventeen years in partnership with a German. There was little he did not know of the region or of German ways, and his knowledge

 

Jan. 2-6, 1915

DRESDEN AND PRINZ EITEL

 

had enabled him to find out the locality to which the Dresden supplies were going. On January 2 a French hunter came into Punta Arenas and reported that on December 2 he had seen her, with a tender alongside, in a bay south of Santa Ines Island and north of the Pleiades, that is, in the inner recesses of Stokes Bay, while a second tender was in a bay fifteen miles away. There could be no doubt about her identity, for the Germans had boarded his boat. This information the Consul telegraphed to the Admiralty on January 4, and he also communicated it to the Admiral, but unfortunately it was discredited. (The telegram was not received by the Admiralty at the time.)

 

The region was uncharted, and moreover, being exposed, as the whole chain of the Patagonian Islands is, to incessant westerly gales and continuous storms of snow and sleet, no part of the world had a more forbidding reputation. Consequently the Consul's report was regarded as more than suspicious, it looked so much like the outcome of a German scheme to entice our ships into the dangers of remote and unknown waters in order to give the Dresden a chance of escaping, that the Admiral thought it unwise to act upon it, and, as we have seen, he went on to the Falklands without altering his dispositions.

 

A month had now elapsed since the battle had been fought, without any trace having been found either of the Dresden or the Prinz Eitel Friedrich. The latter ship had, indeed, quitted the area. As soon as she heard of Admiral von Spee's fate she realised it was impossible for her to keep the station, and decided to clear away from the coast before the British cruisers appeared. Her point of refuge was the remote and lonely Easter Island, and on the way she captured another British ship and also a French sailing vessel with 3,500 tons of Welsh coal. It was a godsend: after sinking the British ship, she towed her new prize to Easter Island, and there proceeded to establish herself in defiance of the Chilean authorities. She even went so far as to keep an armed look-out party ashore, apparently expecting supply ships to reach her there. But, exasperated by the German contempt for their neutrality, the Peruvian and Chilean authorities had interned every one of Admiral von Spee's tenders that had put into port, and were keeping so strict a watch on all German ships that their game was completely stopped. Accordingly, after spending about a fortnight at Easter Island, the Prinz Eitel Friedrich decided to attempt to reach a German port. It was on January 6 she put to sea, meaning to make a wide sweep round the Horn into the Atlantic. This was also the day that Admiral Stoddart left Possession

 

Jan. 9, 1915

THE KRONPRINZ WILHELM

 

Bay for the Falklands. As he put out he overhauled, in the mouth of the Straits, a Dutch collier, and finding her papers suspicious, he detained her, and took her on to his base. At the same time the Australia was capturing the Eleanore Woermann, thus, it would seem, dealing the last blow to the German coaling arrangements in the south.

 

The Prinz Eitel Friedrich was now as completely lost as the Dresden, and before the Admiral could renew the search for the hidden cruiser a fresh complication was introduced. When, on January 9, Admiral Stoddart reached the Falklands, he found that another raider had become active. On January 8 a Hamburg-Amerika liner, called the Otavi, had put into Las Palmas with the crews of two ships, which the Kronprinz Wilhelm had captured a month previously in the region of St. Paul Rocks. Ever since the Bristol and Macedonia had been called away from those waters to join Admiral Sturdee's squadron the whole of the Pernambuco focal area had been unguarded. Notwithstanding its importance, it had been decided, in order to secure a full concentration against Admiral von Spee, to leave it to take its chance, as Admiral Cradock had originally suggested, and after the battle the home-going ships were so constantly passing through or near the area that it had seemed hardly necessary to detail special cruisers to watch it. Now, however, it was obvious that further steps must be taken.

 

Admiral de Robeck, who at that time was still in command of the Canaries Station, was up at the Salvages, but returned to Las Palmas the day after the Otavi appeared. He quickly secured her internment, and as soon as he had ascertained the facts of the case, the Highflyer, with her two merchant cruiser consorts, Marmora and Empress of Britain, were sent from the Cape Verde Station to sweep the infected area. The Dartmouth (this light cruiser, after the defeat of Admiral von Spee, had been moved from St. Helena to the West Indies) also, which had been searching for the Karlsruhe on the Spanish Main, and was under orders for the Dardanelles, was to cross the area on the way to St Vincent (Cape Verde). But this area was not the only one threatened by the Kronprinz Wilhelm's reappearance Until the Otavi appeared the last that had been heard of her was when the Sierra Cordoba, on November 22, had put into Montevideo with the crews of the prizes she had taken during October, both of which had been captured off the River Plate. As Argentine maize and wool were now moving in vast quantities, and the no less important New Zealand meat trade was streaming through the area,

 

Jan. 15, 1915

THE DRESDEN

 

it could not be left unwatched. Admiral Stoddart's squadron had to be drawn upon, and he had little enough as it was. The Cornwall which had been watching the Falklands, had just been sent away to St. Helena, where the opening of the operations against German South-West Africa called for an increase of force, and there was nothing for it but to use the Glasgow. When therefore, on January 15, Admiral Stoddart was able to get back to the Straits, he sent her away up to Montevideo, with orders to search the anchorages along the Patagonian coast as she went.

 

It was likely enough the Dresden might be lurking in one of them, with the intention of striking the River Plate area or joining her consorts to the northward. But the Admiral, on his return to Punta Arenas, found the Consul more certain than ever that he knew where the chase was hiding. It appears that she had recently shifted her berth, and he had reason to believe she was at Kempe Island, the outermost of the group, that lies where the Cockburn and Barbara Channels meet. On this information the Admiral decided to act, and, after hiring a tug to search the more dangerous waters, he proceeded, on January 24, to Sholl Bay, in company with the Bristol, which had joined him from the western entrance of the Straits.

 

On January 27 Kempe Island was reached, but nothing was found there. The Consul had mentioned several other anchorages in the vicinity which she might be using, but, unwilling to venture further into those wild and uncharted waters, the Admiral turned back, as much at a loss as ever. Yet he had been very close. She was actually only a dozen miles from Kempe Island, in the southern end of the Gonzales Channel, an unsurveyed passage that led from the Barbara Channel to Stokes Bay. Had the tug been permitted to search for another day in the vicinity the chase might well have been located, but, unfortunately, the Admiral sent her south to examine the Beagle Channel once more, while he, with the Bristol, spent the last days of the month in making another cast round Admiralty Sound. Nothing was seen, but in the early hours he actually passed a small steamer which was taking provisions to the Sierra Cordoba. He was then on his way from Sholl Bay to Punta Arenas, and on January 31 he sailed again with both ships for the Falklands.

 

The effect of his second failure was to convince him that the local information was either tainted or worthless, though in point of fact it was neither one nor the other. Admiral Stoddart was now strongly of opinion that the Dresden had left the inhospitable labyrinth of crags and glaciers and

 

Feb. 1-March 3, 1915

THE DRESDEN

 

intended to work in the Atlantic. He therefore decided to give up the search of the Magellan area, and after cruising up the Patagonian coast as far as Montevideo, with the Bristol in company, to go north to Abrolhos Rocks. There he ordered the Otranto to escort his colliers, and the southern guard was left to Captain Luce, in the Glasgow, who had just returned from Montevideo.

 

The Consul, knowing provisions were still being sent to the Dresden, was sure she had not moved far away, but Captain John Luce did not feel justified in searching the locality again. The situation was undoubtedly difficult, and was made all the more so by the fact that the Germans, in order to get our ships out of the way, were secretly spreading rumours that the lost ship was hiding in one of the deep culs-de-sac which open out of the Straits to the northward. About February 10 one of these reports reached the Admiralty.

 

It stated that the Dresden was in Last Hope Inlet; this is the remotest recess of the maze of intricate and almost inaccessible fjords which spread north-eastward from Smyth's Channel, and nowhere would our ships be so completely out of the way. Unlikely as it was that the Dresden would venture into waters whence there was no escape, the rumour was believed, and orders were sent from the Admiralty for the Glasgow to proceed there and for the Kent or Orama to get charts from Valparaiso and search it if it proved to be navigable. Two days later they telegraphed that the Dresden was actually at Port Consuelo, a little trading station in Last Hope, and ordered the Bristol, which was at Montevideo, to return and assist in the search. In vain the Consul protested that it was a transparent ruse to get our ships out of the way. The Germans had succeeded in getting him suspected, and the false scent was followed, as ordered, by the Glasgow, Bristol and Kent. The only result was that the Bristol seriously damaged her rudder on an uncharted shoal, and that Captain Luce made up his mind the Consul was right, and that the Admiralty were being deceived.

 

At Punta Arenas there was fresh news that, on February 14, the Dresden had been at the south end of the Barbara Channel, and on the strength of it, by March 8, Captain Luce was back at Sholl Bay, with the Kent and a small steamer called the Galileo, which the Consul had chartered. Proceeding to the south end of the Barbara Channel, the two cruisers worked up it, while the Galileo was ordered to make a cast round Santa Ines Island and rejoin them at the top of Barbara Channel. But it was too late. On February 4, that is, a week after Kempe Island had been searched

 

March 4-7, 1915

THE DRESDEN FOUND

 

by Admiral Stoddart, she had put to sea. According to a German account, she had been found in the Gonzales Channel by a Chilean destroyer, and had been ordered to leave within twenty-four hours. Consequently, she moved westward to the Grafton Islands, and, after lingering there for ten days in the Wakefield Passage to coal from the Sierra Cordoba, made off into the Pacific. It may be that the rumours which the Germans had spread were to facilitate her escape, but, in fact, they hampered her. Her intuition, it seems, was to run up to Talcanuano, the port of La Concepcion in Northern Chile, there to intern herself, as her boilers were almost burnt out. But hearing the wireless of our cruisers that were coming down to search Last Hope, she changed her destination to Juan Fernandez.

 

In spite of the fact that the search had discovered nothing, the Admiralty still clung to the idea that she was in the northern cul-de-sac, and when, late on March 4, Captain Luce reached the head of Barbara Channel, he was surprised by an Admiralty order directing him to search Last Hope again. That they should be twice so easily deceived affords a striking instance of the danger of taking such operations out of the hands of the men on the spot, who have the best means of sifting local intelligence. But there was nothing to do but obey, and, leaving the Bristol behind, as she could now only steer with her engines, he went off to make the search with the Orama.

 

But already, before the order reached him, the Admiralty had other intdligence. It was that a collier called the Gotha was under orders to meet the Dresden on March 5 at a rendezvous 800 miles west of Coronel, and, without changing Captain Luce's orders, they told the Kent to go and capture her. The position indicated was actually one of the rendezvous which the Dresden had fixed for her colliers since the Sierra Cordoba was empty and had been dismissed; and on February 27, while hovering about it, she had captured and sunk the British sailing vessel, Conway Castle, transferring the crew later on to a Peruvian ship. It was not, however, till a week afterwards — that is, March 7 — that the Kent reached the spot. There was nothing there. Still she waited in the hope she was not too late. Next morning was too foggy to see anything, but in the afternoon the weather cleared, and she found not the Gotha, but the Dresden herself, about a dozen miles to the westward. Away she went in chase, working up to 21 ½ knots, but, for all she could do, she could not get within eight miles before nightfall, and then the

 

March 8-14, 1915

THE DRESDEN CAUGHT

 

Dresden disappeared. To continue the chase was impossible. The Kent had only 800 tons of coal left in her bunkers, and Captain J. D. Allan could do nothing but return to the rendezvous and send out a signal to report his encounter.

 

When Captain Luce got the message he was deep in the maze of the northern fjords, and it was impossible to pass through the narrow outlet till daylight. But on the 9th he hurried off to join the Kent, and sent the Orama away to Possession Bay to order the colliers to the rendezvous at Vallenar. The Bristol was, of course, useless till she had been docked. The Kent, however, had gone to Coronel to coal, and Captain Luce waited on the Dresden's rendezvous till the morning of the 13th, where the Orama joined up. His intention was to seek the chase at Mas a Fuera, the outermost of the little Juan Fernandez group, which he knew the Germans had used. It was a shrewd guess, and before he was ready to proceed he learned how nearly right it was. In the nick of time it was ascertained that a collier was to meet the Dresden at Mas a Tierra, the main island of the group. The Kent, which, after a smart spell of coaling, had just left Coronel, was at once directed to the same destination, and a combined raid was arranged for the following day.

 

To ensure that the enemy should not escape, the Glasgow and Orama were to approach from the westward and the Kent from, the eastward, and at daylight on March 14, precisely to time, all three ships were in position. Whether the chase was actually there or not was still uncertain, but, as the Glasgow closed in from seaward, she was gratified to see the long dance was at its end. There in Cumberland Bay, silhouetted against the precipitous cliffs, lay the Dresden at anchor, with her colours flying. She was clearly not interned, and smoke in increasing volume was coming from her funnels, as though she meant to make a run for it. Obviously there was no time to be lost.

 

The port was neutral, but the Chileans had been quite unable to assert the neutrality of their remote possession; the lonely group had been used by Germans, with notorious contempt for the Government; there was no one to enforce internment but the " Maritime Governor," and he was no more than the lighthouse-keeper. Captain Luce could not hesitate, and, waiting only till he brought the houses of the little settlement out of the line of fire, he gave her a salvo at 8,400 yards. It got home well on board her; the second struck all along her side. She replied at once as the Kent joined in with her 6" battery. The punishment was too severe to last, and in about three minutes she

 

March 14, 1915

END OF THE DRESDEN

 

hauled down her colours and flew what appeared to be a white flag. (Captain Luedecke in his declaration said his colours were shot away and rehoisted.)

 

Our ships then ceased fire and closed in. The enemy cruiser could be seen to be on fire, her crew were taking to the water and she was making a signal to communicate. In reply, a boat was sent off from the Glasgow with the Commander and Staff-Surgeon, but before they reached the burning ship the Dresden's steamboat was seen coming out under a flag of truce. On reaching the Glasgow the officer in charge stated he came from the captain to state that the ship was interned. This was certainly untrue, for she had refused to sail within twenty-four hours or to be interned.

 

Captain Luce's answer was — as the tradition of the service required — that he could treat on no basis but that of unconditional surrender. As the boat returned another came out, bearing the lighthouse-keeper in his capacity as Maritime Governor. He was naturally agitated over our breach of neutrality, particularly as he had put out to meet our ships when they first appeared, and, having forgotten his flag, had narrowly escaped being sunk by our fire. Though he protested against the action that had been taken, he had to confess he had no power of controlling the German ship, and that she had been there ever since the Kent first chased her. All he had done, by his own account, was to send a boat to Valparaiso asking for a ship of war, and he expected her that night or next morning. Captain Luce offered full and immediate compensation for all actual damage done, and at the request of the Maritime Governor was arranging measures for disabling the enemy's machinery when the Dresden was seen to blow up.

 

On the return of her flag of truce with Captain Luce's reply, Captain Luedecke had decided to put in action the preparations he had made for exploding her fore magazine. As the smoke of the explosion cleared she was seen to be slowly settling. In about an hour she was nearly gone, and, as she disappeared, her people lined up on shore and, led by the Captain, gave her dolefully " Deutschland uber alles " for a dirge. Twenty of them had been killed or drowned in leaving the ship, and on shore were a number of wounded. To assist them all the medical staff of the squadron were sent in, and, as there was no means of treating them on the spot, they were taken off to the Orama. Till the next morning Captain Luce waited for the Chilean warship to appear, but there was no sign of one, and, after settling the

 

March, 1915

APOLOGIES TO CHILE

 

Governor's claims for damage in full, he sailed away, leaving the islands to the age-long loneliness from which they had been so rudely awakened by the limitless spread of the war.

 

Chile, of course, lost no time in protesting against the whole proceeding, not only to our Government, but to that of Germany as well. They were glad enough to be rid of the obnoxious cruiser, but their honour was touched. So far as we were concerned there was little difficulty in meeting the complaint. For months the Dresden had been violating Chilean neutrality. She had coaled at Punta Arenas, and stayed there over twenty-four hours. From there she had been supplied by tugs owned by the German Consul; in Chilean waters she had prepared herself for a new cruise, and when she was ready had sunk another British ship. A week before her destruction we had formally asked for her internment, and given friendly notice that, if she sought to escape our cruisers by taking refuge on a part of the Chilean coast where the Government had no means of detaining her, then, on the accepted principle of " hot chase," our captains would have to sink her where she was.

 

On our Minister communicating this at Santiago, he was given to understand that our doctrine was accepted. On these lines, then, our reply was drawn, with a full expression of regret that in the circumstances there was no course for Captain Luce except to act as he did. The prompt apology was accepted as frank and courteous, and was in sharp contrast with the attitude of the Germans, who for at least six months did not even deign to reply. So far, then, from the incident having any evil effect, it rather increased the sympathy of the Chileans for the Allied cause as against that of the Central Powers.

 

In all our Staff studies of the question of commerce protection the moral effect of overriding the accepted principles of international law had always been regarded as a by no means negligible factor, and the surest guarantee that they would not be too flagrantly violated was that the failure to give them decent respect had always tended to raise up fresh enemies for the offending belligerent. We ourselves had learnt the lesson by bitter experience, and so had France, but Germany had not. It was not that she regarded neutral sentiment as amongst the imponderabilia that do not count. Indeed no more costly and elaborate efforts were ever spent than those she was lavishing on land to secure the goodwill of the American Republics. But she was too blind to see that they weighed little in the balance against what she was doing at sea.

 

Jan 1-16, 1915

KRONPRINZ WILHELM

 

In Brasil, which she had always regarded as specially subject to her influence, and where the ground had been most carefully prepared before the war, the same process was going on. Off the coast the Kronprinz Wilhelm was still active, and had been relying on supply ships from Brazilian ports. From Pemambuco had come the Otavi, which was now interned at Las Palmas. In another month a ship called the Holger was to follow. She had been detected in reporting departures of vessels to a German cruiser by wireless, and, finding herself under suspicion, had slipped out to sea on January 1 without clearance. The double violation of Brazilian regulations so irritated the Government that they resolved to refuse clearance to all the ships of any company that had once offended. They dismissed the captains of the port and guardship of Pernambuco, closed the Fernando Noronha wireless station and instituted an active search for secret and illicit installations ashore, and their neutrality became more warmly benevolent to the Allies than before.

 

The Holger, though narrowly escaping the Inflexible on her way homewards, succeeded in joining her cruiser. By that time the Kronprinz Wilhelm had captured another British vessel, the Hemisphere, 800 miles south of St. Paul Rocks, and well to the eastward of the usual tracks. She was a collier of 3,500 tons, a happy windfall, and from her the Kronprinz Wilhelm proceeded to coal. Where the Holger joined her is uncertain, but it was not at the rendezvous we had anticipated, for all that area was being thoroughly searched by the Highflyer and her two merchant consorts from Admiral de Robeck's squadron, without result. All we know is that she shifted her ground further north, and on January 10 captured the Royal Mail steamer Potaro of 4,400 tons, outward bound in ballast, and on the 14th the Highland Brae, a Nelson liner of 7,600 tons, with a general cargo and passengers for Buenos Aires. Both were carefully observing the latest Admiralty instructions about deviations of course. The same day she also captured and destroyed by ramming a small Nova Scotian schooner, the Wilfred M. The other two ships were retained. Being equipped with wireless, they were valuable auxiliaries, and with them she joined the Holger, apparently some eighty miles from where the Highflyer was searching.

 

This was on January 16, and the next fortnight was spent in gutting the Highland Brae and in disguising the Potaro and equipping her as an auxiliary. She was kept, but the Nelson liner was scuttled. During this period the raiders were in no little danger. British ships were all round them.

 

Jan. 17-Feb. 20, 1915

PRINZ EITEL FRIEDRICH

 

The last two captures were actually made within the area which the Highflyer was covering. On the 17th the Australia, on her homeward passage, passed close to the westward of them, and the Dartmouth did the same two days later. Still narrower was the escape from the Canopus, which, like the other battleships detached for support of cruiser squadrons, was on her way to the Dardanelles. As she proceeded she took in a signal from a merchantman saying that the Kronprinz Wilhelm and her consorts were off St. Paul Rocks. She therefore went out of her course to search the vicinity, but though she came across the waterlogged remains of the Wilfred M., no other trace of the raiders was found. So she passed on, and as she neared St Vincent, the Highflyer and her two consorts started for another sweep through the infected area. The Kronprinz Wilhelm was still working in it, and on February 8 had a narrow escape from the British cruisers close to the spot where she took the Highland Brae, and where she was scuttling the Norwegian barque Semantha, with wheat from Astoria (Oregon) to England.

 

By this time the Prinz Eitel Friedrich, after suffering terribly in the stormy seas south of the Horn, had reached the Atlantic, but, having no further hope of assistance, and being several knots slower than any British cruiser or armed liner, she did not dare to approach the fertile waters off the coast. She had to be content to cruise up the sailing track wide of the Plate, and here on the last days of January she had the luck to capture four ships. One was Russian, two were French and the fourth, the William P. Frye, a four-masted barque from Seattle to Queenstown, with wheat, was American. The first three were sunk out of hand. As the fourth was neutral, an attempt was made to jettison the cargo, but the work proved too difficult, and she too against all law was scuttled. (After a warm controversy over this ship with the United States Government, the Germans were forced to pay a large sum in compensation.)

 

A fortnight later, on February 12, she captured another British wheat ship from Oregon, the Invercoe, but by that time it was clear her coal would not suffer her to cruise any longer. She therefore determined to run for internment to a North American port, doing what harm she could on the way. And she was not without success. On February 18 she approached the main steamer track to Pernambuco, and on that and the two succeeding days sank three more ships. (Mary Ada Short, with 5,000 tons of maize, from the Plate to England; Floride, of the Cie. Generale Transatlantique; Willerby, outward bound from Havre to the Plate.) None of them was a collier,

 

Feb. 18-25, 1915

KRONPRINZ WILHELM

 

so she ran on across the track, passing between Fernando Noronha and St. Paul Rocks.

 

It was a hazardous movement, and it brought her within an ace of her end. On February 14 there had been a report that a German supply ship was proceeding to Lavandeira Reef, which lies at the east end of the north coast of Brazil. It was thought she was to meet there the Kronprinz Wilhelm and the Karlsruhe, which was still believed to be alive, and a combination was rapidly arranged for dealing with them. The Sydney, which had been watching German ships in Port San Juan, Porto Rico, and had just been relieved by the Condé, was directed to the spot. The Edinburgh Castle, which was bringing down two colliers fitted with wireless from St Vincent (Cape Verde), was directed to meet her there, and Admiral Stoddart was ordered to come up from Montevideo and take charge of the operations. The result was that, on February 21, the Edinburgh Castle, making for the reef, and the Prinz Eitel Friedrich, going north, crossed each other's track quite close, about 150 miles north-north-west of St. Paul Rocks, but neither saw the other.

 

The Sydney and Edinburgh Castle duly met at the suspected rendezvous on February 26, but the Admiral did not appear. On February 22 he had duly left Abrolhos Rocks for the north, but half an hour after weighing the Carnarvon struck an uncharted shoal and tore a rent 95 feet long in her bottom. She had to be beached, and was, of course, completely out of action. So there was nothing for it but for the Admiral to shift his flag to the Vindictive, which, since the Canopus had left for the Dardanelles, was guardship at the Abrolhos base. He was able, however, to patch up the Carnarvon sufficiently to send her into Rio, where, as she had suffered peril of the sea, the Brazilian authorities readily permitted her to dock.

 

The accident was the more annoying, for next day the Admiralty had information that the Karlsruhe, Dresden, Kronprinz Wilhelm and a supply ship were going to meet at some unknown rendezvous. Some anxiety was felt lest it might portend an effort to deal a blow for the relief of the Cameroons, where the Germans were then making their effort to regain some of the positions they had lost on the coast, and the Amphitrite and Laurentic were ordered with all speed to St Vincent (Cape Verde). In the Pernambuco area active steps were at once taken, and the Sydney and Edinburgh Castle made a cast to Rocas Island and Fernando Noronha. Nothing, however, was seen, and they carried on to join the Admiral at Abrolhos.

 

The Kronprinz Wilhelm was actually working at this

 

Feb. 22-March, 1915

PRINZ EITEL FRIEDRICH

 

time well off the track, about 300 miles south-east of Fernando Noronha. Like the Prinz Eitel Friedrich, she, too, was almost at the end of her tether, owing to the rigorous hold the Brazilian Government was keeping on suspicious ships. But on February 22 she captured two prizes that were keeping wide of the track. One was the Guadaloupe, of the Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, with clothing for the French army and 150 passengers, and the other the Chasehill, with nearly 3,000 tons of British coal for the Plate. By this stroke of luck her life was prolonged, and for the next fortnight she lay drifting while she cleared her prizes. It was not till March 9 that the work was complete. She then sank the Guadaloupe, and sent the Chasehill into Pernambuco with the prisoners, while she herself held away north, but only just in time to save her skin. For next day the merchant cruiser Macedonia, which, after being re-armed with 6" guns, was coming out to join Admiral Stoddart, ran over the spot where she had been gutting her prizes.

 

The general situation was now clearing. On the 9th the Prinz Eitel Friedrich had put into Newport News, and on the 12th the Chasehill arrived to reveal what the Kronprinz Wilhelm had been doing. Some difficulty was experienced in arranging further action against her. The West Indian squadron was fully engaged in watching German ships at Havana and Porto Rico, and the Prinz Eitel Friedrich had to be watched by the North American squadron, for the whole month passed away before the United States Government were satisfied that our demand for her internment was justified.

 

As this squadron had also to keep its ceaseless guard off New York, there was nothing to do the work but the reduced squadron of Admiral Stoddart. Having shifted his flag to the Sydney, he proceeded to sweep the area indicated with the Edinburgh Castle and two colliers, but at the same time suggested that the Liverpool and Gloucester, which had been detached from the Grand Fleet at the end of February to sweep down the African coast in quest of the Kronprinz Wilhelm, should now come direct to Rocas Island to meet him. They were under Captain Edward Reeves of the Liverpool, who at the moment was at Sierra Leone coaling. On March 19, in response to an order from the Admiralty, he put to sea in company with two colliers which, as was now the usual practice, were fitted with wireless, so that they could act as scouts.

 

His original orders were to sweep the two zones in the vicinity of St. Paid Rocks and Fernando Noronha, where the Kronprinz Wilhelm was known to have been operating, but

 

March 19-31, 1915

KRONPRINZ WILHELM

 

before he started it was possible to give him a more precise indication of where to find her. She was reported to be expecting two colliers. One of these was the Odenwald, which the Melbourne was now securely holding at Porto Rico. The other was the Hamburg-Amerika liner Macedonia. In the early days of the war she had run out of New Orleans to meet the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, but she was still far away when that ship was sunk by the Highflyer on the Morocco coast. For months the Macedonia hung about in the Canaries, where, for fear of hurting Spanish susceptibilities, our cruisers were not permitted to watch her closely, and she was comparatively free, until at Admiral de Robeck's instance, she was finally interned at Las Palmas. Her machinery was partly disabled by the Port authorities, but in the course of time she managed secretly to repair it, and on March 15 quietly slipped her anchor and made off to find the Kronprinz Wilhelm at a certain rendezvous. It became known that it lay approximately on the equator, north of Fernando Noronha, and for this point Captain Reeves was ordered to make.

 

The Kronprinz Wilhelm was still in the same area cruising to the southward of St. Paul Rocks, and there, on March 94, five days after Captain Reeves started, she captured the Royal Mail steamer Tamar, with a rich cargo of 4,000 tons of coffee. Three days later, having moved about 100 miles to the north-westward — that is, towards the Macedonian's rendezvous — she fell in with the Coleby, homeward bound with 5,500 tons of wheat. Not only was the ship of no use to her, but it brought her one of her moments of acutest danger. For, as she was sinking her prize. Captain Reeves' ships, sweeping on a wide front to the westward, passed to the northward, and without sighting her, carried on to the rendezvous which had been given him.

 

He had missed her by barely sixty miles, but he had hardly taken up his assigned position when he was able to put an end to her career. While the Gloucester (Captain Howard Kelly) was patrolling there on March 28, in company with the Liverpool, she chased and captured a suspicious ship, which, on being boarded, was found to be none other than the runaway Macedonia. This ship, which was indispensable to the Kronprinz Wilhelm's continued activity, was made a prize and fitted with a spare set of wireless, and with this addition to his squadron Captain Reeves continued to patrol the vicinity of the rendezvous, keeping rigid wireless silence and expecting any hour to have sight of the cruiser he sought. But nothing appeared, and, in fact, all danger was now over.

 

March 27-April 11, 1915

HER END

 

A week earlier the Admiralty had been able to announce that the Karlsruhe was believed to have been lost in the West Indies at the beginning of November, and that the survivors of her crew had reached Germany in one of her tenders. This fact Captain Kelly also ascertained from the Macedonia. As for the Kronprinz Wilhelm, she never appeared at the rendezvous. By this time she badly needed docking. She had been seriously damaged in ramming the Wilfred M. and by coaling at sea, and sickness was rife on board. Moreover, she had little coal or provisions left, and despaired of meeting the supply ships she was expecting. From such wireless messages as she could hear, she believed herself to be surrounded by at least eight cruisers, and, according to her commander, on March 27 he decided to give up the struggle and run for a United States port.

 

Even so she had another miraculous escape, for next day, as she went northward, she actually saw the Gloucester chasing the Macedonia, but she herself managed to get away before she was sighted. A few days later she intercepted a message saying that the Prinz Eitel Friedrich was in Newport News, and, as she had encountered no ship from which she could relieve her necessities, she eventually decided to join her there. By running in during the night without lights she avoided our watching cruiser and came to anchor safely on April 11. (Account given by her commander, Kapitanleutnant Thierfelder, Weser Zeitung, May 8, 1915.) Two days later orders were given for the squadron to disperse.

 

So ended the first phase of the German attack upon our seaborne trade. Never in the long history of our wars had the seas been so quickly and so effectually cleared of commerce destroyers, and in comparison with what had been anticipated, the whole campaign had been singularly ineffective. During the first eight months of the war the loss to British commerce in all seas was estimated at £6,691,000, and in that period the value of imports and exports to and from the United Kingdom alone amounted to £776,500,000. If we add to this the value of the tonnage employed we get a total actually risked at sea of not far short of a thousand million, so that the percentage of damage done was no more than two-thirds of one per cent. In so far as it could affect the issue of the war, so small an impression on the vast bulk of our seaborne trade was negligible, but already there had begun the new form of attack — the results of which were destined to surpass all previous experience, and to reach a total so formidable, that by comparison the losses of the first period, grave as they seemed at the time, and great

 

NEW MENACE TO TRADE

 

as was the naval energy and thought that their suppression exacted, are now only remembered as a pin-prick. By the time the original attack had been mastered and no raider was left upon the High Seas the new one had been already launched in Home waters. The submarine as a commerce destroyer was threatening to become one of the most formidable factors in the war at sea, and what it might achieve if brought to bear upon a large combined expedition, such as the Dardanelles venture was becoming, could only be regarded with grave concern.

 

 

---

 

 

CHAPTER XV

 

HOME WATERS IN FEBRUARY AND MARCH, 1915 — THE BRITISH " BLOCKADE " AND THE GERMAN " WAR ZONE "

 

February 18, the day before the attack on the Dardanelles opened, was the day on which, in accordance with a notice issued by the Germans a fortnight earlier, their new departure in commerce warfare was to begin. The decision to adopt it had not been reached without misgiving. Admiral von Tirpitz, the Minister of Marine, though he looked forward eventually to a rigorous submarine attack on our seaborne trade, regarded the declaration of a war zone round the British Isles as an impolitic extension of legitimate naval warfare, mainly because it was premature. At the moment Germany had not enough submarines to blockade the whole of the British coasts effectively, and unless a blockade was effective under the terms of the Declaration of Paris it was not lawful, and neutrals would be placed in a position to resent it.

 

His view was that the submarine blockade should be for the present confined to the Thames. It could then be defended as a legitimate extension of naval practice to meet the new conditions on all fours with our own extension of the doctrines of blockade and continuous voyage which neutrals seemed inclined to condone. Admiral von Pohl, however, who was Chief of the Admiralty Staff, took the opposite view. It was he who had fathered the policy for which the country was clamouring more and more loudly, and it was he who had the ear of the highest quarters. The result of the Dodger Bank action had completed in the Kaiser's mind the impression which Heligoland had begun. He was resolved more than ever to keep in being the fleet he had created, and his impatience to see his submarines at work increased with his stiffening determination to deny the fleet all offensive action. (Von Tirpitz, My Memoirs, Chap. XIX., et passim, Eng. Ed.)

 

The precise step which the new departure marked in the degradation of German policy at sea must be clearly apprehended. Hitherto, apart from sowing mines in the open sea, they had fairly well observed the accepted limitations of naval warfare. On the high seas, beyond the fact that in one or two cases they had availed themselves too freely of the right to sink neutral prizes in case of necessity there had been little to be ashamed of. In Home waters, as we have seen, there had recently been some inexcusable cases of destruction of merchant ships without warning, and with no attempt to save life, and one shameless attack on a hospital ship, but their offences had been sporadic — explainable possibly by the perverted zeal of individual officers who had lost their heads.

(Up to February 18 the following losses by German mines and submarines had occurred: —

 

Sunk by submarines – 11 British and 1 Allied merchant vessels

Sunk by mines – 15 British merchant, 18 British fishing, 4 Allied, 38 neutral merchant vessels

Damaged by submarine – 1 Allied merchant vessel

Damaged by mines – 6 British and 3 neutral merchant vessels.)

 

N.B. — Of the British ships sunk by submarines four were torpedoed without warning, as was the Allied ship damaged. Of six British ships which escaped two appear to have been attacked without waning. One of these was the hospital ship Asturias)

Until all their cruisers had been swept from the sea, and our command according to accepted standards was fully established, there had been no indication of deliberate and organised lawlessness. Now, however, when they saw their trade completely paralysed and our own enjoying full freedom of movement, they threw off all disguise. Following the semi-official warnings to neutrals — already referred to— the German Admiralty, on February 4, issued their declaration forbidding all traffic in British waters. Though lacking in definiteness, its intention was not in doubt, and at last our eyes were opened to the fact that Germany did not mean to shrink from extending to the sea the lawlessness of which she had from the first been guilty on land. The text of the official notice was as follows: —

" All the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole of the English Channel, are hereby declared to be a war zone. From February 18 onwards every enemy merchant vessel found within this war zone will be destroyed without its being always possible to avoid danger to the crews and passengers.

 

'' Neutral ships will also be exposed to danger in the war zone, as, in view of the misuse of neutral flags ordered on January 31 by the British Government, and owing to unforeseen incidents to which naval warfare is liable, it is impossible

Feb. 4, 1915

GERMAN "WAR ZONE"

to avoid attacks being made on neutral ships in mistake for those of the enemy.

 

'' Navigation to the north of the Shetlands, in the eastern parts of the North Sea and through a zone at least thirty nautical miles wide along the Dutch coast is not exposed to danger." (Translated from the Reichsanzeiger, February 4, 1915.)

This notice was accompanied by a long memorandum justifying the action of the German Government on the ground that we had been carrying on war against their commerce in defiance of all the principles of international law. In particular, it alleged that we had added to the list of contraband various articles not useful for military purposes, and in applying the doctrine of ultimate destination had actually abolished the distinction between conditional and absolute contraband. Not content with overriding the rules of the Declaration of London, which they themselves, so they claimed, had strictly observed, we had violated the Declaration of Paris by seizing in neutral vessels German property which was not contraband.

 

They further charged that '" in violation of our own decrees concerning the Declaration of London," we had also removed from neutral ships German subjects liable to military service and made them prisoners of war. (The allusion is presumably to the Order in Council of August 20, 1914, adopting the Declaration with certain modifications. The article referred to is No. 47, which provides that " any individual embodied in the armed forces of the enemy who is found on board a neutral merchant vessel may be made a prisoner of war." This article was not amongst those modified by the Order in Council.)

 

Their final point was that we had declared the whole North Sea a military area, and thereby set up a blockade of neutral coasts. By thus seeking to paralyse legitimate neutral trade, our obvious object was not only to strike at German military strength, but also at their economic life, and ultimately by starvation to doom the population to destruction.

 

Were it not that the world had become used to the effrontery of similar German declarations, it was scarcely to be believed such a defence was put forward seriously. So far from strictly observing the Declaration of London, Germany had consistently ignored it in her treatment of neutral prizes. As a mere matter of convenience, her cruisers had made a practice of sinking them even in cases where the ship was not liable to condemnation in a Prize Court, and where it was impossible to pretend that sparing the ship would involve danger to the safety of the cruiser and to the success of her operations. The Declaration provided expressly that to justify occasional departures from the rule the captor must show that he had acted "in the face of an exceptional necessity" and the report explained that "danger" meant a danger that existed ''at the actual moment of the capture."

 

In seven carefully guarded articles, the Declaration had made all this clear, yet in spite of them, the German cruisers had consistently made the exception the rule. (There were three known cases of German cruisers capturing neutrals bound to belligerent ports with contraband, and they had sank them all. The Maria (Dutch), sunk by the Karlsruhe, September 21, 1914; the William P. Frye (American), sunk by the Prinz Eitel Friedrich on January 28; and the Semantha (Norwegian), sunk by the Kronprinz Wilhelm, February 3. In none of these cases was there exceptional danger to the ship, nor could releasing the prizes have endangered the success of the operations, which were to harass enemy trade.)

 

Moreover, it was untrue that we had put on our list of contraband articles not useful in war. The accusation was presumably made to cover their own irregularity in the matter. On November 17 they had declared all ordinary wood and lumber unworked or only roughly worked to be contraband, as being capable of being used as fuel within the meaning of the 24th Article of the Declaration of London. Mining timber and paper wood were expressly included, and under this order they proceeded to detain in the Baltic neutral vessels laden with pit-props and similar cargo. By a supplementary notice of November 23, they had declared that the order extended to all woods hewn, sawn, planed or grooved, so that all timber except certain hard foreign woods like mahogany were constituted contraband as being fit for fuel. In no case had our orders so perversely strained the doctrine of contraband.

 

Their contention that we had gone far to abolish the distinction between absolute and conditional contraband had more justification, but they had also done the same, as in the case of the Maria. (The Dutch ship Maria, which the Karlsruhe had sunk, was bound for Belfast and Dublin with wheat, and although at that time, September 21, 1914, Dublin at least was not a naval port, the action of the cruiser was upheld by the German Prize Court on the plea that although the cargo was consigned to civilians it might be requisitioned by the Government.) This, however, was a minor point. The speciousness of the German case is not fully revealed till we come to the accusation that we had made prisoners of men not embodied, but only liable to military service, found in neutral ships. We had certainty done so, and had thereby violated the letter of one article in the Declaration of London which we had not repudiated. But to our declared reasons for doing so, the German memorandum did not venture to refer.

 

Feb, 1915

THE GERMAN CASE

 

Those reasons were her flagrant breaches not only of the letter, but also of the spirit of the Hague Conventions. On these conventions she was silent. Yet the Hague Conventions were solemnly ratified acts that had passed into the written Law of Nations, and the Declaration of London was unratified and bound nobody. From the outset, they had trodden the conventions underfoot as it pleased them. They had begun by sowing mines of illicit type broadcast in the open sea, and not content with seizing British ships in their ports at the outbreak of war without conceding the usual Days of Grace, they had imprisoned the crew of one that was sunk by a mine in the Elbe before war was declared. (San Wilfrido, a tank steamer returning empty from Hamburg.)

 

On land their violations had been still more flagrant and numerous. The special offence in point was that in France and Belgium they had made prisoners of war of all male inhabitants who were of military age. It was in retaliation for this, that we had declared our intention of extending to all men of military age our right to arrest from neutral ships men embodied in the enemy forces. Though the German memorandum was guiltily silent on the point, the evidence was conclusive enough, for the Prime Minister had announced it in Parliament on November 17, 1914. Compared with the magnitude of the provocation, the retaliation fell far short of an equal adjustment of account, and could by no means warrant further steps by the enemy.

 

As to their accusation that in breach of the Declaration of Paris we had confiscated enemy goods in neutral ships, it was not true; and if it had been, it did not lie in their mouth to make it. For though by the Declaration innocent neutral goods were free under an enemy flag, they claimed the right to sink enemy merchant ships without paying indemnity for neutral cargo they carried. (The claim by Norwegian owners for compensation in the case of the British ship Glitra (Grangemonth to Stavanger), the first ship sunk by a submarine, was dismissed on appeal, apparently on the ground that if indemnity had to be paid for neutral cargoes, enemy ships would often have to be released.)

 

 The real German grievance was, as the memorandum clearly suggests, that we were endeavouring to paralyse the economic life of the nation. We certainly were, and with perfect justice, for this is the ultimate object of all war, and it is to give a belligerent the power of exerting such pressure that he seeks to destroy the enemy's armed forces.

(This view in regard to foodstuffs had been officially recognised thirty years previously by the Germans themselves. In 1885, at the time when His Majesty's Government were discussing with the French Government this question of the right to declare foodstuffs not intended for the military forces to be contraband, and when public attention had been drawn to the matter, the Kiel Chamber of Commerce applied to the German Government for an official statement of their views on the subject. Prince Bismarck's answer was as follows: —

" In answer to their representation of the 1st instant, I reply to the Chamber of Commerce that any disadvantage our commercial and carrying interests may suffer by the treatment of rice as contraband of war does not justify our opposing a measure which it has been thought fit to take in carrying on a foreign war. Every war is a calamity, which entails evil consequences not only on the combatants, but also on neutrals. These evils may easily be increased by the interference of a neutral Power with the way in which a third carries on the war, to the disadvantage of the subjects of the interfering Power, and by this means German commerce might be weighted with a heavier losses than a transitory prohibition of the rice trade in Chinese waters. The measure in question has for its object the shortening of the war by increasing the difficulties of the enemy, and is a justifiable step in war if impartially enforced against all neutral ships."— Correspondence Relating to the Rights of Belligerents, Cd. 7816 (1915), p. 15.)

Otherwise their destruction would bring the hope of peace no nearer. We had already acquired the power by having established a domination over the enemy's naval forces, such as they could not venture to dispute by any means that had hitherto been regarded as legitimate. Equally untenable was the excuse of our having abused neutral flags. It was not even true that the alleged order had been given. But on January 31, after the publication by an American journalist of an interview with Admiral von Tirpitz, in which a sub-marine war on commerce was adumbrated, and after three British merchant ships had been torpedoed without warning, the Admiralty did issue a confidential instruction advising merchantmen to keep a sharp look-out for submarines, and when near the British Isles to show either neutral colours or none at all.

 

It was a well-established ruse of war, which all nations had practised as a matter of course. By no means could it justify a revolution in the code of civilised warfare, and in any case it was issued after the new German policy had been sanctioned. (It seems clear that our alleged abuse of the neutral flag was not regarded by the Germans themselves as a serious point in their case. The clause was added at the last moment at the instigation of Admiral von Tirpitz, after the policy had been decided in spite of his opposition and behind his back. His fear was that the new departure would alienate neutrals, and his proposal was probably no more than a last effort to avert the worst of their resentment. (See Von Tirpitz, My Memoirs, Vol. II., p. 398.)

 

On the other hand, the firm conviction which we then held that they themselves had been abusing the neutral flag in a wholly unprecedented manner, was regarded as the main justification of our own war zone.

 

 It will be remembered that on November 2, 1914, just

 

Feb. 1915

THE BRITISH CASE

 

after the Audacious and the Manchester Commerce had been lost on the minefield which the Berlin had laid, as was then believed, under neutral colours, we had issued a notice that as secret minelaying in the open sea under a neutral flag had become the common practice of the Germans, countermeasures had become necessary which would render the North Sea unsafe for navigation, and that all ships passing between Iceland and the Hebrides would do so at their peril. Traders to and from Scandinavia, the Baltic or Holland, were therefore advised to proceed by the Channel, between which and their destination a safe route would be given them.

 

Clearly, then, the measure did not amount to a blockade of neutral ports, and though an extension of former practice, it was not without precedent. During the Russo-Japanese war, the right to declare an area of active operation a prohibited zone had been exercised without question, and it could not be pretended that the narrow waters of the North Sea, lying as they did between the coasts of the opposed belligerents, was not an area of active operation. The waters we closed were actually those which lay between our own and the High Seas Fleet. But granted that the German extension of the precedent was legitimate, it was not this which we reprobated, so much as their claim to destroy at sight, without visit or identification, without thought of innocent life, every ship that entered the vaguely defined area.

(Admiral Ton Tirpitz seems to have taken a similar view. When the plan of the war zone was submitted to him by Admiral von Pohl he wrote in his reply (December 16): " The reference to the measures taken by the English, in proclaiming navigation in the North Sea dangerous, does not seem to me apt. The English have not declared these waters to be dangerous simply as a result of their own action, but on the ground of their allegation (false, I agree) that we had laid minefields there and that neutral ships were exposed to the danger of being mistaken for German minelayers and treated as such." From this and other passages in his book it is noteworthy that he does not seem to have known that German minelayers had laid mines in the open sea. Presumably he believed they had carried out the declared intention of laying them in the entrances of our ports (My Memoirs, Vol. n., p. 394).)

The threat to neutrals was undisguised, but it is possible that to the German Government the atmosphere seemed favourable, and that this was why they would not listen to Admiral von Tirpitz's warning. The only neutral they had to fear was America, and at the moment the relations between the United States Government and our own appeared to be strained. In the cotton districts of the South, where lay the President's chief political support, the shrinkage of available tonnage for exporting the crops was being severely felt, and to relieve it the President was pressing a bill authorising the purchase by the State of German ships held up in American ports. The admissibility of such a transfer of flag in war-time was more than doubtful, even if the purchase was made by a neutral Government, but the situation had been intensified just before the new year by the announcement that the German ship Dacia had been sold to a New York firm, and had been given an American register to enable her to take a cargo of cotton from Texas to Germany. We at once intimated that we must reserve our rights as to recognition of the transfer. (Such transfers had been disallowed by the Declaration of London and the German Prize Manual. Previous to the Declaration France and Russia had held them to be illegal in any circumstances, while Great Britain and the United States of America held them illegal unless made bone fide.)

 

It was clearly a test case, for options had been secured on a number of other German vessels. Negotiations followed during January, but as each side fully sympathised with the other's embarrassments, they were of a very friendly character. The outcome was, that as there was no question of principle between us, but only the question of bane fides, the ship, if captured, would have to go into the Prize Court; but we agreed, in order that the shippers should suffer no loss, that we would pre-empt the cargo at the price the Germans had agreed to pay. On this understanding, so far as we were concerned, things were left to take their course, but our arrangement could not bind France, whose view of the law was severer than our own.

 

For her there could be no doubt, and, in fact, on January 24, while the matter was still under consideration in London, the Ministry of Marine informed us that orders had been given to the Admiral of their Western Patrol to capture the Dacia if she was sighted by one of his ships. This decision did much to ease the situation, for as at this time the Western Patrol consisted of six French cruisers and only three of ours, the probability was that the Dacia would fall into French hands. In the end this was what happened. It was a French ship that captured her. As between ourselves and the American Government, the main result of the affair was further to impress them with our earnest desire to make things as easy for neutrals as possible, and if the incident did anything to affect the American attitude to the German war zone, it was certainly not what the Germans wished or appeared to expect.

 

As was only natural, a protest from Washington against the German declaration was neither slow in coming nor wanting in precision. In a note of February 12 the United States Government reminded Berlin that the sole right of belligerents in

 

Feb. 12-17, 1915

THE AMERICAN PROTEST

 

dealing with neutral vessels on the high seas was limited to visit and search, unless blockade was not only proclaimed, but effectively maintained. To declare or exercise the right to attack and destroy any vessel entering a prescribed area of the high seas without first establishing her belligerent nationality or the contraband nature of her cargo, would be an act so unprecedented that they were reluctant to believe that Germany really contemplated putting the declaration in force. Should such acts be committed, they added, the American Government could only regard them as an indefensible violation of neutral rights, which would be very hard to reconcile with a continuation of friendly relations between the two countries.

 

In their reply, which was dated February 17 — the day before the war zone was to be put in operation — the Germans avoided meeting the American case in so far as it rested on established law. To confuse the issue they made play with their afterthought as to the abuse of neutral flags, and introduced the question of our arming of merchantmen, which, as they contended, made visit and search impracticable — that is, impracticable for submarines, the only means they had left. Their real defence was implicitly based on two contentions, both of which were new. One was that neutral traffic in contraband was not legitimate trade, and the other that an attempt to starve an enemy into submission was not legitimate warfare. So long therefore as neutrals submitted to our interference with their import of foodstuffs, they intended to stop contraband trade by all means in their power, fair or foul.

 

The chief flaw in the German case, as thus presented, was that we were not treating foodstuffs as contraband. It is true that on August 20, when it was reported that the German Government had assumed control of foodstuffs, orders had been issued to the fleet that such cargoes were to be detained. (This order was issued to the fleet with the Order in Council of the same date by which we adopted the Declaration of London with certain modifications. The chief of them was that conditional contraband was subject to the doctrine of continuous voyage.) That order had not been cancelled, but as it was ascertained that the report was erroneous, foodstuffs, except when consigned to an enemy's naval port, had never been put in the Prize Court; they were dealt with by pre-emption or agreement by a special committee set up for the purpose. The trade was simply diverted to our own ports, so that while it failed to reach the enemy, neutrals suffered little or no loss, and gained a nearer and more convenient market.

 

It was a method not without precedent, for we had used it freely with America during the war of the French Revolution. At that time the settlement of the vexed question of whether food could be made contraband or not was thus avoided by a compromise, and as between ourselves and America the plan had worked with full contentment. France, of course, had not been appeased, indeed she had protested so vehemently, and the United States had so warmly resented dictation as to where they were to sell their goods, that the two countries came to the brink of war, just as Germany and America seemed to be approaching it now. From all points of view, therefore, the system on which we had been acting promised well, and particularly as our power of inducing the compromise in the present war was much greater than before; for, owing to our control of the Marine Insurance market, it was very difficult for neutrals to obtain war risk policies for voyages across the mine-infested North Sea.

 

So securely, indeed, had the Germans blockaded themselves by minefields, that direct voyages of neutrals, except within the Baltic, were so few as hardly to come into the question. (No ship is recorded in Lloyd's List as having reached a United States port from Germany since the war began. The first arrival listed is that of the Swedish s.s. Ran on February 19, 1915, from Lubeck to Boston.) The trouble arose almost entirely over goods consigned to Dutch ports, and these imports were becoming so far above normal as to raise by their very volume a presumption of enemy destination. However, on October 1 we had so far relaxed the strict orders to the fleet as to exempt from detention all cargoes of foodstuffs not exceeding a hundred tons, and in November, in concert with our Allies, we offered to let all pass if the Dutch Government would constitute themselves sole consignees of foodstuffs, as they had already done with copper and petroleum, with a guarantee that they would not reach the enemy. To this compromise the Dutch Government agreed early in December.

 

American trade was no less seriously affected, and at the end of the month the United States Government presented a note protesting against our proceedings in treating foodstuffs consigned to neutral ports as contraband on mere suspicion that they might reach the enemy. But Sir E. Grey was able to reply that we had not, in fact, done so. Fully admitting the principle on which the United States of America insisted, he pointed out that we had never detained and put into the Prize Court foodstuffs in the absence of presumption that they were intended for an enemy Government, and to this rule it was still our intention to adhere, but no unconditional undertaking could be given in view of the enemy's

 

Feb. 1915

FOODSTUFFS AS CONTRABAND

 

progressive violation of the hitherto accepted rules of civilised warfare.

 

So matters stood, till on January 25 the German Government announced its intention of taking over the control of all foodstuffs as from February 1. This measure, on the doctrine of their own Prize Court, entitled us to treat such cargoes as contraband, and the United States' ship Wilhelmina with wheat consigned to an American firm in Hamburg was seized at Falmouth and put into the Prize Court. The American Government objected on the ground that the cargo was intended for the civil population, and that the ship had sailed before the recent German food order. To this we replied that if Scarborough was a fortified place, as the Germans contended, Hamburg was certainly in the same category. Eventually the case was settled out of court. But by this time Germany had issued her declaration of the war zone, and in replying to the American protest Sir E. Grey, in accordance with his previous intimation, had indicated that the time seemed now to have come when we should be forced to treat all foodstuffs as contraband in retaliation for Germany's persistent breaches of International Law.

 

Till the eleventh hour we, no less than the Americans, were " reluctant to believe " that she would put her threat in force. During February there had been very few attacks. On the 15th the Dulwich was torpedoed without warning off Havre, and the French steamer Ville de Lille was sunk off Cape Barfleur by U.16. The most notable attack was that on the Laertes, a Holt liner bound from Liverpool to Amsterdam on her way to Java. About 4.0 in the afternoon of February 10, some twelve miles from the Schouwen bank light-vessel, off the estuary of the Schelde, her commander. Captain Propert, sighted a submarine about three miles on his starboard bow. As he altered a little to avoid her she summoned him to heave to, but instead of complying he ordered the engines to be opened out to the full and made all ready for abandoning ship. Seeing his intention to escape, the submarine, U.2, made straight for him at top speed, while he manoeuvred to bring her right astern. The submarine quickly closed, and at about three-quarters of a mile opened fire with machine-guns and rifles.

 

The Laertes was unarmed and could do little more than 11 knots at best, so as the chase went on the enemy gained, firing briskly all the time. Still, though a good deal of damage was done to the bridge, boats and upper works, no one was hit. By 5.15, that is, after an hour's chase, the submarine was within a quarter of a mile and there seemed little chance of escape. Then suddenly she slowed down, but the danger was not yet over, for now she fired a torpedo. Its track was seen, and by a smart change of helm avoided by a few yards. The submarine, which seemed to be in difficulty, then gave up the chase, and Captain Propert was able to bring his riddled ship safely into Ymuiden without a single casualty. For this fine perfonnance he was given a commission as Lieutenant R.N.R. and the D.S.C., while all his officers and crew received suitable recognition.

 

The resource and spirit displayed by all concerned was very timely. For as an example it gave hope that even if the Germans did proceed to extremities the worst they could do would have no appreciable effect on our trade, so long as it kept moving. This important consideration was put clearly forward by the First Lord in introducing the Naval Estimates on February 16. Without disguising the fact that losses must be expected, the Admiralty believed that no vital impression could be made if traders put to sea regularly with proper precaution and acted in the spirit of the Laertes. The response of the shipowners and the Mercantile Marine was all that could be desired. During the first week after the war zone had come into force, although owners had been warned that the enemy would probably begin with a supreme effort in order to make a paralysing impression, there was no diminution of sailings or arrivals that could be traced to the threat. The little fall that occurred was almost entirely in coasting vessels, and this was due to the ports being specially congested at the time.

 

But for all the confidence of the shipowners, the prospect of the coming attack could only weigh heavily on those who were responsible for meeting it. The German declaration had been made at a moment when our still incomplete patrol system was in a state of disturbance, owing to the appearance of the submarines off Liverpool bar in the last days of January. At the same time information had been received from our Legation at Copenhagen that in a week's time the Germans intended to begin an organised submarine attack on the cross-channel communications of the army. The announcement was all the more serious, since in the second week of the month the Canadian division was due to sail for France, and in order to deal with submarines in the Irish Sea a whole flotilla of destroyers had been detached to that area. If the enemy's operations off Liverpool were intended to confuse our control of the Channel and its approaches, they could scarcely have been more cleverly designed, but from the first alarm the Admiralty had been taking energetic and comprehensive measures to counter the German move.

 

Feb. 1915

ANTI-SUBMARINE DEVICES

 

As a first step, it was finally decided to withdraw the slow old cruisers of our Western Patrol and to assign Portland as a coaling base for the faster French merchant cruisers which had been acting with them, leaving on the station no ships of our own beyond a few boarding steamers. Our own share of the work was, in fact, to be done by the Devonport Patrol, whose area (No. XIV) covered the home side of the Western Patrol area, and measures were taken to increase its force, as well as that of other areas, by ordering no less than a hundred more trawlers to be armed with guns. At the other and more important end of the Channel a plan for blocking the eastern entrance to the Straits of Dover with a new minefield south-west of our existing one had been settled. At the end of January it was communicated to the French, and with a slight modification approved by them. The work was commenced at once and completed by February 16. By this means, and the new device of indicator nets, it was hoped to render the passage of the Dover Straits at least highly dangerous for submarines. (See foot-note (1), p. 18.)

 

Experiments with these nets had been in active operation for some time, and gear had been devised by which they could be run out with great rapidity. They were to be operated by special flotillas of net drifters, which, being unarmed, were to be attended by patrol yachts or other vessels furnished with guns and explosive sweeps. By February 18 seventeen miles of these nets had been laid across the Dover Straits; other flotillas were ready for St. George's and the North Channels, and next day an order was issued establishing net bases all round the coasts.

(The first instituted were as follows:

 

for Scotland — Scapa, Cromarty, Peterhead, Firth of Forth;

for the East Coast— Yarmouth, Harwich, the Nore and Dover;

for the Channel — Portsmouth, Poole, Portland, Devonport and Falmouth;

others for the Irish Sea and West Coast were to be established as soon as possible at Larne, Milford Haven, Queenstown, the Clyde and Liverpool.

 

Nets were being supplied as fast as possible, and on February 24 a number were sent out to the Dardanelles.)

As a further precaution, it was now decided to extend the principle of defensive armament to vessels engaged in Home waters. Fifty were to be armed at once and two marines allotted to each to work the guns; half of these ships were to be Admiralty colliers or storeships working to France, and half west coast and Channel traders not going north of the Clyde or the Thames.

 

All these measures, extensive as they were, could be taken without any disturbance of the general strategic distribution of the fleet, but they were not enough. There still remained the question of escort for important navy ships and liners entering or leaving dockyard or commercial ports, as well as for transports and special munition ships. For this a radical redistribution of destroyers was found necessary. The eight destroyers originally assigned to the defence of Scapa were ordered south, to join the Dover Patrol, and to escort transports sailing from Plymouth and Avonmouth. A flotilla of twelve coastal destroyers (now classed as torpedo-boats) which had been under the Admiral of Patrols on the east coast, were also assigned for Channel escort, and the area for which he was responsible was reduced, so that Area X, south of Winterton Ness, came under Harwich. Provision for Channel escort was completed by abandoning the idea of absorbing the eight '' Beagles '' at Portsmouth into a new 10th Flotilla. They were to remain under Admiral Meux, and the 10th Flotilla was confined to the Aurora and " M " class destroyers.

 

Finally, on the day the war zone came into force, the Western Auxiliary Patrol areas were reorganised in accordance with their increased importance by making them flag officers' commands. The Larne, or North Channel area, was given to Admiral Barlow; the Kingstown, or Irish Channel area, to Rear-Admiral E. R. Le Marchant; and the Milford area, which included the St. George's and Bristol Channels, to Vice-Admiral C. H. Dare. Liverpool, at the same time, was constituted a separate area, like the Clyde, and entrusted to Rear-Admiral H. H. Stileman, who was established there in charge of the 10th Cruiser Squadron base. An independent squadron of six armed yachts was also established at Belfast for service wherever it was needed.

 

Before these arrangements were complete the Canadian division had crossed, but not by the usual route to Havre. Though its base depots and other advance units had gone to Channel ports, the division proceeded from Avonmouth to St. Nazaire, thus keeping clear of the Channel altogether. They sailed in groups between February 9 and 12, escorted by the two divisions of destroyers which had been working in the Irish Sea under the orders of the Undaunted since the enemy's submarines had appeared there, and which now went back to Harwich. The whole movement was completed without interference, but the German submarine blockade had not then begun. After it had been in operation a week, another division was due to cross. This was the North Midland Territorials. They were to go by the regular route from Southampton to Havre, and it was a much more serious undertaking, for it was already clear that the measures taken

 

Feb. 1915

THE CHANNEL LINE OF PASSAGE

 

to bar the Straits of Dover to submarines were not entirely effective.

 

On February 18 the war zone was inaugurated by the torpedoing of a ship off Dieppe; on the 20th, a submarine, which had passed through the minefield, was caught in the nets to the south of it near the Varne, but though two of the watching destroyers followed the buoys and exploded charges the submarine seems to have torn through and escaped. Keen disappointment was felt at the failure, but the nets were still incomplete. No satisfactory detachable clip for joining them had yet been supplied, and better success could be hoped for in the future. On the other hand, new difficulties were making themselves felt. That ancient highway, through which the traffic of the seas had thronged for ages, was strewn with wrecks, and in their forgotten resting-places they were obstructing the fight against the new peril which they had never known. Owing to them and the bad weather that prevailed, nearly ninety nets had already been lost, but the Admiralty only ordered more — enough to cover the whole twenty-five miles of the Straits — and gave directions that they should be shot by night as well as by day.

 

On February 22, two days after the disappointment off the Vame, the North Midland Division began to cross. That night two troopers and one storeship left, each escorted by a destroyer. Next night eight troopers left, similarly escorted, although, in spite of the Dover nets, two ships had been lost off Beachy Head. Next day three more were lost in the same waters, and neither the patrol nor specially detached destroyers could find trace of an enemy. Four transports were to sail that night, but as they were slow ships and there was a bright moon the Admiralty ordered that none of them was to leave without three destroyers for escort, and Admiral Meux had to detain two of them.

 

No less than eleven transports were now waiting to start, three of 19 knots and the rest 18 or under, and there were only eight destroyers for escort. To Admiral Meux's request for instruction the Admiralty replied that the fast ships could sail without escort, and slow ones, for which no escort was available, must be detained. As the fast ships were paddle steamers the system, as Admiral Meux pointed out, was not without hazard, for the beat of the paddles could be heard at a long distance. But it was the best that could be done, and in this way the whole division, as well as the usual drafts and stores, was got across during the week without loss. What it meant for the overworked destroyers must never be forgotten. The Beagle had had her fires alight for no less than twenty-six days in February . But the system had to be continued. On March 3 instructions were given to Admiral Meux that slow ships carrying vehicles, horses, or a small number of men, should be escorted by two destroyers. Fast transports carrying troops must also have one when the moon was bright. Some risks, it was pointed out, must be taken to get troops across in sufficient numbers, and to relieve the pressure on his destroyers the four Newhaven torpedo-boats, which were good for fair weather, were placed at his disposal.

 

On this system the work of keeping up the flow of men and stores for the army — from which the navy, with all its other preoccupations, was never free for a day — went on uninterruptedly, and not without hope of success. The experience of the first week was distinctly encouraging. How many submarines were out it is impossible to say, but out of 1,881 arrivals and departures only eleven British ships were attacked, and of these four escaped. Five were sunk in the eastern part of the Channel and two in the Irish Sea. A French vessel was also damaged, but was able to make Dieppe. The most sinister feature of the week's work was that a Norwegian steamer, the Belridge, was torpedoed without warning in the approach to the Dover Straits. Though she succeeded in getting into Thameshaven, the case, which was the first of its kind, was peculiarly flagrant, for she was bound from America with oil for the Dutch Government. (The Germans state that only one boat, U.8, was ready to sail when the war zone was inaugurated. U.30 was then on her way north-about. On February 25 two more started, U.20 for the Irish Sea, north of the Isle of Man, and U.27 by way of the Channel for the Irish Sea, south of the Isle of Man. (See Gayer, Vol II., p. 14.) )

 

So far the rate of damage was less than what had been caused by the cruisers, and the next week only increased the ineffective impression of the attack. Only three ships were molested and all of them escaped. One was the St. Andrew, another hospital ship, which was attacked off Boulogne. Another was the Thordis, whose escape was entirely due to the spirit and readiness with which her master. Captain John W. Bell, acted on the instructions of the Admiralty. They had been issued confidentially on February 14, and were designed to instruct masters as to the best means of eluding submarine attack. There was no suggestion that they should attempt to destroy an assailant — nothing, indeed, which could be used by the enemy to prejudice their status of non-combatants. If a submarine was sighted at a distance they were advised to turn their stern towards her, as Captain Propert had done, and make off at full speed, if possible, into shoal water. If, however, a

 

Feb.-March 1915

SUBMARINE ENCOUNTERS

 

submarine came up close ahead, so that a turn would only expose them to effective attack, they should steer direct for her so as to force her to dive. By carrying on and passing over her they would thus be able to bring her astern and make off as before. It was the latter situation with which Captain Bell had to deal. On February 28, as he was passing down Channel, he saw off Beachy Head a periscope on his starboard bow. The submarine was crossing athwart his course, and when she was only thirty to forty yards off on his port beam she fired a torpedo without warning. It apparently passed under the ship, and Captain Bell, when he saw its wake to starboard, immediately put his helm hard over and ran at his assailant. As he passed over the periscope a jar and a crash told that he had hit her, and oil was seen on the water, but nothing more of the submarine. Whether she was destroyed or not is uncertain.

 

The Germans claimed she returned to port, but when the Thordis was docked for examination it was found that her keel plate was torn and dented and that she had lost a blade of her propeller. Clearly, then, the submarine must have been badly damaged, and a reward was granted in recognition of his skilful conduct in saving his ship. The activity the enemy was displaying against our cross-Channel communications brought no relief in the North Sea, and here we fared badly. Owing to the heavy call for destroyers elsewhere the floating defences of the east coast were seriously reduced in strength. Though submarines were being reported almost daily, and though many ships were attacked and several lost, only one success, due to an accident, was claimed. On February 23, a hundred miles east-north-east of the Farn Islands, a fishing trawler, the Alex Hastie, reported she had capsized and destroyed another submarine by getting her foul of her trawl hawsers, and the claim was allowed, though it was ascertained later that the submarine reached port.

 

In the Channel zone March opened well with news from the Devonport area. Start Bay, by Dartmouth, was suspected of being a resting-place for the submarines which were operating in the Channel, and a net was shot across it. On March 1 part of the nets were seen to sink and begin to move to the inner part of the bay. They were found to be foul, violent pulls and vibrations were seen and the lead gave only 6 fathoms when the chart showed 9 ½ . Next day an explosive sweep was obtained and exploded over the spot, with the result that such quantities of oil came to the surface as to leave little doubt the submarine had been destroyed.

 

On March 4 there was another success about which there could be no doubt. This time it was the turn of the Dover nets and destroyers. At 1.15 p.m. the destroyer Viking signalled a submarine near the Varne buoy and followed the tracks paying out her explosive sweep. On receipt of the signal the rest of the division, under Captain C. D. Johnson, was ordered to close. A little after 2.0 an indicator buoy, moving fast to the eastward, gave the chase's position away, and presently her periscope came to the surface again as though she was in trouble with the nets. The Viking ran up to the spot and exploded her sweep. There was no result, except that for a moment the periscope reappeared. An hour later it was seen again by the Maori further to the westward. The submarine was clearly moving down Channel, and Captain Johnson directed the Ghurka to work her sweep across the track. At 5.0 it was exploded and with complete success. The submarine shot up to the surface nearly vertically and stem first. A few shots at her conning-tower finished her. Her crew of four officers and twenty-five men surrendered, and ten minutes later she sank.

 

She proved to be U.8, the first boat that had started from Heligoland to enforce the war zone. After a week's cruise in the Channel she had returned to Zeebrugge for repairs and was now about to resume her work of destruction. To the hard-worked Dover Patrol the success was a great encouragement after their disappointments, but to the enemy it was no deterrent. In hope of making it so the Admiralty ordered that the crew were to be segregated in detention barracks and treated not as prisoners of war, but as pirates awaiting trial. But it was an attitude that could not be maintained.

 

The Germans replied with reprisals on military officers, and the order was soon after rescinded. Still we could congratulate ourselves on having found one means of dealing with the pest, and as a result of these two incidents an order was issued, at Admiral Hood's suggestion, that one drifter in every four should be furnished with an explosive sweep. Other means were also being prepared; chief among them were decoy ships with concealed guns; the hydrophone for locating submarines by sound, and depth or lance bombs for destroying them when located beneath the surface, but the latter two were still in an experimental stage.

 

The weak point of our defence was the inadequate number of destroyers. A large number had been ordered, but they would not be coming forward till the summer, and during March the considerable movements of troops which had to take place made the shortage a special cause for anxiety. In

 

March 1-11, 1915

TRANSPORTS AND SUBMARINES

 

the first week of the month the Royal Naval Division began to sail for the Dardanelles. Their port of departure was Avonmouth, and they had to be escorted clear of the danger zone. On March 1, 3,400 men of the Marine brigade were to leave in three transports, but as the weather was too bad for even the " L " class destroyers to keep up with them they were sent away without escort. Three days later three ships, under escort of the Essex, arrived at Queenstown with reinforcements for the Canadian division, and had to be brought over to Avonmouth by destroyers. In the following week a London Territorial division was to cross to Havre, and on March 9, the day the movement began, a collier was sunk by a U-boat off Dungeness and a French trawler twenty miles west-south-west of Beachy Head.

 

Other submarines were reported in the Channel, and before the transport of the division was complete they were busy again in the Bristol and North Channel. On the 9th, in spite of the eighty drifters and two patrol units which Admiral Barlow now had at Larne, a ship was torpedoed off Liverpool Bar, and on the 11th one of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, H.M.S. Bayano, on her way to coal at Liverpool, met the same fate in the North Channel. She had slowed down so as not to pass the net line before daylight and was an easy prey. The same afternoon another ship of the squadron, H.M.S. Ambrose, also coming in to coal, was attacked three times as she approached the Channel, but keeping up her speed, she escaped, and at the third attack was able to get in some shots at her enemy, which, whether damaged or not, did not reappear. Another submarine attacked two ships off Liverpool and was driven off by the Dee, one of the two destroyers attached to the port. Later in the evening another steamer, the Florazan, was sunk off the entrance to the Bristol Channel. (According to Gayer, all this work was done by U.20 and U.27. Vol. II., p. 14.)

 

In view of the force that was being devoted to the area these results were very disappointing, but, as Admiral Barlow explained, the strength of the tides made it impossible to keep the nets athwart the Channel, and none of his armed patrol vessels were fast enough to deal with submarines that were sighted. Apart from actual losses it was a serious interference with the working of the Northern Cruiser Patrol on which our blockade mainly depended. Four other ships of the squadron had to be detained in the Clyde, till, at Admiral Jellicoe's suggestion, he was authorised to detach half of one of his flotillas to patrol the approach to the North Channel. For this purpose he placed the Faulknor and six other destroyers at Admiral Barlow's disposal, mainly for the protection of the ships of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, but, as will appear directly, so widespread and determined was the effort the Germans were now making that they had to be recalled in four days.

 

Following the bad day in the North Channel two other areas became infected. On March 12 U.29 was attacking ships off the Scillies. (She was commanded by Lieut-Commander Otto Weddigen, the hero of the " Cressys " episode. It was he also who had sunk the Hawke.) The local patrol, though on the spot, proved too slow or too inexpert to interfere with her, and during the morning she torpedoed three steamers. Next day another was lost off the Irish Coast opposite the Isle of Man, and it was specially disconcerting that on the same day (the 13th) H.M.S. Partridge, attached to the West Coast of Ireland squadron, which was still patrolling, found and engaged, without success, a submarine off the Fastnet (south-west point of Ireland). This was the first time that one had appeared in that quarter, and the indication it gave of the intensification and reach of the submarine campaign was the more serious, for the time had come for the XXIXth Division to leave for the Dardanelles.

 

All the week before it was due to sail, the submarines had been specially active all round our coasts. On March 16, when the first group of four transports left, one was operating in the mouth of the Bristol Channel, but she was so persistently harried by an unarmed drifter that she was forced to dive. Each ship was escorted by two destroyers, and sailing daily in small groups, as escort was available, the transports and storeships were all away by the eighth day and not one was attacked. The submarine activity had, indeed, subsided everywhere except in the North Sea and the eastern end of the Channel, where more ships were lost off Beachy Head, in spite of an increase in the patrol. (Gayer states that there were three more submarines operating in the Channel during March 1916, U.34, U.35 and U.37, the last of which never returned. Vol. II., p. 20.) But in these areas the enemy had not had things all their own way.

 

About sunset on March 6 a submarine, which proved to be U.12, the boat which claimed to have sunk the Niger off Deal in November, was sighted twenty-five miles south-east of Aberdeen by the Duster, a trawler of the local patrol (Area V). The submarine was steering west-north-west, as though just arriving from the Bight. The Duster gave chase, but only to lose her as she dived, nor was it till next morning

 

March 6-10, 1915

THE HUNT FOR U.12

 

when she fell in with the yacht Portia, that she was able to pass the news to the Rosyth naval centre. Then ensued a hunt which affords a fine example of how our then existing anti-submarine system worked, as organised by Rear-Admiral Sir R. S. Lowry for the coast of Scotland. The Peterhead Admiral at once got to sea every available unit of his patrol, but it was not till next morning that the enemy was sighted again. She was then seen off Cruden Bay, south of Buchan Ness, by a minesweeping trawler. She must then have moved south, for in the evening a trawler picked her up seventeen miles east by north of Girdle Ness, that is, Aberdeen, but lost her again. Next morning, the 9th, however, she was found again by the trawler Martin and was chased down to Stonehaven, when she dived and got away.

 

All day the hunt went on, and at 8.0 p.m. she was seen by the trawler Chester between Montrose and Red Head, but again she escaped by diving. Meanwhile another submarine had appeared on Aberdeen, and all these reports were being rapidly passed to the naval centres and war signal stations by the patrol yachts, and Admiral Sir Robert Lowry at noon had ordered out Captain W. F. Blunt in the Fearless, with thirteen destroyers of the 4th Flotilla from Rosyth, to sweep northward. U.12 was now in great danger. She must have been actually making for the estuary of the Forth, for at 5.30 she was near the Bell Rock, which the Leviathan was about to pass, having just been ordered to Rosyth, on the suppression of the 6th Cruiser Squadron, to hoist Admiral Patey's flag for the North American Station.

(In the course of the cruiser re-distribution that was going on, the North American and West Indies Station was being strengthened by newer and more powerful ships. Admiral Patey, who had been commanding the 2nd and 3rd Squadrons of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, had been appointed to command it, with Admiral Phipps Hornby, who was then in charge of it, as his Second in Command. Admiral Pakenham from the 3rd Cruiser Squadron succeeded Admiral Patey in the Battle Cruiser Fleet, and Rear-Admiral W. L. Grant took the 3rd Cruiser Squadron.)

Apparently before the Leviathan saw her she fired a torpedo, but as the cruiser was zigzagging it missed. The submarine was preparing another attack when a trawler came up, opened fire and forced her to dive. The inference from this was that the flotilla must have passed over her and they were at once recalled to sweep south.

 

The following morning (the 10th) from various trawlers Captain Blunt ascertained positions off the Forth where a submarine had been seen, and distributed his force accordingly. One of these positions, reported by the fishing trawler May Island, was twenty-five miles east of Fife Ness, and thither he despatched Commander B. M. Money with the Acheron, Attack and Ariel. Making for the spot in line abreast at one mile intervals, they sighted her at 10.10 a.m. about a mile and a half ahead. Putting on full speed they all converged upon her, a most delicate manoeuvre, that required the coolest and most skilful steering to avoid collision. The Attack (Lieutenant-Commander Cyril Callaghan), which was nearest and had seen her first, opened fire.

 

The submarine dived and the Attack rushed over the boil of water without feeling anything. For a minute or two the enemy was lost, but then the Ariel saw her periscope about 200 yards four points on her starboard bow. With both engines at full speed and helm hard over, Lieutenant-Commander J. V. Creagh dashed for her conning-tower, which was just coming awash, and rammed her fair amidships. She then came to the surface and the destroyers opened fire. One of the first shots hurled her gun overboard, and then the crew were seen scrambling on deck holding up their hands. The destroyers ceased fire, but before the boats could get to her she was sinking, and only ten survivors of her crew could be rescued. So ended a hunt which had lasted nearly four davs and had covered at least 120 miles. Every one concerned in the operation was highly commended by the Admiralty, for success was due not only to the organisation, but to the smart way every man did his part, from the signal stations to the fishing trawlers.

(Five hundred pounds was allotted to the fishing trawler May Island, and lesser money rewards to the other fishing trawlers, the armed yacht Portia and to the patrol trawlers Duster, Coote, Chester and Martin.)

Elsewhere there were similar indications of the enemy's activity. On the same day the Dover destroyers and drifters came upon another submarine, again near the Varne. After a three hours' hunt the Ghurka got her sweep home and exploded it with the result that a " probable loss " was allowed, though we now know the submarine escaped. The following evening the second submarine, which had been sighted during the hunt for U.12, attempted to attack the Indomitable off Montrose. She was on her way from Scapa to Rosyth, when, in the last of the light, she sighted a submarine getting into position to fire, but turning promptly towards it she forced it to dive under her and it was seen no more.

 

From this and other incidents it seemed evident that an organised attack was being made on the Grand Fleet as well as upon our commerce. From March 15 microphones were constantly detecting the presence of submarines in and near the Firth of Forth area. All sailings from Rosyth had to be stopped, and though neither indicator nets nor the Patrol

 

March 18, 1915

THE DREADNOUGHT AND U.29

 

destroyers could catch one of the intruders, the defence was active enough to prevent any ship being attacked during the four days the alarm lasted . It was not till the 18th, when the weather was too bad for submarines to lie on the bottom, that the indications ceased and the port could be opened again.

 

It was on this day the Faulknor and her six destroyers, which had been detached from Scapa to the Lame area, were recalled. Simultaneously there was another attempt on the Grand Fleet. Admiral Jellicoe had taken out the battle squadrons for a few days' tactical exercises with his cruisers east of Scapa, but owing to the numerous reports of submarines in the area, he had cut the programme short, and on the morning of March 18 the fleet was zigzagging west-north-west for the Pentland Firth with the divisions in line ahead disposed abeam — northernmost were the two divisions of the 4th Squadron and southernmost those of the 1st Squadron, with his flagship and the 2nd Squadron in the centre. By noon they were within fifty miles of the Firth, and signal was made to Admiral Sturdee to turn the 4th Battle Squadron to the southward and proceed to Cromarty, passing under the stem of the other two squadrons. He was just doing so when, at 12.15, the Marlborough, flagship of the 1st and southernmost squadron, signalled there was a submarine ahead.

 

A torpedo had just been seen to pass astern of the Neptune, the Marlborough's second astern, and the enemy was clearly bent on another shot. But as Admiral Sturdee had just started to swing to starboard upon his new course he could not turn away, as laid down in the standing orders. The Dreadnought was outermost ship to port, the submarine's periscope was on her port bow, and increasing to full speed Captain W. J. S. Alderson made directly for it; the Temeraire, which was next in the line, did the same. In vain the submarine doubled this way and that; the Dreadnought, handled as she was by Commander H. W. C. Hughes, the navigating officer, was too nimble for her, and after a breathless ten minutes the famous battleship crashed over her. For a minute her bows reared out of the water astern of the Dreadnought, there was just time to read her number " 29," and then she slowly settled by the stem and that was her end. Nothing but oil and a little wreckage came to the surface; every man went down with her, including Captain Weddigen, her commander, and thus was avenged the loss of the three " Cressy's " and the Hawke.

 

Whether or not the incident was part of the organised attack on the Grand Fleet, it would seem that Captain Weddigen was returning north-about after his recent depredations off the Scillies. It was from one of his victims in that area we learnt who the commander was. Possibly he had reserved his last torpedoes to use on the way home. In any case, the end of this intrepid commander marked the completion of the first month of the new campaign, and some idea could be formed of what it meant. During the period we had lost one armed merchant cruiser, and twenty merchant vessels. On the other hand, twenty-two merchant vessels had been attacked and escaped, and we had destroyed at least three submarines. Though our losses were disquieting, the navy could be congratulated on having kept open the communications of the army, as well as the vital home terminals of our trade routes. Since the beginning of the war there had been conveyed to France alone about 600,000 men and 150,000 horses, with all their stores and munitions, and the merchantship sailings and arrivals showed no diminution.

 

But our efforts did not stop at prevention. In view of the lawless course the enemy was taking, more drastic retaliatory measures were deemed justifiable, even at the cost of a further stretch of belligerent rights. In effect, Germany, in setting up her war zone, had declared a blockade of the British Isles, which her opening had shown she was unable to make effective according to time-honoured standards. Moreover a blockade must not only be effective, it must be maintained, but owing to the limited sea endurance of the submarine, and the insufficient number Germany possessed, she had periodically to withdraw the blockading force. Under the Declaration of Paris such a blockade was illegal, and on this ground alone we claimed the right to enforce measures of retaliation.

 

To declare a blockade of German ports without also closing those of adjacent neutral countries was clearly useless, and, as the Declaration of London had reasserted, the blockade of neutral ports was inadmissible. What was done, therefore, as the method which would involve least loss of legitimate trade to neutrals, was to declare that no ship bound to or from a German port would be allowed to proceed on her voyage. Her cargo would have to be discharged at a British port, and so far as the goods consigned to a German port were not contraband or were not requisitioned by the Government, they would be restored to the owners on such terms as the Prize Court deemed just. Goods coming from a German port would all be seized subject to neutral claims of ownership. As to voyages to or from adjacent neutral ports, goods with an

 

March 1, 1915

RETALIATORY " BLOCKADE"

 

enemy destination, or which were enemy owned, might be similarly treated. The Declaration was issued on March 11 by Order in Council, and was to apply to all ships that had sailed after March 1. In so far as it amounted to a blockade of neutral ports it was irregular, but in that neither ships nor innocent cargoes were to be confiscated it was much less severe than a blockade, and seeing that it did not involve the destruction of life or property, it fell far short of the ruthless system that had provoked it.

 

That system continued to be pressed so far as German means allowed, and although it was falling far short of producing the interruption of our supplies which the Germans had so confidently promised, it remained a heavy weight on the Admiralty, and one which they did not doubt would increase. With the measures that were being taken to prevent the submarines reaching the army's line of communications they could not be content. It was clear that our Dover minefield was not stopping the submarines, for two at least were known to have got through. Many explosions were heard in the barrage minefield, but it was probable they were due to the defects of the mines themselves. The pattern then in use was proving very unsatisfactory and they were constantly breaking adrift.

 

Nor were the indicator nets yet giving the results that had been hoped for— owing to defective clips, floats and buoys and the insuperable trouble of tides and wrecks. It was even found impossible to keep them out at night, and the Admiralty had to rescind the order to that effect. Seeing therefore that the time was nearing when the new armies would be passing to France in ever-increasing numbers and offering a more enticing objective to the enemy's submarines, more drastic measures had to be taken. They were already on foot.

 

Towards the end of February it had been decided to attempt the herculean task of throwing a boom right across the Straits of Dover. The plan was to run an anti- submarine steel net, suspended from buoys, from a point just east of Folkestone, across the Varne Shoal to Cape Gris Nez, with a " gate " at either end. Such devices were already in use to protect our chief fleet anchorages, but as yet they had not been used for the open sea. The difficulties in the way of the new scheme were, of course, enormous, especially in a locality where tides were so strong and complicated as in the Dover Straits. From the first it was doubtful whether such a boom would stand the inevitable strains, but the attempt seemed worthwhile, and the work of design and collecting material was tackled at once with promptitude and energy. In view of all the other calls that were pressing on our power of production it was a stupendous task. The distance to be covered was twenty nautical miles, and as a result of the change of plan at the Dardanelles much of the gear that was first collected had to be diverted to the Mediterranean for the defence of the new base at Mudros, so that the work of laying the boom could not begin till April.

 

Still, in the last two weeks of March only five British, one French and two neutral ships were sunk, while masters were growing so skilful in acting on the Admiralty instructions that no less than ten British ships foiled attempts to attack them. Nor had the enemy any success against military objectives. In the last days of the month another division of the new army (the South Midland Territorials) was transported by way of Boulogne and Havre without loss. The main trouble was in the Bristol Channel, where U.28 was now active.

 

Taking up a position where the tracks to the Bristol and the St. George's Channel diverge, she destroyed on March 27 three steamers, and next day chased three more and sunk a fourth. In two cases of the ships destroyed the behaviour of the submarine commander, Lieut.-Commander Freiherr von Foerstner, was characterised by wanton brutality. One of them was the Falaba, and her destruction became specially notorious, for she was full of passengers. Not only was this the first instance of such a ship being sunk, but the German captain, after ordering her to be abandoned, fired a torpedo while the boats were being got out, and before passengers or crew could leave the ship, with the result that over a hundred lives were lost. The Aquila was treated with like savagery, and the bitterness which the incident engendered was increased by reports from signal stations that S.O.S. calls were being used to lure ships to destruction.

 

If such conduct, of which Captain von Foerstner set the example, was not dictated by mere wanton cruelty, it may have been part of a deliberate design to deter mariners from going to sea. If this was so it had no effect. The Mercantile Marine was not so easily intimidated. Both in owners and mariners the old spirit burnt as steadily as ever, and in sturdy defiance of the new terrors arrivals and departures went on as though nothing unusual were happening. The confidence of courage proved well founded, for the percentage even of ships attacked was very small. During the four weeks ending March 31 the total movement of British shipping in and out amounted to over 6,000 vessels, while the losses numbered

 

March, 1915

OUR "DIVING PATROL"

 

only twenty-one, and the tonnage destroyed was less than 65,000. During the same period twenty-nine other ships were molested, of which only five were damaged and the rest escaped.

 

But the Germans were now well started on the downward road of intimidation, and how far they were ready to go in ignoring the established customs of the sea by which the hardships of commerce warfare had been mitigated, further appeared this month in attacks by aircraft on merchant vessels. Eight British ships were attacked in this way off the estuary of the Thames, but in all cases without result. On the other hand, losses from mines almost ceased during March. The increasing number and efficiency of our patrols had doubtless much to do with the immunity, but it would also seem that the Germans at the same time temporarily restricted their minelaying in the open sea, so as not to hamper unduly the action of their submarines.

 

The offensive work of our own submarines, though equally persistent and daring, was necessarily more restricted, targets were few and difficult to reach. Only in the Bight and the Baltic were they to be found, and in those perilous waters was the main scene of operations. Inside Heligoland and off the mouths of German rivers the Harwich submarines of the " diving patrol " kept the enemy continually on the alert. In the whole area of their guard the enemy swarmed about them, under the water, upon it and in the air. In every direction were lines of patrol trawlers to be dived under, all kinds of aircraft to be avoided and groups of well-handled destroyers hunting like hounds. Conflicts were frequent, but with small material gain. But it was not in material gain that much was to be hoped for. The significance of the diving patrol submarines was more subtle. They were, in fact, the tentacles of the Grand Fleet. Though apparently inert in its lair, its reach was long, and at the mouths of the enemy's ports it was feeling — always feeling — for its opportunity.

 

Nor was it only in the North Sea that the enemy was smarting under its stings. E.1 and E.9 were still in the Baltic, under Lieutenant-Commanders N. F. Laurence and M. K. Horton. At the end of October 1914, after their first raids, we have seen how they came definitely under the orders of Admiral von Essen. All through the winter, with short intervals in port, he kept them busy, mostly in the approaches to the Sound which the Chief of the German Naval Staff had not permitted to be mined. It was watched by a force under Rear-Admiral Jasper, consisting

 

Oct.-Nov. 1915

THE BALTIC

 

of four old light cruisers and some destroyers operating from Kiel, and it was one of these light cruisers, Victoria Luise, which Lieutenant-Commander Laurence had attacked on October 18, and not the Furst Bismarck, as he had conjectured. (See Vol. I, p. 237.)

 

To the eastward, keeping observation on the Russian fleet, was another force under Rear-Admiral Behring, consisting of the cruiser Friedrich Carl (flag), a few light cruisers and about half a flotilla of destroyers. It was based at Neufahrwasser, where Lieutenant-Commander Laurence had seen the cruisers when he looked into the Gulf of Dantzig. As soon as it was known that the British submarines had gone to the eastward. Admiral Behring, reinforced by Admiral Jasper's light cruisers, was ordered to attack Libau to prevent its being used as a base by the unwelcome intruders. It seems that the Germans were unaware of the extent to which the Russians had dismantled the port, and his orders were to close the entrances with blockships and to destroy the place by bombardment.

 

Owing to adverse weather it was not till November 16 that the expedition was able to leave Dantzig, and in the small hours of the 17th, as the Friedrich Carl was proceeding to her covering position, she was twice struck by a mine about thirty miles off Memel, and later on another ship was blown up nearer the coast. Clearly it was Russian work, and about ten days previously several mysterious ships had been sighted in this vicinity by a German light cruiser, who neglected to attack them. By a fine effort the flagship was kept afloat, and, further north, the operations against Libau went on in a heavy snowstorm. Though the entrances were found to have been already partially obstructed, the blockships were sunk to complete the work, while the Augsburg, which had been supporting two submarines in the Gulf of Finland, came hurrying down to the rescue of the Friedrich Carl, and by 6.30 a.m. the crew of the flagship had been taken off and she was left to sink.

 

This was the price the Germans paid for an operation which was quite unnecessary, since, as we know, our submarines had long given up the idea of using Libau. To add to the disturbance they were creating, it was felt that Dantzig was now no longer a fit base for Admiral Behring's detached squadron, and it was withdrawn to Swinemunde, with the heavy cruiser Prinz Adalbert for flagship in place of the lost Friedrich Carl. How deep was the impression made by our appearance in the Baltic is seen in a General Instruction issued by Prince Henry to the German submarines of the

 

Dec. 1914-Jan. 1915

E.l AND E.9 IN THE BALTIC

 

Gulf of Finland patrol when it was known where our submarines were based. In warning them against wasting effort on the local surface patrol, he said, '' I consider the destruction of a Russian submarine will be a great success, but I regard the destruction of a British submarine as being at least as valuable as that of a Russian armoured cruiser. (The above account of the German operations is from the Official History Der Krieg zur Sea (Baltic Sea, Vol. I.), pp. 205-52.)

 

During the winter the German Baltic forces were mainly employed in efforts to control the flood of contraband from Sweden to Russia across the Gulf of Bothnia and in an expedition to the Aland Islands, where they suspected an advance base was being formed for operations in the southern Baltic. Nothing was found, and again the price paid was severe. In the course of the various operations the Augsburg struck a mine east of Bornholm, and the Prinz Adalbert ran aground off Steinort, near Libau, where E.9 proceeded in order to destroy her, but found her gone. Both ships were out of action for about three months, and besides these mishaps, the Gazelle, one of the old light cruisers of the Sound Patrol, was also mined and injured past repair.

 

During this period our submarines had been operating with the Russian fleet between Bornholm and Gothland. Several attacks on the patrols were made till they had to go into dock for a refit. Towards the end of January they were again active, and on the 29th Lieutenant-Commander Horton reported having torpedoed a destroyer off Moen on the Danish coast, and believed he had sunk her. The work was beyond measure strenuous, and demanded endurance almost past bearing. When on the surface the spray froze on the bridge and hands had to be continually employed keeping the conning-tower hatch free from ice; even so it sometimes became immovable, and return to port was necessary. Periscopes when put out of water were almost immediately cased in ice, bow and stem caps became fixed in like manner, and a more or less prolonged dive into the warmer depths was needed to put them in action again. Still they carried on, to the complete satisfaction of the Russian Commander-in-Chief.

 

He himself, though as eager for action as he had always shown himself during the Russo-Japanese war, had been kept quiet by higher authority. Since the unfortunate loss of the Pallada, sunk by a German submarine off Hango on October 11, he had not even been permitted to maintain his cruiser patrol between Gotland and the Gulf of Finland. Nothing else was to be expected. Russia had adopted the specious principle of a single command. Both army and navy were under the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich as supreme commander by land and sea, with the result that the Baltic Fleet was regarded as part of the defence force of the capital and an extension of the right wing of the Sixth Army.

 

Admiral von Essen was actually placed under the immediate orders of the General commanding that army, who was responsible for Finland and the coast provinces south of the gulf, and he was allowed no such freedom as was enjoyed by Admiral Ebergard in the Black Sea. Seeing how inferior the Russian fleet was to the German, for the two new Dreadnoughts that were completed had not yet finished their trials, the policy was probably correct in principle, though it hardly justified complete inaction. On the other hand, it must be said that minor operations with the existing force must have been precarious for lack of destroyers. Those which Admiral von Essen had were too slow, and though many more were on the slips, most of their machinery had been ordered in Germany, and there was consequently no hope of the bulk of them being completed for a long time to come. Their new submarines were similarly crippled, and thus it was that E.1 and E.9 had to bear the whole weight of active operations in the Baltic.

 

While we in these ways were employing our oversea submarines against strictly naval objectives, it became clearer every week that those of the Germans were devoting their main energy to the development of their commercial '' blockade." All our intelligence indicated that in the near future it would increase in intensity as it was increasing in barbarity, while, on the other hand, there was a growing doubt whether the means we were adopting for destroying submarines at sea and barring their access to vital waters would ever prove adequate to meet the situation.

 

It was not by such means we bad been wont in former days to meet attempts to undermine our command of the Narrow Seas. The sound old tradition had been to prevent the enemy ever getting to sea, and if this could not be done by blockade, to destroy or capture the bases from which he was acting. It was natural, then, seeing how difficult it was to close the submarine ports by mine and active blockade, that the idea of attacking them gained new strength. As we have seen, a plan of campaign to this end was in preparation, and in naval opinion there was a growing belief that nothing less would serve to parry the insidious attack. Yet it was at this juncture that the Government found itself entangled, owing to an incorrect beginning, in a distant operation which

 

March, 1915

THE NORTH SEA PLAN

 

promised to absorb so much naval force that the elaborately-laid plans for the North Sea offensive might prove impracticable. On the other hand, it was also a moment when the great lines of the war seemed to be taking a new direction, which raised doubts whether the North Sea plan was that best adapted to meet the threatening development.

 

 

---

 

 

CHAPTER XVI

 

THE DARDANELLES — ORGANISATION OF THE COMBINED ATTACK — MARCH 28 TO APRIL 26

 

In all wars it is a familiar feature that the spring of the year tends to exhibit new developments in their course, and never perhaps has the tendency been more conspicuous than in the spring of 1915. On each side the traditional opening had been pushed to its utmost capacity, and showed no clear prospect of a quick decision. The vast and sudden effort which the Central Powers had so long prepared had exhausted itself without having even secured on either front a defensive position from which there was any prospect of decisive operations in view. The opening of the Maritime Powers had been, on the whole, more successful, for they had secured, according to old standards, a complete control of the sea, but unless they could use it to strike in a new direction the prospect of a decision was as remote for them as for their enemy.

 

Both sides were therefore bent on breaking fresh ground. At sea Germany, in order to tilt the balance in her favour, was seeking to sap our control by a wholly new departure in naval warfare, and at the same time was gathering what force she could to strike towards the Balkans on the line where lay her ultimate goal. At the same time we had persuaded our French Ally to join us in an attempt to wrest the initiative from the land Powers in our traditional manner, by giving the Continental war a new direction that was best suited to the position and resources of Maritime Powers. Whatever effect the new departure of the Germans was destined to have upon our control of the sea, it was clear that for some time at least it could not affect it sufficiently to prevent our developing the advantages which the command we had already established afforded us. Those advantages were the power of freely combining naval and military force against the point where the system of the Central Powers was weakest, while standing securely on the defensive in the main theatre, where its strength was greatest.

 

In the main theatre such operations have never been found possible, unless indeed we except the Walcheren expedition, which for the importance of the forces engaged

 

OLD PRECEDENTS

 

and in its strategical conception most nearly approached that which we were about to attempt. But that expedition had failed by a spell of bad weather, and whether the success that was so nearly attained would have been decisive, must remain a matter of speculation. But there were at least three instances in which it had been shown that, when a war is sufficiently maritime in character for the sea to become an essential factor, secondary theatres may be decisive. It was in the Peninsula we had made our chief contribution to the overthrow of Napoleon; in the Crimea the Russian war had been won, and by the conquest of Havana we had brought the Seven Years' war to its sudden and triumphant conclusion. In all three examples the result was due to the concentration of naval and military force where the enemy was weakest.

 

The difficulty of such combinations is that they necessarily require elaborate preparation, so as to secure perfect harmony of action between the two forces, and in recent times this drawback had tended to increase. For while the time required for such preparation had not sensibly diminished, railway transport had greatly accelerated the enemy's power of taking effective counter-measures. The drawback is specially strong where the expedition has to be prepared in the actual theatre of operation and cannot conceal its objective. So it was in the present case. Since the army had been sent out merely to make good what the navy had won, and to push on thence to ulterior operations, it was unfit to undertake a wholly different operation, and, as we have seen, it had to concentrate in Egypt for reorganisation. But it was not only for the army that this process was necessary; the fleet also had much to do. An essential feature of the naval operations was minesweeping, and, since the civilian-manned trawlers had proved unfit for the work under fire, the whole flotilla had to be reorganised and naval ratings distributed through it. Moreover beach-gear for a disembarkation in force had to be improvised, a landing flotilla had to be collected, and the transport anchorages thoroughly protected, work which could not be done in less time than the army would require for its own preparations.

 

It would, of course, have been possible to have made the attempt at once, trusting to surprise as the lesser risk, but the risk would have been very great, especially at a season when the weather was not yet settled. By the men on the spot a postponement was regarded as inevitable, nor was it without good precedent. In the analogous case of Lord Keith's and Sir Ralph Abercrombie's expedition against Alexandria in

 

March 22-28, 1915

 

1801, they had chosen to remain nearly six weeks in Marmarice Bay, in order to perfect their force before attempting to land at Aboukir. The decision to sacrifice surprise for the sake of training and organisation proved justified, but in that instance surprise was not so important, since it was quite impossible for the French in Egypt to receive material reinforcement. In the present operation, though the road from Berlin to Constantinople was not yet open, it was possible for the Germans to furnish the Turks with supplies, and, above all, with officers to direct the defences of Gallipoli and to expedite and organise a concentration of force to man them. Air reconnaissance confirmed that the damage done to the forts in the Narrows was slight, and proved that new works were being constructed, especially to cover the vital point of the Kephez minefields. No time was therefore to be lost in pushing on the reorganisation of the army; but it must be done thoroughly, for it was only too clear that if success were now to be attained every available unit would have to be thrown into the scale at the first onset. And this was no less true for the naval than for the military forces. When the time came, therefore, Admiral Peirse, at Port Said, was to transfer his flag to a small cruiser and send the Goliath, Euryalus and anything else he could spare to the Dardanelles, subject always to the situation in the canal permitting the withdrawal of his ships for the time required.

 

This was on March 28, by which time indications were not lacking that the Germans were forcing a demonstration against the canal to compel us to keep troops in Egypt. It is even possible that they regarded the return of the army from Mudros as a result of their effort, for it was just when the decision was taken to withdraw the base to Alexandria that enemy patrols began to reappear in the vicinity of the canal. On March 22 an Indian patrol from El Kubri came in contact with a party of Turks, numbering about 400, who were only dispersed when the havildar in charge had enticed them within range of the guns of his post. Measures had promptly to be taken to reconstitute the floating defence of the canal. It was no easy matter. Admiral Peirse had parted with all his torpedo-boats and most of his aircraft, and the French had ordered the Henri IV to the Dardanelles to replace the lost Bouvet. Small craft patrols, however, were got to work, the Philomel and Requin took up stations in the canal, the Bacchante steamed up from Suez to a supporting position, and next morning a composite force moved out to round up the intruders. They were found, and after the exchange of a few shots they made off, leaving behind them

 

April 1-12, 1915

THREAT TO EGYPT

 

a quantity of kit and ammunition, but owing to heavy sand the cavalry was unable to cut off their retreat.

 

For a few days there was little further activity on the part of the enemy, but by the end of the month there were signs of another serious movement against the canal. The Intelligence reports indicated troops moving in considerable numbers on both the central and northern lines of approach, and an advanced post was located at Katia. At El Arish there seemed to be 14,000 men, with 10,000 more on their way to join them from Ramleh. At El Sirr, twenty miles to the southward, were 12,000 men with fifty guns, and at Nekhl 4,000 with twenty guns, besides reinforcements that had come by the Hejaz Railway to Maan. A heavy fall of rain in Sinai facilitated an attack. By the 30th enemy patrols and scouts were close to the canal, and Arab reports timed the coming attack for April 3. To meet the menace the Montcalm and Philomel had taken their stations at Ismailia and the Bitter Lakes, and on April 1 the Royal Naval Division, which had arrived at Port Said on March 27 en route to the Dardanelles, sent four half battalions to take over the defences about Kantara. (See Plan p. 118. (below))

Plan - Suez Canal

(click plan for near original-sized image)

But with nearly the whole Mediterranean Expeditionary Force in Egypt it was no time for the enemy to deliver an attack. April 3 passed without any further sign of an offensive movement, and next day the Royal Naval Division detachment returned to Port Said. For some days cavalry patrols hovered near the canal, but the training of the Dardanelles force was not interrupted again, and Admiral Peirse reported that the Bacchante and Euryalus would leave for Tenedos on the 10th if there were no further developments. Nothing further occurred in the canal area, and on the 12th the re-embarkation began. On the same day orders were sent for the Goliath, which was on her way to Suez from East Africa to proceed direct to the Aegean.

 

In the meantime considerable preparatory progress had been made at the Dardanelles. The only new development was a sudden activity of the German aircraft. On March 28 one of their machines made a bombing attack on the Ark Royal, but it was unsuccessful, and the following day all the British aeroplanes were landed and established in the new aerodrome in Tenedos. It was now completed and defended by the anti-aircraft guns, and from this time the British air service was able to assert a full ascendancy over that of the enemy. During the week, while the minesweepers, covered by battleships, worked inside under fire, the aircraft made continual reconnaissances, combined with bombing attacks on the enemy's positions, apparently with good effects. On

 

March 28-April 9, 1915

 

April 9 Admiral de Robeck was able to report that he had eighteen aeroplanes, and, as the French had an equal number, he had all he required for the present; but as he had had to send away several of his seaplanes, at the urgent call of Admiral Peirse, for the defence of the canal, he would require others, at least when it came to operating in the Sea of Marmara. For spotting purposes, however, he had now the Kite Balloon section, which had that day arrived.

 

The plan of these further operations, which were to follow the forcing of the Straits, had now been worked out. They depended, it will be remembered, on the co-operation of a large Russian force, and a scheme for concerted action was in course of development. The future status of Constantinople had been settled to the satisfaction of the Tsar's Government, and they were ready to provide an army corps when the time came, and meanwhile to place their Black Sea squadron at Admiral de Robeck's disposal. On March 29 our Admiralty was informed that the Grand Duke Nicholas had ordered Admiral Ebergard to get in touch with the British Admiral and to be guided by his wishes.

 

They had, in fact, been in communication for some time through the Askold, which had been attached to the Allied squadron by the Russian Admiralty as linking ship, and Admiral de Robeck had been kept informed of his colleague's operations. On March 28, the day before the Russian Ambassador communicated the new arrangement. Admiral Eberhard had delivered an attack against the entrance of the Bosporus. Forts Elmas and Riva, to the eastward of the entrance, were shelled, fires were seen, and a large steamer, believed to be an armed transport, was driven ashore and burnt. Later in the dav, while one of his planes attacked a destroyer in the strait, he bombarded the group of forts at Cape Rumili, on the European side, and was rewarded by getting two heavy explosions. (Morskoi Sbornik, May 1915. The Turks state that the only damage was a few houses destroyed and a few persons wounded.)

 

The forts made no reply, as the range was too great, nor did any of the enemy's ships show themselves, although it was known that the Goeben was out of dockyard hands. On the following morning (the 29th) he closed the Bosporus to within seven miles, and at noon his aircraft reported the Turkish fleet, including the Goeben and Breslau, coming down the Straits; but though he maintained his position all day they did not venture out, and on the 30th he moved away and once more bombarded the quays and establishments at Zungaldak, Erekli and Koslu, along the Anatolian coast.

 

April 3-5, 1915

BLACK SEA OPERATIONS

 

It was after learning of these operations that Admiral de Robeck took the first step towards co-ordinating the work of the fleets by suggesting to Admiral Ebergard that his next attack on the Bosporus should synchronise with ours on the Dardanelles, advising at the same time that all important communications should be sent by way of London, to avoid the risk of wireless messages being intercepted. On April 6 he was informed of the Russian military arrangements so far as they had gone. Owing to the fatal limitation of the Russian fleet's coal capacity the blockade of the Bosporus could not be maintained, and Admiral Souchon decided to make use of his advantage by raiding coastal trade, which was now starting on the seasonal opening of navigation, and by striking a blow at the transports assembling off Odessa. In the early morning of April 3 Admiral Ebergard's squadron was getting underway, when heavy smoke clouds were sighted to the south-westward, and an aeroplane reported that the Goeben and Breslau were approaching the harbour. Almost simultaneously the Russian Admiral was informed that another force had been sighted off Odessa. This latter actually consisted of the cruisers Medjidieh and Hamidieh with some light forces attached to them, for Admiral Souchon appears to have decided on making his attack in two divisions, and intended the vessels under his immediate command as a covering force for the lighter squadron to the westward.

 

Hastening to sea Admiral Ebergard did his utmost to bring the Goeben to action, and although for a time it was hoped that she would give battle, she persistently declined. For five hours he pressed the chase, till, in spite of the enemy's efforts to keep away from him, he got within extreme range, a few rounds were exchanged, and then, presumably as the Russians had been drawn far enough away from the Odessa force, the Germans made off. The Russian destroyers followed, and at nightfall delivered a torpedo attack. They were detected and fired on; all the torpedoes missed, and before they could get into position for another attempt the moon rose. Nothing further was possible, but on his return journey the Russian Admiral learnt that the Medjidieh had sunk in the minefield off Odessa.

 

The two German cruisers escaped, but the failure of the attempt against the Odessa transports appears to have deepened the anxiety which the Russian threat was already causing in Constantinople. The impossibility of ignoring the menace of troops brought down to the sea, with transports gathering to them, has been recognised by all great commanders from Napoleon downwards. As a method of disturbing the

 

April 11-12, 1915

 

equilibrium of the enemy or diverting his attention it was frequently used by our most capable masters of war, but seldom perhaps had it been used with more grave and immediate effect than in this campaign. During March precautions had begun to be taken, in view of the menace materialising when our own troops began to move on Gallipoli, and from now onwards to the end of June the effect was practically to detain no less than three Turkish divisions on the Bosporus —one on the Asiatic side and two on the European. When it is considered that it also entailed the allocation of twenty-eight 6" guns brought from the Chatalja lines — that is, the advanced defences of the capital — for the protection of the Bosporus entrance, it is clear that it meant a vary serious diminution of force available to resist a combined attack on the Dardanelles.

 

On our side the recent occurrences in the Black Sea had the opposite effect. It was a week before Admiral de Robeck heard of them, and in his eyes, showing as they did that the Goeben was still active, they materially modified the prospect of Russian cooperation; for so long as the enemy had a battle cruiser free to move in the Black Sea it would mean high risk to pass an army corps across it. This difficulty was, in fact, pointed out by Admiral Ebergard on April 11, when he informed Admiral de Robeck of his recent operation, adding that he had found the Goeben could still steam 26 knots. The transportation of troops, he said, would therefore be a more complicated operation than had been anticipated. In reply Admiral de Robeck agreed he had better not embark the troops, but informed him that a naval demonstration off the Bosporus, to coincide with the coming attack on the Dardanelles, would be of great assistance.

 

The three weeks originally fixed for the reorganisation of the force had gone by and it was not nearly ready. When on April 10 General Ian Hamilton returned to Mudros from Alexandria the bulk of the Australian Division was there, but only the first transports of the XXIXth. It was still uncertain when the French would arrive — it would not be for ten days at least — and as their part in the plan was subordinate to the two main landings on which it was based, the General was minded to begin without them. The Admiral, whom he at once consulted, fully concurred in his plan of operation, but urged that, in addition to the main landings, a demonstration should be made at the Bulair lines. This was approved, and the Royal Naval Division was ordered to embark on the 12th and come on to Skyros, seventy miles south of Lemnos. Trebuki, its port, was also to be the point of assembly for the

 

April 13, 1915

THE RUSSIAN DIVERSION

 

French, since the political objections to using the well-placed and far more convenient island of Mityleni, as they at first intended, had proved insuperable. Admiral de Robeck also pressed for two days' practice in landings under naval supervision, and the enforced delay was thus utilised with excellent results. (See Plan p. 382. (below))

 

Plan - Eastern Mediterranean

(click plan for near original sized version)

Of Russian military assistance there was no longer any hope for months, for on April 13 it appears to have been decided that their transport to the Bosporus was out of the question till the Imperatritza Mariya, one of the new Dreadnoughts completing at Sevastopol, was ready for sea, and that was not likely to be before June. At the moment, it is true, there existed in some quarters a feeling that a way out of the difficulty might be found much sooner. There were indications that certain sections of opinion in Bulgaria were being turned by the display of Allied force away from the Central Powers. Should they decide to throw in their lot quickly with the Entente, friendly ports would be open to which the Russian troops might safely be transported.

 

Our ships which had been sent to Dedeagatch, to prevent contraband reaching Turkey that way, had met with so friendly a reception that it was even suggested that it might be well to give Bulgaria time to decide before commencing operations. But the eventual attitude of King Ferdinand was far too shifty a factor to reckon with, and the proposal was at once rejected. Still the idea that Bulgarian ports might be open when the crisis came was sufficiently in the air to make play with, and what the Admiral did, when he realised that the Russians would not be able to move their troops, was to request that they should be embarked in the transports to deter reinforcements being sent from Constantinople to the Dardanelles. Whether this suggestion was ever acted on is doubtful, but, as we have seen, it was unnecessary; their mere presence was a sufficient threat.

 

To prevent reinforcement of the Gallipoli peninsula was one of the Admiral's chief cares till the troops were ready. Continual reconnaissances of the shore in the upper part of the Gulf of Xeros were maintained; Bulair was shelled; the landing facilities at Enos were thoroughly examined by the picket boats of the Swiftsure and Majestic, and the troops that came down to oppose them were driven off by ship fire. But the Admiral's main idea was to use his submarines for the actual interruptions of the enemy's communications. Their instructions were to enter the straits singly, at intervals of twenty-four hours, two or three days before the operations began, and try to get up to Gallipoli to cut

 

March 25-April 14, 1915

 

the enemy's sea line of supply. Until the moment came the Turks were kept busy by picket boats with explosive sweeps making night attacks on the Kephez minefield. By day the troops on the peninsula were continually harassed by fire from the sea, and as the air service improved, the patrolling battleships had some success in hitting concealed gun positions. An explosion was also caused by the Lord Nelson in their main magazine at Taifar Keui, a village which lay abreast of Gallipoli on the road to Maidos, about a mile and a half inland from the north coast. Still little could be done to stop the night activity of the Turkish working parties that swarmed over the broken ground of the peninsula. Every morning fresh work could be seen. Amongst other additions a new battery was located in the Gulf of Xeros, and was engaged by the Majestic on the 14th. The next day the Triumph, with military officers on board, entered the Straits to carry out experimental firing on the trenches and wire entanglements which could now be seen line after line on the confused slopes culminating in Achi Baba, but the results were not satisfactory, and the fact had to be faced that our supply of ammunition was quite insufficient for producing any serious impression on the formidable obstacles which had been growing up under our eyes.

 

Ever since a few days after the attack on the Narrows, when General Liman von Sanders had accepted the command of the Dardanelles area, work on the defences had been pushed on with energy and skill. Every possible landing-place was entrenched, and battalions of Armenian and Greek Christians were kept at work making a network of roads to connect them to the main points of concentration. The chief difficulty of planning the defence was that the theatre of operations was so well adapted for bringing out all the advantages of amphibious attack. It was impossible to tell where the Allies would land, or even what their main line of operation would be, and it was on a thorough appreciation of these conditions that our plan was based. When, therefore, on March 25, General Liman von Sanders took over the Gallipoli command, he began at once to reorganise the whole system of defence, basing it on a few well-placed concentrations, whence, by improving the mule-tracks, the troops could be rapidly moved to any point on the coast. Two divisions, under Weber Pasha, were left on the Asiatic side, and were concentrated about Chiplak Keui, close to the site of Troy, which thus once more asserted its strategical importance.

 

April 1-16, 1915

TURKISH DISPOSITIONS

 

In the peninsula were four divisions, under Essad Pasha, the hero of Janina, with his headquarters at Gallipoli. Owing to the amount of reconnaissance work which the ships had been carrying out in the Gulf of Xeros, Bulair was a special source of anxiety, and it was hard by, at Gallipoli, that the General also established his headquarters. To meet the special dangers new fortifications had been built where the Kavak River flows into the head of the Gulf, and the position of some of the Bulair guns was altered to cover it. Cohesion between the northern and southern sections of the Gallipoli forces was obtained by arranging for water transport in the Straits, and similarly at Chanak and Nagara, on the Asiatic side, embarkation facilities were provided so that the troops could be passed rapidly across to the peninsula and vice versa.

(Major E. R. Prigge, Der Kampf um die Dardanetten, pp 28-30 and 34. According to information supplied subsequently by the Turks the detail of the distribution was as follows:

 

The force under General Liman von Sanders was the Fifth Army, consisting of the 3rd and 15th Army Corps, with the Vth Division and an independent Cavalry Brigade.

 

3rd Corps— (Essad Pasha)— (VIIth, IXth and XlXth Divisions) on the European side. Headquarters at Gallipoli, with the Vth Division in reserve near Yeni Keui and the Cavalry brigade near Keshan, on the north coast of the Gulf of Xeros. Approximate strength: 40,000 infantry and 100 guns.

 

15th Corps — (Weber Pasha)— (IIIrd and XIth Divisions) on the Asiatic side. The IIIrd Division had one regiment in the vicinity of Yeni Shehr, on the west coast, and two regiments at Chiplak, near Troy. The XIth Division was in reserve between Kalafatli Keui and Chiplak. Approximate strength: 20,000 infantry and 50 guns, of which two batteries of 4.7'' guns could be moved across to the peninsula.)

So far as was in the enemy's power, his preparations also took the more active form of attempts to interfere with our own concentration. During the week that followed General Hamilton's arrival at Mudros there had been a continual stream of transports coming up from Egypt. The last British troops had embarked by the 16th, and on that day the first group of the French were sailing from Alexandria. The British transports, which proceeded in small groups or singly, were unescorted, for the dangerous part of the route seemed sufficiently well covered. The only visible possibility of attack was from two or three torpedo-boats that had been reported by aircraft in the Gulf of Smyrna, which, ever since Admiral Peirse's departure, had been strictJy blockaded. (According to an official statement by the Turkish Admiralty there was no ship of war at Smyrna until the arrival of the Demir Hissar.)

 

 It was now being watched by two destroyers, Wear and Welland, with the Minerva in support. On the route itself at Port Trebuki, in Skyros, under the command of Captain Heathcoat Grant of the Canopus there was also a group of ships in

 

April 16, 1915

 

which were the Dartmouth, Doris, the destroyers Jed and Kennet, and a number of transports.

 

This was the position when, early on April 16, the Manitou, one of the last of the XXIXth Division transports, which had just passed Skyros, sighted a torpedo-boat ahead making for her. Thinking that she was a British boat that wanted to communicate, the transport stopped. She was, in fact, the adventurous little Demir Hissar, still under the same German officer who had torpedoed the seaplane carrier Anne Rickmers a month previously, when Admiral Peirse was arranging his truce with the Vali of Smyrna. Since that time she had lain in the port idle, waiting possibly for more torpedoes. After a month's delay she apparently received them, for on the night of April 15-16 she became active again and, by hugging the northern shore of the Gulf, managed to steal out past our blockading destroyers. She had then made straight for the transport route, and, on sighting the Manitou, came close up and ordered the ship to be abandoned in three minutes. There was no possibility of resistance, for, though the transport carried troops and guns, there was no ammunition available even for rifles, and at that time no instructions had been issued for unescorted transports defending themselves. (She carried the 147th Brigade, R.F.A., a transport unit and an infantry working party, in all 20 officers, 626 men and 616 horses.)

 

As she had only boats enough for a third of the men on board, the captain protested against the shortness of the time allowed, and the German commander extended it for ten minutes. Meanwhile the men, who were actually starting boat drill at the time, began lowering the boats without orders. There was consequently some confusion. Boats were overloaded, one so heavily that the davits broke and she capsized. Many men who could find no place took to the water, and in the midst of the confusion the enemy fired a torpedo. It missed, and the torpedo-boat held off after the unarmed despatch boat Osiris, which was just coming up with mails for Mudros. She, however, easily got away, and the enemy went back to the Manitou and fired another torpedo, which, like her other shots, also missed. She then made away at her utmost speed, and it was high time.

 

It happened that when the attack took place Captain Heathcoat Grant was holding a conference with General Paris and his staff of the Royal Naval Division on board the Headquarters transport, Franconia, at Port Trebuki. Orders could, therefore, be given promptly the moment the S.O.S. was heard. The Kennet was away at once, and the Jed

 

April 16, 1915

THE DEMIR HISSAR'S RAID

 

quickly after her, while the Dartmouth and Doris went to the assistance of the transport. Captain Warleigh of the Minerva, who was then coaling at Port Sigri, in the west of Mityleni, also ordered the Wear to the scene of action and made in the same direction himself. Hearing, however, that the chase had swerved for Cape Mastiko, the south end of Khios, he quickly altered to the southward and signalled to the Skyros destroyers that both he and the Wear were coming down the channel between Khios and the mainland.

 

Meanwhile the Kennet and Jed, having sighted the enemy's smoke, had been fast overhauling her. About 3.0 p.m. the chase had reached Cape Mastiko, with the Kennet now hard on her heels, so close indeed that a few minutes after she had rounded the point, to pass up the Khios Channel, the Kennet was able to open fire. The chase at this time was making to double the next point ahead, which forms the northern arm of Kalamuti Bay, but suddenly she swung to port, for ahead of her the Wear was rounding the point for which she was making. So she was fairly trapped, and, seeing no escape, she beached herself in the bay, a complete wreck. The crew, after attempting to blow her up, escaped ashore and were interned by the Greek commandant of the island. (As an example of German diplomatic methods it may be mentioned that the release of the crew was demanded of the Greek Government on the plea that the crew of our submarine E.13 had been released by Denmark, whereas the fact was that they were kept strictly interned.)

 

The attempt of the Demir Hissar was undoubtedly an act of extreme daring, and perhaps deserved a larger measure of success. As it was, owing to the hurry in lowering the Manitou's boats and so many of the men taking prematurely to the water, fifty-one lives were lost by drowning and exhaustion. The episode, however, did little to delay the completion of the concentration. With the assistance of the French Admiral, arrangements were rapidly made for escorting the rest of the transports, and the last of them left Egypt three days later.

 

Our own attempts on the Turkish communications were even more disappointing. Towards the middle of April the Admiralty became persuaded that quantities of oil intended for submarines were being accumulated at the little town of Budrum, which lies at the western entrance to the Gulf of Kos, in the south-eastern portion of the Aegean. Admiral de Robeck was too deeply engaged in perfecting his final plans for the landing to be burdened with further duties, and Admiral Peirse was directed to move up from Alexandria and

 

April 17, 1915

 

raid Budrum with a small force detached for the purpose from the Dardanelles. In order to ensure complete surprise and secrecy Admiral Peirse ordered the ships detailed to join his flag at sea, after which they were to proceed together for the objective. Further investigation showed that the reports were false, and that no expedition was necessary. On the 20th the plan was countermanded.

 

The submarine operations up the Straits began the day after the attack on the Manitou. The first trip was assigned to E.15, Lieutenant-Commander Theodore S. Brodie, and in her went Mr. Palmer, the former Vice-Consul at Chanak — now a Lieutenant, R.N.V.R., whose services Admiral Carden had found so invaluable in the early days that he had got him attached to his staff for intelligence duties. The general idea was for the submarine to be submerged off the Soghanli Dere at daybreak, and then proceed, keeping the centre of the channel, while a succession of aeroplanes watched the passage and created a diversion by dropping bombs. The attempt was made as arranged, but about 6 a.m. heavy firing was heard in the neighbourhood of the minefield, and soon afterwards the first of the aeroplanes returned, to report that the submarine was aground south of Kephez light, and only a few hundred yards from Fort Dardanos. Caught by a strong current, it would seem she had been swept into shoal water and was apparently uninjured.

 

A Turkish destroyer was endeavouring to haul her off, but this attempt the aeroplanes frustrated by bombing. Still it was only too certain that the enemy would continue their efforts to salve her, and it was of the utmost importance to prevent her falling into their hands intact. Whether the crew had managed to disable her was quite uncertain. In fact they had not. Before the Turks realised she was aground they had opened fire on her and killed the commander in the conning-tower. Another shell burst in the ammonia tank, and the fumes asphyxiated six of the crew. The rest took to the water and were rescued by the Turks. The dead were buried on the beach.

 

Though these facts were not known till long afterwards. Admiral de Robeck assumed she was still intact, and decided to destroy her — no easy task, seeing how close she lay under the guns of Fort Dardanos. One of our small submarines (B.6) was at once ordered in to try to torpedo her. She failed to get a hit owing to the heavy fire with which she was greeted. Nevertheless she got back safely. At nightfall two destroyers. Scorpion and Grampus, tried their hands. They were quickly

 

April 18, 1915

DESTRUCTION OF E.15

 

picked up by the beams of the searchlight and heavily fired upon, and so well were the lights handled to screen the wreck that, though the Scorpion got within 1,000 yards, she could not locate it. Next morning (the 18th) another small submarine, B.11, went in, but, owing to a fog, she was equally unable to find the wreck. In the afternoon the weather cleared, and another plan was tried. The Triumph and Majestic were ordered in to see what they could do with their guns. But so soon as they were inside they were received with such a shower of shell that it was impossible to get within 12,000 yards of their target, and as at that distance firing was mere waste of ammunition, they returned and asked for further orders.

 

They were not long in coming. In spite of successive failures, the Admiral was determined to persevere. There was still a chance. It was possible that picket-boats might steal in without attracting the attention of the sentries ashore. This was the plan he meant to try. It was hazardous in the extreme, for more guns had been placed in position to cover the enemy's salvage operations, and nothing could get near the spot without coming under their fire at close range, but it was worth trying.

 

To the Triumph and Majestic fell the honour of providing the two boats. They were fitted with dropping gear for 14" torpedoes, manned by volunteers, and placed under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Robinson of the Vengeance, the same officer who had displayed so much nerve and resource in his single-handed destruction of the guns at Achilles' Tomb on February 26. It was a pitch black night as they went in, and in silence, with all darkened, they stole up under the Gallipoli shore till they reached the point for their last dash. Nothing could be seen, and steering could only be done by the faint glimmers on the compass; yet all went well till, by sheer ill-luck, just as they reached the bend before the Narrows, two beams shot out of the darkness and lit up both boats.

 

In a moment the sea about them was in a boil with shrapnel and bursting shell, and in the glare of the searchlights the void before them was blacker than ever. It seemed hopeless now to find what they sought. Still Lieutenant-Commander Robinson led on, and he had his reward. By a miracle neither boat had yet been touched, when suddenly, by careless handling of searchlight, the edge of a beam caught the wreck. It was only for a moment, but time enough for Lieutenant Claud H. Godwin, who commanded the Majestic's boat, to fire his torpedo. What happened could not be seen. There was a loud explosion, a blinding flash inshore, and almost at the same moment a shell burst in the boat's sternsheets, and she

 

April 19, 1915

 

began to sink rapidly. But the Triumph's boat, having fired her shot, rushed up to the rescue, and, in spite of the hail of shell, was able to take off the last man just as the sinking boat went under. They had done their work, and their luck stood by them. Somehow the doubly-laden boat managed to get back without being hit, only one man had been lost, and in the morning the airmen were able to report that E.15 was nothing but a heap of scrap-iron. It was a gallant feat, finely executed, and one which it is pleasant to know extorted the highest admiration from the enemy.

 

An official of the American Embassy has recorded the impression it made upon German officers in Constantinople, and how one of them said, in discussing it, " I take off my hat to the British Navy.'' He also recorded that when Djevad Pasha heard that the dead from E.15 had been buried on the beach, he ordered them to be re-interred in the British cemetery and a service read over them. By the destruction of the lost submarine one source of anxiety was removed. With that the Admiral rested content, and no further attempt at this time was made to get submarines past the minefields.

 

Every energy was now devoted to the final preparations for opening the combined attack. It was centuries since the slumbers of the Aegean had been disturbed by anything comparable with that vast array. Not even the fleet of the Holy League, when it gathered to stem the tide of Turkish expansion at Lepanto, could have equalled it in numbers or in force. The spacious shelter of Mudros would not alone contain the host. Besides the warships and the crowd of auxiliaries which a modern fleet requires, there were some fifty transports of the XXIXth Division and the Anzac Corps. The Royal Naval Division and its attendant squadron had to lie at Trebuki. At Trebuki, too, was the first echelon of the French, but they were to move up to Mudros before the operations began. From these two starting-points the elaborate plan of attack had to be developed, and what that meant for Admiral Wemyss and his slender staff can only be conceived when it is remembered that six weeks before Mudros was just a slumbering Aegean port, disturbed by little except the sparse and drowsy local trade.

 

It was a plan no less complex than that of its nearest prototype, Walcheren, but by this time it had been worked out to its last ramification. The general idea, it will be remembered, was that the army was in the first instance to devote itself to assisting the fleet in forcing the Straits,

 

April 19, 1915

THE PENINSULA DEFENCES

 

and, with this object, to endeavour to take in reverse the European group of the Narrows forts and secure a vantage ground from which it could dominate those on the opposite shore. Its main objective, therefore, was the position which covered the European group of defences. The chief feature of this position was the Kilid Bahr plateau, which extended in a semicircle two-thirds of the way across the peninsula between Maidos and the Soghanli Dere. (See Plan No.4. (below))

Plan No. 4 The Dardanelles
(click plan for near original-sized image - 9.5Mb)

The plateau, being of great natural strength and well entrenched, presented a very formidable obstacle by itself, but, in fact, the position had been extended by elaborate works both to the north and south, so that the lines actually began well to the north of the Narrows where the Kakma Dagh ridge touches the Straits. The position thus not only included a sea base at Maidos, but also commanded the Kilia plain, one of the most important tactical features of the theatre of operations. Between the Straits north of the ridge and the sea at Gaba Tepe, the land contracts to a width of five miles. The neck so formed is occupied by the Kilia plain, and its importance was that it cut off from the main portion of the peninsula all we wished to occupy, while the Kilid Bahr position afforded an ideal front for holding it.

 

From their Maidos termination the lines of the principal Turkish defences followed the Kakma Dagh ridge to its western extremity, nearly half-way across the neck, and thence, crossing to Ayerli Tepe; they touched the north-western point of the Kilid Bahr plateau, and ran along its western edge towards the village of Maghram; but instead of turning here to the sea again, the lines had been prolonged over the Soghanli Dere, so as to include the Achi Baba group of heights, and finally came down to the Straits over the Tener Chift knoll, just east of Chomak Dere. In addition to this main system of defence, a secondary advanced one had been formed by connecting Achi Baba with the sea by a line of entrenchments passing westward through the village of Krithia.

 

A coup de main at Achi Baba was, therefore, no longer possible, but it had been hoped that nothing serious would be encountered between that hill and Sedd el Bahr, since by such maps as were available the whole end of the peninsula seemed exposed to a cross-fire from the sea. Further reconnaissances, however, had shown that this was not so. Owing to the cup-like formation of the area, the bulk of it was not open to direct ship fire. It was also found that during the absence of the Expeditionary Force in Egypt it had been strongly entrenched and wired, and the whole terrain was

 

April 19, 1915

 

a network of successive entanglements, with specially strong organisations to command the narrow landing-places at the toe of the peninsula, which previously had been undefended.

 

The situation was obviously a thorny one to tackle, nor was there any admissible way of getting round it. General d'Amade's idea was to avoid it altogether by landing on the Asiatic side at Adramyti, in the Gulf of Mityleni, and marching by way of Balikesier and Brusa to Skutari, but such a move would involve us in continental operations of unlimited extent, and would prevent any co-operation from the fleet. For these reasons operations on the Asiatic side had been ruled out by Lord Kitchener. Similar objections barred a direct advance on Constantinople on the European side from the head of the Gulf of Xeros beyond Bulair. As for the method of turning the whole system by the seizure of the Bulair neck itself, which at first sight had seemed the obvious way, we have seen already why it would not bear examination.

 

The nearest alternative was Suvla Bay, and this was the most tempting of all. A splendid, well-sheltered beach beyond the main system of coast defence and easy to debouch from, it seemed to offer all that was desired, but, after full consideration, it had to be rejected. It was at the widest part of the peninsula, and therefore furthest from the objective. It was also too far from the Gaba Tepe-Maidos neck, which would have to be held in order to secure our foothold in the tail of the peninsula. But the main objection to a landing at this point was that it would do little to further the first object of the enterprise, which was to assist the fleet in forcing the Narrows. It appears now to have been fully recognised that the key to effective co-operation between the ships and the troops was the capture of Achi Baba as an observation point, and Suvla Bay was too remote from this essential zone of operation to have any direct effect upon it.

 

Further down to the south of the Gaba Tepe-Maidos neck was another excellent beach. Here was the landing-place which had been selected by the Greek General Staff during the Balkan war, and there can be little doubt the selection was known to the enemy. The whole coast, from a place called '' Fishermen's Huts," north of Ari Burnu, as far as the cliffs that run north-east from Tekke Burnu, had been heavily wired and entrenched, and it was moreover so closely commanded by the Kilid Bahr guns and other specially placed batteries as to be practically impregnable.

 

The result, then, of the first reconnaissance was that a

 

April 19, 1915

PLAN OF ATTACK

 

landing should be made as near as possible to Achi Baba, and at a point whence we might turn the formidable entrenchments which ran across the extremity of the peninsula from the Old Castle above Sedd el Bahr and formed the outworks of the hill. Morto Bay, just within the Straits, was the obvious place, but it had the serious drawback that it could probably be reached by the heavier guns on the Asiatic side about Eren Keui and the Achilleum, and also by concealed howitzers behind Achi Baba. This being so, the troops landed there would require all the assistance it was possible to give them. Other landings were to be made on the two beaches at the toe of the peninsula between Sedd el Bahr and Tekke Burnu. Another possible plan was to effect a landing at a point some two miles north of Tekke Burnu, where a ravine ran down to the sea, and which was known to us as Gully Beach. Owing to the difficulties involved it was not, however, seriously considered. Nowhere else in this region was there anything better than a strip of foreshore, but it was hoped both to the north and south of Gully Beach small bodies of men might be able to get a footing and scramble up the cliffs, and so materially assist in turning the Turkish advanced line.

 

All this work, which constituted the main operations, was to be committed to the XXIXth Division and the Marine Brigade of the Royal Naval Division, under General Hunter-Weston. Subsequently, however, the scheme had to be modified. The Naval Staff pronounced Morto Bay to be so much encumbered with reefs as to be unfit for landing any considerable force. There was, in fact, no practicable landing-place except a small beach at its eastern arm under De Tott's old battery, and here there was room for no more than one battalion. This landing, then, as well as those at the foot of the cliffs on the other side, came to be regarded primarily as subordinate operations to protect the flanks of the main attack and distract the attention of the enemy. In accordance with this modification, the landings on the west coast had been reduced to two—one at X Beach, about a mile north of Tekke Burnu, and the other at Y Beach, a mile and a quarter north of Gully Beach where abreast of Krithia a scrub-covered gully broke the cliffs and made it possible for active infantry to crawl up—a place not unlike that by which Wolfe's men reached the Heights of Abraham. Subject to this alteration the general idea remained the same—that is, to throw ashore a force sufficient to rush the Krithia-Achi Baba position and develop from it the attack on Kilid Bahr.

 

The rest of the troops were to be employed in feints to distract the enemy and threaten his communications. The most important of these — in that it was hoped it might be converted into a real attack — was committed to the Anzac Corps, under General Birdwood. (The Australian Division (three Infantry brigades) and the New Zealand and Australian Division (two Infantry brigades).)

 

The point selected was a beach north of Gaba Tepe, at the northern end of the coastal entrenchments, where a tenable covering position had been marked out on the foothills of the Sari Bair ridge — extending from Fishermen's Huts to Gaba Tepe. If this position could be seized, there would be at least a possibility of developing from it a further penetration through Koja Dere as far as the height known as Mal Tepe, which completely commanded the road from Gallipoli to Maidos, but in any case it would serve to hold troops away from the toe of the peninsula.

 

Scarcely less important was the task committed to the French. A part of General d'Amade's force was to be thrown ashore at Kum Kale and to advance as far as it could towards Yeni Shehr, with a view to attracting and keeping down the fire of the Asiatic mobile batteries, while at the same time the French squadron with the rest of the troops made a demonstration of landing in Bashika Bay. The intelligence reports pointed to no considerable number of troops as likely to be met with, but for the success of the British landing in Morto Bay it was essential to prevent the enemy placing field guns in the Kum Kale section to harass the transports in the bay. Otherwise, the French landing was to be regarded as purely diversionary, and the operations were not to be extended beyond what was necessary to clear the area between the sea and the Mendere River from Kum Kale as far as Yeni Shehr. The British Staff considered that for this work a battalion and one battery of 75's would suffice, and General d'Amade was informed that a large force was to be deprecated, because as soon as a footing had been secured on the European side his men were to be re-embarked and landed at Cape Helles in readiness for the general advance. Finally, as Admiral de Robeck had suggested, the Royal Naval Division, acting as an independent force, was to make, with its attendant ships, a similar demonstration off Bulair, so as to prevent any relief coming from the Gallipoli-Bulair area. The whole elaborate scheme was to be completed, as we have seen, by Admiral Ebergard's demonstration off the Bosporus, and the promised concentration of a Russian army corps at Odessa, as a means of holding down the Turkish troops in the Adrianople and Constantinople areas.

 

In concert with Admiral de Robeck the general lines of the plan had been settled by April 13, three days after

 

April 19, 1915

THE PLAN COMPLETED

 

General Hamilton had rejoined him from Egypt. Its admitted defects were that it broke up the landing force into fragments, but owing to the restricted accommodation on the available beaches this was unavoidable if a force adequate for establishing itself was to be flung ashore at the first onset. The separation of the Anzac Corps from the XXIXth Division was the weakest point, but the defect was more apparent than real; for, as Wolfe had shown at Quebec, an army based upon a fleet can be freely divided without prejudice to its real cohesion. Given command of the sea, the ease and elasticity of the communications will keep the detachments almost as firmly knit for mutual support, and as free to retire as though they were all physically in touch one with the other.

 

At the same time, the multiplicity of the constituent parts rendered the detailed staff work exceptionally heavy. Every beach had to be provided with its separate organisation, each required its covering force and its main force, and each its supporting squadron and landing flotilla. But, complex as the work was, it was expected to be complete in ten days, and eventually, at a meeting of the principal officers held on April 19, Admiral Wemyss was able to announce that everything was ready, and the attack was fixed for the 23rd, if weather permitted. (The above account of the plan is from (1) General Hamilton's private letters to Lord Kitchener, (2) the omitted portion of his first despatch, (3) his evidence before the Commission.)

 

It was a week later than had been hoped, but, in fact, no time had been lost, for had all been ready earlier the abnormal condition of the weather must have kept the force idle. As a succession of calm days was essential the weather was all-important. It was also the most disturbing factor. It was still far from settled, and it was of the last importance that the enemy should not be allowed further time to perfect his defences or increase his force. So far as we had been able to ascertain up to this time the total force of the enemy in the peninsula was three first line divisions (Nizams) and one second line (Redifs), in all about 84,000, and the main concentrations were reported to be about Bulair, Kilid Bahr and between Achi Baba and the front of attack. (Force Order No. 1, Headquarters, Mediterranean Expeditionary Force, April 13.)

 

 A similar force was believed to be on the Asiatic side. Our own strength, with the French division and the 29th Indian Brigade in reserve in Egypt, was now all told rather over 75,000 officers and men, with 140 guns.

(Headquarters Diary, April 14, 2,250 officers, 58,459 men approximately. The consolidated Field Returns give the "Effective Strength" for April 26 as 2,840 officers and 72,646 men, which was 46 officers and about 4,000 men short of establishment. The French had one infantry division, consisting of the " Metropolitan " brigade (the 176th Regiment of the Line and a composite African regiment — two battalions of Zouaves and one of the Foreign Legion) and one " Colonial " brigade of two regiments each composed of one battalion of Colonial Infantry and two of Senegalese. With them were two groups of Field Artillery, i. e., six batteries of 75's (four guns each) and one Mountain group, i.e. three batteries of 66's (six guns each).)

April 19, 1915

 

But the main artillery strength lay, of course, in the ships. The losses of the fleet had been to a great extent made good by fresh arrivals (at the end of March the battleship Jaureguiberry had arrived to replace the Suffren as Admiral Guepratte's flagship, and also the coast defence ship Henri IV, while two armoured cruisers, Latouche-Treville, which had been serving in the Western Channel Patrol, came on with the troops), and although the Inflexible, Suffren and Gaulois were still out of action, it numbered, without auxiliaries and minesweeping craft, fifty-nine pennants — that is, eighteen battleships, twelve cruisers and about twenty-four British and five French destroyers. There were also eight British submarines, including the Australian AE.2 and four French. In order to enable it to carry out its functions in regard to the various operations, it had been organised in seven squadrons, as follows: —

Fleet Flagship: Queen Elizabeth

Vice-Admiral (Act) John M de Robeck

Commodore Roger J B Keyes, Chief of Staff

Captain G P W Hope

 

FIRST SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral Rosslyn E. Wemyss

Rear-Admiral Stuart Nicholson

Battleships

Swiftsure (2nd flag) – Captain C Maxwell-Lefroy

Albion – A W Heneage (Captain "S"), Acting Captain, Commander H L Watts-Jones

Lord Nelson - Captain J. W. L. McClintock

Implacable - Captain H. C. Lockyer.

Vengeance - Captain B. H. Smith.

Prince George - Captain A. V. Campbell (Attached to Rear-Admiral Guepratte's squadron for the landing operations of April 26.)

Goliath - Captain T. L. Shelford.

Cornwallis - Captain A. P. Davidson

 

Cruisers

Minerva - Captain P. H. Warleigh

Euryalus (flag) - Captain R. M. Burmester.

Talbot - Captain Fawcet Wray.

Dublin - Captain J. D. Kelly.

 

Six fleet mineweepers.

SECOND SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral Cecil F. Thursby

Battleships

Queen (flag) - Captain H. A. Adam.

London - Captain J. G. Armstrong.

Prince of Wales - Captain R. N. Baz.

Triumph – Captain M. S. FitzMaurice

Majestic - Captain H. F. G. Talbot

 

Bacchante, cruiser - Captain The Hon. A. D. E. H. Boyle.

Adamant, submarine depot ship - Commander F. A. Sommerville.

Ark Royal, seaplane carrier - Commander R. H. Clark-Hall.

Manica, balloon ship – Lieut. D. H. Metcalfe.

Eight destroyers, Captain C. P. R. Coode (Captain " D ").

Four trawlers.

 

THIRD SQUADRON

Captain Heathcoat S. Grant.

Battleship, Canopus, Captain Heathcoat S. Grant.

Cruisers, Dartmouth, Captain Judge d'Arcy.

 Doris, Captain F. Larken.

Two destroyers.

Two trawlers.

 

FOURTH SQUADRON

(Attached to First Squadron)

Cruisers Sapphire, Commander P. W. E. Hill

 Amethyst, Commander G. J. Todd.

Twelve trawlers.

 

FIFTH SQUADRON

(Captains H. A. S. Fyler and A. W. Heneage (Captain "S").

Battleship, Agamemnon, Captain H. A. S. Fyler.

Ten destroyers.

Three French minesweepers.

Two trawlers for net-laying.

 

SIXTH SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral P. F. A. H. Guepratte.

 

Battleships

Jauriguiberry (flag) - Captain A. R. Beaussant

Henri IV - Captain G. F. C. Varney.

Charlemagne - Captain J. A. E. Salaun. (Ship did not take part in operations of April 25.)

 

Cruisers

Latouche-Treville – Captain C H Dumesnil. (Ship did not take part in operations of April 25.)

Jeanne D'Arc – Captain M F A Grasset.

Askold (Russian) – Captain S Ivanov.

Savoie – Captain Tourette.

 

Seven destroyers.

Five torpedo boats.

 

SEVENTH SQUADRON

Captain C P Metcalfe

Four destroyers.

Triad, armed yacht, Commander A. L. Ashby.

(Smyrna blockade.)

The general idea of the organisation was to provide each zone of operations with a separate squadron, which in its turn was divided into " covering ships " and " Attendant ships.'' The function of the '' covering ships " was to prepare for the landing with their fire, and subsequently to cover it by searching the enemy's trenches and batteries inland. The function of the " attendant ships " was to carry the advance echelons of the covering troops, who were to seize the beaches and advance to a position in which they could cover the completion of the landing. These ships could also take part in the artillery preparation and support, but this duty was secondary to their special purpose.

(The terminology is a little confusing here owing to the difference between naval and military usage. " Covering troops " are those intended to seize a " covering " position ashore. "Covering ships," as the expression was used in the operation orders, were those which "covered the landing" with their guns, but they would more correctly be called "supporting ships." According to traditional phraseology these ships were not the "covering squadron," for the function of a covering squadron is to prevent the enemy interrupting from the sea. Admiral de Robeck's covering squadron was, strictly speaking, the seventh, which was watching Smyrna. The true covering squadron was the French fleet blockading the Adriatic.)

In delivering an attack from the sea against a position which some of the highest military skill in the world had had ample time to prepare for troops renowned for their stubbornness in defence, the first consideration had been how to reduce the time during which the troops would be exposed in boats during the final approach. General Hamilton had been in favour of a night operation, even though it would entail dispensing with the preliminary bombardment. The naval objections, however, had been found insuperable. The difficulty of transferring heavily equipped troops into the boats in the dark, the difficulty of finding the narrow beaches, which it was not permissible to mark beforehand, and finally the danger of

 

April 19, 1915

LANDING TACTICS

 

uncharted rocks, rendered a night landing, at least on the southern or main front, altogether too precarious. The gravest objection to an attack after dawn was that the transports could not lie within range of the enemy's heavy guns without danger of being sunk. The navy ships were less tender, and as an alternative the Admiral had offered to take the advance troops close in before transferring them to the landing flotilla as soon as possible after dawn. It was a method which would considerably reduce the exposure, and at the same time permit a preparatory bombardment. This plan was therefore adopted for the main landing. Landing ships were also to be employed for the subsidiary attempts on the west coast, but in these cases the pilotage difficulties were smaller, and, as being primarily intended as diversions they should logically precede the main attack, the disembarkations were timed to take place before dawn.

 

For one of the main beaches these precautions were not deemed sufficient. This was the beach between Sedd el Bahr and Cape Helles, known as " V," which promised to be the most difficult of all. The foreshore, which was wired down to and even under the sea, was like the stage of a well-en-trenched amphitheatre, and was commanded from one flank by the village and half-ruined works of Sedd el Bahr, and from the other by precipitous cliffs. (See Plan pp. 328-9 (below))

 

Plan - Gallipoli, the Southern Beaches

(click plan for near original sized version)

 

Such a death-trap was not to be dealt with by ordinary means, and a device almost mediaeval in character was hit upon to nullify its worst dangers. Here, as at all places, the advance party was to land in boats, but the bulk of the covering force was to be run ashore at the Sedd el Bahr end of the beach in a collier. For this purpose the River Clyde, a vessel capable of taking over 2,000 men, was told off, and the work of preparing her and arranging the whole scheme was entrusted to Commander Edward Unwin of the Hussar. His idea was to let her advance as far as possible till she took the ground, and to arrange for the immediate formation of a floating pier to connect her with the beach, the means of forming it being taken in with her. From a spar guyed out to port she was to tow a steam hopper, which, as soon as the River Clyde grounded, was to push on under her own steam till she was brought up by the beach, when she would shove out over her bows a specially constructed gangway to reach the shore. To complete the pier, the River Clyde would tow alongside four lighters, two on either bow, which the troops could enter from large ports cut in her sides, and two to fill the gap between her and the hopper. In order to cover the troops in the actual process of

 

April 19, 1915

 

landing, she had also machine-guns mounted on her forecastle behind steel plates, and to complete the work she carried in her all the material for constructing a permanent pier, indeed, every detail of the novel expedient was worked out by Commander Unwin with the utmost foresight and skill.

To the main landings at the toe of the peninsula the First Squadron was devoted, under Admiral Wemyss, in the Euryalus. His reward for the labour of organising the base and working out the complex details of the approach was that he was given the whole direction of the landing operations. To him were also attached the two light cruisers of the Fourth Squadron, which were told off to Y Beach.

 

The covering squadron, which was placed under the command of Admiral Nicholson, included, besides these two ships, six battleships, Swiftsure (flag). Lord Nelson, Albion, Vengeance, Prince George and Goliath, and the three cruisers of the First Squadron, Minerva, Talbot and Dublin.

 

The Second Squadron, under Admiral Thursby, was assigned to the Anzac landing at Gaba Tepe, with the Triumph, Majestic and Bacchante forming its covering division, and as this zone of operations was out of convenient reach of the aeroplanes, he was to have the seaplane carrier Ark Royal, and the balloon ship Manica, to direct the ship fire.

 

The small Third Squadron, under Captain Heathcoat Grant, in the Canopus, was to attend to the feint on Bulair.

 

Captain Fyler, in the Agamemnon, had charge of the Fifth Squadron, which, with its flotilla under Captain Heneage, was to look after the minesweeping and net-laying inside the Straits.

 

Admiral Guepratte's force, which formed the Sixth Squadron, was devoted to the landing and demonstration on the Asiatic side, while the Triad with four destroyers which formed the Seventh Squadron watched Smyrna to guard against torpedo attack from that direction.

Complex as this arrangement was with all its incidental details, the organisation was complete by April 19. By that time, in spite of the unfavourable conditions, nearly all the troops which were detailed as the covering forces for the various landings had been exercised in landing at least once, and all other preparations made so far as the not too adequate material allowed. The work had been onerous and exacting in the extreme. Though Admiral Wemyss's staff had been increased by both naval and civil officers, it was still inadequate, even if it had been a question of landing a homogeneous British force, but in this case to the strain of working harmoniously with an Allied army and fleet, there was added the labour of conducting the civil administration of Lemnos, which belonged to a neutral Power. The place became

 

April 20-23, 1915

WEATHER-BOUND

 

thronged with all the rascality of the Levant, upon whom the most watchful eye had to be kept. Order and sanitation had to be carried on and undesirables removed, and all without offending Greek susceptibilities. As Acting Governor and Senior Naval Officer, moreover, Admiral Wemyss had to adjust the inevitable questions of accommodation which arose between British and French officers ashore. The readiness of the French, both on sea and land, to fall in with his suggestions did much to smooth the difficulties, and the devotion of his small and overworked staff did the rest. As he afterwards wrote, it was only through the happy spirit of co-operation between the two services, and the determination of all ranks that nothing should be left undone to ensure success, that the endless obstacles and deficiencies were overcome.

 

But all the goodwill in the world could not control the weather. It was still so far from settled that some doubt was felt in fixing the attack for April 23. For the success of the landing a promise of at least four days' fine weather was essential, since, in order to have the lighters and the less mobile and seaworthy units in place to time, it was necessary to begin the approach two days ahead. Accordingly they were to start from the base on the 20th, but it could not be. During the afternoon of the 19th — a few hours after the decision had been taken — the glass began to fall again, and so threatening was the outlook that Admiral de Robeck had to postpone everything for twenty-four hours. Next day brought no improvement, and another postponement of twenty-four hours had to be signalled.

 

So, in spite of the desperate exertions that had been made to expedite the attack, the enemy was afforded another two days to complete his already too formidable dispositions to meet it. He had already had a month, and that had proved barely sufficient. If the enemy," wrote a German officer on the staff, " had only attacked a little earlier. Heaven knows how the matter would have ended. But by this time all companies were in well-entrenched positions at the various important military points along the coast, and behind them the reserves, who were to hold the assailant till the big divisions could come up."

 

 

---

 

 

 

CHAPTER XVII

 

THE DARDANELLES — LANDING OF THE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, APRIL 25

 

It was not till midday on April 23 — a full five weeks since the attack on the Narrows — that the weather began to give promise of the fine spell that was essential for the combined operation. Admiral de Robeck, therefore, gave the word for the preliminary movements to begin as arranged about sundown, and during the afternoon five aeroplanes were able to get away from Tenedos to bombard the enemy's base at Maidos. No dumps were exploded, but buildings were seen to collapse, and all five machines returned safely.

(Maidos was also the headquarters of the IXth Division, which was responsible for the defence of the tail of the peninsula from the Kilia plain to Helles. According to Turkish official information twenty soldiers were killed and some fires started. As a result two battalions of the 27th Regiment which were then in reserve for the Gaba Tepe (Anzac) area had to be moved out into the open on the Kilia plain, about five miles from Anzac Cove, or about one and a half miles nearer to it than they had been at Maidos.)

Seaplanes also went up and brought back further reports of the condition of the enemy's defences and gun positions.

 

The first movement was to get the twelve lighters for the two southern beaches away to the anchorage north of Tenedos. About sunset they started, towed by three transports, in which were the two advanced battalions of the covering force for W and V Beaches and the battalion which was to land in Morto Bay. They were followed by Admiral Wemyss, in the Euryalus, with the other two attendant ships, Implacable and Cornwallis; and to the same rendezvous the River Clyde proceeded, and the tugs, towing floating piers. During the following day the rest of the transports moved out in successive groups. The main rendezvous tor the XXIXth Division was off the mouth of the Straits, that for the Anzac attack off Cape Kephalo, in Imbros, and that for the Royal Naval Division west of Xeros Island, at the head of the gulf. The work of getting each section of the force into its station, without mutual interference in those confined waters, was probably more arduous than anything of the kind which the navy had undertaken. Numbers can give but a faint impression of what it meant. The British transports alone numbered over sixty, trawlers and sweeping craft over

 

April 24, 1915

DEPLOYMENT OF THE FORCE

 

thirty, besides tugs and other auxiliary craft. So that, as the ships of war and torpedo flotilla numbered well over ninety, the whole operation must have involved the movement of at least 200 vessels.

 

On the 24th General Ian Hamilton transferred his headquarters from the Arcadian to the Queen Elizabeth. The first group to move on that day was the Royal Naval Division and its attendant ships from Skyros. (See Plan p.382 (below)).

Plan - Eastern Mediterranean

(click plan for near original sized version)

They had the farthest to go, for, in order to keep clear of the Mudros groups, they were to proceed by an indirect course. At the first gleam of dawn therefore they left Trebuki harbour and made for their distant rendezvous by a course which took them outside Lemnos, Imbros and Samothraki.

 

The first group of the French, with the troops intended for Kum Kale, had already moved up to Mudros three days previously. There the movement began at 10.0, with the Sapphire and Amethyst and two transports carrying the King's Own Scottish Borderers and the Plymouth Marines, who were to rendezvous off Tekke Burnu for Y Beach. Then followed a group of munition ships making for a position twenty miles south of Mudros, whence after nightfall they were to proceed to the main rendezvous off the Straits. Shortly before 2 p.m., when they were well clear. Admiral Thursby took out his squadron, with the leading battalions of the Anzac covering force embarked in his three attendant ships and their supports in four transports. He was to make for a rendezvous five miles west of Gaba Tepe, leaving the rest of the Anzac Corps to assemble off Cape Kephalo, in Imbros.

 

At 3.30 six transports followed with the battalions of the XXIXth Division, which were to land when the covering force was ashore and were to make for the main rendezvous. The remaining transports of the XXIXth Division were not to leave till next day. The French, in order to clear the harbour, had anchored outside. They had had no practice in landing, and at the eleventh hour, at Admiral Guepratte's suggestion, the opportunity was seized for conducting a rehearsal. The result was to show how much both troops and ships, except the Askold, had to learn. There was, however, no time to repeat the exercise, and at 9 p.m. they sailed for their rendezvous at Tenedos, where the rest of the French were also proceeding.

 

At nightfall all the British sections had reached, or were nearing their rendezvous, but it was still doubtful whether another postponement would not be necessary. The glass had begun to fall again, and during the afternoon the wind had got up, with a choppy sea that was by no means favourable for towing the lighters. The moon, too, rose with a wet, windy halo, but the presage of bad weather soon passed. At sunset the wind had begun to die down, till shortly after midnight it fell away to nothing, with a perfectly smooth sea. So the last anxiety passed, and as the transports, with their attendant ships and destroyers, stole quietly to their positions, Admiral Wemyss, in profound silence and without a light showing, was transferring the three leading battalions of the main landing from their transports to the Euryalus, Implacable and Cornwallis. The evolution had been frequently practised, and in the now brilliant moonlight and perfect calm it was carried out quickly and without a hitch; and, well to time, the three ships were able to move away for their final positions off their respective beaches.

 

By 4.30 a. m. on the 25th Captain Grant with the Royal Naval Division was off Xeros Island and ready to make his demonstration. Anchoring his convoy there out of range from the shore, he ordered the Dartmouth and Doris to go in and bombard the Bulair lines, while under cover of their fire the trawlers attached to the squadron swept Bakla Bay as though a landing was intended north of the lines. There was no reply, nor could the Canopus when she too stood in see any trace of the enemy. Not even when the Kennet with military officers on board made a close reconnaissance of the whole of Xeros Bay were any troops seen. Only once did she draw the fire of a small gun, and the seaplane which went up from the Doris reported the lines apparently deserted. At the time, therefore, it seemed that the feint had little or no effect in relieving pressure at the real landing-places, but we now know that it did all that Admiral de Robeck hoped from it.

 

Its effect on General Liman von Sanders' dispositions was immediate. It will be recalled that four divisions of Essad Pasha's 3rd Corps to which was assigned the defence of the peninsula had been divided into two groups, one for the north or Bulair area, and one for the south below the Kilia plain. The corps headquarters were at Gallipoli, where the General had also established himself. In this area were the VIIth and the Vth Divisions, the VIIth being at Gallipoli itself, less one regiment, which was distributed for the defence of the coast from Ejelmer Bay to the head of the gulf, and the Vth held in reserve at Yeni Keui, a village north-west of Gallipoli, about three miles from the north coast and twelve miles west of the Bulair lines. The southern area beyond the Kilia plain

 

April 25, 1915

THE BULAIR DIVERSION

 

was occupied by the IXth Division, with its headquarters at Maidos. Here, too, had been two of its battalions until they had been bombed out on April 23 by our aircraft. Four other battalions were distributed along the coast from Suvla round to Morto May, with the remaining regiment in support at a central position on the Kilid Bahr plateau. Between the two areas was the XlXth Division, a newly-formed unit, incomplete in its artillery. It was held in reserve at Boghali, about four miles north of Maidos, with one battalion completing the coast cordon from Ejelmer Bay down to Suvla. From this disposition it would appear that the General regarded the Bulair area as the most likely, or at least the most dangerous point of attack, and possibly this view gave special weight to the demonstration.

 

At any rate we are told that as soon as the Royal Naval Division transports were signalled off the coast he moved up the VIIth Division from Gallipoli to a road centre to the north-east — that is, towards Bulair, and ordering Essad Pasha to go down to Maidos and take command of the Southern Force, he himself hurried to the threatened front, and for over twenty-four hours had his post of command on a height near the central fort of the Bulair lines. (Liman von Sanders, Funf Jahre Turkei, pp. 83 et seq., and Prigge, pp. 42 and 44. General Liman von Sanders became convinced on the 26th that Captain Grant's squadron was only demonstrating, and during that and the next day practically cleared the Bulair lines of troops, so as to reinforce the southern end of the peninsula. See also post, p. 348.)

 

The result of these arrangements was that at Gaba Tepe — some thirty miles south of Bulair — when the Anzacs were landing, there was nothing to oppose them except a single battalion of the IXth Division, that is, the division which was charged with the defence of the whole of the area of the real attack. (Prigge, pp. 43-4. The Turks state that it was the 2nd Battalion of the 27th Regiment, and that it had attached to it three batteries — one field artillery, one mountain and one of 6" short guns — besides some Nordenfeldts.)

 

At Gaba Tepe affairs were already well advanced. This landing, it will be recalled, was to be the first to develop, and the only one to be attempted before dawn. Its details had been left entirely to Admiral Thursby and General Birdwood, commanding the Anzac Corps, and they had taken special precautions to prevent things going wrong in the dark. The Triumph had been sent on overnight, with orders to anchor quietly on the exact rendezvous five miles west of Gaba Tepe, and to show a dim light if called for. There at midnight Admiral Thursby arrived with 1,500 men of the 3rd Australian Brigade, which formed the advanced guard of the covering force in his three attendant ships, Queen, London and Prince of Wales. The rest of the brigade, numbering about 2,500, had been transferred to six of his eight destroyers at the Imbros rendezvous two hours earlier, and joined him at 1.30 a.m. under Captain Coode (Captain D.).

 

The transports with the bulk of the corps were anchored to seaward till the covering force was ashore. As the laden destroyers joined the Admiral the advanced guard were being silently put on board the boats in which they were to land. As a surprise was aimed at, absolute quiet was essential, The beauty of the night, without breath or ripple, helped all to go smoothly, and yet it could not promise a complete surprise. For behind the squadron the moon was setting, and the silhouettes of the ships were clear for the watchers ashore to see. But by 3.0 a.m. it was dark, and word was given to carry on. Stealthily, at five knots, the attendant ships crept in over the motionless sea, each with her train of sixteen boats disposed abreast in four tows, and astern of them followed the destroyers with the second echelon.

 

The point settled for the landing was just north of Gaba Tape, where the general character of the coast was so rugged and difficult that in the General's opinion the Turks would hardly expect it to be chosen for a descent. Close to the cape, however, it looked less formidable. There was a fair piece of beach, and tracks could be seen leading towards the Sari Bair ridge, which was the first objective. Though the beach would be closely commanded by whatever troops might be found on Gaba Tepe itself, it was decided to risk a landing here, rather than involve the force in the almost impossible ground further north. The right wing, of which the flagship had charge, was to make for a point 800 yards north of the cape; the centre, in charge of the Prince of Wales, was to try 800 yards further north; and the London with the left, the same distance beyond it.

 

Each section had its covering ship, which, after leaving her boats with the attendant ships, moved to her assigned position — the Triumph 2,600 yards west of Gaba Tepe for the right, the Bacchante about a mile from the centre landing-place and the Majestic to the northward, a mile off Fishermen's Huts, to prevent the approach of reinforcements. For there she could command a point at which the road from Biyuk Anafarta ioined the coast road from the Huts to Suvla Bay and the hills immediately on the Anzac's left.

 

Shortly before 3.30, when the attendant ships were within two or three miles from the coast, they stopped, and

 

April 25, 1915

THE ANZAC LANDING

 

the picket boats crept on with their tows. It was a critical phase of the operation, and the wisdom of the naval decision not to attempt the main landings in the dark was soon apparent. To the military Staff officers, at least, it appeared that the ships had closed too much, and that the prearranged intervals had been lost. At any rate, as the boats moved on ahead of the ships there was some interference. Some of the tows even crossed each other, with the result that progress was slow, and the officers in the picket boats began to lose their direction. No landmark could be made out ashore, and without their knowing it the current was setting all the tows too much to the northward. Still feeling their way as best they could they stole on towards the land in dead silence. Not a word was allowed in the boats, and the profound stillness of the coming dawn was only broken by the beat of the picket boats' propellers.

 

Ashore there was no sign of life, and every breathless minute gave increasing hope that a complete surprise was in store. All was still quiet when, a few minutes after 4.0, the first glimmer of dawn began to detach the outline of the forbidding hills. In another ten minutes the tows found themselves within 100 yards or so of the beach, and in the waxing light word was quietly passed for the boats to cast off and row in. Still no sound broke the quiet of the serene dawn except the murmur of the muffled oars. Then in a moment all was changed. Progress in the stealthy approach had been too slow, and the light had made sufficiently for the watchers ashore to give the alarm. A single shot rang out, and before the leading boats had grounded they were under a heavy fire from rifle and machine-guns. But nothing daunted, as boat after boat touched the ground, the men sprang into the water waist deep and made for the beach, stumbling and falling on the smooth, water-worn stone which formed the bottom. Still without pause they staggered on, but only to find in front of them ground entirely different from what they had expected.

 

The point at which they had actually reached the shore was about a mile and a half north of the selected place, on a narrow strip of sand about 1,000 yards in length, between An Burnu and Fishermen's Huts, where the forbidding coast was at its worst. All they could make out in the dim light was that they were on a cramped ribbon of beach, from which, instead of the sloping ground and goat tracks they expected, sandy cliffs rose abruptly before them to a height of two or three hundred feet. To make matters worse, it was also apparent that during the blind approach units had become mixed. But even this was not allowed to check them. For two minutes only they lay down to fix bayonets and throw off their packs. Then at the first word of command, all unformed as they were, they sprang to their feet and with a wild cheer made for the precipitous bluffs. Heavy as was the fire while they scrambled up, nothing could stop that first fine rush, and in a few minutes they were on the top, with the enemy flying in front of them. For a raw force, assured till the last moment of an unopposed landing and confused by the mixing of battalions and a landing on unstudied ground, it was a notable feat that gave good augury of a great success.

 

The whole operation had been watched by the Admiral and General Hamilton in the Qwen Elizabeth, which had come up during the dark hours from her night anchorage off Avlaka point, in the south of Imbros, and so successful did the first attempt appear that they steamed off for Cape Helles. As yet, however, the Anzac's hold was precarious, but help was at hand. When Admiral Thursby heard the first burst of firing there was just light enough to see that the boats had reached the shore, and he at once ordered the destroyers with the second echelon of the covering force to push on through the squadron and land their troops. They had therefore been coming on close astern of the tows. As they approached the shore they came under a fairly hot fire of shrapnel, as well as rifles and machine-guns, but by 5.30 the whole of the covering force was ashore and the destroyers were starting back to fetch the main body from the transports, which were just beginning to close the shore.

 

It was clear, however, that the enemy was now fully on the alert, and had no mind to let the covering force be supported too easily. As soon as the transports drew within range of the Turkish field guns they met with so warm a reception that the Admiral had to order them to stop and lie outside the battleships. One of them, however, the Galeka, with the 7th Australian Battalion on board, had already pushed so far in that she did not obey the order, and finding no naval boats coming to her she landed her men piecemeal on her own initiative. Error or set purpose, it was a happy decision. Landing on the extreme left the troops, after a sharp struggle, were able to seize a trench which enfiladed the narrow beach from behind Fishermen's Huts, and so quench the worst of the fire that had galled the landing of the covering force. The rest of the transports had stopped as directed, but notwithstanding the delay this inevitably caused, 4,000 more men were ashore by 7.20, making 8,000

 

April 25, 1915

THE ANZAC LANDING

 

in all, and as no reorganisation was yet possible they were pushed up into the line as they landed, wherever was the greatest need.

 

In spite of the confusion which the original mistake had caused, it to some extent proved a blessing in disguise, for though by edging too far to the north they had hit on an ugly part of the coast, they had just missed the formidable system of trenches by which the selected beach was defended. But from that side the fire was very severe. Shrapnel from Gaba Tepe was specially deadly, and to subdue it the Admiral ordered the Bacchante to close in and try what she could do. Captain Boyle responded in the old naval spirit of close action. The fire seemed to be coming from a depression behind the bluff of the cape, and in order to get at the guns, he determined to steam right inshore till the depression was open to his broadside. With his lead going continually he moved slowly in dead on to the beach, and kept on till his stem actually touched the ground. Though the guns were still invisible, he could now locate their position, and with his broadside he so swept the place that the guns were effectively kept under, and, indeed, seem subsequently to have been removed altogether. It was a fine feat of seamanship and measurement of risk that was deservedly applauded.

 

With this assistance and what the covering ships could give, by 8.30 the troops had penetrated about a mile inland, and there they proceeded to entrench till the main body could land. It was none too soon. For at the first alarm the two Turkish reserve battalions which had been bombed out of Maidos had been ordered to march. Thanks to the shortness of the distance from the fresh position they had had to take up, they had already reached the central ridge and were creeping down to attack. Afloat too there was another delay, for just when the main body of the troops were beginning to take to the boats a sudden burst of fire fell amongst the transports, not only from heavy howitzers, but also from the Turgud Reis, which the airmen spotted above the Narrows off Maidos. (Turgud Reis, formerly Weissenburg, 9,000 tons, 6-11'' guns, completed 1893, purchased from Germany.)

 

As the transports were being straddled, there was nothing for it but to order them to retire out of range. The battleships also moved, but only to take up new billets a little further north and more directly off the landing-place. Here the transports closed in again, for the Triumph, firing over the land, had soon shifted the Turkish battleship up the Straits. She with the other covering ships had also checked the howitzer fire, and by 9.30 the disembarkation was once more in full swing.

 

So well indeed did it proceed that the three brigades of the Australian Division (12,000 men) and two batteries of Indian Mountain Artillery were ashore by 2.0 p.m. All this time Turkish reinforcements were creeping into the fight, and the Anzac covering force and its supports struggled desperately to maintain the position they had so brilliantly seized, while shrapnel never ceased to rain on the beach for all the ships could do. But through it all the crews of the destroyers and boats, exposed and helpless as they were, toiled on without flinching to enable their comrades ashore to win the undying fame they did. Theirs was the inglorious part, but no one better than the hard-pressed troops knew what it meant to them, and their recognition of it was unstinted. " I can never speak sufficiently highly of them," General Birdwood wrote, " from admirals down to able seamen. The whole Anzac Corps would do anything for the navy. . . . Our men were devoted to those ships and their crews, and will always remember the British Navy with admiration and devotion."

 

While this happy brotherhood was thus performing its famous feat, the other subsidiary landing, ten miles to the southward, had developed at Y Beach. About 2.30 a.m., at a rendezvous four miles west of the landing-place, two companies of the King's Own Scottish Borderers, which formed the advanced guard of the covering force, were transferred to the four trawlers which were attached to the squadron. The rest of it, consisting of the remainder of the battalion and one company of the South Wales Borderers, remained in the Sapphire and Amethyst, while the Plymouth Marine battalion stood fast in their transport.

(By Admiral Wemyss's order of April 17 the Marines were to land first, but by the order of the 21st the privilege was accorded to the King's Own Scottish Borderers, the reason being that the Marines were mainly recruits as yet too imperfectly trained to be used as a covering force.)

At 4.0, while it was still dark, the trawlers shoved off, and with the Sapphire and Amethyst on either flank began to make for the shore in line abreast, each towing six boats. At 2,000 yards from the beach the two light cruisers took up stations to support the flanks, while the Goliath got into position between 4,000 and 5,000 yards off the shore. At this landing a surprise was confidently expected, and though the dawn was fast breaking, no sign of life could be detected as the trawlers pushed in. Not a sound broke the stillness, till about 5.0, when they were close to the shore, the guns of

 

April 25, 1915

"Y" BEACH

 

all the ships disposed around the end of the peninsula suddenly proclaimed that the great attack had begun. Far inland and along the coast the burst of the first shells was telling the enemy what was at hand when the trawlers touched the ground. Their orders had been to push on till they felt the bottom. The troops were already in the boats; the oars were out in a moment and a dash began for the beach. Still not a sign of opposition. Undisturbed, the troops reached the shore in perfect order.

 

The ground on which they quickly formed was a mere strip of sand at the foot of a steep, crumbling cliff some 200 feet high and covered with scrub. A number of small gullies, however, made an ascent possible. Scouts were soon at the top, reporting no enemy in sight. It was clear the surprise was complete. Apparently the landing had been expected a mile and a half to the southward, the point originally intended. This was Gully Beach, where the Zighin Dere, or " Gully Ravine," as it was known to us, runs out to the sea nearly parallel to the coast. There elaborate defences had been constructed, but at Y there was nothing.

 

The Marines' transport was at once ordered in, the trawlers quickly returned to the cruisers for the rest of the covering force, and by 6.20 the whole of it was on the top of the cliff without a single casualty or trace of opposition. The trawlers by this time were well on their way to fetch the Marines, and by 7.15 they too had landed. As soon as the force was complete Colonel Matthews of the Marines, who was in command, signalled for the ships to cease fire on the lower part of Gully Ravine, since his intention was to advance along the ridge between it and the sea, in order to hold out a hand to the force landing at X Beach as soon as that force appeared to the southward. To facilitate the movement part of the troops were pushed forward across the upper part of the ravine to occupy a ridge about 1,000 yards inland which overlooked the road from Krithia to Sedd el Bahr. From this point scouts were thrown towards the south and as far as Krithia, but up till now nothing was seen either of enemy or friends.

 

At X, though there was no sign of an advance to join hands with the Y force, the landing had gone no less satisactorily. (See Plan pp. 328-9. (below))

 

Plan - Gallipoli, the Southern Beaches

(click plan for near original sized version)

 

Here, as the operation was part of the main disembarkation, the force was larger, comprising three battalions, one each from the Royal Fusiliers, the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers and the Border Regiment, with a working party of fifty men from the Anson battalion of the Royal Naval Division. The Royal Fusiliers, who were told off as the covering force, were brought up from the general rendezvous off the mouth of the Straits in the Implacable, and the rest, when the time came, were to come in from their transports in the fleet-sweepers attached to the squadron.

 

At four o'clock, simultaneously with the Y Beach force, the Implacable stood in with the leading companies in two tows and the other half of the battalion in two of the fleet-sweepers. Since there was here no chance of surprise, everything depended in the first instance on the Implacable's preparatory fire, and Captain Lockyer was ready to run all legitimate risk in making it as crushing as possible. It was soon evident that his utmost effort would be required, for as he stood in at five knots with the tows a heavy fire was opened on them from the cliffs on both sides of the beach. He therefore held on till close on the five-fathom line, and then anchored with only a shackle and a half out (18 ¾ fathoms), and there, with very little to spare under his keel, he brought his broadside to bear no more then 450 yards from the shore.

 

From this close range he developed over the tows as they advanced an intense fire from his four 12" and six of his 6" guns on the cliffs and beach, and with eight of his 18-pounders on a ridge to starboard whence rifle fire was reaching the ship. In this work, he was supported by the Dublin, who also came under rifle fire, and till the boats were nearly touching the ground they kept it up. But for this support the losses might have been very great, for the beach was no more than a ribbon of sand 200 yards long and not ten yards broad, with a low cliff rising from it. As it was, the fire at the decisive range to which Captain Lockyer had pushed in was so overwhelming that the troops were able to leap ashore and form up with nothing but distant rifle fire to annoy than, and the whole battalion was quickly landed without a single casualty. (The Implacable drew nearly 28 feet full draught and had 4-12", 12-6" and 16-12-pounders. While covering the landing she fired twenty rounds of 12", 368 of 6" and 308 of 12-pounders.)

 

As the troops landed Captain Lockyer lifted his fire to set up a barrage, and this he kept up till seven o'clock, when, on receiving a signal from the Euryalus, in which Admiral Wemyss' flag was flying, that his " overs " were falling close ahead of the men landing on the southern beaches, he ceased fire. Then, in accordance with his instructions, he moved out to his assigned bombarding position about 8,000 yards to seaward, and there he anchored while the fleet-sweepers took in the main force from the transports. At no point was the disembarkation carried out with so much precision and success as here. Admiral de Robeck, who had left Gaba

 

April 25, 1915

THE SOUTHERN BEACHES

 

Tepe as soon as the Anzac covering force was well ashore, to bring the General down to the southern beaches, was passing as the Implacable was taking up her new station, and could give him the good news. He pronounced it a model landing, not only for the work of the ship, but also for the way the troops profited by the combined drill they had had at Mudros. The army's appreciation of what the navy had contributed was no less high, and thenceforth the place became known as " Implacable Beach.'' And justly so, for the Turks have testified that nowhere was the ship fire so terrible and effective as there.

 

The operations on the southern beaches which had stopped the Implacable's fire had been of a very different character from the rest. It was here the main attack had evidently been expected, and the enemy's organisation for defence was most complete. The configuration of the land was ideal for opposing a landing. The toe of the peninsula was marked by three hills, 114, 138 and 141 (these heights are given in feet), corresponding to the three capes in which the peninsula terminates, Tekke Burnu, Helles and Sedd el Bahr. Between Tekke Burnu and Cape Helles the valley between the hills ran down through a break in the cliffs to a foreshore of deep powdery sand. This beach, which was known as " W," began close under Tekke Burnu, and with a breadth of fifteen to forty yards extended for about 350 yards to where the cliffs rose again precipitously at Cape Helles. Thus on each flank it was commanded by high and inaccessible ground, while along the centre the sandhills sloped gently upward, affording admirable ground for trenches with a perfect field of fire.

 

General Hamilton, indeed, described it as a mere death-trap. Its natural capabilities had been increased by every device of German skill. The whole length of the foreshore was deeply wired at the water edge, another line of wire was concealed under the sea, and, in addition to this, both land and sea mines had been laid. The high ground moreover was seamed with trenches, machine guns enfilading on the wire were cunningly hidden in holes in the cliffs, and the crest, if ever it could be reached, was commanded by redoubts on the hills in rear which must be captured before a lodgment could be made.

 

That on the slopes above Cape Helles, in the centre, was particularly formidable, for besides being protected by an entanglement twenty feet broad, it had a natural bare glacis, and was cut off from the next beach by wire extending to the shattered ruins of the Helles lighthouse.

 This beach, known as V, where the main effort was to be made, was even more formidable. About the same length as that at W, but narrower, it formed as it were the stage of an amphitheatre, bounded on the east by the bluff on which stood Sedd el Bahr village and on the west by the slopes of Hill 138, near which stood the half-demolished but still tenable works of Fort No. 1. From a height of 100 feet above the shore grassy terraces sloped down in a natural glacis to a low stretch of sand dunes about four feet high, which formed an escarpment at the inner edge of the curving beach. Here was the only dead ground where a force could form, and before it could be reached there was another maze of wire and mines to be passed.

 

To storm such positions from the sea was by all experience an almost impossible enterprise without a severe preparatory bombardment, and it was this consideration that had gone far to reconcile the General to abandoning his idea of a night attack in deference to the technical naval objections. Still the experiments which had been made of the effect of ship fire on wire had not been encouraging, and when the hour came the weather conditions gave little hope that previous results would be improved upon. The beauty of that Sunday morning brought with it a soft haze which veiled the shore, so that nothing could be seen distinctly. To make matters worse, when at dawn the signal was given to open fire the glare of the approaching sunrise directly behind the hills threw the shore into shadow, so that picking out a target or accurate spotting was impossible, but by 5.0 a.m. all the bombarding ships were hard at it.

 

A mile to seaward off W Beach was Admiral Nicholson, commanding the main covering squadron in the Swiftsure, while the Albion was nearly the same distance off V Beach. For the best part of an hour with all calibres they searched the hills, the valley between the hills dominating Tekke Burnu and Cape Helles and every point that commanded the beaches. But it was blind work. By 5.30, the hoar for which the landing was timed, the smother of smoke and mist ashore was so thick that the Albion had to cease fire, but as the tows were not yet approaching she began again. The troops were, in fact, behind time. At 4.0 the Euryalus had transferred to the boats her three companies of the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers, and a platoon (50 men) of the Anson battalion of the Royal Naval Division; the fourth, which completed the covering force for W Beach, was to come from the Implacable. The start was punctual enough, but owing to the unexpected strength of the current and the weakness of some of the towing steam-boats progress was slow. It was not till 5.50 that the Euryalus steamed in

 

April 25, 1915

HELLES (''W") BEACH

 

with her tows past the Swiftsure who then made her final effort, and kept it in full blast till the boats were close in. At 1,500 yards from the shore Admiral Wemyss stopped, and the Euryalus, taking station north of the Swiftsure, joined in the bombardment while the tows went on.

 

The effect of the ship fire was to hold the enemy in his dugouts and support trenches, and he was kept completely silent till the boats were so close to the beach that the bombardment had to cease. Then in a moment, as the steam-boats slipped the tows, the fire trenches were manned and a murderous fire of rifles, machine guns and pom-poms broke out from every point. Before the boats grounded numbers of men were killed and wounded, and in front of them they saw the maze of wire barely touched by the ship fire.

 

Nothing daunted they hurled themselves ashore. Beneath their feet buried torpedo-heads exploded, and the fire increased. Still they pushed on, and under the converging storm of bullets and shell began hacking at the wire. Many fell, more took their places, and still success seemed impossible. But relief was at hand. At the west end of the beach, right under Tekke Burnu, were rocks on which it was believed a landing was possible. The tows of the left company made for it, and thus avoiding the worst of the cross fire they were able, by consummate handling of the boats, to get ashore with little loss. Pushing forward at once they surprised the enemy in a position which enfiladed the beach, captured some well-concealed pom-poms, and so turned the worst of the defences. At the same time the ships closed, and thanks to their help and the flanking fire of the left company the remaining three companies, or what was left of them, broke through the wire and past the exploding mines and began rapidly to reform to storm the higher ground.

 

To the sister service, breathlessly waiting for the result, the feat appeared no less than miraculous. " From the forebridge of the Euryalus," wrote Admiral Wemyss, " it seemed as though the impossible had been performed, for before many minutes had passed it became apparent that the beach was gained. I cannot conceive that it has ever been the lot of anybody to witness a finer exhibition of heroism." (This beach was subsequently known as " Lancashire Landing.").

 

In the glory of those crowded minutes the sailors shared and suffered their full portion, sitting at their oars with no means of retaliation. Yet, defenceless as they were, their spirit was as high as their losses; not a single boat failed to return for its second load, though in some of them there were not more than two men to pull an oar. While encumbered with dead and wounded, they painfully made their way back, the survivors of the gallant Lancashire Fusiliers, covered by the naval guns, were already pushing up the slope. At 9.30 more troops were being put ashore in order to press the advantage gained by the successful landing at Implacable Beach; everthing was favourable to an early junction between the forces on either side of Tekke Burnu. But of their comrades from V Beach there was no sign.

 

There the daring had been no less, but success had proved beyond human endeavour. It had been fully realised that this would be the most hazardous landing of them all, and it was for this reason it was to be made in larger force than the rest and in a different manner. As at W Beach, the first echelon of the covering force — three companies of the Dublin Fusiliers with fifty men of the Anson battalion — was to be taken in from the fleet-sweepers in six tows, each tow consisting of three or four service boats, manned by a midshipman and six seamen, but simultaneously the rest of it was to be run ashore in the River Clyde, close under Sedd el Bahr. In her were the rest of the Dublins, the Munster Fusiliers and half of the 2nd Hampshires, with the West Riding Field Company, Royal Engineers, and a further fifty men of the Anson Battalion. It was hoped that by the means which Commander Edward Unwin had devised for expediting the landing, all these troops, numbering about 2,000, could be very quickly thrown ashore without undue exposure.

 

The operation had been timed for 6.0 a.m., at which hour the River Clyde was to be off the Albion and go straight in. But here also the boats had been delayed. Commander Unwin, who was in charge of the River Clyde, signalled to know if he should go in. He was told to do so as soon as the tows got up in line and to run ashore as they landed. It was over half an hour before they arrived and the final push in could begin. In deference to the wish of the Brigadier on board, the River Clyde still held back a little for the boats to land first, according to plan, but by 6.44 the tows were so close in that the Albion had to cease fire on the beach and lift to the hills above. As she did so the boats cast off and the starboard tow, carrying a half-company of the Dublin Fusiliers, made for the camber at Sedd el Bahr, where a landing was also to be effected. As yet the beach was silent, and the tows held on, the next two for the shore between Sedd el Bahr and the River Clyde and the other three to the west of her. For about five minutes they were undisturbed. Then, as the steamboats cast off the boats, and the oars were got out.

 

April 25, 1915

SEDD EL BAHR ("V") BEACH

 

the same murderous fire broke out as at W. And here, owing to the configuration of the ground and the impossibility of turning the flank, it was far worse. In a few minutes nearly every man was killed or wounded and the boats were seen drifting about helplessly, some broadside on with men taking cover behind them. In several not a man was untouched, in one of them only two hands were left alive, and another entirely disappeared. The attack was simply wiped out, and it was no more than a few stragglers that were able to struggle through the unbroken wire to the shelter of the low escarpment of the sandhills.

 

Nothing could now save the situation but the success of the experiment with the River Clyde. She was coming in, with her hopper and big lighters in tow alongside, under a hail of shell from the Asiatic batteries. But heavy as it was, added to the local fire, it did nothing to unnerve the hand of her commander. With precise accuracy he ran his ship ashore in exact position at the eastern end of the beach and all seemed well. Had the shore been what was believed, there would have been no hitch. But unhappily it proved to shelve so much more gently than had been expected that the hopper took the ground before she was high enough for her flying gangway to reach the shore. The foremost lighter, moreover, instead of being carried on by its own way to make the connection, swung away to port in the wind. Thus a gap was made, and as nearly all the men in the lighter and the hopper were quickly shot down, the accident could not be immediately rectified.

 

So the well-considered plan had failed, but failure was a thing that neither service was ready to admit. Commander Unwin promptly left the River Clyde and, standing up to his waist in water in the galling fire, directed operations for putting things right.

(The names specially mentioned by Admiral Wemyss for the "extraordinarily gallant conduct" were, besides Commander Unwin, Lieutenant John A. V. Morse (Cornwallis), Midshipmen G. L. Drewry, R.N.R. (Hussar), and W. St. A. Malleson, R.N. (Cornwallis), Petty Officer J. H. Russell and Rummings (R.N.A.S.) and Able Seamen W. C. Williams, R.F.R., and G. McK. Samson, R.N.R. (both of Hussar). Commander Unwin, both the midshipmen and Samson were awarded the Victoria Cross, and Lieutenant Morse the D.S.O.)

In about five minutes, ''thanks," as the Brigade Diary records, " to the extraordinary gallantry displayed by the naval party, the barges were got into some sort of position." One was close on the starboard bow, and Captain E. L. H. Henderson of the Munsters at once led his company out into it through the deadly fire. Many were shot down on the gangways and lighters as they ran from one to the other; those that reached the hopper began leaping into the water, but not more than a platoon reached the beach. Nothing dismayed, Captain G. W. Geddes immediately followed with his company. He, too, readied the hopper, but only to find that a flaw of wind off the shore had drifted it out into deep water. Even that did not stop them. He himself gave a lead by jumping overboard, and though he succeeded in reaching the shore, those that followed him were nearly all drowned by the weight of their ammunition and equipment. Such an effort was far too costly to continue, and the remnant could do nothing but stay where they were.

 

Yet there was no word of defeat. Commander Unwin and his party were still at work. For an hour, in spite of all the enemy's fire could do, they toiled on. He seemed to bear a charmed life, but even so, he and his gallant band could not have survived for five minutes but for the well-served machine-guns in the bows of the River Clyde. It had been Commander Unwin's idea to take in with the troops a ready-made fort, and it now well served his turn. The detachment of the armed motor-car contingent of the Royal Naval Division who manned the machine guns on board could at least make sure of their target, as, so hot and accurate was their fire that the Turks kept quiet in the trenches, and their fire was almost confined to snipers. In this way the machine-gunners were able not only to keep the naval men going in the water, but also to prevent a complete massacre of the troops who were sheltering in the lighters.

 

The result was that by 8.0 the floating bridge was connected up again. Then, covered by the River Clyde's machine-guns, Major C. H. B. Jarrett led out another company of the Munsters to complete what their comrades had begun. Their heroism and their fate were the same. The spit of sand and half-submerged ledge of rock over which they had to pass were at once the focus of a tornado of fire. Few passed alive, and when Major Jarrett saw how behind him the gangways and lighters were choked with dead and wounded he passed the word that no more should leave the ship. There at least they were safe from rifle and machine-gun fire, and there they waited while the few survivors ashore sought what shelter they could find at the foot of the cliffs by digging themselves into the sandy escarpment. Until the ships could do something more to subdue the enemy's fire it was madness to proceed in daylight.

 

At present there was only the Albion, and she could do little; for about half an hour earlier a signal had come from

 

April 25, 1915

MORTO BAY

 

the Lord Nelson inside the Straits to say that our men were in Sedd el Bahr village, and she had to cease firing on it and devote her attention to the centre hill, against which the Lancashire Fusiliers were preparing to advance from W Beach. Half a company of the Dublin Fusiliers from the starboard tow had, in fact, landed at the Camber. It was dead ground, and their landing had been unopposed, but when they attempted to advance up the steep and narrow approach which led to the village they were met with a blast of rifle and machine-gun fire that was quite impassable. Again and again, with the greatest gallantry, they strove to close the loopholed ruins of the fort, and so far did they push on that from the sea it looked as if they had actually reached the village. But it was, in fact, beyond human effort, and at last — reduced to a bare skeleton of the party that had come ashore — they had to be re-embarked, and leave the well-organised Turkish position to do its worst against V Beach.

 

Another ship, the Cornwallis, had been told off to support the River Clyde landing, but for the moment she had other work to do and was long in arriving. Her first task was to act as landing ship for Morto Bay. Although it had been found necessary, owing to the confined nature of the approaches, to reduce the force below what was originally intended, this landing had a special importance. The idea of using it in combination with that at V Beach to envelop the enemy's advanced force had naturally become less hopeful since its strength was reduced, but as a security for the right flank of the main attack it was still a vital link in the chain.

 

Since Morto Bay had been rejected as too badly exposed to be used for the main landing, the venture had all the character of a forlorn hope. Three companies of the 2nd South Wales Borderers had been detailed for the attempt. It was one of the best battalions in the division, but there had been no opportunity for exercising the men in boat work. Success depended on ship fire, and the night before the attack Captain Davidson of the Cornwallis had received a signal from Admiral Wemyss that after taking in the troops he was not to come out to his bombarding station immediately, but to stay and support them till they were landed. This he took as a further expression of the anxiety that was felt about this landing, owing to its exposure to shell fire from the Asiatic batteries.

 

Two covering battleships had already been told off to it, the Lord Nelson at Morto Bay and the Vengeance a mile or so above it, off the Kereves Dere. The Prince George was also in the entrance, with orders to attend to the Asiatic batteries, and the Agamemnon was well inside, covering Captain Heneage's minesweeping and net-laying flotilla. Besides these five ships there were also three of the French squadron supporting their own landing. The cover provided by the original plan was therefore very strong, and for this reason Captain Davidson interpreted the new order in a sense beyond what appears to have been intended. His view of its meaning was emphasised by a further difficulty about the particular landing. It was that no destroyers and no steamboats or naval boats of any kind were available for the operation. Four trawlers, each towing six boats, were to take them in, and as it was impossible for fully equipped soldiers to row them against the current the trawlers were to carry on till they ran ashore.

 

Even so the distance the untrained troops would have to cover by their own efforts might be considerable, and two seamen for each boat were all that could be spared. The first company was to land just inside Eski Hissarlik Point, the precipitous headland which marks the eastern end of the bay, and to endeavour to seize the old De Tott's battery which crowns it. Further in the bay a well-wooded slope falls gently from a lower ridge to a good beach. It was known to be entrenched, but here the other two companies were to disembark and rush the defences. Thus, while the right flank of the troops would be well protected by the sea, their left would be in the air. Captain Davidson therefore arranged with Colonel H. G. Casson, who commanded the South Wales Borderers, that besides providing a coxswain and bowman for each boat he would send in his marines in his own boats to form a flanking party, and twenty-five seaman as a beach party to help drag in the transports' boats and disembark the ammunition quickly.

 

During the night at a rendezvous outside the Straits the troops had been transferred from the Cornwallis to the trawlers, and about daybreak, when well inside, they were quietly moved from the trawlers to the boats, and as the trawlers laboured on against the strong current for the two or three miles that remained to do, the Cornwallis kept station to conceal them from the European side, and fired on the beach and adjacent hills as she proceeded. As soon, however, as the light made, the Asiatic batteries detected then, and were soon showering shrapnel, but though some boats were hit, there were no casualties before the trawlers went forward to enter the bay. Captain Heneage, who had been proceeding ahead of than with his ten destroyers and five minesweepers, covered by the Agamemnon, had already swept the bay, and at the last moment, at Admiral Wemyss's

 

April 25, 1915

MORTO BAY LANDING

 

orders, had detached two of his destroyers, Basilisk and Grasshopper, to support the landing. The special covering ships. Lord Nelson and Vengeance, had taken up their station at 5.0 a.m., and ever since had been assiduously searching their assigned fire areas, and especially the hill, above De Tott's battery. Owing to the number of our own ships and those of the French entering at the same time and to the strength of the current it was not till 7.30 that the trawlers with their tows passed the Lord Nelson, and as they went in both she and the Cornwallis, as well as the two destroyers, swept the whole shore with their guns.

 

In a few minutes the trawlers had taken the ground 400 yards from the shore. They were still under distant howitzer fire, but here again, either owing to the ship fire or a general order, not a shot came from the shore, nor could any enemy be seen as the boats, in excellent order, rowed in. As an eye-witness says, it was as though they were landing on a desert island. But as the first company on the right took to the water up to their waists a heavy rifle fire opened on them. Still, without a moment's hesitation, while the other two companies were wading in, they formed and made for the cliff. By 7.50 nearly all were ashore.

 

The other two companies quickly rushed with the bayonet a trench they found right in front of them, and by the time the Cornwallis's landing party reached the shore the first company were half-way up to De Tott's. With the naval party was Captain Davidson himself. In order to better to carry out his orders to support the landing he had decided to anchor his ship and come ashore with his men. With him was Colonel Casson, the intention being to land at the same time as the troops, but through having to keep clear of the Agamemnon they were late in reaching the beach.

 

Once ashore they were quickly at work. While the bluejackets ran to draw in the boats and help the troops clear them, the marines were in time to assist in taking the second trench. When the blue-jackets' work was done they, too, begged leave to join the fighting line, and being unencumbered with equipment were in time to take a hand with the third trench. Everything indeed had gone with such speed that by 8.30 De Tott's battery and the ridge above the slope were won, and the position secured with comparatively little loss. The unexpected facility with which the forlorn hope accomplished its task was undoubtedly due to ship fire. A special field battery had been placed north-east of the bay to command it, another was sent down from Krithia, where the 25th Regiment was in reserve, but the Turks say that owing to the severity of the naval bombardment neither was able to fire, while a howitzer battery north of Morto could only get in a shot occasionally. As for the infantry defending the place, of whom prisoners state there was a whole battalion, their first experience of heavy shell from the sea had a demoralising effect for the time being.

 

That the fire from the Asiatic side had also proved less troublesome than had been anticipated was, no doubt, owing to the Prince George and the French ships keeping the guns busy on that side. Though the French covering force did not begin to disembark till nearly ten o'clock, the ships had opened their bombardment about a quarter to six, more than an hour before our troops began to land in Morto Bay. Admiral Guepratte, in the Jaureguiberry, was well inside, some 3,000 yards east-north-east of Kum Kale, and the Henri IV north of it, both concentrating on the fort, barracks and village. Outside was the Askold, keeping up her reputation for smartness and exciting every one's admiration in the neatness and accuracy of her salvoes. With her was the Jeanne d'Arc, distributing her fire between Kum Kale, Yeni Shehr and Orkanie, but shortly before 8.0, when our troops were all ashore, she was ordered off at high speed to join the demonstration in Bashika Bay, where the French auxiliary cruiser Lorraine, with five transports and a destroyer, had been left to operate. The effect of this feint was scarcely less successful than that of the Royal Naval Division in the Gulf of Xeros, for Weber Pasha was forced to move there and deploy one of the two divisions which he had concentrated near Troy. (The Turkish official statement is that this day there was only one company.)

 

The French Staff, who had detailed a complete regiment for the Kum Kale landing, intended to put than ashore at the pier, where our own marines had previously met with so hot a reception. On this experience the Royal Marine officer attached to General d'Amade persuaded him to substitute the beach just outside, where, under shelter of the ruined fort, was fairly dead ground. At 6.20 the Admiral made the signal to land, but, as was only to be expected from the previous day's trial, there were serious delays in carrying it out. It had been bad enough when rehearsing in the still waters of Skyros, but at the entrance of the Straits the old-type steamboats of the French ships were unequal to the strong current, and torpedo boats had to be called up to take their place. Owing to this difficulty and others arising

 

April 25, 1915

THE FRENCH LANDING

 

from want of practice it was nearly three hours before the Askold's steamboat got the first tow clear of the foremost transport. At 10.0 the boats were cast off, but too near the pier, and they came under fire from guns on In Tepe and also from machine-guns which had been concealed in a windmill at the mouth of the Mendere River. One boat was sunk and the other six were swept back by the current. The obnoxious redoubt which had done the damage was, however, quickly silenced by the ships and the mill blown to pieces, and the other tows, making more directly for the selected beach, covered by the destroyers, were able to land their men almost unopposed. (Vedel, Nos Marins a la Guerre, p. 135. Prigge says there was only one company in Kum Kale, and that it had lost heavily under the shrapnel fire of the ships, pp. 36-7.)

 

The covering force which thus got ashore was the 6th Colonial Regiment, and by 10.30 it could be seen that their leading company of Senegalese was right through the village. So without difficulty the regiment was able to establish itself in the fort and village and along the shore to the south of it, and there they waited for the other battalions before making a push for the cemetery and Yeni Shehr, where a battalion of Weber Pasha's other division (the IIIrd) was now deploying, while its reserves were being hurried up from Chiplak Keui, six miles away.

 

By this time also the covering forces of the Allied army had everywhere got a firm hold on the first positions they were intended to seize — everywhere, that is, except at the fatal Sedd el Bahr (V) Beach. But there another attempt was about to be made. At 8.15, just as the second effort failed. Admiral de Robeck and General Hamilton had come up near the Albion in the Queen Elizabeth, and having ascertained that the report of troops being in Sedd el Bahr was false, ordered the flagship to open fire on the village with her 15" guns. The Albion, who had just heard of the failure of the fighter bridge, seized the opportunity to ask leave to send in two of her boats to make good the gap. It was granted, and shortly before 10.0 her launch and pinnace, with casks lashed under the thwarts and manned by volunteer crews, were towed in, but so heavy was the fire they met that work was almost impossible.

 

Still the new attempt was not abandoned. General Napier, commanding the 88th Brigade, had just managed to get on board the River Clyde. Finding that by some means or other the gap had been closed, he called on the two companies of the Hampshire Regiment to see what they could do. With the utmost alacrity they responded, but all in vain. The connecting hawsers had been shot away, and before fifteen men had readied the end lighter it drifted again into deep water, and every one had to lie down where he was. The Brigadier, apparently not seeing the cause of the check, went out himself to lead them on, followed by his Brigade Major. But when they saw what was the matter they could only do like the rest, and there as they lay in the lighter both were killed by snipers.

 

Unless the Turkish positions could be destroyed by further bombardment it was clearly useless to persevere. But although at 8.0 the Lord Nelson had signalled from Morto Bay that the South Wales Borderers were already on the top of Eski Hissarlik, above De Tott's battery, the Cornwallis had not come away. At 8.45 she herself reported them in possession of the hill and ridge from the bay to the Straits, and the Queen Elizabeth signalled for her to take her new station. Still Captain Davidson was too busy getting off the wounded, to obey at once. Again and again the signal was repeated with increasing emphasis, but it was not till 10.0, when the Asiatic guns had ceased to be troublesome and the troops seemed firmly established, that he began to withdraw his landing party. By the time his ship was in position off Sedd el Bahr it had been decided to abandon any further attempt to land from the River Clyde till nightfall, and the remainder of the troops allotted to this point, consisting mainly of the Worcestershire Regiment had been diverted to W Beach.

 

There, too, after the ridge had been seized in the first rush the advance had been held up. The Lancashire Fusiliers had pushed far enough on the right, however, to establish a signal station in the ruins of the Helles lighthouse, and could now communicate more easily with the ships. About eight o'clock it looked as if the ship fire on the centre hill (138) had done its work. The redoubt seemed evacuated, but when the Fusiliers tried to advance they found it still too well occupied to enable than to pass the unbroken wire which covered its glacis. (The Turks state that the troops fighting in this area— Tekke Burnu to Sedd el Bahr — were four companies of infantry and one of engineers.)

 

On the left the movement which had begun against the hill above Tekke Burnu (114) was also held up. The attempt which the first two companies of the Royal Fusiliers had been making to take it in reverse from Implacable Beach had been checked, but, reinforced by a third company, they pushed on again, and by 11.0 had a good hold on the hill and

 

April 25, 1915

DEVELOPMENTS AT "X" AND "Y"

 

over forty prisoners. Meanwhile, however, their left, which, had advanced too far forward, were being thrust back to the edge of the cliff with heavy loss, and for a time the position was precarious. From Y Beach came no help, for though, as we have seen, the King's Own Scottish borderers and Marines had been reaching out from their advanced position since 10.0, they had not been able to get touch, and finding themselves in the air and without support, they had just decided to retire back across the gully and establish themselves behind it closer to the landing-place.

 

Here, then, began the second hitch in the combined plan. It was the more regrettable since the landing itself had been so complete a success, and since the failure at Sedd el Bahr Beach it had gained increased value as a turning movement. So much importance indeed did General Hamilton attach to its development that, about 9.0, when he was aware how completely the attack at Sedd el Bahr was held up, he had it in mind to divert the troops intended to support that landing to reinforce Y Beach. Admiral de Robeck had trawlers available, and shortly before 9.30 General Hunter-Weston was asked if he would like to see it done. No reply was made, and when at 10.0 it was clear that the Worcestershire Regiment must be diverted from Sedd el Bahr Beach he asked again. But after consulting Admiral Wemyss and the principal transport officer, General Hunter- Weston declined the offer, on the ground that his naval colleagues thought that such an interference with the existing arrangements would too greatly delay the general disembarkation.

 

From Y therefore nothing further could be done, but at Implacable Beach they were quickly able to secure the position with the force assigned to it. The two supporting battalions, 1st Border Regiment and 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers, had been all ashore for half an hour. It had been intended to keep them there in reserve till the advance from the southern beaches began to reach them, but now reinforcements for them were sent up the cliff, when an immediate bayonet charge drove the Turks back for 1,000 yards. By this smart piece of work they obtained elbow room to establish a tenable position and about noon make a firm connection with W each, where by this time the left wing of the Lancashires had hold of the other side of the hill above Tekke Burnu.

 

Owing to the havoc that had been made with the boats the main body of the force had been seriously delayed. It was not till nearly 9.30 that the Essex Regiment began to land at W Beach. Before they were well ashore the Worcestershire who had been diverted from Sedd el Bahr followed them, and both battalions were at once thrown into the gap between the two wings of the Lancashires for an attack on the crest of Hill 138. But in face of the fire from this hill and with no sign of support from Sedd el Bahr progress was impossible. Thus as the forenoon wore to an end we were everywhere just clinging to the ground which the covering forces had won, and the prospect was black for the intended advance on Achi Baba.

 

To the Turks the outlook was no less dark. General von Sanders' dispositions had been based on a firm belief in the impregnability of the southern beaches. No more than one regiment of the IXth Division, it would seem, had been devoted to their defence; the other two were in reserve and still far away. One of them had reached Krithia, but had had to turn its attention to X and Y Beaches. The third regiment had not yet arrived. It was noon before Essad reached Maidos, and then he found that part of the reserves of his XIXth Division had been already sent to Gaba Tepe. Hurrying to the top of the Kilid Bahr ridge, he was so impressed by the gravity of the Anzac threat to his communications that he ordered the third regiment to follow the other two. Thus all his main reserve was absorbed, and hearing a new outburst of fire from the fleet he went on to Krithia.

 

We had still, in fact, a good chance of extending the footing gained, and the Essex and Worcestershire battalions advanced to the assault of the centre hill under cover of the unceasing bombardment from the sea. The demoralising effect on the Turkish infantry was all that could be desired. By 1.30 the Worcestershire had reached its south-east slopes, but there they were brought up by a mass of wire. It had been too close to our own troops for the ships to destroy it, but officers and men got to work with wire-cutters, while from the sea the shells screamed over their heads to keep down the fire from the summit. For two hours the terrible struggle went on. They had now fresh troops in front of than, for by this time a regiment of the IXth Turkish Division had come up and been thrown into the fight. But in spite of the numbers against them our men persevered, and as they crept on the ships never ceased to fire close beyond. The effect seems to have been to crush almost entirely the fresh forces of the enemy. In the end, out of the whole regiment, only two officers are said to have been left fit for duty. The accuracy

 

April 25, 1915

THE CHECK AT SEDD EL BAHR

 

of the Swiftsure's fire elicited special admiration, and under cover of the storm of shell lanes were gradually opened in the wire. The price in gallant lives was heavy enough to shake the stoutest troops, but these men were not shaken. By 4.0 they had captured not only the hill, but also the redoubt in which its almost impregnable defences culminated.

 

Still they were not content. Severely as the heights commanding Sedd el Bahr Beach had been punished, no advance on that side was yet possible. Trenches close to the Helles lighthouse still denied any attempt to leave the River Clyde or to move the men, who, all day long, parched and scorched by the sun, had been crouching under the low escarpment of the sand-dunes. To release them the Worcestershire began to push to their right to take the lighthouse trenches in reverse. But again they were checked by wire. The entanglement which stretched between the two beaches barred the way, and it was swept by machine-guns established in the ruins of Fort No. 1 above Sedd el Bahr beach, but again the wire-cutters were got to work, while on board the ships men watched and wondered. '' Through glasses," wrote General Hamilton, " they could be seen quietly snipping away under a hellish fire as if they were pruning a vineyard." But all was in vain. In spite of the utmost the ships could do in the failing light the enemy's fire grew hotter and hotter, and exhausted at last with a long day's fighting under a hot sun after a sleepless night, the undaunted remnants of those immortal regiments had to desist.

 

At sea there could be no rest. All day long, while afloat and ashore the fighting rose and fell, streams of boats passed incessantly between ships and shore, taking off the wounded as best they could and bringing in gear and stores, nourishing the thinning ranks, and hour by hour tightening the grip the troops had seized. The hold was still far from secure, and progress was far short of what had been hoped. Since the first landings, the covering ships, whenever no more urgent target offered, had been bombarding Achi Baba in anticipation of an assault, but the key of the situation was still beyond our reach when the sun was low. In the struggle with the unbroken wire and in the costly failure at Sedd el Bahr the power to advance was spent.

 

Still much had been done. By 4.0 the line was continuous from Implacable Beach to Helles. At headquarters in the Euryalus it was even believed that it reached unbroken to Y, but this was far from the truth. There from 3.0 p.m. till 5.0 the troops had been digging themselves in on the sea side of the gully, when, just before sundown, it was discovered that a heavy attack upon their left was developing from Krithia. Half the Turkish reinforcements which had reached that place about noon were being launched against them. Essad had not ventured to attack earlier, so deadly was the fire from the sea in daylight. Even now he was too soon. The evening glow was still enough for the ships to see the Turks making their way from the northward along the cliff. The Goliath, Dublin, Sapphire, and Amethyst were on them at once, and before the sun set the attack was swept away.

 

On the Asiatic side the French operations had equally failed to develop as intended. About noon the second landing began, and by 2.30 the whole of the infantry was ashore and an advance could be begun against the cemetery. But though they captured some prisoners, the moment they debouched from the village they were met with such heavy fire that further progress was impossible without artillery. The battery of 75's was just approaching the beach, but almost as soon as the guns were in position they were found by the enemy's howitzers, and by 5.0, when the whole force was ashore, it was realised that the chance of a quick success was passed.

 

An aeroplane had just reported that strong reinforcements were coming up to Yeni Shehr, and seeing that the operation was only intended as a diversion, to storm the position was not worth the sacrifice it would entail. They therefore stood fast where they were, while every attempt of the Turks to counter-attack from Yeni Shehr was easily crushed by the ships deployed along the shore. Those within the Straits equally prevented any reinforcements crossing the Mendere River. Thus on the Asiatic side, though less had been accomplished than had been intended, there was little doubt the diversion served its purpose in reducing the distant fire on Morto Bay and Sedd el Bahr beach. So slight indeed was the interference of the Asiatic guns at Morto Bay, where they had been most feared, that General Hamilton afterwards regretted that the whole of the troops assigned to Sedd el Bahr had not been sent there instead.

 

Up at the extreme left of the operations the Australians and New Zealanders had had a very different experience from the French on the extreme right. There the counter-attacks had been ahnost incessant and always in superior force. Prisoners said that besides the troops they first met, a whole division had concentrated at Boghali. As we have seen, all three regiments of the main reserve, that is, the XlXth Division, had been thrown in against them. Seldom have

 

April 25, 1915

ANZAC IN DANGER

 

untried troops received so severe a baptism of fire —never have they borne it with more fortitude. There had been no time to reorganise. Every company as it landed had to be pushed up into the firing line wherever it was most needed. They had no artillery, and were galled by shrapnel, which the ships, being as yet without direct communication with the observation officers ashore, could not entirely subdue. The advanced position, which had been seized after the first rush, was lost, and under every kind of difficulty an attempt was made to establish themselves on the ridge above the landing-place. So they clung on, looking anxiously for the delayed reinforcements. About 3.0 p.m. the transports with the New Zealand and Australian Division (two brigades) began to arrive, and in half an hour the first echelon was making for the shore.

 

At the moment our left was being dangerously pressed back, but with a seaplane to direct her fire the Majestic was able to give assistance, and as the fresh troops could be pushed in to the rescue, the position was saved. From then till midnight the exhausted seamen toiled on to get men and stores ashore, and at the same time to evacuate the wounded, of whom at one time there were 1,500 on the beach. So busy indeed were the boats in getting them off, that at sunset the Turkish divisional commander reported that the force was re-embarking. The night was wet and dark; the attacks and shelling continued, even the last comers had suffered severely, and the spirit of the force was well-nigh spent. They had endured beyond all that could be expected of young troops, but what would happen if they were heavily attacked in we morning? If they stayed where they were it might mean the massacre of the whole corps, and as darkness fell it began to be a question whether the only course left was not to re-embark while there was yet time.

 

As night closed in upon that day of sacrifice, Morto Bay and Y Beach were also causes of anxiety. Owing to the failure of the intended advance from the southern beaches, both these forces were still in the air, and there was every prospect that during the night the enemy would have time to bring up fresh strength to drive them into the sea. No troops were available to reinforce them. All that could be done was to increase the ship support. The Admiral therefore ordered the Lord Nelson and Agamemnon, who had seen the sweeping completed within the Straits, to come outside and lie off Y Beach for the night, while the Prince George was directed to join the Vengeance off Morto Bay.

 

Meanwhile Captain Heathcoat Grant and General Paris had been carrying out their demonstration with the Royal Naval Division at the head of the Gulf of Xeros in accordance with the original plan. After a prolonged bombardment a feint of landing began just before dark. Some 1,200 men were put into the transports' boats and towed in by trawlers. The feint was not made at Bulair, but on three contiguous beaches north of Xeros Island near the village of Karachali. Till 9.30, they remained off the shore without drawing a shot or causing any perceptible movement. They were then withdrawn, and a naval party was sent in with orders to land and light flares on the beaches in hopes of attracting the enemy's attention. Marines even penetrated some distance inland without finding a trace of Turkish troops. So entirely deserted seemed both the coast and the Bulair lines that Captain Grant had some hope of getting orders to carry out a real landing next day, and in view of this possibility he ordered his trawlers to sweep an approach to the landing-place just east of Bulair. But shortly after midnight, when the flare party returned with their report, he was surprised by orders of a very different character.

 

After making his dispositions for the night in the southern area Admiral de Robeck, about 11.0 p.m., started up to see how things were going at Gaba Tepe. General Hamilton had seized the opportunity of snatching a few hours sleep, but his rest was short. Just about midnight he was aroused to deal with a question which he alone could decide. The flagship was now off the Anzac beach, and Admiral Thursby and two of General Birdwood's brigadiers had come on board with a staggering report of the position ashore. They bore a letter from General Birdwood in which he expressed the gravest doubts whether his crippled and exhausted force could hold on in the face of another such experience as they had had during the past day. In the condition the troops were a few hours more shelling or a heavy attack would probably lead to a disaster, and if they were to re-embark the work must begin at once. What was to be done?

 

Opinion ashore was clearly unanimous that retreat was the only course. Yet even if such a lamentable end to so brilliant a beginning had to be admitted, was a re-embarkation possible without the practical annihilation of that splendid force? In Admiral Thursby's eyes alone could the General discern a ray of hope, and to him he turned in desperation. How long would the re-embarkation take? The best part of three days. And where were the Turks? Right on the top of them. Then what was to be done? The Admiral, having seen what

 

April 25, 1915

DECISION TO HOLD ON AT ANZAC

 

he had seen, did not hesitate in his reply. If the men who had forced that landing were told they must hold on, hold on they would. General Hamilton knew the men, too, and he agreed; so that was the answer he had the courage to send. Since it would take at least two days to get them off, they must dig in and hold their ground, and to lighten the gloomy order he told them that the Australian submarine had just sent word that she had made her way past the Narrows and had torpedoed a gunboat off Chanak. In the course of the night the rest of the Anzac Corps were disembarked.

 

It was this decision which interrupted Captain Grant's proceedings at Bulair. Admiral de Robeck was doing everything possible to make good the desperate resolution that had been taken, as well as to prepare for the worst. Captain Grant's orders were to collect every boat he could and have them towed down to Gaba Tepe, while he himself was to leave his transports in charge of the Dartmouth and come down at once to support the Majestic on the left of the Anzacs. The Doris was to join the Triumph, while the Admiral remained with the Queen Elizabeth on the right, just south of Gaba Tepe. Every ship was given the particular battery for which she was to be responsible, and the Admiral signalled that he relied on the squadron to relieve the pressure on the Anzacs at daylight. Every available lighter and trawler had also been called up from Mudros, and long before dawn the Bulair trawlers, with thirty-six boats, were on their way to Gaba Tepe.

 

So that strenuous period of twenty-four hours came to an end in gravest doubt and anxiety, but with an unparalleled feat to its credit — a feat accomplished in the face of every difficulty that delay, inadequate means and a well-prepared enemy could place in the way of success. Still for all that had been done it was far short of the aim, and much remained to do. As yet the force had barely got its claws in. The cost had been heavy beyond all expectation, and even the stoutest hearts could not look forward to the morrow without misgiving.

 

And yet the anxiety was not confined to our own side. To the anxious enemy it seemed that in effecting a landing on the southern beaches the British had achieved the impossible; from Gaba Tepe the Anzacs were threatening to cut the Turkish army in two, and General Liman von Sanders' system of defence had been upset by General Hamilton's plan of attack. In announcing the success of the landing, the officer commanding at the southern beaches stoutly proclaimed that at nightfall he was going to attack with his whole force and drive the enemy into the sea. But to von Sanders the situation appeared so critical that he felt he must take the risk of moving his two divisions away from Bulair. The ships and transports were still hovering in the offing, but as no attempt had been made to land it might only mean a feint. So with a disturbing sense of the hazard he was running he decided to send both divisions by water to Maidos, leaving nothing but his cavalry brigade to watch the head of the gulf

 

 

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CHAPTER XVIII

 

THE DARDANELLES — THE INITIAL ADVANCE APRIL 26-28, AND THE FIRST BATTLE OF KRITHIA

 

During the night the rain ceased and the dawn came again in perfect serenity, promising another day that left nothing to be desired for the work there was to do. And up at Anzac with the dawn came a new spirit as calm and promising. The troops had been left in comparative quiet, and it soon became evident that the confidence which had been placed in them had bred fresh confidence in themselves. They had been able to dig themselves in snugly; guns had been landed, hauled up to the crest and dug in too, and to seaward, as the day broke gloriously, it lit up an imposing array of battleships and cruisers taking station to back their efforts.

 

The original squadron under Admiral Thursby had been reinforced by the Queen Elizabeth, whilst the bulk of the force that had demonstrated off Bulair was hurrying south to the threatened position, and as soon as day had set in Admiral de Robeck signalled the new arrivals to take station on either flank, whence support could be most efficaciously given. Boats were still streaming between the shore and the transports. During the night ample supplies of water and ammunition had been landed. A reserve of men was accumulating on the beach as the last units of the 4th Australian Brigade were being brought in, and nothing had been left undone to meet a decisive attack.

 

With the first light of day the ships opened on their assigned targets, but they were still difficult to locate, and the rain of shrapnel continued both on the position and the beach. For two or three hours the situation remained critical. Heavy fighting took place in parts of the line, and here and there ground had to be given, but the fire from the sea — which prisoners afterwards described as appalling — made it almost impossible to get the shuddering Turks from the shelter of the broken ground and prevented anything like an organised assault from developing. By 9.0 a.m. the Queen Elizabeth had succeeded in knocking out the most annoying of the batteries and the Turkish attack died away exhausted. It was now possible to organise and improve the line, and so enheartening were the messages from the shore that General Hamilton could feel confident that the position was no longer in acute danger, and that he had not counted on the spirit of the Australians and New Zealanders in vain.

 

Still until the crisis was clearly past the flagship stood by them, much as she was needed elsewhere. As there was no news of any progress at the southern beaches General Hamilton about 7.0 had offered General Hunter-Weston the French brigade, which was in reserve in its transports at Tenedos. Though he was as yet unaware of it, some slight progress had, in fact, been made in the southern zone. Under cover of the first hours of darkness the devoted naval party in the River Clyde had succeeded in re-establishing connection with the beach, and the troops that were still in her had stolen ashore. So rapidly was it done that about an hour after midnight they had succeeded in advancing a little way up the slope, and though after about two hours they were forced to retire to the beach again, they had succeeded in getting touch with the Worcestershire on their left.

 

It was little enough. In reply to the Commander-in-Chief's message General Hunter-Weston could only say that his reports assured him the XXIXth Division was not strong enough without further assistance to take Hill 141, which dominated Sedd el Bahr beach. He would therefore like the French brigade as soon as possible, and suggested that one regiment would land at W Beach and work with the British right to make good Sedd el Bahr — the rest of the brigade could then land there. General Hamilton therefore sent a message to General d'Amade requesting him to bring up everything he had at Tenedos and to meet him off Sedd el Bahr. There, now that the Anzacs were safe, he had asked the Admiral to take him; for quite apart from the need of meeting the French General, there was now another cause for anxiety.

 

The flagship's wireless room had just taken in a disturbing message from Colonel Matthews to the ships off Y Beach. It was to say that he was holding the ridge till the wounded had been embarked. Seeing that this had been the easiest landing of all, the signal was difficult to understand. The disquieting inference was that the beach which had been so cleverly seized and was so vital to the development of the General's plan was being abandoned. Its evacuation would mean the failure of the hoped-for envelopment. It was a situation that needed immediate clearing up, and shortly after 9.0 the flagship started for the spot.

 

April 26, 1915

EVACUATION OF "Y" BEACH

 

The truth was that at daybreak Colonel Matthews had signalled that " without fresh ammunition and reinforcements he could not hold on," but it would seem that the message had not got through to General Hunter-Weston. There had been no reply, and his position seemed critical. His force, which had been unmolested during the greater part of the first day, had been more heavily pressed than any other in the night. After the ships had crushed the attempt on his left the enemy, who had been reinforced from Krithia, seem to have worked their way down the gully, and shortly after dark a new and more formidable attack developed all along the line and most heavily against his centre.

 

All night long it continued with headlong rushes that sometimes reached our trenches. In the darkness the ships could do nothing to help except by bringing up ammunition from the transports. Still the line held. It was a fine defence against superior numbers, but by dawn the men were exhausted and ammunition was very short. Fortunately as the growing light revealed the miserable plight of the force there came a respite. In the desperate fighting the Turks had been so roughly handled that they were no less exhausted than our own men. To seaward they could see the Goliath and her four cruisers, Dublin, Talbot, Sapphire and Amethyst, closing in to repeat the punishment of the previous day, and as soon as their guns began to speak the Turks broke off and retired apparently into the gully.

 

The respite was seized to call for ships' boats to take off the wounded, and the result appears to have been a serious misunderstanding. The right, it seems, believed that an order to re-embark had been given. They began to leave the trenches and make down the cliff. The centre followed, and the Turks began to come on again, but before the break went further it was stopped, a counter-attack was quickly organised and the enemy driven back. By this time the boats were at work on the beach, and again there was a mistaken retirement. It would seem — but the whole episode is very obscure — that an order was given to move to the right down the coast and make another effort to get contact with the Fusiliers at Implacable Beach. This, too, by some error was taken on the left for an order to retire, and they in their turn began to make for the beach. Again the Turks came on, but again our men rallied and with another counter-attack drove the Turks right back.

 

Well as the troops had responded, it was only too clear that most of the comparatively raw men of the Royal Naval Division had been shaken by their hard night's work, and were in no condition to meet another attack in force, and now it was (8.30 a.m.) that Colonel Matthews had sent out the signal which had reached the flagship. He followed it with another to General Hunter-Weston saying that unless he received reinforcements he could not maintain his hold on the ridge, and that he would have to retire to the beach under cover of the ships' guns. This, he says, was approved, but whether the idea was to re-embark at once or merely to take cover and wait for reinforcement is not clear. What he did was to organise from the King's Own Scottish Borderers and the South Wales Borderers, who were still perfectly steady, a rear guard to cover the withdrawal, while at his request the ships stood by to open fire on the crest the moment he gave the signal that his men were off it.

 

Such was the situation when, a little after 9.30, the flagship arrived. All was quiet ashore save for a shot now and then from a sniper. The wounded were being passed to the Goliath and her cruisers, a trickle of troops could be seen coming down the diff to the clusters of men and boats on the beach, but no precise information could be got of what it all meant. On board the supporting ships there was no doubt that evacuation was in hand, and that their pressing duty was to carry it out with all speed and do their best to cover it. A request, originating no one knew how, actually came from the Sapphire for the Queen Elizabeth to fire on the ridge to cover the re-embarkation. This she did for a quarter of an hour, while she tried vainly to get a signal through to General Hunter-Weston. Then, under the belief that the evacuation must have been ordered from the divisional headquarters, she passed on towards Helles to ascertain what the situation really was.

 

At Implacable Beach there was no sign of movement. The three battalions landed there had maintained their position without disturbance, but it was necessary to inform them of the changed situation. The officer commanding was therefore warned of the danger to which his left flank was exposed now that Y was being abandoned, and was informed of the intended advance from the south, which was to be attempted as soon as the French troops were landed.

 

At 10.30 the flagship was in touch with the Euryalus off W Beach, and then, to his surprise, General Hamilton learnt that at divisional headquarters nothing was known of the evacuation of Y. An urgent signal was immediately made to the Goliath asking who had given the order, and the reply was that the shore had asked for boats. For half an hour

 

April 26, 1915

THE FRENCH AT KUM KALE

 

the flagship was off Helles, but it would seem that nothing could be arranged to prevent the unfortunate evacuation. No troops, at any rate, were immediately available to clench the hold. The deadlock in the southern zone appeared at this time so complete that presumably the whole of the disposable French troops were considered necessary to break it. General Hunter-Weston had, in fact, just given orders to Colonel Doughty-Wylie, who was in command at Sedd el Bahr Beach, that he was to reorganise and consolidate, as no advance would be attempted till the French arrived. Except this French brigade there was no reserve which could be thrown in to turn the scale at Y, and things had to be left to take their course, while with a heavy heart the Commander-in-Chief carried on to meet General d'Amade off Sedd el Bahr.

 

Shortly before noon he came on board the flagship. The pressing question was what was to be done with the troops that had occupied Kum Kale. General d'Amade was anxious to re-embark his men. Though they were for the present well established after some hard fighting, and had taken between 400 and 500 prisoners, the position could not be maintained without capturing Yeni Shehr, and the Turks were so well entrenched there that it would mean a major operation and the landing of more troops. This, of course, was beyond the scope of the plan, and even if it had not been in direct opposition to Lord Kitchener's instructions, General Hamilton felt his hold on the peninsula was still far too precarious to permit of his getting entangled on the Asiatic side before he had seized Achi Baba. He was therefore forced to share his colleague's view that the only thing to do was to get the troops away as soon as possible, and with these instructions General d'Amade at once left.

 

The moment he was gone General Hamilton asked the Admiral to take him back with all speed to Gaba Tepe to see how the Anzacs were faring, and to assist them if the great attack which was so much feared had developed. By half-past twelve the Queen Elizabeth was again passing Y Beach. By that time the evacuation was in full swing, and the General — to his deep mortification — saw the bold and well-planned surprise on which he had most hopefully counted for outwitting the enemy being dropped out of his plan. To make matters worse there seemed no need for it. The re-embarkation was not being molested. The enemy were evidently either entirely cowed by the fierce resistance to the night attack or else after the previous day's experience could no longer be brought to face exposure to the ships' guns on the high ground in daylight.

 

We know now that at all points, though the ships' fire had produced less material effect than had been hoped, its moral effect was being underestimated. Dissatisfied as our naval officers were with what they had been able to do, the enemy took quite a different view. To them the fire of the ships was so systematic as to preclude movements either of guns or troops except at night, and so far from its tactical value being negligible, there is no longer any doubt that it was the determining factor which saved our men from heavy counter-attacks in the early stages. (Prigge, p. 56 et passim. See also Liman von Sanders, who speaks of the devastating fire of the ships and its crushing effect during the first days. " Seeing that the Dardanelles campaign is the only great contest in the World War in which a land army has been compelled to fight continuously against an enemy on land and sea, it is worthy of note that the effect of the ships guns was to give a support to their land forces which was quite out of the ordinary. On land no heavy artillery can shift its position so easily, or bring its fire to bear so effectively on the rear and flanks of an opponent as can be done by fire from ships." Funf Jahre Turkei, p. 94. Turkish official statements after the Armistice have fully confirmed this view.)

 

Even to our own people it was clear that it could prevent any serious pressure upon the Y Force, for about noon the Implacable completely dispersed a concentration that was gathering at Krithia, the point from which any attack must come.

 

At the southern beaches also the improving fire of the ships had already produced an effect which, had it been known, might still have caused a reconsideration of the unhappy abandonment of the Y landing. Just before Colonel Doughty-Wylie got General Hunter- Weston's order to stand fast he had found it possible to advance. Since daybreak his men on the left, who were in touch with the force landed at W, had been snugly entrenched close to No. 1 fort. On his right the men from the River Clyde were still stealing ashore singly, and there also the remnants of the first landing had crept out of the dugouts they had made in the sandhills, and were concentrating with the newcomers under the shattered earthworks of Sedd el Bahr fort, which appeared to have been made untenable by the ships' fire and to be deserted.

 

At dawn, however, when an attempt to get round it into the village was made, a machine-gun hidden in the ruins of the south-west tower forced the men to take cover again; but not for long. At a signal from the River Clyde the Albion quickly knocked out the obnoxious gun and by request continued her fire till the tower was battered to pieces. Then, when more men had come ashore, a push was made for the village under cover of an intense bombardment

 

April 26, 1915

CAPTURE OF SEDD EL BAHR

 

from the sea. Stealing along below the mined walls of Sedd el Bahr they were soon in the north end of the village, and began to work their way into it. There was some very hard fighting amongst the ruins and no little loss, but under Colonel Doughty-Wylie's fine leadership the Dublins, Munsters and Hampshires were not to be stopped; by 11.30 they were through the village and the Colonel was calling for artillery support to enable him to storm Old Castle and the adjacent Hill 141. During his advance through the village and up the slopes the bombardment had been checked. Now all the ships reopened, for since cable communication had been established with the shore the response was quick and targets could be taken up more accurately. From Morto Bay the Lord Nelson, too, could give invaluable help. Above the village she had located trenches full of troops which she could enfilade. They were quickly emptied, and by 1.0 p.m. she was shelling strong bodies of Turks in full retreat through the woods at Morto Bay. The result was that about an hour later, before the French transports had appeared Old Castle was in Colonel Doughty-Wylie's hands, and he was only waiting for a concentrated bombardment of Hill 141 to assault the last position which dominated his beach. The French had not been required. This remarkable success had been won with the help of the ships alone by a force scarcely less precariously situated or sorely tried than that which had let go of Y.

 

Up at Gaba Tepe there was a similar story to tell. In the forenoon the great attack, for which so much anxiety was felt, had begun. The Queen Elizabeth had arrived just in time to see the opening and to add the weight of her 15" guns to the terrific bombardment that greeted it. Here, too, cable communication had been established with the shore; fire control was much improved, and moreover, before reaching the Anzac lines the Turks had to cross open country in full view of the ships. It was more than troops new to high explosives and heavy shrapnel could face. The attack was beaten back; but the Anzac force was still galled by artillery fire from the distant heights of Koja Chemen Tepe and its spur, the Chunuk Bair. Till the Anzac artillery could be got ashore no more could be done.

 

Its landing had been delayed by the fact that from time to time ships appeared above the Narrows and by firing over the hills compelled the transports to keep out to sea. Though the ascent of the balloon and a few rounds from the ships were usually enough to hurry them up the Straits again, the interference was serious. Meanwhile the Anzac guns already in position and those of the Queen Elizabeth and the rest of the ships sufficed in a short time to dominate the fire from the hills sufficiently to prevent adequate preparation for a renewal of the Turkish attack. By 4.0 the efforts of the enemy had completely died away; and the moment was seized for a general advance to improve the position and make good the line originally selected. In half an hour more the situation was so satisfactory that the General, with a quiet mind, could return to the south.

 

There by the time he arrived he was astonished to find a striking change for the better. The French transports had arrived, but the troops had not been landed, nor had Colonel Doughty-Wylie waited for them. Without their aid, under cover of the ship fire, which the Turkish supports could not face, he had brilliantly captured Hill 141 as well as its redoubt. The Turks, thoroughly routed, had fallen back half-way to Krithia, the British line had been established from Tekke Burnu to Sedd el Bahr, and the deadly beach was at last practicable for landing. It was a brilliant and wholly unexpected exploit, and Colonel Doughty-Wylie, to whose daring and sagacious leading the success was mainly due, lay dead, shot down in the last stage of his priceless success. For troops who had gone through what those men had suffered it was a feat hard to rival. On board the Albion, where they had had to watch it all at close quarters — almost helpless to assist, as it seemed to them — it was a day never to be forgotten. " I cannot refrain," wrote the captain in his report, '' from expressing the admiration felt by all officers and men of the Albion for the splendid attack made by the troops on Hill 141. We witnessed first their tribulation and then their triumph."

 

So ended the second day of the great adventure. Much had been done — more, as some of the leaders confessed, than they had really believed to be possible — but it was far short of what was needed. In the southern zone the plan had looked to being in possession of the Achi Baba-Krithia ridge. In the north the Anzacs should have been on the backbone of the peninsula dominating the main roads to the Kilid Bahr position. But nowhere had anything more than the preliminary covering positions been made good. The hope of enveloping the enemy's advanced force had entirely gone. The Morto Bay force was still isolated, and when, during the morning, the leading battalion of the Turkish VIIth Division arrived from the north, the South Wales Borderers had been forced to give up their hold on the ground above Eski Hissarlik Point and fall back to De

 

April 26, 1915

THE FRENCH WITHDRAWAL

 

Tott's battery. On the other side of the peninsula the complementary force at Y had lost its hold and was afloat again. To make matters worse, no immediate advance was possible. Even the footing that had been so heroically gained had cost very heavily. Some battalions had lost half of their strength, and all were much exhausted with the prolonged effort. Nor had the General any fresh blood to infuse new life into his force. Contrary to all practice it had been sent out without the usual ten per cent, of strength to replace casualties. The needs of the army in Flanders had been deemed to be paramount, and the normal result was that even so fine a division as the XXIXth were incapable of following up their first blow. Reluctantly, therefore, it had to be admitted that they must have a day's rest before a fresh call was made upon them.

 

The arrest of the offensive necessarily raised new anxieties about the Asiatic guns, particularly since the Morto Bay force must remain in the air for a considerable time longer. This was a point on which Admiral de Robeck felt very strongly. Just after General d'Amade had left the Queen Elizabeth to re-embark his troops, he and his staff had come to General Hamilton to urge upon him the vital importance for the French retaining their hold on Kum Kale for another twenty-four hours. It was then too late for this view to be pressed upon General d'Amade, but about 7.0 p.m. Admiral Guepratte arrived to report how well things had gone at Kum Kale.

 

To him the position seemed excellent. The fire of the ships on the exposed Turkish trenches and concentrations and the admirably served 75's which the French had established ashore had inflicted losses so severe that, although no advance on Yeni Shehr was deemed possible, the Turks showed little disposition to renew their attacks. In any case the French Admiral agreed that the small risk there was in remaining was well worth running for the sake of keeping down the howitzer fire and preventing enemy troops being diverted to the European side till the attack on the Achi Baba position could be delivered. He accordingly left to see if anything could be done to hold on, as his British colleague desired. But unfortunately it was too late, and at 2.0 a.m. he sent word to the Queen Elizabeth that the General had given the order to re-embark; the operation had already begun, and it was out of his power to stop it.

 

It was unfortunate, but there were brighter sides to the picture. The Australian submarine was reporting herself, all well, off Gallipoli, and though her attempts to attack the enemy's battleships that had been disturbing the Anzac zone had been frustrated by the extreme calmness of the weather, she could give assurance that no large transports had ventured to approach the port during the day. General Cox's Indian brigade was also signalled as nearing Lemnos. It was the only reserve behind the Expeditionary Force, but until General Peyton's mounted division arrived at Alexandria it had had to be held back on the canal. Had it come on with the rest of the force Y Beach could certainly have been held, and how great a change that might well have meant in the fortunes of the whole enterprise was soon to become apparent.

 

The French brigade from Tenedos moreover was landing smoothly at V Beach. Thanks to the untiring efforts of the River Clyde party, the shot-torn collier with the hopper and lighters had been turned into a convenient landing-stage, and though one of the French transports had broken down, the bulk of the brigade was ashore by the morning. Of the enemy there was no sign on the British front, and acoordingly General Hunter-Weston decided to make a forward movement to join hands with the Morto Bay force as soon as the French were ready, which was expected to be about noon (27th), and the ships were directed to take positions to support it.

 

The Kum Kale force could now be looked on as an effective reserve, for the evacuation had been very successfully accomplished, thanks to the barrage which the ships were able to put down between Yeni Shehr and Achilles' Tomb. The withdrawal had begun shortly after 10.0 the previous night, and as soon as the Turks were aware of it they opened a heavy fire from In Tepe. But this, as usual, the ships were quickly able to silence and prevent its recurrence to any serious extent. By 2.0 a.m. nothing but a rear-guard was left, and by 5.0 the whole force was on board again on its way to the Tenedos anchorage.

 

At Gaba Tepe, when the Queen Elizabeth went up there early in the morning, she found the enemy no more inclined to activity. The night had passed with little disturbance, and at 8.0 a.m. General Birdwood began to push forward his left. It was met by a counter-attack which was repulsed, but until the position was more fully restored and the force reorganised it was evident that no serious advance could be undertaken. The work too was hampered by a continuous shelling of the beach and the tows as they left or approached it. As the morning wore on the fire became heavier, the worst of it evidently coming from ships above the Narrows. It would seem, indeed, that the Anzac threat to the Turkish communications was formidable enough to have brought down

 

April 27, 1915

QUEEN ELIZABETH AND GOEBEN

 

the Goeben from the Bosporus. At dawn the kite balloon from the Manica had reported her in the Straits, and at 9.0 the Doris's seaplanes signalled that both she and the Turgud Reis were firing. The Queen Elizabeth at once prepared to engage the German battle cruiser. For all concerned there was something peculiarly dramatic in the idea of a single combat between the two champions. The Goeben was the Hector of the new Iliad. It was from her too had sprung the trouble which had forced us to undertake the great adventure, and excitement was high with hope from the Homeric contest. But the hope was not fulfilled. As soon as the balloon was up the Queen Elizabeth fired. The shot fell quite close, so close indeed that the Goeben thought well not to await another round, and moved up out of sight under the shelter of the cliffs.

 

It was well she did, as the sequel was to show. In about an hour's time the Manica reported a squadron of transports near the same place. They had come, it seems, from Constantinople to bring over troops from the Asiatic side, and having reached Nagara were making for Kilia Liman and Maidos. The Queen Elizabeth was on them at once with the balloon spotting for her. Selecting the largest ship, she straddled her with the first two rounds, and in the strained silence that followed the third came the welcome signal " O.K." — a direct hit. One was enough. The transport was seen to be sinking fast, and in a few minutes nothing but her forecastle was showing above water. Seeing that the range was about seven miles it was a feat of gunnery on which both gunlayer and spotter could be heartily complimented. The effect was excellent. The ferry which General von Sanders had arranged was no longer practicable. The transports had to make for Ak Bashi Liman, five miles above Maidos, where, though they were covered by the surrounding hills, there were no wharves or other conveniences for landing. (Prigge, p. 60. He says the vessel destroyed was a British ship which had been detained on the outbreak of war.)

 

The Queen Elizabeth's exploit was therefore no mere display of what she could do with her 15" guns. For it gave assurance that, quite apart from our submarines, the reinforcement of the peninsula by sea would be no simple matter for the enemy. And reinforcement was what was most to be feared if the Anzacs were to be able to carry out their part of the plan, or even to hold their own. It happened that their threat to the Turkish communications was General von Sanders' immediate anxiety. He himself had come down to Maidos in time to witness the disturbance of his transports, and the bulk of the troops which were slowly landing at Ak Bashi Liman were ordered to push across to Gaba Tepe. General Hamilton on his part had already taken steps to reinforce the Anzacs, as well as to prevent further pressure; word had been sent to Mudros that the Indian Brigade was to be met and sent on direct to Gaba Tepe, and the Dartmouth was ordered to make another demonstration next morning at the head of the Gulf, with the Amethyst, the Royal Naval Division transports and one of the Australian Artillery ships.

 

Having made their dispositions the two Commanders-in-Chief, shortly after midday, went back to the south to support the afternoon advance. They found the Turks had just been attempting to forestall it by an attack from Krithia. But the ships on both sides of the peninsula, which all the morning had been intermittently firing on such batteries and bodies of troops as they were able to locate, prevented it developing beyond what the troops could easily repulse. In preparation for the advance their effective searching continued. Krithia itself was cleared of troops, and several attempts to debouch from its vicinity or from behind Achi Baba were caught by heavy shrapnel and high explosive while the troops were in close formation.

 

By this time two French battalions that had landed during the morning were in line on the right of the XXIXth Division, and though the third one in the disabled transport had not arrived, other French troops were landing rapidly at the River Clyde pier. No enemy movement was discernible on the front, and in order to give the men as much time for rest as possible the advance was postponed till 4.0. Then, covered by an increased fire from the ships and by the field batteries that were now in position, it began all along the line. So effective had been the preparation that no opposition was encountered except desultory shelling from the Asiatic side, which our ships and the French could not entirely subdue. As our line progressed the advanced Turkish posts retired, and some of these troops were caught by the Lord Nelson in Morto Bay. There about 3.0 the South Wales Borderers had already got touch with a French patrol from Sedd el Bahr, and before dark the intended line was reached. From Eumer Kapudan Tepe above De Tott's battery it extended astride the Krithia road as far as Gully Beach, close to which the left of the force was already entrenched. The line had in effect swung into a new position about two miles from the end of the peninsula and half-way

 

April 28, 1915

THE TURKISH RETIREMENT

 

to Krithia. There had been no opposition to the advance. The destruction which the ships' guns had wrought in the comparatively open country had put an end to all talk of driving us into the sea, and Essad Pasha had ordered the whole Southern force to fall back on the lines that had been prepared in front of Krithia, in order, so we are told, to save it from being annihilated by the fire of the fleet. There the three gullies of the Zighin, Kirte and Kereves Dere afforded some protection from the sea and made it possible to bring up reinforcements and supplies without undue exposure. On this position the attack was to be delivered on the morrow, and in their new alignment the Allied troops were permitted to complete their rest for the critical day before them, while on either flank the battleships mounted guard with their searchlights to prevent a surprise.

 

The night, both here and at Anzac, passed quietly, and at dawn on the 28th the Dartmouth and Amethyst, with the Royal Naval Division, carried out the demonstration as directed. This time the feint of landing was made further to the westward, before the little port of Ibriji, but again no troops were seen, and after the ships had destroyed the sheerlegs and some lighters that were seen in the harbour, they withdrew, and General Paris came down to Helles to report to the Commander-in-Chief. (See Plan, P.123 (below))

 

Plan - The Approaches to the Dardanelles

(click plan for near original-sized image)

 

The attack on Krithia was already developing when he arrived, but as General d'Amade had also come off to report, the flagship had not yet moved up to her supporting position on the left. Five French battalions were now in line on the right and had taken over the Morto Bay flank from the South Wales Borderers, who during the night had marched across country to Implacable Beach to form a reserve for their own brigade (87th) on the extreme left. Here too the Drake Battalion had been moved up towards Gully ravine as a reserve, as the fourth battalion of the brigade, the King's Own Scottish Borderers, from Y Beach, had only just been landed at W Beach. Beyond them, between the two ravines which ran down from Krithia, were the county regiments of the 88th Brigade, with the remains of the gallant Fusilier brigade (86th) in reserve behind them.

 

From their right to De Tott's battery the line was held by the French. Since they took over from the South Wales Borderers they had not been disturbed. Their orders were now to advance on Krithia, with their left up the Eastern ravine, while their right pushed forward as far as the Kereves ravine, which came down from Achi Baba. Here in immediate support were stationed the Lord Nelson, Vengeance, Cornwallis and Albion, while the Prince George still helped the French ships with the Asiatic batteries. On the opposite flank was the Implacable in her old station, and north of her were the Goliath, Dublin and Sapphire, and there too the Queen Elizabeth proceeded shortly after 10.0.

 

Since an early hour the ships had never ceased doing their best to prepare the attack, but it was little enough, for a mist shrouded the shore and targets were very difficult to take up. Still at first the advance along the whole line up to about a mile from Krithia had been very promising. On the extreme left, when the flagship stopped off Y Beach, the Border Regiment, advancing rapidly between the gully and the sea, had nearly reached it. Almost at once she had a fresh experience of the difficulty of supporting troops from the sea. Down a hollow in the ground were seen a mass of men moving at the double from the direction of the enemy. Some thought they were Turks — some that it was our men retiring. They were a splendid target and the Queen Elizabeth had two of her 15" guns loaded with shrapnel.

 

As each shell could throw 18,000 bullets, a fair burst would be the practical annihilation of the moving mass and go far to decide the day. But were they friends or foes? It was for the General to decide. The temptation was great, but the appalling results of a mistake were not to be easily faced. There was scarcely a doubt they were enemy, but while there was a grain of doubt he could not give the word, and before he was certain the mass was out of sight. The question was soon settled. It was a mass of enemy that had so narrowly escaped destruction. Two companies of the Borderers were now actually in the deserted Y Beach trenches, and when the Turks came into sight again they were deployed and advancing in bold rushes to turn them out. One company was clearly in view, working in perfect style along the edge of the cliff with bayonets glittering in the sun. The Borderers were suffering severely from their fire. Another rush brought the enemy's line to a point where the flagship exactly enfiladed it. Then a 15" gun spoke — the shell burst fifty yards from the enemy's right and when the smoke cleared there was not a man to be seen.

 

The counter-attack was stopped, bodies of the enemy were retiring over the ridge exposed to the fire both of ships and troops, and the advance of the Borderers could be continued. But it was only to be brought up quickly before well-concealed trenches at close range which were hard to locate from the sea. Everything the ships could do to break

 

April 28, 1915

FIRST BATTLE OF KRITHIA

 

the deadlock they did. They were all firing hard. The Goliath had been ordered to move in and use her 12-pounders at the closest possible range. Still for two hours our left was held up. The unhappy abandonment of Y Beach was telling its tale with fatal effect. By about noon the centre, after desperate fighting, had worked up to within a mile of Krithia, but with the left of the line held fast they could not push the frontal attack further. In the firing line, where the whole 88th Brigade was by this time engaged, ammunition was failing, and the 86th had to be sent forward to give the attack new impetus.

 

On the right the French were equally feeling the want of ammunition and were also checked. If only the right of the Turks could be turned all might yet be well, and if as our left advanced against it they had found a friendly force securely entrenched above Y Beach with a new base of supply it might have been done, exposed as the enemy's flank was to the fire of the Queen Elizabeth and her consorts. But the keystone of the General's plan had fallen out and the battalions which should have been there were still on W Beach or afloat. For a final effort first the Anson men and then the Drake Battalion were pushed up into the firing line, but just as the attack was to be renewed an unhappy contretemps occurred incidental to the inherent difficulties of all operations based upon open beaches.

 

The weakness of the supply units, which as yet it had been possible to land, and the congested state of the beaches, which there was no means of clearing quickly enough, made it impossible to get ammunition forward as fast as it was expended. The only chance was more hands on the beach, and at the critical moment a call came for the Anson men to return to their fatigue duty at Implacable Beach. Sailor fashion they responded at the double over the cliff in order to get back along the shore. By the troops near them this rapid movement was taken for a retirement, and a number of men who had lost all their officers were carried away with it. They were soon rallied, and by getting the Drake Battalion forward and some troops from the other side of the main gully a really strong firing line was formed. It was enough to deal with a counter-attack, but a further advance against the Turkish trenches was still beyond their strength.

 

Seeing no further movement, General Hamilton, still bent on making full use of the flexibility which the sea gave him, signalled to General Hunter-Weston that if he wanted to reinforce his left or develop a flank attack troops could come along under the cliffs at Y and climb up under cover of the Queen Elizabeth's guns. But there was no reply.

 

At that time General Hunter-Weston had no reason to believe that the left was held up. But in truth the men were too much exhausted for a further effort against the powerful forces in front of them; and it was the same all along the line. Lack of ammunition both for infantry and artillery made it impossible to prevent the enemy counter-attacking. On the right the French, whose left had reached within a mile of Krithia, had been unable to hold their own and already were retiring. In conformity their right fell back from the Kereves ravine on De Totts. They too were rallied, but the centre of the Allied line had been left in the air. In such a position a fresh attack by the enemy would be fatal, and after holding on till nearly 5.0 they were ordered to fall back. Fortunately the Turks had been too much shaken to attempt another counter-attack, or perhaps were unwilling even in the failing light to expose themselves in the open to the devastating fire of the ships' heavy guns. So by sunset the whole Allied force was digging itself in undisturbed, but on a line far short of what it had been intended to reach. The right was still no further than the hill above De Tott's, and thence the front ran to Y Beach, but with an awkward re-entering angle in the centre whose apex almost touched the line they had started from. From the nearest troops Krithia was still more than a mile away and Achi Baba more than twice as far.

 

What was to be done? It was clear that after all they had gone through in the past four days the troops were too few to renew the attack with much hope of success until they had had further time to recover and until more guns could be landed and the rear services more fully organised. Yet to wait and abandon the basic idea of a coup de main was to give the Turks time to reinforce and strengthen their position. But where were our reinforcements to come from? The reserves on the spot were far from adequate, the Indian brigade had not yet appeared, and there was nothing else but the still raw Royal Naval Division, part of which had been already absorbed for working parties and reserves. At an early hour in the day General Paris had been directed to place one brigade at General Birdwood's disposal till the belated brigade from Egypt arrived. The rest were to make another demonstration at the head of the gulf. It was made in the afternoon, but once more no movement of troops was seen. At Gaba Tepe things were so quiet that General Birdwood did not call on the brigade that had been offered him, and no part of this reserve was used except the ''Drakes" and part of the ''Ansons". With the unemployed

 

April 28, 1915

FAILURE OF THE ATTACK

 

bulk of the Royal Naval Division and the other French and British troops which had taken no part in the day's operations there was little enough to promise success after the first day's failure. But in fact since the morning the problem with which the General had to deal had assumed quite a new aspect.

 

 

---

 

 

CHAPTER XIX

 

THE DARDANELLES — THE FIRST REINFORCEMENTS AND THE SECOND BATTLE OF KRITHIA — APRIL 28 TO MAY 8

 

When the news reached home of how great the first effort had been, how much it had cost, and how far short it had fallen of executing the coup de main that had been planned against Achi Baba, it became clear that the enterprise could not be carried on without greater military force. Lord Kitchener had promised that if need arose the army would see the navy through and the need had arisen. Still, in view of the condition of affairs on the Western Front, it was considered that nothing could be moved either from France or Home— Egypt was the only source. The 29th Indian Brigade had left Egypt for Lemnos on April 26. (The 29th Indian Brigade consisted of the 14th Sikhs, 69th and 89th Punjabis, l/6th Gurkhas.)

 

There in garrison was the fine East Lancashire Territorial Division, and General Peyton's Mounted Division arrived by the end of the month. Some, at least, of the troops remaining in Egypt could be spared. True, the Turks were showing renewed activity on the frontier. The new railway from the north had almost reached Ludd, and large camps both there and at Ramleh had been located by the French aeroplanes with the Syrian Squadron. Reports also came in of some 8,000 troops at Nekhl, about twice as many at Gaza, and a brigade with twenty guns at El Arish. Just as the operations against Gallipoli were opening, a force was reported to have left Nekhl, threatening an attack on some of the Gulf of Suez ports or Suez itself, and the Desaix had to be kept there with 500 men on board ready to move at a moments notice. (See Plan p. 382. (below))

 

Plan - Eastern Mediterranean

(click plan for near original sized version)

From the west also danger was beginning to be feared, for it was found that the Turks were intriguing with the Senussi. But it was so generally admitted that the best defence for Egypt was an attack on Constantinople, that these symptoms could be dismissed as efforts at diversion or attempts to mine the canal or its approaches. So long as the Expeditionary Force was in action at the Dardanelles no attack upon the Canal in force was likely to develop.

 

April 27-28, 1915

REINFORCEMENTS FROM EGYPT

 

On April 27, therefore, Lord Kitchener had sent General Hamilton word that if he wanted more troops the transports that had brought out Peyton's division were available, and that General Maxwell would send him anything he asked for. Early next morning, before the message came to hand, General Hamilton telegraphed home to know if he could have the East Lancashire division if he wanted it. Meanwhile Lord Kitchener had heard through the French Admiralty that reinforcements would be required, and he at once instructed General Maxwell to have all his troops ready to embark, and suggested he should send the East Lancashire division if it was called for. No sooner had this telegram gone off than General Hamilton's arrived asking for a call on this division. The Admiralty had already instructed Admiral Robinson, the Port Admiral in Egypt, to be ready to embark it, and Lord Kitchener replied to General Hamilton that he had better inform Egypt at once that he wanted it.

 

A further important reinforcement was by this time in sight. General D'Amade knew that the French Government were holding another division in reserve for the Dardanelles, and when early on Wednesday (the 28th) he visited the flagship, he informed General Hamilton he would like to have it, and suggested that he, as Commander-in-Chief, should ask for it.

 

About the immediate despatch of the Egyptian reinforcement there was some difficulty. It was objected that the cavalry transports would want altering before infantry could use them. This objection was overruled: they were to be used as they were, and the embarkation of the East Lancashire division as well as over 8,000 Anzac reinforcements commenced on May 1.

(The East Lancashire (XLIInd) Division was composed of the Lancashire Fusiliers Brigade (5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Battalions, Lancashire Fusiliers), the Manchester Brigade (5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Battalions, Manchester, Regiment) and the East Lancashire Brigade (4th and 5th Battalions, East Lancashire Regiment, and 9th and 10th Battalions, Manchester Regiment).)

But another objection was not so easily disposed of. In the evening of April 28 the Bikanir Camel Corps had engaged Turkish patrols eighteen miles west of Hod el Bada, and the threat of an attempt to mine or obstruct the canal became more insistent. The departure of the troops for Gallipoli left only three reliable Indian brigades for the canal defences, both Cairo and Alexandria were stripped of infantry, and but little artillery was available for the canal. Though General Peyton's division, which had been assigned to the Egyptian garrison, could supply the place of infantry, the lack of artillery was a serious matter, and only from the ships could the need be made good.

 

But ships were hard to find. Since the bulk of Admiral Peirse's squadron had been diverted to the Dardanelles, the only ship of force in the canal was the St. Louis. The Philomel had been detached for special duty. A few days before she had been sent down to Aden with two gunboats for the Persian Gulf. Both of than had foundered on the way, and now she was under orders to co-operate with a military force that was proceeding to Somaliland, for even that forlorn outpost seemed to feel the repercussion of the all-embracing war. This left only one British ship, the light cruiser Proserpine, for the canal, though the Himalaya was coming up the Red Sea after a refit at Bombay. There were, however, three other French ships — the Desaix, which, as we have seen, was also detailed for special service; the worn-out cruiser Montcalm, stationed at Ismailia; and the old coast defence ship Requin. It meant but little strength in heavy guns, on which the army so much depended, and without further naval force the position could not be considered secure.

 

Further advance parties of the enemy were appearing close to the canal in several places, and there was every indication of a serious attack being imminent. To deal with it a strong force of Imperial Service cavalry was moved out on the 29th. The Turks retired in front of it, but owing to the exhaustion of the horses our men were unable to effect anything. While the operation was in progress. Admiral Peirse informed the Admiralty of the dangerous state of affairs, and asked to have the Euryalus and Bacchante returned to him at once. Orders were accordingly given to Admiral de Robeck to send them or two equivalent ships. Compliance with the order could not fail to be a serious disturbance to the Dardanelles operations, which presumably was just what the enemy was aiming at by their threat to the canal, and to avoid playing into their hands the French Admiralty were informed that we should be very grateful if they could send their Syrian squadron to Port Said, as all our ships were fully occupied at the Dardanelles.

 

At the moment the strain there was even greater than the Admiralty knew. The Albion was out of action. During the morning of the 28th she had been supporting the right of the French off Kereves Dere, and shortly after midday, just as the Lord Nelson was relieving her, she was so badly hit that she had to retire to Mudros with a leak that would take three days to make good. To spare either the Euryalus

 

April 29-30, 1915

ANXIETY IN EGYPT

 

or Bacchante was out of the question, and with one battleship short all Admiral de Robeck could do was to detach the Goliath. To withdraw another ship, he submitted, would dangerously imperil the situation, not merely by the loss of the ship itself, but also because of the officers and men who could not be spared from communication and beach work. The strain put upon the personnel of the fleet by the multitudinous requirements of an army thrown ashore from the sea was already almost beyond endurance. It had always been a recognised feature of combined expeditions that the officers and men of the supporting squadron were as important as its guns, and in the hey-day of our ripe experience in the old French wars the number of hands required for the amphibious work was a recognised factor in determining the strength of the naval part of the force.

 

Thanks, however, to the readiness of the French to help, no call had to be made. In reply to our request Admiral Dartige du Foumet was ordered to send at once to Port Said the Jeanne d'Arc, D'Estrees and D'Entrecasteaux for the defence of the canal, and Admiral de Robeck was told he could recall the Goliath and keep his other ships. On April 30 the first of the French cruisers arrived in the canal, but all was then quiet. The attack, if indeed an attack had ever been intended, had not developed. The enemy had disappeared from the vicinity of the canal and no trace of them was left, except indications of an attempt to lay a minefield in the Bitter Lakes.

 

At the Dardanelles also the fighting had died down. The two days after the abortive attack on the Achi Baba-Krithia position had been devoted to reorganisation. In the southern area the line which, as we have seen, ran from in front of the hill above De Tott's to Y Beach, had been strengthened, and the bulk of the artillery had been landed. At Gaba Tepe the Royal Marine brigade had relieved some of the most hard-worked Australians, and save for two strong attacks on them as soon as they got into the line things had been fairly quiet. Even the artillery fire was so much reduced that it looked as if the enemy had withdrawn the bulk of his northern force to deal with the main attack. So much, indeed, was the pressure reduced, that General Birdwood was contemplating an advance for May 1.

 

The ships were still as busy as the need of husbanding ammunition permitted, and since an improved method of observation had been established they were able to give the enemy considerable annoyance, and even to dislodge them from their trenches south of Krithia. But do what they would they could not master the fire from the Asiatic guns, which continued to worry the southern beaches. During the last three days of the month our attempts to silence the shore batteries by ship fire, and to continue our sweeping operations, were met by a resistance that seemed to increase m vigour. The destroyer Wolverine, Commander O. J. Prentis, was hit on the bridge, and her commander killed; the Agamemnon was struck twice; the Henri IV eight times, and every other ship engaged met with similar difficulties.

 

Besides the usual inner squadron, we had now two submarines about the Narrows; a French one had also gone up to harass the Turkish communications, and in order to disturb their organisation as much as possible the Lord Nelson, on April 30, was sent up to Gaba Tepe with the balloon-carrier Manica to try what she could do against the enemy's headquarters at Chanak Kale. She found the Goeben again bent on punishing the Anzac transports, and at once engaged her. But she was no more inclined to accept the challenge than she had been the Queen Elizabeth's and the Lord Nelson could only get off five rounds before the German flagship hid herself behind the cliffs. The Lord Nelson then turned her attention to Chanak, and after fifteen rounds had the town in flames. Her orders were then to attack Fort No. 18, in the Kilid Bahr group, but the balloon was again wanted inside the Straits, and she could do no more, but Chanak continued to burn fiercely till nightfall.

 

In this way something at last was done to hamper the flow of Turkish reinforcements, which in view of the forced arrest of our offensive was the immediate cause of anxiety. Of how the submarines had fared nothing was known since the Australian boat reported having sunk a gunboat. Both had been signalling off Gallipoli, but then there was silence. The French boat had come out again with no success to report, and the Minerva was up at Xeros, trying to get into wireless touch with the other two.

 

Whether to forestall the enemy by hurrying on another attack or to wait for the coming reinforcements, was a difficult question to decide. The whole French Expeditionary Force was now ashore and comparatively fresh, but the XXIXth Division, after its prolonged struggle, was thoroughly exhausted, and with no fresh blood in the form of drafts its heavy losses were severely felt. The remains of the Dublins and Munsters had actually to be re-formed into one battalion, the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers had also lost over half their numbers, and the effective strength of the 86th Brigade was reduced to less than 2,000, while the total drafts required

 

May 1, 1915

TURKISH COUNTER-ATTACK

 

to replace casualties in the division amounted to oyer 5,000. Large numbers of men, instead of resting, had still to be employed in getting up stores and ammunition and doing heavy fatigue work in improving the piers. On May 1, however, the tension was somewhat relaxed by the arrival of the Indian brigade from Egypt. The idea of using it at Gaba Tepe had been abandoned. It was too much needed in the southern area, and there it was landed during the day. Better late than never was the universal feeling, but no one could fail to think how different the position might have been had they come in a week earlier.

 

As it was, they were just in time to meet a new crisis. The comparative apathy of the Turkish troops during the past three days had seemed to promise us the initiative in our own time, but in fact the Turks were quietly, but with energy, preparing to deliver a crushing attack. The whole of their XIth Division, which had previously been held at Bashika Bay by the French demonstration, had been brought over from the Asiatic side, apparently by night, and part of the IIIrd Division from the Kum Kale area followed them. The battalions as they arrived were pushed up wherever they were most needed, regardless of their proper formations, and often with great difficulty by mule tracks which had not yet been improved into roads. Owing to their experience of the deadly effect of the ship-fire during daylight the attack was to be made by night, and Colonel von Sodenstern, who had been commanding the Vth Division up at Bulair, was placed in command of the southern area to conduct it.

 

By the evening of May 1 everything was ready, but outwardly all was still so quiet that in the fleet the impression of the apathy of the enemy was deepened. The night fell very dark and preternaturally still. Not even a gun was firing anywhere, when suddenly, a little after 10.0, the whole of the Turkish batteries burst out. In a moment a raging din had replaced the death-like silence: from the Asiatic side and from Achi Baba, shells were raining down on our front trenches, and in a few seconds the uproar was redoubled by our counter-battery. For half an hour the artillery duel continued with the utmost fury, and then the anxious watchers in the ships could hear the rattle of machine-guns and rifles all along the line. Not a word came from shore. It was impossible to tell what was happening, till presently the distant roar of " Allah-Din! " told that the Turks were charging, and answering hurrahs that the charge was being met. But soon it could be seen that the Turkish guns had lifted, and the fall of the shell seemed to tell that our line was falling back.

 

In the dark the ships could do little to help. On the left the Agamemnon was firing as directed from the signal station above Y Beach, and so was the Implacable, guided by star shells. But on the right the Vengeance, which was on guard, could do next to nothing for the French, and from this quarter the reports were specially alarming. The Senegalese were being overpowered, and some support became imperative to prevent a rout. General Hamilton was keeping under his own hand a reserve composed of two battalions of the Royal Naval Division and the Indian brigade, whose arrival released the 88th Brigade for the trenches, and at 2.0 a.m. so serious was the position on the extreme right that he sent off one of the naval battalions to General D'Amade.

 

In another hour, during which the struggle raged in the dark with undiminished intensity, rumour told that the British line was broken and falling back on the beaches. It was but half the truth, for at 4.0 came word from General Hunter-Weston that it had been pierced at one or two points, but elsewhere the thrusts had been repulsed with heavy loss. For the General, who was anxiously waiting for news in the Arcadian (General Hamilton had shifted his headquarters to that vessel on April 30; he visited General Hunter-Weston at his headquarters on shore on April 29, 30 and May 1, and had taken the opportunity, on the last two occasions, of visiting French headquarters.) it was the moment to react, and the order was given for a general counter-attack.

 

Exhausted as the troops were, the response was magnificent. The whole line swept forward, the Turks fell back before it, at dawn the whole area in our front was covered with men in full retreat, and as the light made, the ships could join the field guns in taking heavy toll. Ground was rapidly gained, till our line, as it pushed resolutely forward, began to be enfiladed by machine-guns cleverly hidden in the broken ground. The far-spent energy of the weary troops was exhausted by the check; to find and rush the deadly emplacements was beyond their strength, and in the end there was nothing for it but to fall back to the trenches they had so splendidly defended in the midnight attack. Hundreds of prisoners had been taken, and the ground over which the retirement was made was covered with Turkish dead, but our ranks, too, were sadly thinned, and we were back at the point from which we had started, still no more than half-way to Krithia and Achi Baba.

 

Encouraged by his successful defence Colonel von Sodenstern ordered another general night attack for the night of May 2. On this occasion the weight of the blow fell on the

 

April 25-May 4, 1915

THE BLACK SEA FLEET

 

French, who drove off the Turks with heavy losses. A further attack ou the following night was equally unprofitable and General von Sanders prohibited any further offensive operations, and directed that the troops were to be devoted to strengthening the Krithia-Achi Baba position.

 

The enemy's altered tactics were soon detected, and in spite of all our men had gone through, and serious as was the shortage of ammunition, General Hamilton felt it was impossible to leave the situation as it was. The Turks could be seen hard at work with spade and wire, and it was clear that if they were left alone till our reinforcements arrived they would soon have a continuous line of formidable defences between our front and Achi Baba. It was also evident that since the French had withdrawn from Kum Kale the enemy was passing troops across from the Asiatic side. Some of them had even taken part in the previous night's attack. Still more disquieting was intelligence that troops were moving from the Adrianople district to Constantinople, said there was now little hope that a Russian demonstration could be counted on to hold them there.

 

On April 28 the Admiralty had been informed from Petrograd that the Caucasian Army Corps, which we had been given to understand had been embarked at Sevastopol, had been landed. It was stated that they could be re-embarked in ten hours, but in view of the great effort which the Germans were known to be on the eve of making in Galicia, it was not likely that the force would be available, and whatever deterrent effect it may ever have had on German plans in Constantinople it would now be negligible for a considerable time.

 

The only help could come from the Black Sea fleet, and Admiral de Robeck lost no time in begging Admiral Ebergard to exert the utmost pressure he could upon the Bosporus to check the flow of reinforcements to Gallipoli. Already, simultaneously with our landing on April 25, he had carried out a bombardment off the Bosporus with fourteen pennants. To the new request he responded by repeating the demonstration on May 2, this time with seventeen ships, and firing for two hours on the entrance forts, as well as those at the Kava Narrows. The following day he dealt with the right flank of the Chatalja lines and the adjacent coast forts. On the 4th sweeping operations and a reconnaissance were carried out further north in Inada Bay, a well-known landing-place within the Turkish frontier. The intention was to return next day to the Bosporus for a renewal of the bombardment, but a break in the weather rendered further operations impossible.

 

It was all the Russians could do, and we could scarcely hope that such operations would have much more effect upon the situation at Gallipoli. Current doctrine taught that, without a potent military force behind it, a mere naval menace could be ignored, and of such potent forces there was little prospect. On May 1 the great Austro-German counter-thrust in Galicia had begun, and it was developing with such crushing force that the Caucasian Corps at Sevastopol had to be hurriedly absorbed into the resistance. In spite of this bar to Russian combined action we now know, from official statements, that the Turks regarded the menace as too serious to be ignored. The unreal demonstration worked as it had so often done before in past wars, and for two months longer the three divisions and the heavy guns which had been assigned to the defence of the Bosporus area were kept where they were.

 

From our own effort to cut the Turkish communications, there was at present no sure promise of affecting the situation. So far as the land route was concerned, the unremitted naval observation of the Bulair neck was enough to prevent the road being used. But the sea route down the Marmara, in spite of all the skill and daring our submarines had been displaying, was still open. Much had been hoped from them, but the difficulties were too great. The French submarines had not sufficient range of action to reach the Marmara, and the Bernoulli, in trying to operate above the Narrows, was caught in the current and swept out again. The second French boat that went in was the Joule, commanded by a worthy scion of the famous naval family of du Petit-Thouars, but she unhappily got foul of a mine, and was destroyed with all hands. This was on May 1 and became known two days later; at the same time there were reports which could not be doubted that the Australian boat (AE.2) had fallen to a destroyer in the Marmara and that her crew were prisoners. She had, in fact, been caught on April 30 near the Island of Marmara by a torpedo boat — the Sultan Hissar — and after a gallant fight lasting two hours was sunk, but all her crew were saved by the enemy.

 

Lieutenant-Commander E. C. Boyle in E.14 was now alone. He had begun well. At dawn on April 27, after negotiating the minefields, he ran past Chanak on the surface, with all the forts firing on him. About the Narrows a number of steamboats were seen to be patrolling, and amongst them a torpedo gunboat. This ship he selected for attack. The result was a large column of water flung up as high as her mast. It could only mean a hit, but he could not wait to

 

April 27-May 1, 1915

E.14 IN THE MARMARA

 

see more, for he was aware of men in a small boat trying to seize hold of his periscope — an unusual method of attack, which he had to avoid by diving. After mastering the dangerous swirls of the current round Nagara Point, he proceeded to cruise in the eastern opening of the Straits, but here he was so industriously hunted by destroyers, torpedo boats and patrolling steamers that he had to keep constantly submerged, and was scarcely allowed to be on the surface long enough to charge his batteries. As it was, he had one of his periscopes smashed by gun-fire, and for the rest of his cruise he had to make shift with the other.

 

Not till the afternoon of the third day (April 29) did he have another chance. Three destroyers were seen coming from the eastward escorting two troopships. It was glassy calm, so that the destroyers could not fail to see his periscope. Yet he attacked, but had to dive before seeing the result. An explosion was felt, and when half an hour later he ventured to come to the surface, there was only one transport with the destroyers. The other was making for the shore at Sari Keui, with dense clouds of yellow smoke pouring from her. That evening he met the Australian boat. She had a tale of bad luck to tell and had only one torpedo left. They arranged to meet next morning, but the patrols prevented their communicating and they never came together again.

 

As for E.14 she still could do nothing, so active was the hunt for her. At last, on May 1, seeing no transports moving, and exasperated by the attention of her pursuers, she determined to attack one to teach them caution. A small gunboat fitted apparently as a minelayer was the victim. She was fairly hit and sank in less than a minute, and so she avenged the loss of her Australian consort. A larger gunboat was then attacked, but the torpedo did not run straight and she tried to ram. The effort was parried and another torpedo fired, but the glassy sea revealed its track too clearly, and by using her helm smartly she was able in her turn to avoid it. After that the patrols were less bold, but still the sea was too calm and the look-out posts ashore too vigilant for the boat to do any positive mischief. She did, no doubt, act as a disturbing influence, though she could not entirely stop the flow of reinforcements even in the Sea of Marmara, and the line across the Straits was entirely open.

 

This was the more to be regretted, for it was of the utmost importance that the enemy should not be allowed to develop further force before our next attack was delivered. Every day's delay must increase his strength in the Achi Baba position, and reluctantly the General felt he must call on the shattered brigades for one more effort. After a week's almost incessant fighting by night and day and under peculiarly trying conditions they could not be expected to do it without help, and help they were to have.

 

Up at Gaba Tepe at dawn on May 2, the Colne and Usk with a party of New Zealanders on board, had made a raid on Suvla Bay, and surprising an observation post on Nibrunesi Point, had destroyed it and returned with most of the occupants prisoners. In the evening, under cover of a heavy and effective fire from the ships, an attack was made in force on the Turkish trenches, and though it did not achieve all that was hoped, the effect was to advance and strengthen the Anzacs' position. So good, indeed, was their situation, that General Hamilton felt he could without undue risk make use of his advantage of the sea to give him what was wanted in the southern area. General Birdwood was therefore called upon to provide two brigades.

 

The plan was to shift them secretly and in the dead of night on board destroyers and minesweepers, and land them at W Beach in time for the attack. The original idea was that the transfer should be carried out on the night of the 4th, but the operation was postponed to allow of five batteries being shifted first. Moreover, for the night of the 4th Admiral Thursby had planned a raid similar to the last to destroy another observation station which evidently existed on Gaba Tepe. A small force of about 100 infantry had been placed at his disposal, and he detailed for their inshore support four destroyers, Colne, Chelmer, Usk and Ribble, and the steam pinnaces of the Triumph and Dartmouth, with the Bacchante and Dartmouth as attending ships. While it was still dark the tows were taken close to the north shore of the cape, and at the first glimmer of dawn the boats rowed in. But this time the surprise failed. As they neared the beach they were received with so heavy a fire that on landing they could only take cover under the high bank. It was then found that the place was so strongly occupied and heavily wired that the slender force was quite unequal to doing anything more. At 6.30, under cover of the destroyers' fire, the men were taken off again with very little loss, and Gaba Tepe continued to be a thorn in the side of General Birdwood's force.

 

May 5, the day fixed for the embarkation of the two brigades for Helles, was the day the weather broke, and, as we have seen, prevented Admiral Eborgard from resuming his demonstration off the Bosporus. The night came on dark and stormy. The Admiral had ordered that the eight destroyers and six fleet-sweepers which were to effect

 

May 5-6, 1915

A SECRET SHIFT OF FORCE

 

the operation should arrive in daylight, in order that final arrangements for the delicate task could be made. So high, however, were wind and sea that they were delayed till after dark, but Captain Coode, who as Captain (D) had charge of the arrangements, sent their commanders forward in the Amethyst. The Admiral was thus able to give them their orders in time, but it was not till 11.30, when the moon was already up, that the embarkation could begin.

 

Thanks, however, to the unremitting and harmonious toil of the beach and fatigue parties of the two services, there were now seven piers and a good beach available from which nearly 3,000 men could be embarked at each trip of the boats, and so well had the whole evolution been organised that by 2.0 a.m., in spite of the adverse conditions, the destroyers were away with the New Zealand brigade. The violent weather caused some delay in getting hold of the fleet-sweepers which were to convey the 2nd Australian Brigade, and it was not till 4.30, when day was breaking, that they started. On arrival, they were formed with a mixed naval brigade, composed of the Plymouth and Drake Battalions, into a new division, which General Hiunilton retained as his General Reserve. In addition to this increase of force, the Lancashire Fusiliers brigade of the East Lancashire Division had landed the previous afternoon, and the next brigade was close at hand.

 

It was this day. May 6, that the attack was to begin, and in the meantime the ships available to support had been sensibly reduced in number. In the evening of May 2, the Albion, who had only just come back from repairing the damage received on April 28, and was operating on the French right, had been hit from the Asiatic side so badly that she had to retire again to Mudros to make good defects. Next day the Prince George met a similar mishap. The Asiatic batteries, which had all along been her special care, had become very active, and during the morning she was holed by a 6" shell abaft her armour. She, too, had to retire to Mudros, and there the damage was found so serious as to oblige her to go on to Malta to be docked. The Agamemnon had therefore to be used to help the French keep down the Asiatic batteries, and as the Goliath was due to coal and the Latouche-Treville had exhausted her ammunition, Admiral Guepratte in the Jaureguiberry came in to help the Lord Nelson and Vengeance on the right flank. The Swiftsure and Euryalus were on their old stations at Tekke and Helles, while the Queen Elizabeth joined the Implacable and Sapphire on the left flank.

 

The attack was timed to begin at 11.0 a.m., for General Hunter-Weston felt unable to adopt the Commander-in-Chiefs suggestion of an advance before dawn. He preferred to rely on a preparative bombardment by sea and land; for his loss in regimental officers had been too great to permit of attempting to operate over such confused ground in the dark. Moreover, during the past three days the troops had had but little rest. They had been constantly disturbed by night attacks and by the fire of the flanking ships trying to check them. But, on the other hand, it was probable that the continual night attacks must have left the Turks even more exhausted for want of sleep than our own men. On the whole therefore the best chances of success were to be looked for in a daylight operation.

 

The general idea was to attack Krithia from the west and south-west, that is, to turn the Turkish right by pivoting the line on the French. After half an hour's bombardment, which was all that the supply of ammunition would permit, the advance began punctually, and the troops were quickly involved in heavy fighting. The resistance was very strong, and the number and disposition of the enemy's machine-guns made progress very slow. Still, some progress was made all along the line, except, unhappily, where it was most essential.

 

The left was being held up by a formidable redoubt or cluster of trenches close to Y Beach, and the fatal abandonment of that landing again declared itself. It was apparently somewhere behind the top of the precipitous cliff just north of the beach — afterwards known for good reason as " Gurkha Bluff " — but its exact position had been cleverly concealed. The weather was still too stormy for aircraft to work, and without their help neither the artillery nor the Sapphire could find it. In the end, an advance of from 200 to 300 yards was all that could be made, when about 4.30 the troops had orders to dig in in preparation for a renewal of the attack next day. The only real advantage was on the right, where the French, after hard fighting and with the assistance of the ships on that side, had made good a position on the Kereves ridge which would serve as an excellent pivot for the further development of the tactical plan.

 

It was clear, however, that unless the redoubt at Y Beach could be overcome the scheme must break down, and the military called on the Admiral to help. The attack was to be renewed at 10.0 next morning (May 7), and Admiral de Robeck at once ordered the Manica to meet him an hour earlier near Y Beach. The Talbot was also there, and Admiral Nicholson was summoned with the Swiftsure to assist. But neither from the kite balloon nor from the shore could any information be obtained as to the locality of the redoubt.

 

May 7, 1915

SECOND BATTLE OF KRITHIA

 

and they had to devote their fire mainly to the guns on Yazy Tepe — the height about 2,000 yards north of Krithia from which a gully ran down to the sea near Gurkha Bluff — this hill being the objective of the left that day. Then the Swiftsure closed in to see what she could do by searching the whole ground behind Gurkha Bluff with her 14-pounders. No ship had done better in co-operating with the military. She was one of the ships who had had an artillery officer allotted to assist in directing fire, and the results had been excellent.

 

Now, since the army advanced, these officers had been withdrawn ashore, and their loss was severely felt. All her efforts proved unavailing: owing to the height of the cliffs the ground immediately behind them could not be searched effectively, and in spite of all the ships could do the Lancashire Fusilier brigade, to whom the task of rushing the redoubt had been entrusted, found it impossible to get on. Elsewhere there had been substantial gain of ground. The French, who had lost the pivot position on the ridge over Kereves Dere in the night, had regained it by 3.0 in the afternoon, thanks, so the Turks state, to the ships having entirely destroyed the front trenches in this area.

 

General Hamilton now ordered an intensive bombardment for a quarter of an hour, to be followed by a general advance. The response of the weary troops was magnificent. In the centre and on the right, where the ship fire had also been very effective, trench after trench was rushed with the bayonet, nor did the men stop until the enemy had been pressed back nearly as far as Krithia, but till the extreme left got forward it was impossible to take advantage of it by a swing to the right; and towards Gurkha Bluff, though fresh troops had been poured into the sector between Zighin Dere and the sea, scarcely any progress had been made. More troops were brought up, but the redoubt remained intact, and the night closed in with the sea flank still held up, and the rest of the troops digging in on the ground their splendid work had won.

 

But what they had won was still far from enough. To pause now was to admit failure, and to call on the troops for yet another day's effort was no light thing, but there was no help for it, and the orders went out. The Lancashires on the left were relieved by the New Zealanders, and the General went in person to the critical point to direct the final effort. Another appeal went to the Admiral, and once more the Queen Elizabeth tried to find the redoubt, but again the kite balloon could not see it. At 10.30 a.m. the New Zealanders advanced to the attack, but met with strenuous opposition and made but little progress. It was now evident on this side that all that valour could do had been done; it was hopeless to break the enemy's hold on the bluff, and in desperation the General called up the Australians from the General Reserve and ordered an advance of the whole line.

 

Again it was to be prepared with a quarter of an hour's bombardment with all that the ships and artillery could throw in. The storm of shell began at 5.15, but at half-past it ceased, and then in a moment the whole plain was alive with bayonets glittering in the low sun. With loud cries the men rushed forward as keenly as though the fight had just begun, and quickly from shore to shore the opposing lines closed in a tumultuous melee beyond all that had yet been seen. Back and forward the wild struggle swayed in undiminished intensity till darkness fell. Then in sheer exhaustion it died away, and the ugly truth had to be faced. After a fortnight's effort, in which soldiers had done all that soldiers could do, the great combined attack on Achi Baba had culminated and we had failed.

 

Still something had been gained. The Allied line had been advanced some 600 yards on the right and 400 on the left and centre, and where space was so confined every little increase of elbow room had its value. Determined counterattacks during the succeeding nights testified how sensible the Turks were of what they had lost. Their efforts were as unavailing as costly, and the new line was held and entrenched, and even in some sections improved. Against the new French position the enemy's reaction had been specially violent. For two successive nights their struggle to dislodge our Allies had been incessant, but with the assistance of the Royal Naval Division and the support of the ships enfilading the Kereves Dere, the new ground overlooking it had been held and organised. The line now ran for about a mile up the western side of the Kereves Dere, and thence fairly straight across the peninsula to the Zighin Dere, opposite Y Beach, but there it was still bent back where the redoubt at Gurkha Bluff had held up our extreme left. Though the General now felt for the first time that he had a secure grip on the peninsula, he could not be satisfied till this defect in the position was made good.

 

Force having failed, he was resolved to try stratagem. His idea was, in effect, a variation of the coup de main which had originally been so successful. The coast section was now held by the Indian brigade, with the 6th Gurkhas on the sea flank, and to them was committed an operation which was after their own heart. While it was being prepared General Birdwood up at Anzac endeavoured to exert fresh

 

May 9-12, 1915

GURKHA BLUFF

 

pressure on the troops in front of him, and so perform his function of holding as much force as possible away from the Achi Baba front. On the 9th a smart local attack enabled him to seize new ground, but next day a violent counter-attack in superior strength compelled him to give it up.

 

While this was going on at Gaba Tepe a reconnaissance of Y Beach and its vicinity was carried out in the Sapphire by the military officers concerned with the coming attempt. It proved the bluff to be so difficult of access as to give good hope of a surprise, and no naval co-operation was asked for. The left of the Gurkhas was on the cliffs a little to the south of Y Beach. Just beyond the north end of it the bluff rose precipitously, with nothing to give a foothold except where the weather had scored its bare face with little runnels. The plan was for the men to climb down the cliff after dark, steal along the beach and then scale the steep face of the bluff.

 

It was work exactly suited to Gurkha methods, and creeping through the broken ground under the cliffs till the beach was passed, they began on hands and knees to crawl up the face of the bluff undetected. But the moment they reached the top they were met with so hot a fire that they had to return back whence they came. The surprise had failed, but the failure was not accepted. As a reconnaissance it was very valuable, for it revealed the unsuspected fact that a gully which formed a depression covered with scrub below the crown of the bluff was thick with well-concealed snipers and machine-gun posts enfilading the whole length of Y Beach. To deal with them naval co-operation was needed, and Admiral Nicholson was instructed to organise it, while the General arranged for a diversion ashore. For he was resolved to try again, this time with two ships in support.

 

The 11th was devoted to a joint reconnaissance, and this time, in order to get as close a view as possible, it was made in a destroyer. Every detail could thus be settled, and at 6.30 on the 12th, as night fell, the Gurkhas once more began to steal down the cliff. As they did so the Manchester brigade, which was inshore of the Indians, made a demonstration of attacking with heavy artillery support. In half an hour the double-company of the Gurkhas, which was to lead the attempt, was massed at the foot of the cliff, and when the moment came for them to leave their shelter to pass the beach the Dublin and Talbot began smothering the gully with salvoes at 1,600 yards. The effect was overwhelming; and in three-quarters of an hour the Gurkhas were able to reach the dead ground under the bluff without a casualty.

 

Then, as the men began the almost impossible ascent, the salvoes ceased, and in another quarter of an hour they were on the top unperceived. The military demonstration appears to have entirely distracted the enemy's attention. During the night the triumphant Gurkhas were able to entrench along the top of the cliff, while further companies were sent out to join them. By the morning they were so well establidied that they were able to occupy ground which gave us Y Beach once more and the bluff itself, and the whole left of the line was able to move up in conformity. So the desired position was made good. The whole affair had been brilliantly planned and executed, and once again it proved the truth of Wolfe's maxim that successful surprise need not always be looked for at the first coming on. Its happy result was that the whole position across the peninsula had been so far secured that it was possible to await in comparative security the solution of the new problems with which the Expeditionary Force was now faced.

 

 

---

 

 

CHAPTER XX

 

PROGRESS OF THE SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN AND LOSS OF THE LUSITANIA — THE ITALIAN CONVENTION — RESIGNATION OF LORD FISHER AND MR. CHURCHILL, AND FORMATION OF A COALITION GOVERNMENT

 

The breakdown of the second attempt to force the Turkish defences in Gallipoli constitutes a definite landmark in the progress of the war. The hope of rapidly completing the investment of the Central Powers and opening up our direct communications with Russia was at an end. Further progress by combined operations was out of the question without many more troops, and we were faced with the fact that to carry through the enterprise would mean a drain upon both our naval and our military resources beyond anything that had been originally contemplated. Standing alone it was a disturbing prospect, but it did not stand alone.

 

By a dramatic coincidence there had occurred simultaneously one of the outstanding tragedies of the submarine war against commerce which, for the time, overshadowed the really more vital check at the Dardanelles, and in its reactions intensified the difficulties of the problem. For it made suddenly patent how imperfect was the control of the sea which we had already won, and how exacting must be the struggle to perfect it. There could be no certainty that our maritime resources would be equal to the increased strain which a serious prolongation of the Dardanelles operations must entail, and it was clear they must be prolonged. The arrest of our offensive would permit the Turks to complete their defences, and future operations could only take the form of a regular siege like that of Port Arthur. That alone would mean a greatly increased weight upon our means of transport and supply, without the active interference of the enemy, to the menace of which we were at the moment so tragically awakened.

 

As yet neither at home nor at the Dardanelles had the possibilities of the submarine as a means of disputing the command of the sea made themselves felt except as an annoying irritation. In the Aegean constant rumours of

 

April-May, 1915

SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN

 

coming submarine interference had kept men alive to the profound difference it would make. We have seen how carefully Budrum, in the Gulf of Kos, was being watched on suspicion of its being prepared as a submarine base, but up to the middle of April all the reports proved false. After that, however, they began to increase in number and coherence, and there could be no doubt that the Germans were developing a systematic plan for getting submarines into the Eastern Mediterranean.

 

In Spain, near Vigo, a German subject was reported to be establishing a depot for their supply; before the end of the month intelligence from various quarters told of their presence in the Mediterranean, and of others coming down the coast of Portugal. On May 2 one was reported off Taormina, coming out of the Strait of Messina. It was doubtless a false alarm, but on May 6 torpedo-boat 92, of our Gibraltar Patrol, which on Admiralty orders had been sent to watch Alboran, fell in with one steering east forty miles west of the island.

(The Gibraltar Patrol at this time consisted of three armed boarding steamers and ten torpedo-boats. The Pelorus, which also belonged to it, had been detached on special duty. The submarine most have been U.21, the first to attempt to reach the Mediterranean. She left the Ems on April 25 under Lieut.-Commander Hersing, proceeding north-about to meet an oil ship "about half way" hence probably the suspected depot near Vigo. The oil proved unsuitable, but having just enough to reach Cattaro with luck, Lieut.-Commander Hersing went on and reached that port on May 13 with his fuel all but spent. Ten of the smaller "UB" class were also being sent by rail to Pola in sections. Three had already arrived—UB.3, 7 and 8— and were being assembled by German constructors. Gayer, Vol. II., p. 24.)

The submarine fired a torpedo, which missed, and the torpedo-boat was able to run over her twice, but had not draught enough to do her serious damage and she escaped. Next day this same boat, apparently, chased a British steamer south of Cartagena, which looked as though she were making for the Balearic Islands, where at Palma the Pelarus for six weeks past had been watching a suspicious German steamship equipped with wireless. (She was the Bremen s.s. Fangturm, 6,000 tons. She had been in Palma, Majorca, since the early days of the war, and continual protests to the Spanish Government had failed to get her wireless dismantled.)

 

To complete the impression of coming danger, the Austrian submarines had become so active in the Adriatic that they had forced a relaxation of the French blockade. Since the attack on the Jean Bart the blockade had been maintained by an advanced squadron of seven cruisers and a flotilla of destroyers. The system appeared to work well till the night of April 26-27, when the Gambetta, flying the flag of Admiral Senes was on patrol with two other cruisers. It was a brilliant moonlight night; and being then off the coast of Italy — so near that

 

April-May, 1915

U-BOATS IN THE ADRIATIC

 

she was periodically in the beam of a lighthouse — she had slowed down and sent off a boat to examine a sailing vessel. Before it returned a torpedo from an unseen submarine struck her with terrible effect. So quickly did she sink that every one of her officers perished at his post, and out of a complement of 714 only 186 were saved. As another ship of the squadron, the Waldeck-Rousseau, had narrowly missed the same fate not long before, it was now decided to leave the blockade patrol to the destroyers and to withdraw the cruisers to a supporting position. The comparative weakness of the arrangement quickly declared itself.

 

Austrian submarines, emboldened by success, began to appear off Corfu, and on May 6 — the day our torpedo-boat 92 had her encounter near Alboran — one of the newest Austrian light cruisers was sighted outside the Adriatic in the open sea between Cephalonia and the Calabrian coast. She was chased by the French cruiser Jules Ferry and the destroyer Bisson, but neither was fast enough to overhaul her, and she got away to the northward. Seeing how many of our transports were passing through the Mediterranean, this was a new source of anxiety, and it was destined to have a marked effect on the distribution of our Mediterranean Squadron. Representations were made to the French Admiralty as to the importance of preventing such movements, and Admiral Peirse as well as Admiral Limpus at Malta were warned to take precautions against submarine attack on the transports, but this they were already doing so far as their resources permitted. They were slender enough, but in view of what was threatening at home it was difficult to increase them.

 

There, after a period of comparative quiescence, the expected increase of the enemy's submarine effort was declaring itself. April began like March, with a week of considerable activity, during which five British and three Allied ships were sunk, and a new development in inhumanity, which the Germans seemed to have abandoned since the first month of the war, recurred. Early in April five British fishing craft, a class of vessel which the French and ourselves, even in our bitterest days, had always held immune, were destroyed by submarines. After that the activity died down for a time. In the second week only three British and two Allied ships were sunk, but one of the British losses was a particularly bad case, for she was the Harpalyce, a Belgian relief ship, sunk off the North Hinder lightvessel, with the loss of fifteen lives. A Dutch vessel, the Katwijk, was also sunk without warning in the same vicinity, although it was within the zone which the German warning had declared free

 

April, 1915

SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN

 

from danger. (For the Katwijk the German Government afterwards tendered an apology.)

 

Besides the above, very few attacks were reported, but one from the locality in which it occurred was of exceptional boldness. It was off St. Catherine's, in the Isle of Wight, upon the tug Homer, with a French barque in tow. To an order from the submarine to cast her off the tug replied with a spirited attempt to ram, and though she was subjected to a hot fire, both she and the barque escaped.

 

For the rest of the month the attack slackened. A few more fishing craft were destroyed, but after two more unsuccessful attempts by aircraft that form of attack also appeared to have ceased. Still, though the losses during April were small compared with what the Germans seem to have expected, they were serious enough to cause anxiety for the future, since it was probable the respite was due to the submarines having returned to prepare for further operations. During the month eleven British merchant ships had been lost, measuring 22,000 tons. Of these there were sunk without warning four ships, with the loss of thirty-eight lives, besides two fishing craft, with the loss of eighteen, and in one of these cases, the Vanilla, the submarine actually prevented the crew from being rescued by another trawler. The Allied ships sunk numbered six and the neutrals the same, one of than being a Greek vessel torpedoed without warning in the declared '' free zone " near the North Hinder.

 

In the Channel, after the middle of the month, there were no sinkings at all, and it began to look as though our measures to close the Straits of Dover to submarines were proving successful, in spite of their defects. This impression we now know was correct. Early in the month U.32 on her way to the Channel, fouled a net, and though she broke through she did not venture to return the way she came. On her report, although another boat had got clear through at the same time and returned by proceeding on the surface at night, the Dover route was absolutely forbidden by the German Admiralty. All were to go north-about, and operations in the southern area were confined to a new class of small submarine known as " UB," of which a " Flanders Flotilla '' was being formed at Ostend and Zeebrugge. Three of these '' UB" boats were at work in the first half of the month with some success, but their construction proved so faulty that they had to be withdrawn for overhauling. Unaware of the success his measures had gained Admiral Hood was far from content. The indicator nets were giving constant

 

April-May, 1915

CHANNEL DEFENCE

 

trouble. On April 7 he reported that almost every day some of them were carried away by submarines without the buoys indicating. But glass balls were now coming forward for floats, and an improved indicator buoy had been found. The great Folkestone-Gris Nez boom, in spite of every kind of difficulty, was progressing, and other measures more offensive in character were being taken. On April 8 two new cross-Channel steamers, the Prince Edward and Queen Victoria, which had been fitted for laying wire nets at high speed, made their first venture off Ostend, under escort of two destroyers. It proved a complete success. At break of day they ran out about one and three-quarter miles of nets in twelve minutes within range of the batteries, but so smartly was the work done that it was completed before the guns opened fire, and both net-layers got away untouched. With this operation Admiral Hood's connection with the Dover Patrol ceased. The following day he was appointed to the Irish squadron, and on the 18th Admiral Bacon took his place.

 

The apparent success of the recent measures was the more welcome, for in the last half of the month three more divisions of the Territorial force (the West Riding, the Northumbrian and the Highland) were crossing to France, and with the lengthening days the transports could not make the whole passage in the dark hours. The West Riding Division began to move on April 13 and the Northumbrian on the 17th, partly from Southampton and partly from Folkestone; the Highland Division followed in the last week of the month, and all crossed without interference. (Some battalions of these divisions had already crossed.)

 

During May the pressure on these routes was to continue. For besides the usual drafts and stores, three New Army divisions (the IXth Scottish, the XlVth and the XIIth), which were now ready for service, were to go over to France. Before they sailed a new form of protection had begun to be tried. It took the form of deep mine-fields in the usual lurking places of the enemy's submarines. One of these was laid off Beachy Head on April 24, and one off Dartmouth on May 2. But, as we now know, no enemy submarines were permitted to enter the Channel at this time; and again the troops, mainly in small fast steamers and by night, were put across, to the number of about 100,000 men, without accident. In the other area which had caused so much anxiety — that is, Area XVII, in which lay the North Channel and the approaches to Glasgow, Liverpool and Belfast — success seemed no less assured. Here on April 2 Rear-Admiral

 

April, 1915

SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN

 

The Hon. R. F. Boyle had succeeded Admiral Barlow. He had then at his disposal about 80 drifters, a number which was raised to about 180 by the end of the month. Although the North Channel between the Mull of Cantyre and the Antrim coast is barely eleven miles across— little more than half the width of the Straits of Dover — it required twice the length of net.

 

The reason was, that while in the Straits the accumulation of wrecks and the comparatively shoal water made it difficult for submarines to get through by diving under the nets, in the North Channel the depth averages about seventy fathoms, and diving under a single line of nets was a simple matter. The problem had therefore to be tackled on a different principle. It was dealt with by a system designed not so much to entangle the submarines, as to force them to keep beneath the surface for so long that their batteries would be exhausted. To this end a netted area was arranged. It was a parallelogram twenty miles long by twelve miles wide, touching Rathlin Island with its north-west angle, and extending ten miles each way from the narrowest part of the Channd.

 

In this area with the large number of drifters available it was possible, weather permitting, to keep four or five lines of nets athwart the fairway, and as it was also patrolled, it was practically impossible for a submarine to come to the surface for at least twenty miles. The arrangement was completed by the patrol areas which extended five miles beyond either end of the netted area. The idea was that the patrol vessels would force the submarines to dive at least five miles before reaching the netted area and to remain submerged till they were five miles clear of it. In this manner a submerged run of thirty miles would be forced upon them, which would leave them so far exhausted that on rising they would have little chance of escaping the patrol vessels. For the trade a passage was left between Rathlin Island and the mainland and so down the Antrim coast. It was only three miles wide, and could therefore be easily patrolled, but for the present the area was left undisturbed, and the merits of the system were not put to the proof.

 

(Admiral Boyle organised his drifters into nine sections, with at first nine and afterwards twelve drifters in each, six sections working, and three resting. Each drifter could hold half a mile of net, so that it was eventually possible to keep thirty-six miles of nets in action. The northern end was patrolled by the Belfast armed yacht squadron, the southern by three armed trawler units, the netted area by two destroyers and the armed boarding steamer Tara. To maintain this patrol service he had four destroyers of the 8th Flotilla and three Auxiliary Patrol units. These were over and above the Clyde and Liverpool patrols.)

 

April, 1915

SOUTHERN TRANSPORT LINE

 

It was apparent, in fact, that the Germans were turning their attention to another quarter. Submarines were constantly reported in St. George's Channel and the western approaches to the English Channel. Quite apart from the danger to the ordinary trade, it was an area that was calling for special attention as being the starting-point of our communications to the Dardanelles. When on April 8 General Peyton's Mounted division began to leave Avonmouth for Egypt, a large submarine had been moving in the entrance to the Bristol Channel and near Scilly. Others were reported off the south-east of Ireland. (Probably U.32 and U.24, the boat that passed the Straits with her.)

 

The provision of escort had been difficult, and even though the transports sailed by twos and threes, it had been found impossible to give them destroyer convoy further than forty miles west of Lundy Island. The result was that one of them, as she was passing Scilly, was torpedoed. She succeeded in getting into Queenstown, and there her troops were transferred to another ship. Four days previous to this it had been decided that no more troops should leave Avonmouth. Plymouth was to be substituted as the port of embarkation for long-distance voyages, so that not only would the transports have the protection of the patrols in Area XIV, but the destroyers would have less distance to cover in convoying them to a safe distance and escort would therefore be a simpler matter.

 

Hitherto the area, though well furnished with six patrol units and thirty-six drifters, had not been giving satisfaction. Ships had been harassed and even sunk, especially off Scilly, with impunity, and as the result of a report which Lord Fisher called for, it was reorganised in the middle of the month. On April 15 the Commander-in-Chief at Devonport was informed that the whole area was to be under Captain Valentine Phillimore, who, with his office at Falmouth, would work it in four sections, with sub-bases at Penzance, Falmouth, Plymouth and St. Mary's, Scilly. The Scilly section was to have a yacht and two and a half patrol units, and the other three sections a yacht and one and a half units, and a wireless station was to be set up at St. Mary's.

 

By the end of April, then, the Auxiliary Patrol had made considerable progress both in numbers and organisation, but its efficiency was still hampered by the difficulty of finding sufficient wireless operators and guns. Besides the regular flotillas there were now in Home waters about sixty armed yachts and over five hundred trawlers and drifters, and twenty more yachts and a hundred more trawlers and drifters were being fitted out. These figures did not include the

 

April, 1915

SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN

 

minesweepers, boom defence vessels, or motor-boats, so that with the fifty trawlers at the Dardanelles the total number of auxiliary small craft in commission was already well over 1,500.

 

Two-thirds of the patrol vessels and minesweepers were employed in North Scottish waters and the North Sea, but nearly all the net drifters were assigned to the Straits of Dover, the Western Channel and the Irish Sea, in order to protect our ocean trade and the communications of the army, against which the enemy had seemed to be concentrating his main effort. But it soon became clear that he was extending his sphere of action. The increased size of his new submarines enabled him to turn the well-defended Straits of Dover by going north-about. They had already appeared near St. Kilda, and by the end of the month there could be no doubt that a number of these vessels were passing that way into the Atlantic. The menace to the all-important 10th Cruiser Squadron, on which our whole policy of blockade depended, could not be dismissed. Admiral de Chair's hard-worked ships were still based on Liverpool and the Clyde, and the long passage to and from their exhausting vigil was no longer safe. One of them, the Oropesa, had already encountered and driven off a submarine near Skerryvore, and it had become necessary for Admiral de Chair to seek some place further north where a coaling station could be established.

 

Nor could Admiral Jellicoe be less anxious about his own communications. His supply ships were passing up by the west coast of Ireland; on April 28 one of them, the collier Mobile, was torpedoed off the Butt of Lewis, and next day another, the Cherbury, sunk near Eagle Island, the usual landfall on the coast of Mayo. Owing to pressing preoccupations elsewhere the Hebrides Patrol (Area I) had not yet received the full number of craft assigned to it, and he had to ask for it to be reinforced by twelve trawlers. But it was soon clear that the danger extended further. On the 30th the Russian s.s. Svorono was reported sunk off the Blaskets, in the south-west of Ireland, and close by, apparently the same submarine, destroyed another collier transport, the Fulgent.

 

Further down there was even greater activity, and by May 1 three more ships had been caught in the vicinity of Scilly, one of which had an importance far beyond its local effect. It was a large oil-tanker, the Gulflight, and was the first American ship to fall a victim to the U-boats. Though she was successfully towed into Scilly her master lost his life. For a while opinion in the United States smarted

 

May, 1915

NORTH AMERICAN ROUTE

 

under the outrage, and though no immediate action ensued, the seed was sown from which great things were destined to follow.

 

With us the extension of activity meant a reconsideration of our system of protection. The Grand Fleet supply ships were now directed to proceed by the Irish Channel and the Minch, but they would still be exposed as they left the English Channel and its approaches. The weak point in these western waters was Area XXI, which took in the south coast of Ireland from the Blaskets to Camsore Point, at the entrance of St. George's Channel. Though it covered the landfall of the main route from New York, the calls of other areas had been more pressing, and as yet it had been given only four weak units, each consisting of an armed yacht and four trawlers. Three of the units were based at Queenstown and one at Berehaven. Hitherto the liners frequenting the route had relied for safety mainly on their speed and the general Admiralty instructions, the chief of which were to keep a mid-channel course, to avoid approaching headlands, to make their port if possible at dawn, and when in infested waters to adopt the expedient of zigzagging.

 

So far these precautions had sufficed, but when, in the first week of May, it became obvious that the area was dangerously infested, one of these ships, the largest and fastest of them all, became a source of special anxiety. She was the Lusitania, due off Queenstown on May 7. Since in the early days of the war she had been returned to the Cunard Company as unsuitable for an auxiliary cruiser, she had been running as a passenger ship, and though her boiler power had been reduced enough to make the venture cover expenses, she still remained the fastest ship on the Atlantic. In this way she had already made five round trips with impunity, but this time the Germans were openly threatening to sink her. On the eve of her leaving New York warnings, subsequently traced to the German Government, were issued advising travellers not to take passage in her, but seeing that she carried over 1,250 passengers, of whom 159 were Americans, it was scarcely credible that the threat would be put in force, and no extra precautions were taken beyond giving her special warning as she approached the danger area.

 

The enemy's activity in it became every day more evident. On May 4 a ship reported being attacked off the Fastnet, but the torpedo missed. It was not known till next day, and then the Lusitania was informed that submarines were active off the south coast of Ireland, and the Berehaven section of the Queenstown Patrol was ordered to search the

 

May 7, 1915

SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN

 

Fastnet area. The same evening a sailing vessel was lost off the Old Head of Kinsale. Shortly before noon on the 6th, another ship, the Candidate, was sunk south of the Coningbeg lightship, off Waterford, that is, at the east end of the Queenstown area, and a couple of hours later another, the Centurion, was caught near the same spot. (All these vessels appear to have been sunk by U.20, which left Borkum on April 20.)

 

In the course of the day submarines were also reported close off Queenstown, and off Castletownsend to the westward. All ships were now warned, the Lusitania amongst them, and again cautioned to avoid headlands and steer a mid-channel course. At the moment only ten vessels of the units based on Queenstown were available. Three trawlers were working in the Fastnet section, four where the Coningbeg sinkings had occurred, and three were patrolling the coast between the two groups, with a motor boat off the Old Head of Kinsale. Of the Berehaven unit one boat was patrolling south of Mizen Head, and another guarding the cables off Valencia. From the Milford area there were also two units working north and south from the Coningbeg lightship.

 

During the morning of the 7th numerous reports came in from look-out stations of submarines sighted at various points along the coast from Waterford to Cape Clear. At 11.25 the Lusitania was again warned. She was just then entering the danger zone, keeping approximately her ordinary course, except that, having received warning the previous day that submarines were off the Fastnet, her usual landfall, she was steering to give it a wide berth. At 8 a.m. she had reduced speed from 21 knots to 18, so as to reach the Liverpool bar at early dawn, when the tide would serve for crossing it. A few minutes later she ran into fog and the captain reduced 3 knots more, and began blowing his siren. Shortly before noon she ran into clear weather again, and increased to 18 knots. As the horizon cleared. Brow Head came into view abaft the port beam, but since the captain did not feel quite certain as to its identity, at 12.40 he altered course to port to close the land, in order to fix his position accurately. This was essential. His last warning was that other submarines were off Coningbeg. When last seen they were twenty miles to seaward of it, and he had therefore decided to pass it close inshore. As he was altering course another message was passed to him through Valencia saying that submarines had been seen that morning south of Cape Clear, which was now thirty miles astern. Accordingly, feeling himself well clear of that danger, he held on till, at l.40, the Old Head

 

May 7, 1915

LOSS OF THE LUSITANIA

 

of Kinsale came in sight to port. He then returned to his original course, which would take him past the headland at a distance of about ten miles.

(There was a conflict of evidence on this point. The captain put it at not less than fifteen, the other witnesses at from eight to ten. The balance of direct and indirect evidence points to the lower figure as correct.)

The weather was now quite clear and the sea calm. Nothing was in sight but the motor-boat patrol off Kinsale, when at 2.15, as the passengers were coming on deck after luncheon, the track of a torpedo was seen to starboard. It took the great liner amidships and exploded with deafening violence; another following immediately hit her well aft; there was a second explosion, and she began at once to take a heavy list. Some on board declared another was then fired from the port side. If this was so, it missed, possibly because the captain had ordered the helm hard over to make for the land, but the huge ship, gigantic as she was, had already had enough. The engines stopped, and in twenty minutes she plunged down head foremost and was gone.

(The submarine which sank her was afterwards ascertained to be U.20, Lieutenant-Commander Schwieger. His end was in U.88, when on September 17, 1917, she was sunk by the "Q" ship Stonecrop. The Germans maintained that only one torpedo was fired and that the second erplosion was due to a consignment of high explosives. If this had been so she would, of course, have been blown to pieces. But in fact she carried no ammunition except 5,500 cases of rifle cartridge and shrapnel of a total weight of only 173 tons. They were stowed right forward, where a torpedo hitting her amidships or astern could not have affected them. Captain Schwieger seems to have reported that he refrained from firing a second torpedo because he saw there were so many passengers to be saved. Gayer, II., p. 26.)

The suddenness of her end, combined with the heavy list, which interfered with the lowering of the boats, made the work of life-saving lamentably difficult. Vessels of all kinds flocked to the spot at her first cry for help— among them Admiral Hood, the new commander of the Irish Coast Station, in the Juno, which had just put into Queenstown — but when it was known how quickly the lost ship had sunk he was recalled. The rest held on, but in spite of all they could do the loss of life was appalling. Her crew and passengers numbered within two score of 2,000 souls, and of these there perished of men, women and children no less than 1,198. Never had there been such a war loss on the sea; never one which so violently outraged the laws of war and dictates of humanity. The Germans justified their act on the plea that she carried some 5,000 cases of small arm ammunition and shrapnel. This was true. But even so by every accepted canon it would not warrant the destruction of a ship whose chief freight was non-combatant

 

May 7-10, 1915

SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN

 

passengers, and least of all her destruction without warning. In further defence of the indefensible the Gennans asserted she was armed as a cruiser. This was not true. She was not even armed defensively.

 

As the news spread it was received throughout the world with a shudder. In America the loss of so many of her citizens brought her to the brink of war, but for that the time was not yet ripe. At home its moral effect was a keener sense of the deepening intensity of the struggle, a heightened faith in the justice of our cause, and a passionate determination to greater effort, which displayed itself in a suddenly increased flow of recruits both for land and sea. In Germany there was loud exultation over the lesson they had given us, but what we learnt from it was not what they sought to teach, and in the national sentiment the Lusitania took her place beside Belgium as a symbol of faith in the crusade on which we had embarked.

 

For those on whose shoulders rested the conduct of the war it could only bring a heavier sense of responsibility, and it was while the shock of the outrage was tingling that the news of the failure at Gallipoli came in. The first suggestion for breaking the deadlock came from the navy. Experience had shown that the fleet could do little to help the army against trenches and machine-guns, but amongst the Naval Staff on the spot there was a strong opinion that it could help in another way. Their belief was, now that they had reorganised the sweeping flotilla and brought it to a high state of efficiency, they could rush the Straits without reducing the batteries, and establish a powerful force in the Sea of Marmara. They were eager to try, but in the eyes of Admiral de Robeck the chance of overcoming the difficulty in this way did not justify the risk. Seeing what the spirit of the Turkish resistance had proved to be, and how it must now be heightened by success, he did not believe that the presence of a more or less maimed fleet in the Sea of Marmara could produce any decisive effect. The Straits would certainly be closed behind it, and an enforced return when supplies were exhausted might well mean a disaster, which would place the whole expedition in jeopardy.

 

On these lines he submitted an appreciation to the Admiralty for decision (May 10). There the idea of another naval attack could not be entertained, for quite apart from the Admiral's doubts there were other considerations which forbade it. The chief of these was the adhesion of Italy to the Entente; instead of relieving our burden in the Mediterranean, as might have been expected, the effect was

 

April 14-26, 1915

THE ITALIAN CONVENTION

 

to increase it materially. After prolonged negotiations, which turned mainly on the ultimate allocation of the Dalmatian coast and its fringe of islands, it was left to the British Government to suggest a compromise. On April 14 their proposals were accepted, and an agreement had been come to on April 26 by which Italy undertook to declare war on Austria within a month. Of help in the Dardanelles it gave no hope. Russia was opposed to seeing Italy operating against Turkish territory, and Italy herself was naturally bent on concentrating her efforts upon her special objects in the Trentino and the Adriatic. The agreement provided for a naval convention between France, Italy and Great Britain, the terms of which were delegated to a naval conference to be held in Paris, and Sir Henry Jackson, with the Assistant Director of Operations, went over to attend it. His instructions were based on a memorandum which had been drawn up by the First Lord the day the Dalmatian compromise was accepted — that is, a fortnight earlier, when the Dardanelles expedition was reconcentrating in the Aegean for the combined attack.

 

The memorandum provided for an Adriatic fleet, to be commanded by the Duke of the Abruzzi. It was to be mainly Italian, but was to be reinforced by four French battleships and a flotilla, and also by four British battleships and four light cruisers as soon as the Dardanelles and Bosporus were open. But from the first certain difficulties arose which rendered an arrangement on this basis impossible. The plan which the Italians presented was based entirely on the Allied fleet being used to give direct support to the Italian army as it advanced at the head of the Adriatic. For this they wished to have the Allied fleet divided into two squadrons, one to go up the Adriatic to act on the right of the army, the other to cover the base at Brindisi. But when it came to the question of who should command, there was a deadlock. For moral and political reasons both the French and the Italians found it impossible to give way. In neither country would national sentiment endure to see their ships commanded by a foreign Admiral, and it was left to the British representatives to find a way out.

 

The strategical objections which they found in the Italian plan indicated a line of compromise. They had already pointed out that to attempt to operate with a fleet at the head of the Adriatic, in the immediate vicinity of the enemy's chief naval bases, was little short of suicide. To prevent interference from the enemy's fleet in those narrow waters they could well trust to their flotillas and submarines. The

 

May 10, 1915

THE ITALIAN CONVENTION

 

British proposal, then, was to form for the support of the flotillas an advanced squadron mainly composed of Italian heavy and light cruisers (the Italians had no battle cruisers of British type, but the San Marco and San Giorgio carried 2-10" and 8-7.5''; the Amalfi and Pisa had 4-10'' and 8-7.5"; three others were armed with 1-10", 2-8'' and 14-6';' the first four were designed for 23 knots, the last three for 20 knots), which would operate in the Adriatic under the Duke of the Abruzzi, while the French Admiral remained in command of the battle fleet to support him, and to blockade the Straits of Otranto. But this arrangement, although it gave the most active functions to the Italians, did not satisfy them. Their alternative proposal was to form two fleets, separately commanded, their own to act north of the Straits of Otranto, the French to the south, and if the two had occasion to act together the supreme command would be determined by the area in which the combined fleet was operating.

 

Besides the obvious objections to such a scheme of alternating command, there was the difficulty that without the assistance of their Allies the Italians could not form a fleet capable of assisting their army and protecting their coasts and trade. The French, however, while ready to lend a destroyer flotilla, were still unable to see their way to placing ships of force under the Italian flag. Little hope as there was of the Italian Government accepting such a solution, a draft convention on these lines was submitted to them, but they felt compelled to reject it. The deadlock was now complete, and the British alone could unloose it. There was only one way. It would mean a serious dislocation of our plans, but, heavy as our responsibilities were in the Mediterranean, it had to be done for the common cause.

 

As the sole means of saving the situation we offered to reinforce the Duke of the Abruzzi's fleet at once with a division of four battleships, and also with a squadron of four light cruisers from the Dardanelles, as soon as the French replaced them with an equal number of cruisers. This the French had undertaken to do, and also to increase the number of their battleships at the Dardanelles as soon as possible to six. The French further agreed to place at the Duke of the Abruzzi's disposal twelve destroyers and as many torpedo boats, submarines and mine-sweepers as their Commander-in- Chief could spare, and, if possible, a seaplane carrier with a squadron of seaplanes, The Convention thus provided for two fleets, independently commanded, but with co-ordinated functions, and in this form it was signed on May 10, the same day that Admiral de Robeck's submission deprecating

 

May, 1915

THE WESTERN FRONT

 

another naval attempt to force the Dardanelles reached the Admiralty.

 

The actual situation in the Mediterranean which Ministers had before them when it came to hand was that the difficulty of reconciling the divergent views of our Allies had involved a lamentable waste of strength. Of active ships of force, the Austrians had only three or possibly four Dreadnoughts, six other battleships, two cruisers and six light cruisers, only four of which were up to date. Against this the Italians would have an active fleet of four or five Dreadnoughts, five other battleships, seven cruisers, of which five carried 10'' guns, and five light cruisers, with two more nearly ready, while the French, except in light cruisers, would be still more powerful.

 

From a purely strategical and tactical point of view, therefore, this dispersion of our force was probably unnecessary, but the needs of the new situation in the Adriatic were by no means the only exigency which the British Government had to consider in coming to a decision about the Dardanelles. The naval outlook at this juncture was disturbed by military reactions. The battle of Ypres, which had followed the German gas attack, was just dying out, the casualties had been very heavy, and we had lost a large part of the famous salient to the retention of which so much had been sacrificed. Further down the line, moreover, we were committed to a new and extensive operation. The French, with the idea of relieving the pressure on the Russians, had opened a strong offensive in Artois, and we had undertaken a complementary attack towards Lille. The resistance of the Germans was proving very strong, and it was only too clear that the sanguine expectation that they were becoming exhausted by the gigantic efforts they had made must be abandoned.

 

The opening attack of May 9 on Aubers Ridge had proved that since Neuve Chapelle the Germans had had time to develop a new and highly effective system of defence upon which we could make little impression, and simultaneously with the news of our check in Gallipoli it was known that our offensive in Flanders had completely failed. All hope of breaking through had to be given up, and the subsequent operations took the less ambitious form of pressure in support of the French attack. This was proving a little more successful, but was far from promising a break in the enemy's line. The military authorities at home had therefore come to the conclusion that there was nothing to be done in the main theatre for some time to come except stand on the defensive.

 

By all experience, therefore, it was the moment to press

 

May, 1915

FEAR OF INVASION

 

a minor offensive within the capacity of our surplus force at some other point vital to the enemy. But in the opinion of the military authorities there was little or no surplus force. Our losses in the recent fighting had been very heavy, and, moreover, it was not only of the security at our line in France they were thinking, but also of the security of our own shores. The spectre of invasion had again arisen, as it always had done when our arms were unsuccessful abroad, and the elaborate efforts to lay it, to which so much thought had been devoted before the war, proved of no effect. The first line Territorial force was nearly all abroad, one of the few remaining divisions, the "Lowland," was already under orders for Gallipoli, and the second line had been so heavily depleted to furnish drafts, that as a defence force it was considered to be impotent. True the first of the new armies had completed its training, and the second would be fully equipped in a month at two, but these troops it was considered necessary to regard as general reserve in case the Germans, content with their success in the Eastern Front, should elect to return in force to the west. So deep, indeed, was the apprehension in military circles, that they began to express discontent with the naval dispositions in the North Sea, and to press the Admiralty to take further precautions.

 

It was an attitude which the Admiralty was even less able to understand than ever it had been in the days when St Vincent was First Lord. There had been great changes in the mechanism of naval war since sailing days, but after repeated consideration they were convinced that all those changes told in favour at the defence. Experience during the war had deepened conviction. The two cruiser raids on our coast had shown that the disposition in the North Sea could ensure that even the most mobile force attempting to pass across it would be brought to action if it remained on our shores more than an hour or two. And since that time our hold had materially strengthened. There were now based on the Forth the ten battleships of the Third Battle Squadron, and, under Admiral Beatty, whose flag was again flying in the Lion, eight battle cruisers (soon to be nine), the 3rd Cruiser Squadron and three squadrons of light cruisers with the 1st Destroyer Flotilla. At Scapa were the other three battle squadrons, the 1st, 2nd and 7th Cruiser Squadrons and the 2nd and 4th Destroyer Flotillas, which were constantly engaged in patrol for submarines. And there, too, was the Warspite of the " Queen Elizabeth " class, doing her gunnery before definitely taking her place in the fleet. On the other

 

May, 1915

HOME DEFENCE MEASURES

 

hand, it was felt in certain naval quarters that owing to recent developments the old confidence of the sea service in its ability to intercept any formidable raiding force could scarcely be maintained in full integrity. It could not be disguised that the scouting movements of cruisers were now to some extent restricted by the menace of submarines, and contact with an enemy's force was therefore more difficult to obtain. It appears to have been mainly for this reason that it was considered necessary to maintain the large reserve of troops which, instead of being reckoned as a disposable surplus, were concentrated about Cambridge as the Central force of the Home Defence army.

 

To some military authorities, at least, it appeared that the precaution was beyond what the reasonable risks of war demanded. If to the British navy the enemy's submarines were a bar to free cruiser action, to the German General Staff, unused to risking troops in transports at sea, the submarine factor would be likely to act ten times more strongly as a deterrent. Our own experience of the hasty withdrawal of transports which followed the appearance of the enemy's submarines in the Dardanelles was adduced as a complete confirmation of this view. To soldiers who had witnessed it, it seemed to put out of court the possibility of any landing in force on our own coast being attempted. It appears, however, to have had no effect, and at home the anxiety continued unabated.

 

Since the winter the possibility of such an attempt on the part of the Germans had never ceased to affect the distribution of the fleet. After the battle of the Dogger Bank and the supersession of Admiral von Ingenohl by Admiral von Pohl, the apprehension was aggravated by indications of a revival of activity in the High Seas Fleet. As the spring advanced these indications became so strong that we were forced to infer that the change in the German command meant the inauguration of a new policy at sea.

 

Admiral von Pohl, the original Chief of the Staff, has himself informed us that from the first the German plan had been not to risk the fleet in any large offensive operations. Even an attempt to interrupt the flow of our troops to France was not to be permitted. The policy was simply to keep the fleet in being with two objects— the one defensive, to deter us from undertaking any large combined enterprise against German territory; the other in a sense offensive, that is, it was thought, by denying the Grand Fleet the opportunity of a battle, its inactivity would eventually exasperate public opinion to such a degree that it would be forced to operate

 

Feb.-May, 1915

GERMAN SEA STRATEGY

 

in German prepared waters where it could be engaged with advantage and was certain to suffer serious damage. As we have seen, this policy had been modified to the extent of allowing certain latitude to the cruiser force till the Dogger Bank action gave cause for reconsideration.

 

On assuming the chief command afloat Admiral von Pohl's intention was to adhere to his original policy, and the movements of the High Seas Fleet were to be confined to occasional cruises in the Bight, in hope of forcing the Admiralties hand and enticing the British fleet into the snare which, in his inexperienced eyes, seemed so cunningly set. The fowler was young but the bird was old.

 

Only two such sorties are said to have been made in February and March. April and May were regarded as more favourable months. This was equally obvious to ourselves, and the Commander-in-Chief had orders to carry out his practice cruises in the North Sea. As a supplementary measure it was also decided to lay an intercepting minefield north-west of Heligoland. This was begun on the night of May 8-9 by the newly fitted liners Princess Margaret and Princess Irene, under escort of the Aurora and two divisions of destroyers from Harwich, and was completed two nights later by the minelayer Orvieto with the Broke and six destroyers from Scapa. (The Princess Margaret and Princess Irene were two new vessels of 6,000 tons, built for the Canadian Pacific Railway, which were taken up as minelayers by the Admiralty early in 1915. The Princess Irene was destroyed by an internal explosion at Sheerness on May 27 the same year.)

 

During this and the preceding month we made four sorties in which the various squadrons were combined on prearranged plans. They were never the same, but, generally speaking, it may be said that they were based on getting out the 3rd Battle Squadron and the battle cruiser squadrons on a line between their base in the Forth and the Skagerrak, where they patrolled while the rest of the Grand Fleet was coming down to concentrate upon them. At the same time Commodore Tyrwhitt's force was brought up to a patrol station between the Broad Fourteens and Terschelling, ready to join an action if it took place, or to stop a raid, which, it was imagined, the Germans might attempt under a demonstration of offering battle further north.

 

When the concentration was complete the battle fleet advanced as far towards the Bight as, in Admiral Jellicoe's opinion, could be done without playing into the German hands. The movements lasted, as a rule, from three to four

 

May 1, 1915

GUERILLA WARFARE

 

days, but nothing was ever seen of the enemy, for it appears that he never advanced further than 120 miles from Heligoland, that is, only just beyond the arc which, for the Germans, marked the limits of the Bight.

 

The German policy of inaction with the main fleet naturally gave all the greater importance to the minor offensive. Continual teasing by subsidiary methods was indeed a supplementary means of forcing our hand. In any case, the enemy's narrow escapes off Scarborough and the Dogger Bank taught the wisdom of confining offensive operations to the flotilla and subsidiary craft.

 

At the end of April a new development on these lines was on foot. The operation appears to have been designed for a new type of torpedo-boats which had been constructed at Hamburg and sent to Antwerp overland in sections. (This was the "A" class, of which there were apparently eight of about 100 tons burden and 20 knots speed. Their annament was believed to be one 4-pdr. gun and two 18'' tubes— completed in 1915.)

 

The idea was that an integral part of the "Flanders Flotilla," which we have seen was being formed out of the new small submarines and torpedo-boats, using Zeebrugge as a base, should operate against our armed trawlers that patrolled the approaches to the Channel on the look-out for submarines. As a first step two torpedo-boats, A.2 and A.6, on May-day morning were sent out to ascertain whether any of our destroyers were about. At the same time four of our Yarmouth trawlers (Columbia, Barbados, Miura and Chirsit) had been sent to the North Hinder to search for a submarine that had been reported in the vicinity the previous day. Simultaneously two old destroyers of the Nore defence flotilla (Recruit and Brazen) were patrolling at the Galloper, the outermost of the Thames Estuary shoals, about thirty miles south-west of the North Hinder light-vessel. Here at 11.20 a.m. the Recruit was cut in two by a torpedo from an unseen submarine. She sank immediately. Four officers and twenty-two of her men were rescued by a passing Dutch steam vessel, but the submarine, for it was actually one of the new " UB '' class that had fired the shot, escaped the Brazen and a Harwich trawler who gave chase. (Gayer states that the Recruit was sunk by UB.6, Lieutenant Hacker. Vol. II., p. 27.)

 

In the same hour a torpedo was fired, probably by another of the small submarines, at the Columbia, which at this time was off the mouth of the Scheldt. It missed, and the trawlers continued their search without success till 3.0 p.m. when, being then back at the North Hinder, they were sighted by A.2 and A.6. The

 

May 1-15, 1915

TORPEDO CRAFT IN ACTION

 

torpedo-boats were steaming west-south-west, and at once attacked. Four torpedoes were fired, only one hit and that sank the Columbia. Then for twenty minutes they all fell to with their guns, but no harm had been done when the two German boats suddenly made off towards their base. The reason for their flight was that as soon as the loss of the Recruit was known a division of the Harwich destroyers (Laforey, Lawford, Leonidas, Lark) had been hurried out to look for her supposed assailant. In the course of the search they had run up against the action with the trawlers, and the German reconnoitring boats quickly learnt what was to be expected from Commodore Tyrwhitt's alertness. In vain the enemy tried to escape into Dutch waters or their own mine-fields. Long as was the range, our destroyers began to hit at once, and in about an hour both the German boats sank with colours flying. It seems that as soon as our guns had fairly got the range the German crews had abandoned ship and taken to the water, and most of them were rescued.

 

A few days later the Germans had something to set off against this reverse. Further operations were being called for on the Belgian coast, partly from Headquarters in France and partly from Dunkirk, where guns from somewhere were dropping shell into the harbour. The Venerable was warned to be ready for a return to her old work, and destroyers of the Dover Patrol were told off to reconnoitre the coast and settle marks to guide her fire. On May 7 the Maori and Crusader were thus engaged when the Maori was sunk by a mine, and though the crew got away in the boats, the fire from the shore was too hot for the Crusader to rescue them. Three days later the Venerable, off Westende, was trying to find the guns that were worrying Dunkirk, but so severe was the enemy's counter-battery that she could not anchor, and she seems to have done little or nothing effective before she was ordered off to the Dardanelles (May 15).

 

With all this activity of the enemy in the southern part of the North Sea it was at the time particularly difficult to deal. The extension of the German submarine attack had involved a serious weakening of the Harwich Force by the withdrawal of a number of destroyers for escort duty in the western approaches to the Channel. Ever since the dead set at the Lusitania this area was infested with the enemy's submarines; they were being continually seen even in the Bristol Channel, and constant attacks were reported. During May this area demanded ever-increasing attention. Not only did the loss of the Lusitania emphasise its importance for trade defence, but with our deepening commitments at the Dardanelles

 

May, 1915

THE DESTROYERS' BURDEN

 

its security was more than ever vital from the point of view of our Mediterranean communications. Between hunting reported submarines and escorting munition ships and transports, as they were ready for sea, the work of the destroyers was incessant. In the latter half of the month it became strenuous almost past endurance. On May 18 three transports, with 250 officers and 4,400 men of the Royal Naval Division and drafts, sailed for the Mediterranean, and two of the six destroyers that escorted them beyond the danger point had to wait out and meet a home-coming Canadian transport. Three days later the 52nd Lowland Division was to sail from Liverpool and Devonport, but the movement had to be stopped while destroyers scoured the sea for submarines that had appeared in the transport route and another Canadian transport was met.

 

So the work went on night and day for the rest of the month; the destroyers were run off their legs, and no praise can be too high for the men who endured the strain or for those who built the no-less-sorely-tried hulls and engines. Still the flow went on with scarcely a break, and no outgoing ship or incoming Canadian transport was lost — not to mention the Grand Fleet ships that had to pass in and out of dock, and all demanded destroyer escort. It is a marvel how the work was done in the face of so intrepid and tenacious an enemy. Naturally we fix our attention on the great operations of the war, but what they meant can never be understood unless we keep in mind the unceasing undercurrent of exhausting labour on small craft that made them possible.

 

Nor was it only the destroyers that felt the weight of what our increasing military commitments demanded. The Auxiliary Patrol was also called on to take a hand in the work, and in consequence the enemy had freer scope for his minor operations in the North Sea. Indications of new minefields were being detected in the waters between the Humber and Terschelling, and these operations the enemy supplemented by raids on our fishing-boats. In the air they were scarcely less persistent than beneath the water, and from Harwich both the light cruisers and the remaining destroyers were continually at sea on the watch for Zeppelins, till a special squadron could be formed in the Humber to help with the guard.

(This was the 6th Light Cruiser Squadron, formed of five of the " Sentinels "— the old type of flotilla cruiser, Sentinel, Skirmisher, Adventure, Forward, Foresight. It was soon dispersed for other duties. A new type of destroyer, termed "flotilla leader," was coming forward. Four of them (Kempenfelt, Nimrod, Lightfoot, Marksman) were completed between August and November 1915. By July the same year eight more had been ordered.)

May, 1915

STRAIN IN HOME WATERS

 

So much is all that can be said of the stir and strain in Home waters. It never ceased, nor were the efforts to desl with the problem of minor attack ever relaxed. Owing to the drain upon our resources to the westward much energy had to be expended in making good in the North Sea. All down our East coast the patrols were being materially increased. In the middle of May over and above the vessels in the six Auxiliary Patrol areas between the Forth and the Nore, we had thirty submarines, two defence and two patrol destroyer flotillas (about fifty in all), and, besides this defence force, there were the destroyers and submarines at Harwich and the three Grand fleet flotillas based at Cromarty and Rosyth. It was all too few. During the summer and autumn the twenty " M " class destroyers ordered in September 1914 would be coming forward for service, and behind them were thirty-two more, ordered by Lord Fisher in November for his grand design. But as yet the whole system was not adequate to deal with the enemy's submarines and minelayers, and the problem of getting certain contact with a raiding force was still with us.

 

To some extent, however, the difficulty was less serious than it seemed on the surface. The North Sea was now so widely sown with mines that only certain known lines of approach were open.

(According to Gayer the sorties of the High Seas Fleet at this period were for the purpose of laying minefields in the open sea, apparently to catch the Grand Fleet. But it was found that these minefields were so quickly detected and reported by our fishermen, and that they so hampered the movements of the German submarines that the policy was abandoned at the end of the year. He also states that the Germans, on their part, discovered that a great part of the areas which we had declared dangerous were free from mines. Vol. II., p. 30.)

It was, indeed, practically certain that if a hostile force could get round these difficulties and succeed in effecting a landing it could only be small and lightly equipped. By no means could it have time to land guns and ammunition on a scale that the war had proved to be necessary for effective action, and its sea communications must be immediately and permanently cut. In these circumstances, seeing how much the Germans had on their hands, how hazardous was the enterprise, and how disastrous would be its failure, nothing seemed to the Admiralty less likely than an attempt to land at the existing juncture, and Ministers shared their view.

 

Military opinion was not entirely convinced, and the highest authority was still pressing for further precautions in the North Sea. They were already in hand. The new destroyers and submarines

 

May 12, 1915

RECALL OF QUEEN ELIZABETH

 

were being pushed on, and measures had been taken to reinforce the Grand Fleet. The whole situation rested ultimately on the power of this fleet to deal decisively with the High Seas Fleet if it ventured to sea. That it would do so before long was regarded as quite likely. There was reason to believe that the Germans would soon have some new and very powerful units ready to join it, and for this reason the Admiralty had decided to recall the Queen Elizabeth. She was required to head the line with her sister, the Warspite. An order was consequently sent to Admiral de Robeck on May 12, instructing him that she was to sail for home at once with all despatch and secrecy, and it was to replace her that the Venerable was being taken.

 

With her was to go the Exmouth, and at the end of the month they would be followed by the first two of new monitors, Abercrombie and Roberts, each of which was armed with a pair of 14" guns and provided with bulges against mines and torpedoes. At the same time, he was informed of the Italian Convention and ordered to detach Admiral Thursby with the Queen, Implacable, London and Prince of Wales, and four of his light cruisers as soon as French ships arrived to replace them, but independently of these ships they had ordered to his flag two other cruisers. They were the Cornwall and Chatham from the East Coast of Africa, where they had been operating against the Koenigsberg in the Rufiji River.

 

The means chosen for strengthening our position in the North Sea was one which the highest military opinion was unable to approve. The recall of the Queen Elizabeth, though it was the one thing necessary to allay their legitimate anxiety, they resented a little bitterly. They themselves had just decided to reinforce General Hamilton with the Lowland Territorial division and 1,000 drafts for the XXIXth; and the withdrawal of the most powerful unit of the squadron looked to them like desertion. They pleaded the serious moral effect it would have, not only on the troops, but on the whole Mussulman world. They further urged that what had most weighed with them in assenting to a combined expedition, was the knowledge that the Queen Elizabeth was to form part of it, and the Admiralty representations as to the power of her guns. The Admiralty's view was that she had been sent out when little more than a naval attack was contemplated, and now that the operations were to be mainly military, the ships of lesser force and the monitors were all that were required, and that in any case her presence in the Grand Fleet was vital to the home situation.

 

Regrettable as was the conflict of opinion, it will be clear

 

May 11-13, 1915

U-BOATS IN MEDITERRANEAN

 

on a general view of the way the war as a whole had been developing, why the Admiralty felt they could not sanction any idea of an attempt to rush the Straits. Even on the spot there was a sharp difference of opinion as to whether it was practicable. In their own judgement it could do little even if successful to assist the further progress of the army, and as a naval operation the danger was out of all proportion to the prospect of tangible result. Day by day the menace of the submarine was closing in.

 

Three U-boats had been definitely located making for the Eastern Mediterranean. One had passed Malta, and on the 11th had been unsuccessfully attacked by French destroyers off the south-east point of Sicily. Another was reported off Bizerta, and instructions had been sent to Admiral de Robeck to take measures to meet them. This he had already done. An anti-submarine defence was in position at Mudros, and all transports were to remain there, leaving the troops to be taken on in fleet-sweepers and destroyers. An elaborate system of patrol had also been organised. The Doris, with two destroyers, was to search the coast south of the Gulf of Smyrna for likely anchorages, while a submarine watched Smyrna itself. An Allied patrol of four fleet-sweepers and four submarines watched the channels east and west of Mykoni which gave access to the inner Aegean. A French patrol was established at Cape Matapan, and four of their destroyers were told off to search the vicinity for oil depots that had been reported.

 

But there was another danger nearer still which had not been expected. It declared itself the night after the Gurkhas had secured the left of our line. On the right, the French were still holding the position they had gained at the Kereves Dere, but the Turks seemed so determined to wrest it from them that the French General had made a special request for ship support. Every evening two battleships were sent in, and on the night of May 12-13 the ships detailed for the duty were the Goliath and Cornwallis. The Goliath anchored off Morto Bay and the Cornwallis astern of her. Above De Tott's battery was a protecting patrol of two destroyers, Beagle and Bulldog, while the other subdivision, Wolverine and Scorpion, were on guard on the opposite side in Eren Keui Bay, and in mid-channel was the Pincher. The night was very still and dark, there was no moon, and about midnight to increase the obscurity a fog began to roll down the Asiatic shore and spread across the Straits. It was an ideal opportunity for a torpedo attack, and it was noticed that except far up in the Narrows the enemy's searchlights were not working as usual. Orders were therefore issued for special vigilance,

 

May 13

LOSS OF THE GOLIATH

 

and they were not superfluous. That day Lieutenant-Commander Firle, a German officer, had begged leave to make an attempt to check the flanking fire of the British ships which each night was proving so disturbing to the Turks at Kereves Dere. Permission for the hazardous adventure was given, and after sunset he started down the Straits in the Turkish destroyer Muavanet-i-Miliet. (She was one of a group of four destroyers of 600 tons, and 33 knots, with three torpedo tubes, built in 1909.)

 

Keeping as close under the cliffs of the European shore as the depth of water would allow, and going dead slow, he was able towards 1.0 a.m. to steal past the Bulldog and Beagle without being detected, and a little later the two battleships could be made out at anchor. (From the account sent by the Constantinople correspondent of the Berlin Lokalanzeiger, reproduced in the Weser Zeitung, June 3, 1915.)

 

But for all his care, as he crept on under the steep Eski Hissarlik Point, at 1.15 he was detected from the bridge of the Goliath. The night challenge was made to him, he flashed some kind of a reply, the challenge was repeated and then he could be seen to dash ahead, the order to fire was given, but before three rounds could be got off a torpedo hit the old battleship abreast of the fore turret. Almost immediately another got home abreast the foremost funnel. By that time she was already listing badly to port, and the list rapidly increased till she was nearly on her beam ends, when a third torpedo struck her near the after turret. (So the officer of the watch reported officially in the afternoon. The account he seems to have given on board the Cornwallis when he was first rescued differed, but in no material point except that it made the first hit on the port side and the other two on the starboard. See Stewart and Fashell, The Immortal Gamble, p. 168.)

 

The attack had been carried out as skilfully as it had been daringly conceived. No ship could survive such punishment, and so rapidly had the blows followed one upon the other that before most of those below could reach the deck she turned turtle, and after floating so a couple of minutes she plunged under, bows foremost. Of her assailant nothing could be seen. She had sped away into the darkness, but as craft of all kind hurried to the spot, and tried to rescue the survivors her exultant wireless signals could be heard up the Straits, " Three torpedo hits! Sunk, sunk." '' An English battleship sunk.'' This was about three o'clock, and the Wolverine, realising that an attack had been made, went off with the Scorpion towards Kephez Point to cut off the invisible enemy's retreat; but though the increasing strength of the signals told them they were very close, and though in spite of heavy fire they maintained their position near

 

May 14, 1915

A DARDANELLES COUNCIL

 

Kephez nothing more was seen of the Turkish destroyer. Meanwhile the work of rescue was proceeding. In the intense darkness and the swift current it proved very difficult. In the end, of the Goliath's complement of 750, nearly 570 were lost, and amongst them her commander. Captain Shelford.

 

Such was the latest news when the War Council had to decide what was to be done with an enterprise which, if pushed to a decisive conclusion, must obviously involve them in much heavier liabilities than had been originally contemplated. There had been no formal meeting since March 19, when, after the failure of the naval attack on the Narrows, it had been decided to continue the enterprise as a regular combined operation with the troops that had been ordered out. In this they followed precedent. During the wars of the eighteenth century, when the Cabinet system became established, it was the practice for the Cabinet, after deciding that a campaign was to be undertaken, to leave its conduct to the Chief Minister and the heads of the two service departments, and not to intervene unless some large question of policy developed from it which involved a new departure in our relations with Allies. Such a juncture had now arisen, and on May 14 the War Council met.

 

The difference of opinion between the naval and the military authorities proved as strong as ever. The Admiralty had informed Admiral de Robeck that all idea of the fleet breaking through must be given up. They had always regarded the plan as a measure of necessity, and had they known that in three months an army of 100,000 men would have been available, they would never have undertaken a purely naval attack. In view of the new factors — the submarines, the Italian Convention and the needs of the Grand Fleet — a revival of the idea was out of the question. The campaign had become, and must continue to be, mainly military, in other words, instead of a military force to assist the fleet, it was now a question of a naval force to assist the army, and for this purpose the naval force they were now organising was in their estimation as good as, and even better than the original one. This the military authorities doubted, and maintained that their promise to see the fleet through was based on the power of the Queen Elizabeth's guns.

 

Nor could they hold out hope of success for a mainly military campaign. They were ready to maintain General Hamilton's force up to strength, as well as the reinforcements that had been promised him, but in view of the military situation on the Continent, and the needs of home defence, they could do

 

May 14, 1915

CONFLICTING VIEWS

 

no more, and in their opinion this force would not be equal to breaking through the Kilid Bahr position.

 

On these appreciations three courses seemed to be open — to withdraw at once, to push on for a quick decision, or to settle down to a siege. Immediate withdrawal could scarcely be contemplated, a rapid decision was equally out of the question, and as to the third alternative, it was agreed that no conclusion could be come to until it was known what force would be required to ensure success. After hearing all that both the Admiralty and the War Office had to say of the danger of a German attempt on our shores, Ministers were not convinced that more troops could not be spared from home defence. About the security of the Allied line in France they were less easy, and the final decision was to ascertain from General Hamilton what force he considered necessary.

 

But the matter could not end here, for unhappily it was not only the Admiralty and War Office who could not see eye to eye. The course things had taken at the War Council brought to a head a difference of opinion within the Admiralty itself which had long been increasing in force, and it was one that struck deep into the roots of our war plans. When Lord Fisher first supported the idea of perfecting the unity of the Allied line by opening the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, he contemplated making the attempt with a strong combined force which was to strike suddenly and quickly. In this way it seemed possible to do what was needed and get it over before his own plans for the North Sea and Baltic were ripe for execution.

 

It was only with reluctance he had assented to the Dardanelles enterprise as it was actually undertaken, and as soon as it became clear that the political situation in the Balkans and the available military force gave no prospect of success by a coup de main he became frankly opposed to it. His apprehension was, that if undertaken with inadequate or unsuitable force the work would be long and costly, and when the time came, we should find ourselves saddled with liabilities which would put it out of our power to carry on the offensive campaign in northern waters, which he believed to be the only way of bringing the war to a quick and successful conclusion.

 

Ever since his accession to office he had been devoting all his well-known energy almost entirely to its preparation. His plans involved a large building programme of specially designed ships and other material. Under the influence of his inspiration, every one concerned had thrown himself into the work with almost

 

May 15-19, 1915

LORD FISHER'S RESIGNATION

 

unprecedented enthusiasm, and the programme was rapidly approaching completion. As it progressed the slow devdopment at the Dardanelles more and more justified his fears and hardened his opposition. Now that the meeting of the War Council had made it clear the attempt could not be abandoned, and must be continued as a military operation which could only be of a prolonged nature, he saw his war plan doomed. The same evening his apprehensions were confirmed. In order to meet the military objection and remove the ill effects of the withdrawal of the Queen Elizabeth, the First Lord drafted orders for an increase of the naval part of the expedition. They involved the absorption of the whole of the new monitors which had been developed as an essential element in the North Sea plans. Without them the offensive could not be pushed into German waters, and in view of the determination of the Government and the War Office to proceed with the Dardanelles operation it was equally impossible to oppose their diversion. Other special units were also involved. The plan which, as Lord Fisher believed, could alone give decisive results within measurable time was obviously to be postponed indefinitely, and feeling unable any longer to be responsible for the conduct of the war at sea, he next morning resigned.

 

The loss at such a crisis of a man who bulked so large in popular opinion could only add to the general depression. To the country at large he was the embodiment of the old fighting energy of the navy — the man to whom we owed the organisation and strategical disposition which rendered the German fleet impotent when the long-expected struggle began, and the all-embracing combination against Admiral von Spee which had given us our only decisive success at sea. But his loss proved to be only the first step in a far-reaching process of disintegration. In a few days Mr. Churchill, whose untiring energy had perfected Lord Fisher's design In the last days of peace, also left the Admiralty, and so it was destined that the progression of events which had begun with the failure to intercept the Goeben brought about the loss of the two men to whom the navy chiefly owed its readiness for war. The tragedy which had had its origin in what seemed at the time so small a thing had gathered force from point to point, till it precipitated a situation which neither of them could survive.

 

Nor was this the end. The general uneasiness about the conduct of the war, which had been vaguely displaying itself for some time past, received a deeper and more restless impetus. The confidence in the Government, which had been inspired by

 

May 20, 1915

CABINET CRISIS

 

their grasp and handling of the initial problems of the war, had gradually been sapped, as it always had been, by lack of telling successes at the outset, which in past times the public had ever expected and never seen realised. The break at the Admiralty gave the final shock, and within five days of Lord Fisher's departure the leaders of the great parties in the State were sitting in council to form a Coalition Government.

 

 

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APPENDIX A

 

ORGANISATION OF THE GRAND FLEET. JANUARY 24, 1915

(Ships in parentheses in dockyard hands)

 

SCAPA

 

Commander-in-Chief: Admiral Sir John R. Jellicoe.

Fleet Flagship: Iron Duke

Attached ships: light cruiser Sappho, destroyer Oak

 

FIRST BATTLE SQUADRON

Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney

Rear-Admiral H Evan-Thomas

Marlborough (flag of VA), St Vincent (flag of RA), Collingwood, Colossus, Hercules, Neptune, Vanguard, (Superb), light cruiser Bellona

 

SECOND BATTLE SQUADRON

Vice-Admiral Sir George J S Warrender, Bt

Rear-Admiral Arthur C Leveson

King George V (flag of VA), Orion (flag of RA), Ajax, Centurion, Monarch, Thunderer, (Conqueror), light cruiser Boadicea

 

FOURTH BATTLE SQUADRON

Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas A Gamble

Rear-Admiral Alexander L Duff

Benbow (flag of VA), Emperor of India (flag of RA), Agincourt, Bellerophon, Dreadnought, Erin, Temeraire, light cruiser Blonde

 

FIRST CRUISER SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral Sir Robert K Arbuthnot, Bt

Duke of Edinburgh (flag, temp), Black Prince, Warrior

 

SIXTH CRUISER SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral William L Grant

Drake (flag), Donegal, Leviathan

 

SEVENTH CRUISER SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral Arthur W Waymouth

Minotaur (flag), Cumberland, Hampshire (This squadron which was proceeding to Scapa west-about, was ordered to join the battle fleet, but did not arrive till after January 24.)

 

SECOND LIGHT CRUISER SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral Trevelyan D W Napier

Falmouth (flag), Gloucester, Yarmouth, (Liverpool)

 

SECOND DESTROYER FLOTILLA

Galatea, Broke, 20 destroyers

 

 

ROSYTH

 

THIRD BATTLE SQUADRON

Vice-Admiral Edward E Bradford

Rear-Admiral Montague E Browning

Dominion (flag, temp of VA), Hibernia (flag of RA), Africa, Britannia, Hindustan, Zealandia, (King Edward VII), (Commonwealth), light cruiser Blanche

 

THIRD CRUISER SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral William C Pakenham

Antrim (flag), Argyll, Devonshire (Roxburgh)

 

FIRST BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON

Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty

Lion (flag), Princess Royal, Tiger, (Queen Mary)

 

SECOND BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral Sir Archibald G H W Moore

New Zealand (flag), Indomitable

 

FIRST LIGHT CRUISER SQUADRON

Commodore William E Goodenough

Southampton (broad pendant), Birmingham, Lowestoft, Nottingham

 

 

CROMARTY

 

SECOND CRUISER SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral the Hon Somerset A Gough-Calthorpe

Shannon (flag), Achilles, Natal, (Cochrane)

 

FOURTH DESTROYER FLOTILLA

Caroline, Faulknor, 20 destroyers

 

 

HARWICH

 

DESTROYER FLOTILLAS

Commodore Reginald Y Tyrwhitt

Arethusa (broad pendant), Aurora

 

FIRST FLOTILLA

(Fearless), Meteor, 20 destroyers

 

THIRD FLOTILLA

Undaunted, Miranda, 20 destroyers (attached were also 8 M-class destroyers, which were to be formed into the Tenth Flotilla)

 

OVERSEA SUBMARINE FLOTILLA

Commodore Roger J B Keyes

Firedrake, Lurcher, 21 submarines

 

 

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APPENDIX B

 

BRITISH WAR VESSELS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, EGYPTIAN AND EAST INDIAN WATERS, FEBRUARY 19, 1915

 

EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Commander-in-Chief: Vice-Admiral Sackville H Carden

Chief of Staff: Commodore Roger J B Keyes

Second in Command: Rear-Admiral John M De Robeck

SNO, Mudros: Rear-Admiral Rosslyn E Wemyss

 

BATTLESHIPS

Agamemnon - Captain H A S Fyler

Albion - Captain A W Heneage

Canopus - Captain H S Grant

Cornwallis - Captain A P Davidson

Irresistible - Captain D L Dent

Lord Nelson - Captain J W L McClintock

Majestic - Captain H F G Talbot

Prince George - Captain A V Campbell

Queen Elizabeth - Captain G P W Hope

Triumph - Captain M S FitzMaurice

Vengeance (flag of RA) - Captain B H Smith

 

BATTLE CRUISERS

Inflexible (flag of V A ) - Captain R F Phillimore

 

LIGHT CRUISERS

Amethyst - Commander G J Todd

Dartmouth - Captain Judge D'Arcy

Dublin - Captain J D Kelly

Sapphire - Captain P W E Hill

 

AIRCRAFT CARRIER

Ark Royal - Commander (act) R H Clark-Hall

 

GUNBOAT

Hussar - Commander (ret ) E Unwin

 

DEPOT SHIP FOR T B D 's

Blenheim - Captain C P R Coode (Captain, D ), 16 T B D 's, 6 submarines, 21 minesweepers

 

 

EGYPT AND EAST INDIES

Vice-Admiral Sir Richard H Pierse

 

BATTLESHIPS

Swiftsure (flag) - Captain C Maxwell-Lefroy

Ocean - Captain A Hayes-Sadler

 

CRUISERS

Bacchante - Captain The Hon A D E H Boyle

Euryalus - Captain R M Burmester

 

LIGHT CRUISERS

Chatham (refitting) - Captain S B Drury-Lowe

Doris - Captain F Larken

Fox (refitting) - Captain F W Caulfeild

Minerva - Captain P H Warleigh

Philomel - Captain P H Hall Thompson

Proserpine - Commander G C Hardy

 

ARMED MERCHANT CRUISERS

Empress of Asia – Captain P H Columb

Empress of Japan – Commander M B Baillie-Hamilton

Empress of Russia – Commander A Cochrane

Himalaya – Commander (act) A Dixon

 

SLOOPS

Clio – Commander (act) C MacKenzie

Espiegle – Captain W Nunn (Persian Gulf)

Odin – Commander C R Wason (Persian Gulf)

 

VESSELS OF THE ROYAL INDIAN MARINE

Dalhousie - Commander (act) E M Palmer (Persian Gulf)

Dufferin - Commander A W Lowis

Hardinge - Commander (act) T J Linberry

Lawrence - Commander (act) R N Suter (Persian Gulf)

Minto – Lieut-Commander C E V Crauford

Northbrook – Commander A E Wood

 

6 TB's for duty in Suez Canal

4 armed tugs in Persian Gulf

 

 

---

 

 

APPENDIX C

 

GRAND FLEET, CHANNEL FLEET, AND OVERSEA SQUADRONS EXCEPT THOSE SHOWN IN APPENDIX B, FEBRUARY 22, 1915

 

GRAND FLEET

Commander-in-Chief: Admiral Sir John Jellicoe

Chief of Staff: Rear-Admiral C E Madden

Fleet Flagship: Iron Duke – Captain R N Lawson

Attached ships: light cruiser Sappho – Commander G V C Knox; destroyer Oak – Lieut-Comm D Faviell

 

FIRST BATTLE SQUADRON

Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney

Rear-Admiral H Evan-Thomas

Marlborough (flag of VA) - Captain E P F G Grant

St Vincent (flag of RA) - Captain W W Fisher

Collingwood - Captain J C Ley

Colossus - Captain The Hon E S Fitzherbert

Hercules - Captain H H Bruce

Neptune - Captain T D L Sheppard

Superb (in dockyard hands) – Captain E Hyde Parker

Vanguard - Captain C S Hickley

Light cruiser Bellona - Captain P M R Royds

 

SECOND BATTLE SQUADRON

Vice Admiral Sir George J S Warrender Bt

Rear-Admiral Arthur C Leveson

King George V (flag of VA) – Captain G H Baird

Orion (flag of RA) – Captain F C Dreyer

Ajax – Captain Sir A J Henniker-Hughan Bt

Centurion (dockyard hands) – Captain M Culme-Seymour

Conqueror (dockyard hands) – Captain H H D Tothill

Monarch – Captain E H Smith

Thunderer – Captain C L Vaughan-Lee

Light cruiser Boadicea – Captain L C S Woolcoombe

 

THIRD BATTLE SQUADRON

Vice Admiral Edward E Bradford

Rear-Admiral Montague E Browning

King Edward VII (flag of VA) – Captain Crawford Maclachlan

Hibernia (flag of RA) – Captain A Lowndes

Africa – Captain H J O Millar

Britannia (dockyard hands) – Captain H G G Sandeman

Commonwealth – Captain M Woolcombe

Dominion – Captain H L Mawbey

Hindustan – Captain J Nicholas

Zealandia – Captain R M Harbord

Light cruiser Blanche – Captain R Hyde

 

FOURTH BATTLE SQUADRON

Vice Admiral Sir F C Doveton Sturdee

Rear-Admiral Alexander L Duff

Benbow (flag of VA) – Captain J A Ferguson

Emperor of India (flag of RA) – Captain W C M Nicholson

Agincourt – Captain D R L Nicholson

Bellerophon – Captain E F Bruen

Dreadnought – Captain W J S Alderson

Erin – Captain The Hon V A Stanley

Temeraire – Captain A T Hunt

Light cruiser Blonde – Captain A C Scott

 

BATTLE CRUISER FLEET

Vice Admiral Commanding: Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty

Fleet Flagship: Lion (in Tyne repairing damage after Dogger Bank action) – Captain A E M Chatfield

 

FIRST BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON

Commodore De B Brock

Princess Royal (broad pendant) – Captain W H Cowan

Queen Mary – Captain C I Prowse

Tiger – Captain H B Pelly

 

Attached – FIRST LIGHT CRUISER SQUADRON

Commodore E S Alexander-Sinclair

Galatea (broad pendant) - Commander F A Marten

Caroline - Captain H Ralph Crooke

Cordelia - Captain A V Vyvyan

Inconstant - Captain B S Thesiger

 

SECOND BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON

Vice-Admiral Sir George E Patey

(Relieved by Rear-Admiral W C Pakenham, March 8, 19150

Australia (flag) - Captain S H Radcliffe

Indefatigable - Captain C F Sowerby

New Zealand - Captain L Halsey

 

Attached – SECOND LIGHT CRUISER SQUADRON

Commodore William E Goodenough

Southampton (broad pendant) – Commander E A Rushton

Birmingham - Captain A A M Duff

Lowestoft - Captain T W B Kennedy

Nottingham - Captain C B Miller

 

THIRD BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON

Indomitable (in dockyard hands) - Captain F W Kennedy

Inflexible (at Dardanelles To join later) - Captain R F Phillimore

Invincible (to be flagship) - Captain A L Cay

 

Attached – THIRD LIGHT CRUISER SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral Trevelyan D W Napier

Falmouth (flag) - Captain J D Edwards

Gloucester - Captain W A H Kelly

Liverpool - Captain E Reeves

Yarmouth - Captain T D Pratt

 

FIRST CRUISER SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral Sir Robert K Arbuthnot, Bt

Defence (flag) - Captain E La T Leatham

Black Prince - Captain J D Dick

Duke of Edinburgh - Captain H Blackett

Warrior - Captain G H Borrett

 

SECOND CRUISER SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral The Hon Somerset A Gough-Calthorp

Shannon (flag) - Captain J S Dumaresq

Achilles - Captain F M Leake

Cochrane - Captain W G E Ruck-Keene

Natal - Captain J F E Green

 

THIRD CRUISER SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral William C Pakenham

Antrim (flag) - Captain V B Molteno

Argyll - Captain J C Tancred

Devonshire (in dockyard hands) - Captain E V Underhill

Roxburgh - Captain B M Chambers

 

SIXTH CRUISER SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral William L Grant

Drake (flag) - Captain A C H Smith

Cumberland - Captain C P Beaty-Pownall

Leviathan - Captain M R Hill

 

SEVENTH CRUISER SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral Arthur W Waymouth

Minotaur (flag) - Captain E B Kiddle

Donegal - Captain C D Carpendale

Hampshire - Captain H W Grant

Lancaster (in dockyard hands) - Captain W H D'Oyly

8 armed boarding steamers (attached to Commander-in-Chief)

 

GRAND FLEET DESTROYER FLOTILLAS

 

SECOND FLOTILLA

Active (Light Cruiser) - Captain J R P Hawksley (Captain D )

Broke (Flotilla Leader) - Commander C D Roper (2nd in Command )

20 destroyers

 

FOURTH FLOTILLA

Swift (Flotilla Leader) - Captain C J Wintour (Captain D)

Faulknor (Flotilla Leader) - Commander A J B Stirling (2nd in Command )

20 destroyers

 

HARWICH DESTROYER FLOTILLAS

Commodore Reginald T Tyrwhitt (Commodore T )

Arethusa (broad pendant) (Light Cruiser) - Commander (ret ) E K Arbuthnot

Penelope (Light Cruiser) - Captain H Lynes

 

FIRST FLOTILLA

Fearless (Light Cruiser) - Captain W F Blunt (Captain D )

Meteor (Destroyer) - Commander A B S Dutton (2nd in Command )

20 destroyers

 

THIRD FLOTILLA

Undaunted (Light Cruiser) – Captain F G St John (Captain D)

Miranda (Destroyer) – Commander B E Domville (2nd in Command)

30 destroyers

 

TENTH FLOTILLA

Aurora (Light Cruiser) - Captain W S Nicholson (Captain D)

10 destroyers

 

HARWICH SUBMARINE FLOTILLA

EIGHTH OVERSEAS FLOTILLA

Commodore Sydney S Hall (Commodore S )

Captain A K Waistell (Captain S )

Firedrake (Destroyer) - Commander A T Tillard

Lurcher (Destroyer) - Commander W Tomkinson

20 submarines

 

CRUISER FORCE "B"

Tenth Cruiser Squadron (Armed Merchant Cruisers)

Rear-Admiral Dudley R S de Chair

Alsatian (flag) - Captain G Trewby

Ambrose - Commander C W Bruton

Bayano - Commander H C Carr

Calyx - Commander T E Wardle

Caribbean - Commander F H Walter

Cedric - Captain R E R Benson

Changuinola - Commander H C R Brocklebank

Columbella - Captain H L P Heard

Digby - Commander R F H H Mahon

Eskimo - Commander C W Trousdale

Hilary - Commander R H Bather

Hildebrand - Captain H Edwards

Mantua - Captain C Tibbits

Motagua - Captain J A Webster

Oropesa - Commander N L Stanley

Orotava - Commander G E Corbett

Otway - Captain E L Booty

Patia - Captain G W Vivian

Patuca - Lieut-Comm J H Neild

Teutonic - Captain G C Ross

Virginian - Captain H N Garnett

 

CHANNEL FLEET

 

FIFTH BATTLE SQUADRON

Vice-Admiral The Hon Sir Alexander E Bethell

Rear-Admiral Cecil F Thursby

Prince of Wales (flag of VA) - Captain R N Bax

Queen (flag of RA) - Captain H A Adam

Implacable - Captain H C Lookyer

London - Captain J G Armstrong

Venerable - Captain V H G Bernard

Light Cruisers:

Diamond - Commander L L Dundas

Topaze - Commander W J B Law

 

SIXTH BATTLE SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral Stuart Nicholson

Russell (flag) - Captain W Bowden Smith

Albemarle - Captain A W Craig

Exmouth - Captain H R Veale

 

Detached on Special Service

Jupiter - Captain D St A Wake

Revenge - Captain C H Hughes-Onslow

 

WESTERN CHANNEL PATROL

TWELTH CRUISER SQUADRON

Diana (SNO) - Captain G B Hutton

Eclipse - Captain F H Mitchell

Talbot - Captain F Wray

4 armed boarding steamers

 

IRISH COAST PATROL

ELEVENTH CRUISER SQUADRON

Rear Admiral Henry L Tottenham

Juno (flag) - Captain A K Macrorie

Isis - Captain J T Bush

Sutlej - Captain H M Doughty

Venus - Captain R G D Dewar

4 armed boarding steamers

 

MID-ATLANTIC

NINTH CRUISER SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral Sir Archibald G H W Moore

Europa (flag) - Captain H G C Somerville

Amphitrite - Captain H Grant-Dalton

Argonaut - Captain R A Nugent

Calgarian - Captain T W Kemp

Carmania - Captain N Grant

Edinburgh Castle - Captain W R Napier

Ophir (In dockyard hands) - Commander J M D E Warren

Victorian - Captain H B T Somerville

 

CRUISER FORCE "D"

Highflyer (SNO) – Captain H T Buller

Empress of Britain – Commander G B W Young

Marmora – Captain R W Glennie

 

NORTH AMERICA AND WEST INDIES SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral Robert S Phipps-Hornby

Glory (flag) - Captain C F Corbett

Berwick – Captain L Clinton-Baker

Caronia – Captain F S Litchfield

Essex – Captain H D R Watson

Melbourne - Captain M L'E Silver

Niobe – Captain R G Corbett

Suffolk (In dockyard hands) - Captain B J D Yelverton

Sydney – Captain J C T Glossop

 

SOUTH-EAST COAST OF AMERICA SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral Archibald P Stoddart

Carnarvon (flag) - Captain H L D'E Skipwith

Bristol - Captain B H Fanshawe

Celtic - Captain O M'D English

Glasgow - Captain J Luce

Kent - Captain J D Allen

Macedonia - Captain B S Evans

Orama - Captain J R Segrave

Otranto - Captain H M Edwards

Vindictive - Captain C R Payne

 

CAPE OF GOOD HOPE SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral Herbert G King-Hall

Goliath (flag) (In dockyard hands) - Captain T L Shelford

Armadale Castle - Captain O F Gillett

Astraea – Captain A C Sykes

Laconia - Captain C S Wills

 

WEST COAST OF AFRICA

Challenger - Captain C T M Fuller

Dwarf - Commander F E K Strong

Laurentic - Captain V G Gurner

 

EAST COAST OF AFRICA

Weymouth (SNO) - Captain W D Church

Hyacinth - Captain D M Anderson

Kilfauns Castle - Captain D B Crampton

Pioneer - Lieut-Commr (RAN ) T W Biddlecombe

Pyramus - Commander Viscount Kilburn

4 armed whalers

 

PACIFIC

Newcastle (SNO) - Captain F A Powlett

Rainbow - Commander W Hose

Shearwater - Lieut -Commr A St V Keyes

 

CHINA

Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas H Jerram

(Flag flown on shore at Singapore )

Cadmus - Commander H D Marryat

Rosario - Lieut-Commr F A N Cromie

4 destroyers

 

AUSTRALIA

Encounter - Captain C La P Lewin

8 destroyers, 2 armed vessels