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CONTENTS

(continued)

XVI. Operations on the Belgian Coast – Second Phase: The First Battle of Ypres

XVII. Dispatch of Submarines to the Baltic and the Loss of the Audacious

XVIII. The Gorleston Raid and Conclusion of the Belgian Coast Operations

XIX. Reactions of Admiral Von Spee's Movements on the Atlantic Cruiser System

XX. Opening of the Cameroons Expedition – August 15 To October 15

XXI. Operations of the German and Allied Squadrons in the East from the Japanese Declaration of War to the Middle of September

XXII. The Eastern Fleet – First Exploits of The Emden

XXIII. Admiral Von Spee Crosses The Pacific

XXIV. Reappearance of the Karlsruhe, Emden and Koenigsberg  

XXV. The Battle of Coronel, November 1

XXVI. Cruiser Redistribution after Coronel and the Turkish Intervention – Fate of the Koenigsberg, Emden and Karlsruhe – Fall of Tsingtau

XXVII. Securing the Command in Egypt and the East – The Persian Gulf Operations and Progress of The Cameroons Expedition

XXVIII. Operations Leading Up To The Battle of The Falklands

XXIX. The Battle of The Falklands, December 8

 

Appendix A – German High Seas Fleet

Appendix B – The Grand Fleet

Appendix C – The Mediterranean Fleet

Appendix D – (1) Loss of The " Cressys ", (2) Coronel

 

Index (not included – you can use Search)

 

 

MAPS, PLANS AND DIAGRAMS IN VOLUME

(continued)

 

Duala and the Cameroons Estuary - 276

German New Guinea, with Inset of Rabaul - 286

Cocos Islands; Action Between Sydney and Emden, November 9 - 384

Operations near Basra - 388

Operations near Kurnah - 392

Lower Mesopotamia to the Head of the Persian Gulf - 394

The Battle of The Falklands –

Position at 12.51 P.M. - 419

Position at 1.30 P.M. - 420

Positions in Main Action 4.17 P.M. To 4.24 P.M. - 423

Positions in Main Action 4.44 P.M. To 5.01 P.M. - 424
Action between Kent and Nuernberg, 5.35 P.M. to 6.36 P.M. - 430

 

 

CHAPTER XVI

OPERATIONS ON THE BELGIAN COAST - SECOND PHASE: THE FIRST BATTLE OF YPRES

(See Map 8 in case)

 

So striking was the success on the sea flank that it led at once to a new development which seemed to give promise of breaking down the western deadlock before it could solidify, and securing something like a decisive result.

 

In the evening of October 22 Admiral Hood went to Dunkirk to meet our military liaison officer with the Belgians, and also Admiral Favereau, who had just been appointed to command the French forces in the Channel. He found that the French XLIInd Division had arrived on the scene. The Belgians, who had now lost the Schoorbakke bridge-head, as well as the Tervaete bridge, and were clinging precariously to the neck of the river salient, seemed to expect the reinforcement there. But General Joffre had a larger plan which he hoped to carry out with the help of Admiral Hood, and the new troops went into Nieuport instead. The British squadron was now considerably strengthened; the old cruisers and sloops were coming in, and after the conference he reported to the Admiralty that he had ships enough. Winter was approaching, and he had to point out that a sudden northerly gale would probably make an end of the monitors and the gunboats. This risk, however, he considered as less than that to which the ships must be exposed from submarines, and that, therefore it should be taken if they were doing valuable work.

 

The plan now in hand certainly justified a high risk. The French division was intended, with the support of the squadron, to attempt a counter offensive up the coast in order, if possible, to recover Ostend and to deprive the Germans of the support of the sea on the right flank. The movement would be complementary to that of the main Allied Army. Since the 19th our First and Fourth Corps, in concert with the IIIrd Cavalry Division under General Byng, had been endeavouring to advance through Ypres and Thourout, with Bruges as their ultimate objective. Large German reinforcements checked the movement on the 21st,

Oct. 21-23, 1914

THE PROJECTED ADVANCE

 

but as General Joffre expressed his intention of bringing up his Ninth Corps to Ypres, with further, troops to follow, it was hoped that the offensive could be resumed. (Sir John French's Despatch, November 20.) His intention was,"in conjunction with the Belgian troops, to drive the Germans east," and the effort was to begin on the 24th.

 

To this movement the proposed Franco-Belgian advance was apparently preparatory. It was to be arranged in the greatest secrecy, and at 6.30 a.m. on the 23rd Admiral Hood was informed that the French would be moving out northeast from Nieuport till 9 a.m., and after that time he would be required to support them to the northward. Before anything could be done, however, the Germans anticipated the movement by renewing their offensive against Lombartzyde, and the squadron had to devote its attention to checking them. All reports showed the fire which was quickly developed against the enemy's batteries and troop concentrations was very effective. With this assistance not only was the attack stopped, but in the afternoon the French were able to advance through Lombartzyde towards Westende. For a time it looked as if the push along the coast might well succeed, but at this juncture the fire of the ships was required elsewhere. The weight of the German attack was now falling on the Belgian lines between St, Georges and the Tervaete salient, and in this section the trenches were being enfiladed by heavy batteries which at last had been accurately located about Roodepoort Farm and Blockhuis. Unless they could be silenced this part of the front would soon become untenable, and the ships had to come to the rescue. Still, for all they could do it was not enough. Before long the position grew so serious that the Belgians had to inform the French Staff that nothing but the largest possible reinforcement from the XLIInd Division could save it. So urgent was the call that the new plan had to be suspended. Till the centre was made secure an advance up the coast was obviously impossible, and though the French had pushed right up to the outskirts of Westende they had to stand fast, and during the night a whole brigade was detached to strengthen the neck of the Tervaete salient.

 

Yet the idea of the coastal push was not given up, in spite of the difficulties. Amongst them was a serious dilemma which once more brought naval and military exigencies into conflict. The advance admittedly depended upon how much the squadron could do to assist, and the squadron could never do its utmost if it was in ever-present danger of submarine attack. So long as Ostend was open as a submarine base it would not

 

Oct. 23-24, 1914

be safe for an hour. On the other hand, if the advance was to achieve its ultimate object, Ostend must be left intact as a port of re-entry. It was a dilemma extremely difficult to solve, and for several days opinion fluctuated. The Admiralty, of course, were for destroying the port; but it was not till noon on October 23, before the French advance had begun, that Admiral Hood received authority from the Belgian Headquarters to bombard it. It was clearly high time. Both the sloop Wildfire and the destroyer Myrmidon had just been attacked by submarines. Both attacks failed, but the enemy escaped, and without more ado Admiral Hood proceeded to bombard the harbour.

At home the anxiety for the squadron increased, and steps were being taken to mitigate, as far as possible, the risk it was running. The Admiral was ordered to send all ships not actually required into Dunkirk; three trawlers with anti-submarine sweeps were sent across; Commodore Tyrwhitt was ordered to lend a division of destroyers; the Venerable and Irresistible, which were now in Dover at Admiral Hood's disposal, prepared towing charges for them so that they could deal with submarines diving in shoal water; and barges with nets were equipped for the protection of the larger ships when in action. But all this would be of little avail so long as Ostend was open, and at midnight the Admiral received orders from home to destroy the basins and railway station, and, indeed, not to spare any part of the town where the enemy was located. Blockships for closing the port had also been prepared at Sheerness, and he was to report on the prospects of running them in under the fire of the squadron and sinking them in the entrance.

But by this time the French forward movement had reached Westende; the advance looked quite hopeful, and half an hour later the Admiral had orders to hold his hand till they could hear from Sir John French what the actual prospects were. Already, however, he had been informed from Dunkirk that the offensive was to be resumed in the morning, and that the French had begun a supplementary line of advance, on the Plasschendaele Canal, with Bamburg Farm as its objective. During the morning of the 24th he devoted his attention to supporting the movement with the increased force at his command. He had lost the Severn - sent home to shift her 6" - guns but besides the other two monitors and the Bustard he now had, as gun-vessels, the old cruisers Brilliant and Sirius, the sloops Rinaldo and Wildfire, besides eight British and five French destroyers. All the morning he was searching the targets indicated, and the

Oct. 24-25

THE ADVANCE CHECKED

work went on till about 3 p.m., when word came to cease fire as the French, having won Bamburg Farm, were about to push on into Westende.

Meanwhile, a further conference between the Naval and Military Authorities had decided, in view of the success of the advance, to wait a day or two before wrecking the quays and docks at Ostend. The Admiral, however, was directed to bombard the railway station and its approaches at once, and also to deal with any activity he might detect in the harbour. But by the time the order reached him the weather had turned so thick that nothing effective could be done, and as an air reconnaissance from Kingsnorth had reported all quiet in the harbour, he was told to take no action unless local circumstances required it, but to confine himself to supporting the Allied left.

Such support was again essential, for during the day the general situation changed for the worse. The Allied attempt to advance had been met with violent counter-attacks in ever-increasing force. Nowhere could any progress be made, and in the centre the situation had become desperate. The German attacks on the Tervaete salient increased in force and fury till the neck was won, and in spite of a brilliant counter-attack by the French Brigade, the Belgians had to fall back to the line of the Beverdyk. This movement reacted on the St. George's sector, and there, too, they had to retire over the Noord Vaart (Canal du Nord) and abandon the line of the canal. In these circumstances the Belgians found it necessary to insist once more on the need of reinforcing their centre, and the French Staff saw nothing for it but to give them nearly the whole of the XLIInd Division. All present hope of the intended offensive had how to be given up, and while enough French troops were left to hold the posts they had occupied near Westende, the exhausted Belgians fell back to Nieuport.

On the 25th little could be done. The weather was still too thick for effective air reconnaissance; the heavy batteries that were annoying the new Belgian position were far inland, and the only one that could be located brought the French outposts at Westende and Bamburg Farm into the line of fire from the sea. Every effort the Admiral made to close in to a better position was met by guns newly posted amongst the dunes, and finally he drew off. To make matters worse, it came on to blow so hard in the night that the monitors, which had gone to Dunkirk to replenish ammunition, had to stay there, and all small craft were forced to take shelter.

Oct. 26-27, 1914

Fortunately, it mattered less than was to be expected; for the Germans seemed too much exhausted to make a serious attack on the new Beverdyk position. On the coast all was quiet. The French, however, thought well to withdraw their advanced posts, and by the morning of the 26th the whole of the Allied troops in the coastal section were behind the Yser, except for the bridge-head, a mile north of Nieuport, which was still held.

 

Of an offensive movement along the. coast there was now less hope than ever. The inaction of the Germans meant only strenuous preparation. At an early hour they developed an attack so violent and in such force all along the line that by 10.0 the Belgian situation was pronounced to be critical. The Admiralty at once decided to take further risk, and ordered the Venerable to join Admiral Hood. Hour after hour, as in all haste she obeyed the order, the attack continued with undiminished energy, and it was only too plain that at any moment the defence might break. As for the squadron, it was now developing its utmost energy. By two o'clock all the ships were in hot action, and still, the coast section held firm. But the enemy had not yet attained his maximum effort. Two hours, later it became evident he was, preparing a culminating blow from Lombartzyde, and an. urgent signal came from Headquarters for the squadron to concentrate the heaviest possible fire on the village. It was done, and with the aid of the storm of heavy shell the stubborn defence of the sea flank was undefeated. But in the centre, where the Germans' main effort was made, their artillery fire could not be adequately checked, and, unable to endure more, the reduced Belgian ranks were forced to fall back to the embankment of the Nieuport-Dixmude Railway.

 

Here was the last possible stand, but if it could only be held long enough it would be made impregnable. It required but the stopping of the railway culverts to flood the whole country in its front and so develop the ancient Low Country defence which had so often baffled the invader. The work was already in hand, but it would require some time to complete; the water would take two days to rise; and it was more than doubtful whether it was physically possible for the exhausted Belgians to hold out long enough. Much would depend on what the squadron could do - so much indee, that it seemed only too likely it would be attacked in force. With the two battleships at Sheerness, and with Commodore Tyrwhitt's force, every preparation was made to meet the expected interruption, and Admiral Hood's Squadron held its ground. Early next morning (the 27th), with his flag in the Venerable,

Oct. 27, 1914

GERMAN ATTACK BROKEN

 

he had anchored in position, and on his asking for targets, all available units of the inshore flotilla were directed to engage Westende, Slype and Lombartzyde. But by this time the enemy had so many guns concealed amongst the dunes that the ships could not approach within 4,000 yards of the shore, and their field of fire was greatly limited. Finally, indeed, in the afternoon the Germans got a heavy gun to

bear, and they had to retire altogether.

 

The Venerable, of course, was unaffected by this fire, but she, too, had had to break off. From 7 a.m. till past 8, lying at anchor with the net barges round her, she was firing, and, as prisoners afterwards reported, with terrible effect. But at 8.15 a.m. one of her destroyer guard reported a submarine, and Admiral Hood decided to weigh and send the Venerable into Dunkirk. In doing so he reported he could do all that was wanted with his less valuable units. The German attack had, in fact, broken down; everywhere it was displaying less energy than on the previous days, and by noon the Admiral received a message from Headquarters to say that his fire had been splendid, and suggesting that he should economise ammunition. (A letter from a German N.C.O, prisoner to his wife at this time stated that German troops had been obliged "to lead the life of cave-dwellers owing to the terrible artillery fire from the fleet." Their losses were very heavy.) So with a few parting shots at the more distant batteries, the Venerable went in to Dunkirk, and the Admiral informed the Admiralty he did not want her any longer. He felt that, given a steady flow of ammunition, he could go on doing what he had done, definitely with the smaller ships, and as yet his casualties were no more than a score of wounded. But the Venerable was not recalled, and remained on the spot in case of need.

It was now clear that the military operations which Admiral Hood would have to support must continue to be of a purely defensive nature. It was no longer a question of recovering Ostend and pushing the enemy away from the sea, The incessant massing of German troops on the Yser front was evidence that it was no mere counter attack on which they were bent to stop the intended advance of the Allies. The growing concentration left no room to doubt that here they were developing their main offensive, and that what we had to face was a determined attempt to break through to Calais. From the sea to the French frontier the first battle of Ypres was raging; the Allies were definitely on the defensive, and the maintenance of the left flank was the vital concern of the fleet.

 

Oct. 27-28, 1914

 

The main anxiety was the shortness of ammunition. Already the miscalculation common to all the belligerents, which was destined to prove the dominant note of the first part of the war in all theatres, was making itself felt. In the evening of October 27 Admiral Hood was urged from home to husband his supply and confine himself to deliberate fire. But with this suggestion he felt unable to comply. During the day the work of closing the railway culverts had been completed, and at flood tide the Nieuport sluices had been opened. But till the water rose to its full height the situation would still be critical. It was a matter of holding on for the next forty-eight hours, and he pointed out that if he was kept to deliberate fire he could not give the indispensable assistance that the Belgians required. The answer was convincing, and he was promptly given full discretion "to obtain the best results." So by the time the German attacks began on the 28th he had moved out of Dunkirk, and, with the Venerable, the three monitors and the Bustard, was in action again - not only against the old targets between Westende and Lombartzyde, but presently as far inland as St. Pierre Chapelle, where the morning air reconnaissance had located a heavy battery and a group of four artillery positions.

So effective had been the support all through that the Germans now seemed to regard the squadron as the determining factor in this part of the great battle. From now onward it became the chief target of their heavy batteries, and it began to suffer more than it had done since the beginning of the operations.

The most serious injury was to the Falcon (right - Photo Ships). With another destroyer, the Syren, she was engaged on the patrol line in the N.E. Channel off Westende on the look out for submarines, when about 12.80 p.m. she came under a. heavy and well-directed fire from the shore. She at once increased speed and opened fire with lyddite. For an hour and a half she gallantly held her position, till at 2 p.m. a shell hit her on the muzzle of the port foremost 6-pdr and burst. The gun's crew was closed up at the time, and extra hands were assisting with the ammunition. The result was that her Commander, Lieutenant H. O. Wauton, was instantly killed, together with seven men, and the gunner and fifteen men were wounded, ten of them seriously. She was completely out of action and in a very dangerous position, but Acting Sub-Lieutenant C. J. H. du Boulay succeeded in bringing her into Dunkirk, a service for which he, together with Mr. Ernest Smith, the gunner, was highly commended.

With the slower ships of the main body of the squadron, serious injury was only avoided by continual alterations of course; but, as it was, the Brilliant had one man killed and

Oct. 29-30

NIEUPORT FLANK SAVED

several wounded, the Rinaldo had eight wounded, and the Wildfire was so badly hit on the water line that she had to be sent home for repairs.

Under these conditions of enforced movement and constant turns, indirect fire was extremely difficult. Moreover, during the afternoon the work was again interrupted by the appearance of a submarine. All destroyers were sent in chase, and the Venerable (right - Photo Ships) took the ground on an ill-charted sandbank. Fortunately she was out of range, and as the tide rose she was got off with the assistance of the Brilliant without injury. Still, the enemy could make no progress ashore, and the Belgian bulletin for the day announced that the German fire had slackened, being subdued by the fleet guns. The truth was that it was to the subduing of the enemy's fire upon the Belgian position that Admiral Hood had been devoting nearly all his attention, with little regard to defending his squadron. The battle of Ypres was still undecided; the Germans were persisting with the utmost determination in their attempt to win through to Calais, and the Admiral's one idea was to do all in his power to prevent them, and to maintain the volume of fire inland which the Belgian Headquarters asked for. All this he explained to the Admiralty, and for reward he had authority "to go ahead " and an assurance that he had shown the enemy there was one flank they could not turn.

Events went to prove that this was probably a not too sanguine estimate of the effect that had been produced. Although the squadron remained on the coast for some time longer there was no serious call upon it. The spread of the inundations quickly rendered the Belgian position secure upon the coast, and the German effort on the Belgian front was mainly directed against Ramscappelle, the key of the railway position. Here, by means of a violent bomb attack, they succeeded in making a lodgment on the embankment, whence they began to push forward to the village. But at this point the ships could give some assistance by firing on the enemy's batteries on the line St. Georges-Schoorbakke, and on October 30 a brilliant Franco-Belgian counter-attack drove the enemy back from the railway and re-established the position.

 

Besides this long-range work, the usual bombardment of Westende Bains was kept up, and here, about 11 a.m., the Vestal (right - Photo Ships) was hit in the forecastle by the same battery that had disabled the Falcon, although the spot had been three times thoroughly shelled. On this day Admiral Hood, in honour

 Oct. 29-Nov. 3, 1914

 

of the late addition to his command, flew his flag in the French destroyer Intrepide, but it was not for long. In the early afternoon it was known that the German attack had failed, and as all signs of activity died away the ships were rested.

 

During this period the position of the squadron had been getting every day more precarious, particularly from submarines, while, owing to the guns the Germans had now placed all along the coast, it was increasingly difficult for the vessels to get any result from then fire. Only by constantly keeping on the move at high speed could heavy casualties be avoided. Incessant vigilance had hitherto availed to foil the enemy's submarine attacks. Early, in the morning of the 29th one had been reported off La Panne, where the Venerable was then anchored, but no attack was made. Similar reports continued, and, on the last day of the month some anxiety was felt for the seaplane-carrier Hermes, which, in the evening of October 30, had arrived at Dunkirk from Portsmouth with seaplanes. Early next morning she sailed for Dover, and at 9.30 a signal was made for her to turn back, but ten minutes afterwards the destroyer Liberty reported she had, been torpedoed and sunk eight miles westnorth-west of Calais. Nearly all her crew were saved, but the incident raised the question whether the risk the ships were running was worth any further good they could do. The German batteries were now so well concealed that it was difficult to obtain any result from ship fire. The Venerable was therefore ordered to return, and the Revenge, an old battleship on the Sale List, which had been hastily prepared at Portsmouth for the service was told to stand fast.

 

With this order the operations practically came to an end. For the next two days the struggle for Ramscappelle continued, but the railway embankment was firmly, held, and on November 2 the Germans, as the water increased upon them, abandoned the left bank, of the Yser, and as they fell back, leaving behind them guns, ammunition and wounded, the Allies began, to advance on the roads through the flooded district. With this forward movement all pressure by the enemy on the sea flank ceased and as it was not likely to recur for the present, Admiral Hood was directed to rest his force, still keeping touch with the military headquarters, and ready to act at the shortest notice. But for him the rest was very short. Next day (November 3) came news that a serious attempt seemed intended by the enemy in the direction of the Straits, and leaving his gun-vessels under the Vestal, he hastened across with all his destroyers to resume his functions as Admiral of the Dover Patrol.

 

 

---

 

 

CHAPTER XVII

 

DISPATCH OF SUBMARINES TO THE BALTIC AND THE LOSS OF THE AUDACIOUS

 

Since October 17 when the Undaunted and her consorts had wiped out the four German destroyers there had been no attempt in force to interrupt the operations on the Belgian coast. The omission is the more remarkable, since the Grand Fleet for the time was not in a position to deal promptly with a sortie of the High Seas Fleet to the southward. During the whole continuance of the operations Admiral Jellicoe had his battle fleet upon the west coast of Scotland, with one or two squadrons supporting his new cruiser lines, while the others rested. The German submarines were still active. On October 18 two of them were reported in the Minch, and were said to have fuelled from a tanker at Stornoway. An active destroyer search failed to find them, but they, on the other hand, appear not to have succeeded in locating the Fleet.

 

Still, as there were signs that information was leaking out, further steps were deemed necessary to ensure secrecy, and the Admiralty now took over the censorship of all the north and west coast of Scotland and the north coast of Ireland. To make it effective they even proposed to declare the whole of Scotland north of the Caledonian Canal, including Inverness and the Islands, a prohibited area, but this extreme measure was as yet deemed unnecessary, and it was not adopted till much later in the war. As an alternative the Commander-in-Chief proposed a maritime prohibited area to extend from Buchan Ness in Aberdeenshire, round the Shetlands and Hebrides to Islay. This, he pointed out, would close the Minch, the Pentland Firth and Fair Island Passage, and greatly assist the operations not only against submarine tenders but also against contraband trade. At the same time the proposals he had made for establishing trawler patrols at various focal points on the north coasts were sanctioned, and the new patrol areas were filled up as fast as the vessels came forward.

 

But this system would not entirely cover the ground. The most northerly routes would still be open, and our

 

Oct. 11-20, 1914

THE BALTIC SUBMARINES

 

Minister at Copenhagen was reporting that a good deal of contraband was reaching Scandinavia for Germany round the north of the Faeroes, and then down Norwegian waters. It was to stop this route that Admiral de Chair's Northern Patrol had been established, but it had continually to be drawn upon for other work owing to Admiral Jellicoe never having had the 6th Cruiser Squadron. Of this squadron he still had only the Drake, and she, with the merchant cruiser Mantua, was away on a special mission to Archangel. He therefore asked for more armed merchant cruisers, a type of ship whose coal endurance rendered them specially fit for the purpose. They were promised him, and till they could arrive a division of Admiral de Chair's 10th Squadron was sent up to fill the gap, south of the Faeroes, while the merchant cruiser Alsatian cruised to the north of them. They found, however, but little traffic. During the whole month of October the Northern Patrol in its various positions examined less than fifty ships, nearly all Scandinavian, and only two, both Norwegians, were detained. To the westward the most notable capture was the S.S. Oscar II, which was sent in by the battleship Hibernia. She proved to have on board the Austrian Ambassador to Japan and his Staff on their way to Rome from Tokio. He, of course, warmly protested against the detention, and the ship was speedily released.

 

For the battle cruisers there was little rest. On October 20 the Admiralty had information, believed to be trustworthy, that certain German cruisers, with destroyers and submarines, which had been at Danzig had left for the North Sea, and Admiral Beatty had to cut short his harbour time. With the 1st Battle Cruisers and 1st Light Cruisers he was sent away at high speed to make a sweep from Fair Island to the Skagerrak in concert with the 4th Destroyer Flotilla from Cromarty. It was, however, quite probable that the object of the enemy's movement did not lie in the North Sea at all. Amongst other matters discussed during the recent conference at Loch Ewe was the possibility of sending submarines into the Baltic to attack the High Seas Fleet. It was heard of constantly exercising between the island of Bornholm and the southern entrance of the Sound, and the opportunity was too tempting to be resisted. The Commander-in-Chief was specially anxious for the attempt to be made, and at his instigation inquiries were set on foot to ascertain whether the Sound was mined. The upshot of them was that it was probably free, and on October 11 Commodore Keyes received instructions to carry out the operation. Three units were to be sent, and those selected were E 1 (Lieut.-Commander N. F.

 

Oct. 17-22, 1914

E l AND E 9 PASS IN

 

Laurence), E 9 (Lieut.-Commander M. K. Horton), and E 11 (Lieut.-Commander Martin E. Nasmith). Their instructions were to pass through the Sound at night so as to avoid the cruiser and flotilla patrol which the Germans were known to maintain between Rugen and the Swedish coast. They would then endeavour to attack the High Seas Fleet, and when their fuel was expended they were to go to Libau and work from there till further orders. That Libau had been dismantled and abandoned as a naval port, and that it was blockaded by a large German minefield, appears to have been unknown to our Staff.

 

Submarine E1 passed in safely during the night of October 17, and next morning Lieut.-Commander Laurence found himself within 500 yards of one of the patrol cruisers, which he judged to be the Furst Bismarck. Diving at once to attack, he fired two torpedoes at an interval of a minute. The first ran under the ship without exploding, and the second just missed her ahead as she put her helm hard over to avoid it. Within the next two hours two other cruisers were sighted, but he could not approach either near enough to attack. Nothing could be seen of the Fleet, and next day he went to lie in wait off Bornholm. Meanwhile Lieut.-Commander Horton had also passed in, but arriving too late to get through as E 1 had done before daybreak, and knowing that he must be observed by the stream of traffic that was passing in both directions, he had lain on the bottom all the 18th. At dark he carried on, and after several close encounters with destroyers got clear past the patrol line on the 20th.

 

Lieut.-Commander Laurence was then making a cast into Danzig Bay, where, having dived right up to the entrance of Neufahrwasser, he found three cruisers in the basin, and as it was impossible to get at them he went on to Libau. Outside he was met by a Russian officer who piloted him in, and then for the first time he learnt that the port and dockyard had been destroyed, and that he had gone right through the German minefield. Next day (October 22) E 9 also arrived in equal ignorance of the risk she had run, but also unscathed, and there they awaited their missing consort. But E 11 had been less fortunate. Being delayed by defects, it was not till the 20th she was able to attempt the passage of the Sound, and quickly she found she was being followed. Two attempts were made to ram her, and as it was impossible to dive in the shoal water ahead she was forced to return. Outside the Sound she sighted a submarine, which she took to be U 3, and tried to torpedo it. It eventually proved to be a Danish boat. As her shots missed no harm was done,

Oct. 19-30, 1914

THE BALTIC SUBMARINES

 

but the incident went still further to reveal her whereabouts, and sure enough next afternoon she was located by a seaplane as she was re-charging her batteries for another attempt to pass, and was hunted all night by destroyers. Next day she tried again, but only with the same result, and on the 22nd she decided to return to her base and wait for the hue and cry to die down.

 

The same day the other two boats were advised by Admiral von Essen, the Russian Commander-in-Chief, to seek safety at Lapvik, an anchorage he was using near Hango, just within the Gulf of Finland. Still, they decided to wait a little longer for their consort, till two days later an order came from our Ambassador for them to go north. Even so they were not content to proceed direct without another try in the Gulf of Danzig. Three days were spent there and nothing seen but a destroyer, at which E 1 fired a torpedo at 500 yards and again missed. This was on the 28th, and being unable to stay out longer they next day moved north. As a last chance they went by the German cruiser track west of Gothland, but luck was still against them. Nothing was seen, and on the 30th they put into Lapvik, where they were definitely placed under Admiral von Essen's orders. As an assistance to the Russians in disputing the command of the Baltic, their presence was little more than a token of good-will. But it was a beginning which the enemy could not permit to develop, and it is quite possible, therefore, that the German movements which had been reported to Admiral Jellicoe were designed to close the Sound and were not intended for offensive action outside. In any case the sweep of the Grand Fleet cruisers, as usual, drew blank, and by October 25 Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers were back at Cromarty and the light cruisers at Scapa, where some further anti-submarine defences had been improvised from local resources.

 

The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron had also been busy. An air raid on the Cuxhaven Zeppelin sheds was on foot under Commodore Tyrwhitt, and on October 18 the Invincible and Inflexible, with a division of destroyers, were ordered down to the Bight to support the operation. The attempt was made on the 25th, but the weather turned against it. A deluge of rain prevented the seaplanes rising from the water, and the enterprise had to be abandoned.

 

Meantime, the enemy's submarine activity seemed to have died away. Possibly it had been foiled by the restless work of our patrols, but in any case the submarines had disappeared, and, so far as was known, without having succeeded

 

Oct. 26-27, 1914

THE AUDACIOUS MINED

 

in locating any of the new anchorages or the new cruiser areas. So the Grand Fleet was left in peace. It was not till October 26 that its comparative quiet was disturbed, and then it, was from another cause. On that day, it will be recalled, certain dispositions were made in the Southern Area to meet an attack which it was believed the Germans were intending to make on Admiral Hood in order to stop his galling interference on the Yser. But these dispositions were only part of the action taken. During the afternoon news that the German fleet was at Brunsbuttel reached Admiral Jellicoe, who, with the bulk of the Grand Fleet, was resting in Lough Swilly, and he at once took steps to concentrate his Fleet in its previous position. All the battle cruisers were to assemble at Cromarty, and the pre-Dreadnought battleships, which were engaged in supporting the cruisers, were to coal at Scapa. The 2nd Battle Squadron had just put out from the Mull anchorage for firing practice and was making for a rendezvous about thirty miles north-by-west of Tory Island (Lat. 55 degrees 45'. N., Long. 8 degrees 30' W) where the Liverpool was to meet them with the targets. Since this movement would not prejudice a rapid concentration should it be necessary, it was not cancelled. But the practice was destined never to be carried out; for just when the Grand Fleet seemed most secure, it suffered its first heavy loss. (See Maps 9 and 10 in case)

 

The time for reaching the rendezvous.was 5 a.m. on the 27th. Four hours later the squadron was about twenty miles N. 1/4 E. from Tory Island, steaming in line ahead, when the Audacious (Captain Dampier), being third in the line and just turning, struck something as she swung, and a violent explosion under her port side aft brought her to a standstill. Whether it was a mine or a torpedo no one could tell. A minefield in those waters was hardly to be expected. True, it was on the track between the Clyde and the West, and also on that from Quebec to Liverpool, which the Canadian Convoy had been originally expected to take, but the convoy had arrived nearly a fortnight before. Though there had been no recent reports of submarines in the vicinity, a submarine seemed the most likely conjecture, and in obedience to the recent general order the rest of the squadron cleared away and called up assistance for the damaged ship.

 

At first it was thought she was sinking and unable to steam. The Liverpool, therefore, stood by, moving round her at high speed, and the tugs that had brought the targets closed in. For a while there was great anxiety, for a fairly heavy sea was running, which added seriously to the danger as the ship

 

Oct. 27, 1914

LOSS OF THE AUDACIOUS

 

began to settle by the stern. But presently the settling ceased, and it was found she could proceed slowly under her own steam. Meanwhile all the fleet destroyers, and every other available vessel were hurrying out from Lough Swilly, but nothing could be done to help her till, some four hours after she had been struck, the White Star liner Olympic appeared in answer to the S.O.S. call and offered to take her in tow. It was dangerous work. As no second attack had been, made it seemed probable it was a case of a minefield, and this was now confirmed by a signal that the S.S. Manchester Commerce had been blown up by a mine in the same waters the previous afternoon. (The information came from the Bunecrana Naval Centre in Lough Swilly. It originated from the coastguard station at Mulroy. The explanation of the delay was that on mobilisation all coastguard stations in this vicinity had been closed except for one chief officer at Mulroy, who was not in telegraphic communication with Buncrana.)

 

Still, the Olympic would not hold back, and to see her clear the Liverpool boldly steamed ahead of her as she closed the Audacious. But by this time the stricken battleship was so badly down by the stern that in the sea that was running she was almost unmanageable. Even when the tow-line was passed it parted. Then the Fleet collier Thornhill, who had just come up, tried her hand, but only with the same result, and all further efforts were seen to be useless. She was still making headway, and up till 4.0 p.m., seven hours after she was struck, there was so much hope of saving her that the Commander-in-Chief telegraphed to the Admiralty asking that an officer of the Construction Department might be sent in order to report on patching her up. At the same time he submitted that every effort should be made to prevent the incident being published.

 

Being now sure the damage was due to a mine, he also ordered the Exmouth to proceed to the struggling ship and make another attempt to take her in tow. But by the time she arrived on the scene all hope was gone. The stern of the Audacious was awash, and all her crew had been taken off to the Olympic. By extraordinary exertions and a fine display of seamanship she had been brought through the heavy sea fifteen miles from where she was struck. But there it ended. At 9.0 p.m., half-way to safety and after a twelve hours struggle, she suddenly blew up with great violence and went down.

 

Thus Admiral Jellicoe, having preserved his capital ships intact for the three most critical months of the war, cruising boldly in the most dangerous waters, and in spite of every German attempt to cripple him, now lost one of his finest

  

Oct 27, 1914

WHY IT WAS SUPPRESSED

 

ships by a stroke of sheer ill luck. Whatever the enemy's object in laying the minefield off Tory Island, it is scarcely credible that he could have had information of the presence of the Grand Fleet in those waters in time to do it; it is even less credible that, had he intended it for the Grand Fleet, he would have laid it to the westward of Lough Swilly. The Germans deserved the success even less than Admiral Jellicoe the calamity, but calamity it was, and the question of suppressing it had to be faced.

 

In announcing the loss the Commander-in-Chief had again urged that its publication should be withheld. Considering what the juncture was, the request was natural enough. The operations on the Belgian coast were at their crisis. It was on this day the Nieuport sluices were opened; the Germans' attempt to reach Calais was reaching its highest intensity; the next forty-eight hours would decide the issue, and now if ever was the time for the German Fleet to strike a blow at Admiral Hood. At the Admiralty it was recognised at once that, owing to the Olympic having been on the scene, the loss could not be concealed for more than a week or ten days, but that would overtide the crisis. For concealment there was the highly successful precedent of the Yashima in the Russo-Japanese War. Still, concealment of loss was so contrary to all British tradition and sentiment that the Admiralty would not decide without reference to the Cabinet. It was a question, after all, of high policy for the Government to decide.

 

When, indeed, it came to the point of a Cabinet decision it was not only or even mainly a question of the naval considerations on which Admiral Jellicoe had based his request. The Foreign Office, at the moment, was faced with what was to prove, and was even then recognised to be, one of the momentous crises of the war, and the announcement of the startling German success against the British Fleet might well turn the swaying scales in their favour. At Constantinople, the struggle between the representatives of the Allies and those of the Central Powers had reached its height. The Germans were clearly doing everything in their power to force Turkey into the war; the Goeben and their Military Mission were gradually dominating the situation and our Ambassador was reporting that the Turks could not be got to believe in any successes except those of the Germans. The tension could not last much longer, and any additional weight might snap the slender hold which the Entente Powers still maintained. Sir Louis Mallet informed the Foreign Office a day or two later that it was events in the main theatre

Oct. 28, 1914

LOSS OF THE AUDACIOUS

 

that would in all probability decide the Turks one way or the other. The situation, he said, was in the last degree critical, as German and Austrian influence was clearly at its maximum. In these circumstances there was obviously every reason to conceal the loss as long as possible, and on October 28 Admiral Jellicoe was informed that, in view of the military and Turkish situation, the loss of the Audacious was not to be made public for the present, and that he was to use every endeavour to keep it secret locally.

 

So the departure from the time-honoured British practice, which proved so distasteful to public opinion, was sanctioned for high reasons of State. That the Turkish crisis, at least, was sharp enough to justify exceptional measures was soon made only too clear; for two days later, although till the last moment the Grand Vizier, and, indeed, the majority of the Turkish Ministers, were determined to maintain neutrality, their hand was forced, as must be related in its place, by the old Prussian device of a false telegram.

 

As for the minefield that had done the damage, why, when, and how it had been laid remained a mystery for some time. It was not till early in the New Year that it was ascertained the mischief had been done by the Berlin, a large Nord-deutscher liner of 17,000 tons, that had been armed as a cruiser and equipped with mine-laying gear during August. She had originally started on her mission from Wilhelmshaven at the end of September, but on nearing the Naze she encountered some British warships which were cruising there on the look-out for two of our submarines returning from a reconnaissance in the Skagerrak. (This reconnaissance was preliminary to passing our " E " boats into the Baltic The Drake, Nottingham and Falmouth, with two destroyers met E 5 on the 27th. The Nottingham was ordered to escort her in while the other cruisers continued to look for E 1.)

 

Not venturing to proceed, she ran back to port, and did not start again till October 14. This time she was said to be mothering two submarines. If this was so she could not have done an average of more than nine knots, and, so hampered, it was scarcely to be believed that she could escape the net which at this time Admiral Jellicoe had spread in her path. Nothing, indeed, is more impressive of the difficulties of his task than the incredible luck that attended her desperate adventure. (Our information as to the Berlin's cruise comes from a source not entirely trustworthy. The following account of her movements, therefore, can only be taken for what it is worth.) His cruisers had just completed the sweep in force down to the Dogger Bank, which had been part of his operations for covering the approach of the Canadian Convoy, and most of the

 

Oct. 15-16

CRUISE OF THE BERLIN

 

squadrons were still in the regular patrol areas between Scotland and Norway, while north of them squadrons of battleships were patrolling in place of the 10th Cruiser Squadron, which to complete the disposition had been called down from the Northern Patrol. Its area was the southernmost - midway between Peterhead and the Naze. Above them was the 2nd Cruiser Squadron patrolling up and down the coast of Norway, with the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron on a parallel line of patrol to the westward. Further north still was the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron (Lion, Queen Mary, New Zealand) in support.

 

The day after the Berlin started, it will be recalled, the disposition had been disturbed by the loss of the Hawke, and the remainder of the 10th Squadron had been ordered to move north, but the 2nd Squadron continued their patrol. Their time, however, was nearly up, and next morning (the 16th) at 5.30 they started westward to return to Scapa, straight across the path of the Berlin, but she passed twenty miles ahead of them and carried on northwards. Her course was now converging with that of the light cruisers, which at 6 a.m. had turned northwards, and ahead of her were the battle cruisers steering diagonally towards her path to pass round the north of the Shetlands. How she failed to run into them is not clear. At 8 a.m. she must have been very close, but they crossed without sight of each other. Still, the light cruisers were coming up on their converging course, but their time, too, was up, and at 1.0 p.m, when they had got within thirty miles of her, they, too, turned away for Scapa.

 

Though she was now clear of the first cordon, she was running into the second. About ten miles north of her was the 3rd Battle Squadron coming in from the Utvoer Patrol Line (off the Sogne Fjord), and about to cross her course on its way to Scapa. Had she been going a knot or two faster they must have met. As it was, the battleships seem to have passed barely ten miles ahead of her, and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron, which was on its way to relieve them, was still some fifty miles away to the south-westward.

 

Still, in spite of her luck, danger thickened. At 6 p.m., when she was far enough north to clear the Shetlands and Faeroes, she altered to the north-westwards direct for the Hafnarnaes Light in Iceland, clearly unaware that this course would take her through another patrol area which at the moment was occupied in great strength. It extended north and north-east of Muckle Flugga, the northern point of the Shetlands. Here were spread four "Duncans" of the 3rd Battle Squadron; to seaward of them were the Audacious

 

Oct. 17-21, 1914

LOSS OF THE AUDACIOUS

 

and her consorts of the 2nd Battle Squadron, with four of the armed merchant cruisers, which had been ordered to join them for duty as boarding ships. As the Berlin was altering course for Iceland, the squadron was coming down south-eastward on an opposite but converging course. It was a splendid chance for the Berlin's submarines if any were with her as well as for our ships, but apparently the squadron about seven o'clock passed close ahead of the raider, and so without seeing or being seen she ran clean through the thronged area.

 

She now had a clear run for Iceland, and it would seem she made the Hafnarnaes Light in the evening of October 18, and then, turning south-west along the Iceland, coast till she made the Ingolf shofdi Light, set her course in the morning of the 19th for a rendezvous south of the Stanton Banks, which lie just south of the Hebrides. Then the strange game of hide-and-seek began again. We have seen how in consequence of the loss of the Hawke the whole patrol system had been shifted to the westward, and the waters on that side were as thronged as the others had been. Where her track passed north-east of Rockall Bank the 1st Battle Squadron was patrolling, and between it and the Hebrides was the Iron Duke with the 4th Battle Squadron. As the Berlin approached the new patrol areas, the 1st Squadron was steering in two divisions from the eastward towards her track. At 6 p.m. on October 20 they were close to it, and as darkness fell they turned to the northward and steamed alongside it for two hours. During this period the Berlin must have passed the 2nd Division, which was to the northward, quite close on the opposite course, and must have been within ten miles of the 1st when, according to programme, the squadron turned back to the eastward and let her by.

 

After this hairbreadth escape she carried on for her rendezvous south of the Stanton Banks, where she, arrived about nightfall on the 2lst, and is said to have left her two submarines. She then held away for the North Channel, where it would seem she intended to lay her first minefield. Once more the course was not clear. The 2nd Cruiser Squadron, haying come down to coal at Lough Swilly, was steaming north again on a converging course to take up a patrol station off the Flannan Islands. But for the second time the luck was against them, and about 8 p.m. she passed ahead of the squadron, at a distance that cannot have exceeded fourteen miles. It can scarcely be that wireless indications had not revealed to her the hornet's nest in which she was moving, and it would seem she

 

Oct. 21-23, 1914

THE BERLIN LAYS HER MINES

 

was getting very nervous; for on reaching the Mull of Cantyre some lights ashore, which she took for alarm signals, scared her off, and without having laid a single mine - at least none were found - she hurried away along the north coast of Ireland. It would look as though her intention was to proceed at once off Tory Island, a course which would have taken her a second time straight across the track of the Iron Duke and the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons. They were just then approaching Lough Swilly from the northward, disposed abeam and covering a wide stretch of sea. Whether she heard them or was nervous about passing Lough Swilly, she turned northward out of their path, when just past Inishtrahull, and ran back for her rendezvous. Even so she only escaped by the skin of her teeth. At 6.0 a.m. she must have passed within eight miles or so of the Iron Duke, and then, was running almost into the arms of the 4th Squadron cruiser, the Blonde, which was coming down for Lough Swilly independently, but neither saw the other, though about daybreak they appear to have passed within five miles of each other.

 

She thus miraculously reached the rendezvous at 10 a.m., while the Albemarle and Exmouth, who were patrolling northeast and south-west below the Hebrides, were making straight for it. But at 11.0, when within about a dozen miles of her, they turned back north-east. During the afternoon they were back again, actually passing the rendezvous close to the Westward, but without sighting the Berlin. At nightfall, when their backs were turned again, she made a fresh start. This time there was nothing near her, and in the midnight hours she laid the fatal minefield off Tory Island undisturbed. Then, after running down to Boylagh Bay - for what purpose is unknown – she, next morning (the 23rd) made a wide sweep to the westward, and went back once more to the rendezvous.

 

There about 6 p.m., it is said, she picked up her submarines and took them on to a point south of the Flannan Islands, where she was to leave stores for them. The movement brought her again into danger. By this time the 2nd Cruiser Squadron had taken up its patrol between Sulisker and St. Kilda, and as about nightfall the Berlin reached her destination, they were passing down sixteen miles to the westward. Still, she was not free. At 9.30, having reached St. Kilda, they turned back, and two hours later it is said the Berlin, having deposited the stores, parted company with the submarines (quite apart from the doubt whether she had submarines with her, no trace was ever found of her alleged attempt to establish a base for them at the Flannan Islands) and steamed away for Iceland directly across their course.

 

Oct. 27-31, 1914

 

So for tbe fourth time they were right upon her, but by a last stroke of luck she passed about thirty miles ahead of them and got clear away. By the evening of October 27 she made the coast of Iceland, and there, somewhere about Wester Horn, while the wholly unexpected victim of her minefield was sinking, she is alleged to have deposited more submarine stores. Thence she ran back for home, but in order to escape our cruisers was forced to seek safety in Trondhjem. She put into the port secretly in the morning of November 16, pleading damaged engines. The pretext was transparently false, and in spite of all protest both she and her crew were promptly interned by the Norwegian Government.

 

Of what she had done and the fairy tale chances by which she had achieved the impossible nothing was, of course, known at the time, but precautions were at once taken to warn merchant ships, to ascertain the extent of the minefield and to sweep channels through it. No further loss occurred, nor did the Commander-in-Chief shift his ground. He did not, however, remain with the Fleet, for on October 30, as our ultimatum to Turkey was being dispatched, he was invited to London to confer witb the Admiralty, and on the last day of October he said good-bye to the Fleet for the first time since he had hoisted his flag, Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender was left in command and as the Commander-in-Chief departed tbe telegram for war with Turkey came in.

 

It was a new Board he met. In view of the rising agitation in the Press against every one German or of German descent, Prince Louis of Battenberg thought it right to offer his resignation as First Sea Lord. On October 29 he had signalled his farewell to the Fleet, and Lord Fisher resumed the office which he had vacated four years before. The immediate result was one of those drastic measures which the country had come to connect with his personality. The loss of the Audacious in one of the great highways of the Atlantic trade naturally forced to the front tbe necessity of dealing firmly with the increasing disregard with which Germany was treating the accepted limitations of naval warfare. Regardless alike of civilian and neutral life, she was sowing mines broadcast and surreptitiously in the highways of the world - and sowing them, as was then believed, under neutral flags. Even without this last aggravation, so ruthless a stretch of legitimate belligerent action could not be met within the old canons of war; that was clear. Admiral Jellicoe, as we have seen, in his proposal for a prohibited area had already indicated the lines on which a new departure

 

Nov 2-5, 1914

MILITARY AREA DECLARED

 

should proceed, and under the stress of the recent outrage the new Board received sanction for something even stronger than he had suggested. But the measure that was to be adopted was at least not carried out surreptitiously or without due notice. On November 2 the decision was announced to the world in the following declaration: -

"During the last week the Germans have scattered mines indiscriminately in the open sea on the main trade route from America to Liverpool via the north of Ireland. Peaceful merchant ships have already been blown up with loss of life by this agency. The White Star liner Olympic escaped disaster by pure good luck. But for the warnings given by British cruisers, other British and neutral merchant and passenger vessels would have been destroyed. These mines cannot have been laid by any German ship of war. They have been laid by some merchant vessel flying a neutral flag which has come along the trade route as if for the purpose of peaceful commerce and, while profiting to the full by the immunity enjoyed by neutral merchant ships, has wantonly and recklessly endangered the lives of all who travel on the sea, regardless of whether they are friend or foe, civilian or military in character.

 

"Minelaying under a neutral flag and reconnaissance conducted by trawlers, hospital ships and neutral vessels are the ordinary features of German naval warfare. In these circumstances, having regard to the great interests entrusted to the British Navy, to the safety of peaceful commerce on tbe high seas, and to the maintenance within the limits of International Law of trade between neutral countries, the Admiralty feel it necessary to adopt exceptional measures appropriate to the novel conditions under which this war is being waged.

 

"They therefore give notice that the whole of the North Sea must be considered a military area. Within this area merchant shipping of all kinds, traders of all countries, fishing craft, and all other vessels will be exposed to the gravest dangers from mines which it has been necessary to lay, and from warships searching vigilantly by night and day for suspicious craft. All merchant and fishing vessels of every description are hereby warned of the dangers they encounter by entering this area except in strict accordance with Admiralty directions. Every effort will be made to convey this warning to neutral countries and to vessels on the sea, but from November 5 onwards the Admiralty announce that all ships passing a line drawn from the northern point

Nov. 2-5, 1914

of the Hebrides through the Faeroe Islands to Iceland do so at their own peril.

 

"Ships of all countries wishing to trade to and from Norway, the Baltic, Denmark and Holland are advised to come, if inward, bound, by the English Channel and the Strait of Dover. There they will be given sailing directions which will pass them safely, so far as Great Britain is concerned, up the east coast of England to Farn Island, whence a safe route will, if possible, be given to Lindesnaes Lighthouse. From this point they should turn north or south according, to their destination, keeping as near the coast as possible. The converse applies to vessels outward bound. By strict adherence to these routes the commerce of all countries will be able to reach its destination in safety, so far as Great Britain is concerned, but any straying, even for a few miles from the course thus indicated, may be followed by fatal consequences."

This, then, was the answer to the German provocation; but no sooner was it given than the enemy took another step in his rake's progress. The theatre of his offence was this time in the Southern area. It was the news of it that had brought Admiral Hood so suddenly back to Dover, and as suddenly it caused Admiral Jellicoe to hasten back to the Fleet.

 

 

---

 

 

CHAPTER XVIII

 

THE GORLESTON RAID AND CONCLUSION OF THE BELGIAN COAST OPERATIONS

 

The reports that had been coming in that the enemy seemed to be contemplating some activity in the North Sea had not ceased. They were still quite vague, and the concentration of the Grand Fleet, for which the Commander-in-Chief had been preparing when the Audacious was lost, had gone no further. The probabilities pointed to action, in the Southern Area, and on November 2, while Admiral Jellicoe was still absent from the Fleet, a new disposition was made. About noon on that day the 3rd Battle Squadron (that is, the "King Edwards" and the "Duncans") were ordered to come south and join Admiral Burney's flag at Portland. The squadron, though originally intended - at least in part - for the Channel, had been supplying the Grand Fleet's shortness in cruisers, and had usually been employed in acting with them for exercising command of the North Sea approaches. They were being so employed at the moment and were widely spread; but Admiral Bradford, who commanded the squadron, proceeded to concentrate, and then steamed south.

 

In the Southern Area Commodore Tyrwhitt had sent out the Undaunted and Aurora, with the 3rd Destroyer Flotilla, to the Broad Fourteens to act as an advanced screen for the squadron on the Belgian Coast; the Fearless, of the 1st Flotilla, had come in to coal; and he himself was standing by at Harwich in the Arethusa. Towards evening he recalled |the Aurora. (The Aurora was a new light cruiser nominally belonging to the 4th Flotilla, but had not yet joined it. She was commanded by Captain Hotham in September, and having completed her trials was specially attached to Commodore Tyrwhitt, whom she joined on October 20. Map No. 11 in case.)

 

In pursuance of the declaration for closing the North Sea that was issued this day, it was intended to strengthen the barrier minefield which closed the northern |approach to the Channel, and the Aurora was required, with six destroyers, to protect the minelayers. As for the other

 

Nov. 3, 1914

THE GORLESTON RAID

 

ships in the Southern Area, there were four battleships at the Nore, Queen, Majestic, Jupiter and the Venerable, which had just come in from Dunkirk; the Queen being on guard at two hours' notice. At Dover was the Irresistible, also at short notice. To the northward the battle and light cruisers were at Cromarty, where the Commander-in-Chief had ordered them to concentrate. This was the position when, shortly after 7 a.m. on November 3, Commodore Tyrwhitt was surprised by a wholly unexpected signal. It came from the Halcyon (Commander Ballard) a mine-sweeping gunboat stationed at Lowestoft, which was then working near Smith's Knoll, and it was to say she was engaged with a superior enemy. At the same time big shells began to fall close to the beach at Yarmouth. In the mists of the autumn dawn no ships could be clearly made out. According to a German report, a squadron consisting of three battle cruisers, Seydlitz, Moltke and Von der Tann, the cruiser Blucher, and three light cruisers, Kolberg, Graudenz and Strassburg, had left the Bight the previous evening with orders to make a demonstration against the English coast. Making the Cross Sands light-vessel about daybreak, they surprised the Halcyon some four miles south of it, steering north-easterly. Two miles south-west of her was the destroyer Lively (Lieutenant Baillie-Grohman), patrolling to the eastward, and astern, near the Scroby Buoy, was another destroyer, the Leopard (Lieutenant V. S. Butler).

 

On seeing the leading ships of the enemy coming out of the morning mist the Halcyon turned towards them and made the challenge. It was greeted with salvoes of 11" and other guns, and she at once turned away to the south-west. Seeing her acute danger, Lieutenant Baillie-Grohman, who also had altered course towards the enemy, dashed across her stern and boldly turned down on a parallel course with her and set up a smoke screen between her and the enemy. For about a quarter of an hour the two ships were under heavy fire, but thanks to continual changes of course and the smoke screen neither was seriously hit when, at 7.40, the enemy, in fear that further pursuit of the action might lead them into a minefield, ceased fire and made off to the eastward. The Leopard, who all through had been under heavy -fire, now turned to search down the coast while the Lively held after the enemy till she lost them in the mist. The other destroyers of the Yarmouth Patrol, though they had put to sea the moment they heard the guns were unable to arrive on the scene before the enemy had made off. Still, it was owing to the bold action of the patrol that the Halcyon was able to escape with only trifling damage, and no more than three men wounded.

 

Nov 3, 1914

BRITISH DISPOSITIONS

 

At 7.45 she reported that the enemy, whose force was still undetermined, was making off to the south-eastward. Upon this, Commodore Tyrwhitt, who on the first alarm had ordered the Aurora and Undaunted to make for Smith's Knoll with all dispatch, and was himself hastily preparing to get to sea, decided to hasten off to Terschelling with the Arethusa and another division of destroyers to try to cut off the enemy's retreat, and ordered the Aurora and the Undaunted, with her destroyers, to do the same.

 

By 8.30 the Halcyon reached Yarmouth and was able to present a fuller report. She made out the enemy to be four Dreadnought battleships and four four-funnelled cruisers and had lost sight of them steaming east-south-east about twelve miles off Lowestoft (Lat. 52 degrees 33 1/2' N., Long. 2 degrees 04' E.). Owing to the inevitable delay in transmission and decoding it was some time before the Admiralty had the information. An earlier message from Gorleston stated that the enemy's force consisted of at least one battle cruiser and three or four others and was steaming south. In this form the intelligence was sent at 9.0 a.m. to Admiral Hood at Dunkirk, and also to Admiral Beatty at Cromarty, and at the same time the nearest East Coast Defence Patrols were ordered to the spot; all available submarines at Harwich were sent out to attack, and those at Dover were to get to sea ready for action. Admiral Burney was also warned, and the Queen and Irresistible were directed to take up a position to support the Patrols. By noon Yarmouth reported for certain that two battle cruisers and four light cruisers had been sighted, and this information was sent to the Commodore with a warning to beware of being cut off.

 

So far all the information pointed to a raid to the southward, but to ensure against the enemy doubling back Admiral Beatty was given discretion to proceed with all dispatch to an intercepting position north of Heligoland, where the Scapa light cruisers were to join him. This was repeated to the Grand Fleet; and the 3rd Battle Squadron, which, on its way to the Channel, was then off the N.W. coast of Ireland, was ordered to turn back and join the Commander-in-Chief at Scapa. There the concentration which he had prepared was now taking place, since the most likely explanation of what then appeared to be an unintelligible attempt of the enemy to bombard an open coast town was that it might be a diversion to distract attention from something more serious in the north. The Grand Fleet battleships would in any case

 

Nov 3, 1914

THE GORLESTON RAID

 

be too late for action in the Channel, and there other precautions were taken. Admiral Burney was to move up to Spithead; the Venerable and five of the Nore submarines were to join the Queen and Irresistible at the Tongue, and the Majestic and Jupiter were to get ready to do the same. At Gorleston were three "Oversea" submarines, E 10 under orders for the Cattegat, and D 3 and D 5 for Terschelling. At the first sound of the guns they put to sea, but unhappily as they were hurrying to the scene of action D 5 struck a floating mine. In less than a minute she went down, and though two fishing drifters, Homeland and Faithful, regardless of the danger, rushed to the rescue, nearly all hands were lost. Though coastal bombardment appeared at first to be the object of the raid, it is more probable that mining was the main intention, but not where D 5 was lost. It would seem that in retiring from Gorleston the Germans had laid a line of mines some five miles long in the Smith's Knoll Passage, and this was known as early as 11.0 a.m., when a fisherman coming in to Lowestoft reported having seen the Germans laying mines as they retired. Before noon a general warning had gone out from the Admiralty.

 

In the meantime the Commodore, having provided as he thought for Terschelling, had decided to take the Smith's Knoll position himself with the Arethusa and six destroyers, sweeping along the Suffolk coast on his way. The Aurora, however, not having received his last order, apparently had held on for the same position, and was waiting there for instructions. The Undaunted, with her destroyers, was thus making for Terschelling alone, and when she had reached a position near the mid-sea rendezvous in Latitude 58 degrees she sighted to the southward four cruisers "looking like two 'Roons,' and two, others." They at once gave chase, and she ran off to the northward; but not content merely to escape, she soon began to turn to the westward to try to lead them south. But the enemy clearly winded a trap, and almost at the same moment they gave up the chase of the Undaunted and made off east-north-east towards Terschelling Light. The Undaunted, true to her name, then resumed her course and followed them, doing her best to keep touch; while the Commodore, who at 11.30 had reached the Corton light-vessel off Lowestoft on his way to Smith's Knoll, started off to her assistance. By this time, however, the Admiralty, having ascertained the overwhelming force of the enemy, had recommended him to concentrate. The Undaunted was accordingly recalled. By 3.0 p.m. the Commodore had his three light cruisers and thirteen destroyers

 

Nov. 3-7, 1914

LOSS OF THE YORCK

 

assembled at the mid-sea rendezvous, and with this force he proceeded to sweep past Terschelling to the Bight. But of the enemy no more was seen, and Admiral Beatty and the Scapa light cruisers were recalled. Towards midnight Commodore Tyrwhitt swept back again, and by noon on the 4th was off the Maas light-vessel, with his whole force barring the way down the Broad Fourteens. Still, there was no further trace of the raiders; and as it was now evident that the German movement was nothing but a runaway knock, the normal routine was resumed, and the 3rd Battle Squadron, which had been ordered to turn south again the previous afternoon, carried on to join the Channel Fleet at Portland.

 

Whether or not anything more effective had been contemplated, the force employed was certainly large enough to justify all the precautions that were taken by the Admiralty. According to German reports all their ships got back safely, but they admitted that the morning after the raid (November 4) the armoured cruiser Yorck forded the minefield which defended Jade Bay and was lost with half her crew. The form in which her loss was announced implied she was not with the raiding squadron. Our final reports went to show that she was. She and the Roon formed a class by themselves, and our nearest observers agreed that besides four battle cruisers the squadron contained four cruisers, and amongst them both the "Roons."

 

To us, in view of the excellent opporttmity they had had of a really telling interference with our operations on the Belgian Coast, the whole affair seemed peculiarly inept. The actual result was to leave the position on the Yser in so favourable a condition that the Belgian Headquarters determined to attempt a forward movement to recover their original line. This was made known the same night (November 3-4), and Admiral Hood, hoisting his flag again in the Crusader, went over with three other destroyers to assist. The advance was so far successful that the line of the Yser was reached and Lombartzyde re-occupied. Admiral Hood's force was now strengthened by the Excellent, and the Revenge was ready for him at Dover; but before he could act a night counter-attack drove the Belgians out of Lombartzyde, and they fell back to the Nieuport bridge-head. There they were soon firmly established, and, content with what they had regained, they decided not to press their offensive further. On November 7, therefore, Admiral Hood was recalled to resume his normal duty at Dover, leaving the Vestal as senior ship with the Humber, Rinaldo, Bustard and Excellent to carry on in accordance with military requirements.

 

Nov. 7-9, 1914

BELGIAN COAST - III

 

His last day's work was directed against concentrations of troops between Westende and Lombartzyde. It was reported to have been very effective, but next day (November 8), when the operation was repeated in his absence, the ships found themselves received with so heavy a fire that they were forced to withdraw out of range. Nor was this all the attention the last day's work had provoked; for as the gunboats retired they were twice attacked by submarines, both times without effect. With that the operations terminated. So secure was now the sea flank that no immediate assistance from the fleet seemed necessary, and next day (November 9) the whole force was recalled to Sheerness to remain organised as a flotilla, full up with stores and ammunition, ready for further orders.

 

So ended the three weeks' operations, with the main object which they were designed to further fully attained. For although all hope of quickly recovering the lost ground in Belgium was given, up, it was certain the enemy would not be able to reach Calais through Nieuport and Dunkirk. The operations had been carried out under every kind of difficulty. The movements of the ships had been greatly hampered by the shoals and banks on the coast and by the constant menace of submarines. Dunes, rising in places to fifty feet high, obstructed the view, and "the only way to find the enemy," so Admiral Hood wrote, "was to locate a prominent high object such as a tower or tree in the neighbourhood of which we were informed the enemy's troops or guns were congregated, and then to search the area round that object by gun-fire." The difficulties were much increased by the weather, which for the most part was unfavourable for air reconnaissance and observing, and fire control was always difficult owing to the slowness of communication with the shore. Yet severe loss both in guns and men was undoubtedly caused to the enemy, while our own loss was insignificant. All told, the casualties were two officers and ten men killed, and three officers and forty-six men wounded, and two-fifths of these had been caused in the destroyer Falcon by a single shot. Apart from the incidental loss of the Hermes the ships suffered very little. Several had to be sent home to shift worn guns, and besides the injuries to the destroyer Amazon, already recorded, no ship was put out of action.

 

In contrast with the risks that had been run to achieve combination between the Navy and the Army, the conduct of the Germans is noteworthy. In spite of the importance and difficulty of the task which their army had been set, and

 

INACTIVITY OF GERMAN FLEET

in spite of the fact that its object was ultimately naval, the Navy had made no real effort to assist it. It is possible, of course - assuming that they had early enough information of Admiral Hood's instructions - that their destroyer reconnaissance of October 17 was intended as a preliminary to more extensive action. The Admiralty, at any rate, prepared to meet it. It may be that the swift and drastic punishment, with which that reconnaissance met, discouraged further effort; but certain it is that, except for weak submarine attacks, the German Navy sat idly by and left the Army to break itself to pieces without holding out a hand to ease its task. Such activity as it displayed was spent on the Gorleston Raid, an operation of no military significance whatever.

 

 

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CHAPTER XIX

 

REACTIONS OF ADMIRAL VON SPEE'S MOVEMENTS ON THE ATLANTIC CRUISER SYSTEM

(See Maps 2 and 12 in case)

 

With the conclusion of the operations on the Belgian coast and the knowledge that the sea flank of the Allies was secure and Calais beyond the reach of the enemy, the interest of the Naval War shifts to the High Seas. There the Odyssey of Admiral von Spee had come more and more to dominate the situation. The existence of his squadron had set up conditions of which the Navy had no experience. Again and again in the old French Wars we had had to hunt down wandering squadrons in the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean, but never, had we had to deal with one at large in the vast wastes of the Pacific, with all our most distant possessions in three continents and the furthest limits of our trade routes exposed to its ravages. It was impossible to tell within thousands of desolate miles where it would strike, and so powerful was it that at all the possible points it must be confronted with concentrations of force which would strain our resources to breaking point.

 

Never perhaps had the Admiralty had a more difficult problem to solve. Yet, thorny as it was, its solution would have been comparatively easy but for the unrelated complications which entangled it. The first of these was the incessant calls of the military for convoy all over the world, and the second a happy inspiration of the Germans. For instead of concentrating the whole of their outlying cruisers under Admiral von Spee's flag, they had left two or three to operate singly as long as they could against our trade. The cruising grounds assigned to them, moreover, were chosen so as to cause us the utmost embarrassment. The chief of the detached ships were the Emden and the Karlsruhe, and the fields of. their activity were respectively the. Indian Ocean and the north-east of Pernambuco. Not only did these waters constitute two of the richest and most important focal areas on the great trade routes, but in relation to the Pacific they were also the most distant in which it was

 

Aug. 12-16

NORTH AMERICAN STATION

 

possible for an enemy's cruiser to operate without the likelihood of immediate capture. As a combination of the concentration and dispersal of cruising force, the disposition had much to commend it. Whether it was not rather accidental than deliberately thought out by the Germans is more than doubtful, but certain it is that no other device could have caused us greater annoyance. No rise to which they put their scanty force of cruisers, with the exception of the even happier inspiration which sent the Goeben and. Breslau to Constantinople, was better designed for our discomfort. Every fleet and squadron from the Grand Fleet downwards became affected by the disturbance with more or less severity, and in tracing its reactions it will be well to begin with the North American Station. For not only was it one of the most distant from the German Pacific base, but it was the officer in command of it - Admiral Cradock - who was so unhappily destined to be the central figure when the problem reached its culmination.

 

It will be recalled how, on August 12 it became known to him that the Dresden, which at that time appeared to have the function of an isolated cruiser, had been molesting British merchant ships off the Amazon, and that the Karlsruhe had appeared at Curacao. Admiral Cradock had then, at his own suggestion, been authorised to move down with his flag in the newly joined Good Hope and take personal charge of his Southern or West Indies area. The force he left in the north under the senior officer, Captain Yelverton, comprised the Suffolk, Essex, and Lancaster, shortly to be reinforced with the Canadian cruiser Niobe. The great subsidised Cunard liner Mauretania was also in Halifax waiting for conversion, but on August 16 it was decided she was not to be used, owing to the cost of fuelling her, but next day, in pursuance of the policy of stiffening the cruiser squadrons with battleships, the Glory reached Halifax.

 

In the West Indian Area were the Berwick and Bristol and the two French cruisers Conde and Descartes, all engaged in patrol or local convoy duty on their assigned stations. Their special preoccupation was with the Dresden and Karlsruhe, both of whom seemed to be still hovering on the most southerly verge of the station and might at any time break back. That they had some such intention was the more likely, since this part of the station had just acquired a new importance; for on August 16, the day Admiral Cradock started south, the long-anticipated change in, the strategical aspects of the Atlantic was consummated by the formal opening of the Panama Canal.

 

Aug. 13-20, 1914

THE ATLANTIC SQUADRON

 

There was no more news of the Dresden having molested ships, and the last word of the Karlsruhe was that on August 13 she had been seen off La Guayra in Venezuela, steaming east. Upon this information Admiral Cradock, on his way down, called the Berwick and Bristol to meet him at St. Lucia. His intention was to seek the two German cruisers in the southern extremity of his station, and he asked for coal to be sent to Trinidad. In the evening of August 20, however, the Admiralty received news which involved a radical change in the whole plan. It came from our Minister at Rio, who reported that the crew of the Houston liner Hyades, from Rosario to Rotterdam, had been brought in by a German auxiliary, and that their ship had been sunk by the Dresden on the 16th about 180 miles east of Pernambuco.

 

Of the Karlsruhe there was no further information, but it was clear that with the ruthless turn the German operations had suddenly taken the Pernambuco area must have instant attention. It was actually in Admiral Stoddart's command - that is, the Canary and Cape Verde Station - but for all its importance he had not at first been able to deal with it. The original intention in our commerce defence scheme was that it should be occupied from the North American and West Indies Station. But the presence of so many large German ships in United States ports and the immediate need of safeguarding, the North Atlantic routes had forced a change of plan, by which the area was committed to Admiral Stoddart. Accordingly, he was given instructions to detach there as soon as possible his fastest cruiser, and we have seen how on August 13, when the Monmouth joined him at Las Palmas from home, he ordered her away.

 

Still, she could not be definitely assigned to the focal area, for she was to be under the orders of Captain Luce, who with the Glasgow had to watch the whole south-east coast of America single-handed, and his station stopped short of the area. It is true that the Cruiser Squadron War Orders of July 1914 provided that no station limits were to be regarded as rigid and impassable, but these Captain Luce had not yet received. His task was, of course, impossible to discharge adequately. Much had to be left unwatched, and regarding the northern part of his station as the more important at the moment, especially as a number of large German ships had by orders from Berlin taken refuge in Brazilian ports, he had decided to leave the River Plate open, and was working from a secret coaling base at Abrolhos Rocks off the Brazilian coast, where the Monmouth joined him. At the River Plate, therefore, German shipping was free to come and go, but off

 

Aug. 1-21, 1914

OPERATIONS OF DRESDEN

 

the Brazilian ports his activity proved so strong a deterrent that the only prize he had taken was the Hamburg-Sud-Amerika liner Santa Catharina, which had left New York before war broke out and had no wireless.

 

Clearly, then, something more must be done. To all appearance the Dresden was operating in the Pernambuco area from a secret base. The conclusion that she had orders to do so was natural enough, but, in fact, her presence was fortuitous and her orders quite different. It will be remembered that she had been actually under orders for home when war broke out, having been relieved by the Karlsruhe, and it would seem that one of the first effects of the closing of the North Sea by the Home Fleets was an order that she was to join Admiral von Spee in the Pacific. On German authority we now know that as early as August 1 she was told that war had broken out, and that she was to carry on cruiser warfare, presumably against France and Russia. (Admiral Dick: Das Kreuzergesahwader.)

 

On these orders, apparently, she proceeded south and hovered about the Pernambuco area for some time. On the 9th and 10th she was coaling at Jericoacoara (Lat. 2 degrees 50' S., Long. 40 degrees 35' W.), an obscure inlet between Para and Pernambuco. Thence she struck across the trade route towards the island of Fernando Noronha, and then doubled back to Rocas Reef, where she coaled again on the 13th from the Hamburg-Amerika S.S. Baden. Here, possibly, she received orders which led to her ruthless treatment of the Hyades. (This, however, is not certain. The first three ships she stopped (on August 6) were released. This may have been because she had then no tender to which she could transfer the crews. Admiral Dick's explanation is: "Several vessels met en route to Rio and River Plate, but all ignorant of war, except Hyades, which is sunk." This ground for release, however, does not appear in the article of the German Prize Code relating to Vessels Exempted from Capture (Part I. ¤ 6).)

 

It would also seem she was told to carry on for the Pacific, avoiding normal trade routes, for the Hyades was keeping off the usual track when she was taken, and the Dresden with the Baden in company continued south, giving the main trade routes as wide a berth as she could.

 

All this, however, was not known till long afterwards, and the Admiralty could only act on the belief that she was definitely engaged in commerce destruction. On August 21 this appreciation was confirmed by intelligence from our Vice-Consul at Pernambuco that she seemed to be using Rocas Reef as a base, and next day the Admiralty ordered Admiral Cradock to go down and search for her. Thus

 

Aug. 19-Sept. 4

THE ATLANTIC SQUADRON

 

early did war experience bring out the importance of the Pernambuco area and the inadequacy of the original defence system in the Atlantic. It was quickly seen that the shift would have to be permanent, and a fortnight later (September 4) Admiral Phipps Hornby, who had been commanding the 11th Squadron on the Irish Station, was ordered out to take over Admiral Cradock's original command. Both stations at the same time were reinforced with merchant cruisers. Admiral Hornby went out in the Caronia, and the Macedonia was sent to join Admiral Cradock, while a third, the Otranto, was well on her way to Captain Luce, who by this time also had the Monmouth, Captain Brandt.

 

It was on August 22, the day Admiral Cradock's new orders were issued, that she joined. Next day Captain Luce, who had asked whether he was to act against the Dresden to the northward of his station, was told that if he had certain news of her she was to be his objective, and that his station limits were only to be taken as a general guide. Accordingly, having heard of her sinking the Hyades, he at once went off to search the infested waters with the Glasgow and Monmouth. The news was a week old, but there was nothing to indicate what the real orders of the Dresden were. The effect of the movement was to leave her, free to get well away on her southward course.

 

On August 19 or 20, in company with her tender, the Baden, she made Trinidada, a lonely island lying out in the South Atlantic some 500 miles from the Brazilian coast. There she found the gunboat Eber, from German South-West Africa, waiting for the liner Cap Trafalgar, whom her captain was to arm and take over as an auxiliary. There, too, was a supply ship, the Santa Isabel, which had come to meet the Dresden .(The Santa Isabel came from Buenos Aires. On August 5 our Intelligence Officer there reported her to he taking in large quantities of coal, apparently for a German cruiser. She also took in coal-bags, shovels, oil and forty bullocks. On August 9 she sailed with a clearance for Togoland. Later it was ascertained that a German ship, the Sevilla, met her at sea about August 16 and transferred to her her wireless installation and an operator.)

 

Having filled his bunkers, Captain von LŸdecke sailed again on the 21st, intending, according to German accounts, to lie in wait off the River Plate for British steamers, whose arrival was known to be impending. (Admiral Dick: Das Kreuzergeschwader. His account of the Dresden's movements does not always accord with her captured log. Here he says she sailed on the 24th, while the log gives the 21st.) Whether it was really his intention to cruise in that area is made doubtful by his actual movements. He certainly laid a course direct for the Plate, but on coming abreast of

 

Aug. 20-28

SEARCH FOR DRESDEN

 

the southern province of Brazil, where the German colony was very numerous, he altered course towards the land, possibly for the purpose of communication. This alteration brought him for the first time upon the regular trade, route, and on August 26, when nearly abreast of Rio Grande, he captured the British S.S. Holmwood, outward bound for Bahia Blanca with coal, and shortly afterwards the Katherine Park from Buenos Aires to Rio and New York. The Holmwood he sank, and as the other ship's cargo was American-owned, he let her go after transferring to her the crew of the Holmwood, a pretty sure indication that he did not intend to remain where he was. He did, in fact, carry on down the coast, keeping well shorewards of the trade route till he reached Gill Bay in the Gulf of St. George, 500 miles short of Magellan Strait. (Admiral Dick says he remained off the Plate several days, detaining enemy vesssels in harbour. But the log records no such story. The fact was the Plate trade had not yet recovered from the financial paralysis, and sailings were very few.)

 

All this time Captain Luce was searching for her as high as Cape San Roque. On the 28th he tried the supposed German base at Rocas Reef. Not even a collier was found, but there the Otranto joined and the three ships went off together to his secret coaling base at Abrolhos Rocks; for having found, nothing in the north, he had little doubt what the Dresden was doing, and was bent on getting off the River Plate as soon as possible.

 

Complete as was the failure, the reasons that had dictated his movements were sound enough. If he had missed the Dresden, he had come within an ace of getting the Karlsruhe; for on September 1, three days after he left Rocas Reef, this ship appeared there, and she it was and not the Dresden that had been told off to the Pernambuco focal area.

 

But meanwhile Admiral Cradock was at hand. On August 27 he had begun a sweep along the north coast of Brazil, with the Good Hope, Berwick and Bristol, leaving the two French cruisers to take care of the West Indies in his absence. He was thus engaged when on August 29 a report reached him that the Cap Trafalgar was making for St. Paul Rocks, which lie about midway between the African and Brazilian coasts. This ship had come out of the River Plate on August 22 while Captain Luce was to the Northward, and it was not till September 1 she received her armament. On that day, somewhere off Bahia, she met the Eber, who had come on from Trinidada, and received from

 

Sept. 1-3

THE ATLANTIC SQUADRON

 

her her two guns, and apparently her officers and most of her crew. The Cap Trafalgar was thus well to the southward and had not actually started her career when Admiral Cradock heard of her. But the report he received pointed to the possibility of the Dresden being also at St. Paul Rocks, as she had not been heard of for ten days, and the Admiral, although it meant a run of 1500 miles, decided to proceed there in his flagship, leaving the Bristol and the Berwick to continue the search of the Brazilian coast.

 

The same report reached Admiral Stoddart at the Canaries, and as St. Paul Rocks were actually in his station he, too, decided to make a cast. Since the merchant cruisers which had been sent him after the Kaiser Wilhelm's raid had arrived, he felt he could do something for his south-western area, and on September 1 he ordered away the Cornwall, not knowing what his colleague was doing. Next day Admiral Cradock reached St. Paul Rocks. Nothing was there; and he at once made back for Fernando Noronha. Here, though it was Brazilian territory, there was a French Cable Company's station, connected with Brest and with Dakar in Senegal. Originally British, the station still had a British manager, who was ready to accept code messages. The Admiral thus got into communication with the Admiralty and the Glasgow, and being now made aware of the general situation was able to realise the extraordinary complication of the problem that the Germans had set.

 

From Captain Luce he heard that a number of German vessels seemed to be gathering in the Strait of Magellan, and that he was proposing to take his squadron there to investigate. On this the Admiral submitted to the Admiralty the possibility of a concentration there of all the German cruisers in the Pacific and Atlantic.

 

It would seem that he felt that in the circumstances he ought not to return to the West Indies. If so he only anticipated the conclusion the Admiralty had come to. Their latest news from China and Australia raised a strong impression that Admiral von Spee was making for South American waters, and they had already sent him through Pernambuco an order that he was now to remain permanently in command of the South American Station, and, like the other stations, it was to have a battleship which he could use as a guardship for his secret base. For this purpose Admiral Stoddart was to send him the Canopus, which had been acting as guardship at St. Vincent, Cape Verde. The Albion was to replace her from Admiral de Robeck's squadron, and Admiral Tottenham, who was still in the Albion, was to strike his flag and take

 

Sept. 3-5, 1914

NEWS OF KARLSRUHE

 

over the Irish Station in place of Admiral Phipps Hornby, who, as we have seen, was now appointed to Admiral Cradock's original command. At the same time, however, there was great anxiety about the West Indies. One at least of the enemy's, Atlantic cruisers did not seem to be destined for the expected concentration, for it was now known that the crew of the Bowes Castle, a ship taking nitrates to the United States, had just been brought into Maranham, on the north coast of Brazil, with news of the Karlsruhe. What they had to report was that the German cruiser had sunk their ship on August 18 about 200 miles east of Barbados. At the same time our intelligence officers reported renewed German activity at the island of St. Thomas, where colliers and supply ships were being sent out apparently to the Karlsruhe, and possibly, also, to the Dresden. In the face of this information the West Indies could not be neglected. For their safety the Admiralty hastened to provide. A cruiser was to be called down from the North American area with special orders to look into St. Thomas, and the Essex (Captain Watson), being nearest, was selected. The Berwick (Captain Clinton Baker) was also to return there, and in her place Admiral Cradock was to keep the Cornwall (Captain Ellerton), who, as he was returning from his examination of St. Paul Rocks, had been ordered to turn back to Pernambtico.

 

The new instructions were entirely in accord with Admiral Cradock's own appreciation of what was likely to happen, and as it was now certain that the German vessels in the vicinity of Magellan Strait were colliers the probability of his having to deal with the Pacific Squadron was increased. As soon, therefore, as he received his new orders he proceeded to Pernambuco to reconcentrate his squadron. Here, as some compensation for his disappointment at St. Paul Rocks, he found ample evidence of the paralysis of the enemy's trade. In the harbour were not less than fifteen large German ships, belonging mainly to the Hamburg-Sud-Amerika and Norddeutscher Lloyd Companies. Many of them had taken refuge there on the general orders from home in the early days, of the war, and none had ventured to stir. On the other hand, it was clear that the exploits of the Dresden had shaken the confidence of traders all down the coast, and our consuls were crying out for a stronger display of force. But this was already provided for, and it was Admiral Cradock who was to see to it, instead of returning to his old station. Before moving he asked for the latest formation as to Admiral von Spee's movements. The reply was that there had been nothing certain for nearly

 

Sept. 6-16, 1914

THE ATLANTIC SQUADRON

 

a month, but it was quite probable the enemy might make for the vicinity of the Strait, or even the Falkland Islands. On this he determined to move down to the River Plate, where confidence had been most severely shaken and the call for protection was most insistent, and to distribute his squadron to examine all likely places on the way. At the same time he ordered Captain Luce to carry on with his division to the southward, searching all unfrequented anchorages south of the Plate as far as the Strait, and as the Dresden was now known by her last capture to be to the Southward, he was to take up a position there so as to prevent her getting away into the Pacific. This plan the Admiral proceeded to carry out, till, in the middle of the month, it was overridden by new orders from the Admiralty, which once more changed his sphere of action.

 

The developments which had been drawing Admiral Cradock to the southward had also had their reaction upon his colleagues on the other side of the Atlantic, and here the problem was complicated in a high degree by military requirements. We have seen already how the first effect was that Admiral Stoddart was called on to reinforce Admiral Cradock with the Canopus and Cornwall. The loss of these ships came at an inopportune moment and heavily taxed his power of meeting the exigencies'of the army. His squadron now consisted of the Carnarvon (flag), the Albion on her way down from Cape St. Vincent to replace the Canopus, the Highflyer refitting at Gibraltar after her action with the Kaiser Wilhelm, and three armed merchant cruisers, Victorian, Empress of Britain, and Marmora. The Cumberland, was engaged in the operations against the Cameroons, and with her were the Challenger and the French cruiser Bruix, which was escorting the Senegalese contingent.

 

His immediate concern was the transports bringing home the Cape garrison, which, in charge of the Hyacinth of the Cape Station and the Leviathan, specially detached from the 6th Cruiser Squadron, were just entering his area, and there was one enemy ship which might interfere with them. This was the Kronprinz Wilhelm, which had been in company with the Karlsruhe when, on August 6, Admiral Cradock lost her off the Bahamas. Since then she had disappeared, but it was now known that on August 27 she had boarded a Russian ship about 500 miles north-north-west of the Cape Verde Islands. Out of his diminished squadron Admiral Stoddart had now to take over the convoy from the Hyacinth with one of his own ships. In view of the proximity of the Kronprinz Wilhelm he had nothing to spare, but was fortunately

 

Aug. 27-Sept. 20, 1914

MID-ATLANTIC

 

able to use the Europa, which had brought out a transport with General Dobell and the Cameroons Staff, and the Challenger had taken it on. Thus all would have gone well, but on reaching the northern limit of his station the Leviathan broke down and he had to take the convoy on himself in his flagship. An order for Admiral de Robeck to relieve him came too late, and he had to carry on to Lisbon. Here he was authorised to leave the transports to the Europa, for the rest of the route was now patrolled by the French, and another large convoy, powerfully escorted, was coming down. This was the East Lancashire Territorial Division bound for Egypt, and ultimately India, together with two Territorial Battalions for Gibraltar and Malta, all in charge of the Minerva, and the Ocean on her way to replace the Albion at Cape St. Vincent, But so much reduced was Admiral de Robeck's Squadron, owing to continual trouble with the old cruisers, that he had to leave the Cape St. Vincent focal area to the French Morocco Division and send away the Ocean, first to Madeira and then to the Azores. (The French Morocco Division at this time comprised, besides the Bruix at Duala, the cruisers Friant and Amiral Charner and the light cruisers Cassard and Cosmao.)

 

But further military exigencies compelled the Admiralty to cancel this arrangement, and to send both Ocean and Minerva to the East Indies, where the menace of the German Pacific Squadron, as will be seen directly, was causing special anxiety for the safety of the all-important Indian convoys. Nor did this kind of interference with Admiral de Robeck's commerce protection duties cease till, after the loss of the three "Cressys," the remainder of the 7th Cruiser Squadron were told off as regular escort between home and Gibraltar.

 

Meanwhile, before Admiral de Robeck could act on the orders which deprived, him of the Ocean and Minerva, Admiral Stoddart, having heard that the Kronprinz Wilhelm was in his station, had gone back to Madeira. She was said to be at Rio de Oro on the Morocco coast, where the Kaiser Wilhelm had been caught, and, with the Highflyer fresh from refitting, he made a sweep for her. Unfortunately, he started just soon enough to miss an urgent call from the French. Among all the fine things they did in the war, few surpass the way in which General Lyautey, the Governor of Morocco, clung to his still raw province without drawing on the resources of the Mother Country. His force was slender in the extreme, and German agents were diligently making trouble by their well-known methods. Amongst other devices, with their reckless or ignorant disregard of

 

Sept. 26-30, 1914

THE ATLANTIC SQUADRON

 

the consequences of deceiving Orientals, they had been spreading a report that Great Britain had declared war on France. The result was considerable unrest amongst the turbulent tribesmen, and, as a direct means of contradicting, the German falsehood, the French Government asked for a British ship to make a joint demonstration with the Cassard along the disturbed coast. The sweep Admiral Stoddart was making may well have given colour to the German story, and it was nearly a week before the instructions' reached him. He then immediately ordered away the Victorian. On September 26 she met the Cassard off Cape Juby, and together they moved up the coast as high as Agadir, bringing home the object lesson with occasional bombardments of the villages they passed. The effect seems to have been all that was desired, and the tribal unrest died down.

 

It may appear that it would have been a better reply to the French if we had sent a regular cruiser to join the Cassard instead of the Victorian, but what was done was in accordance with a new cruiser policy which the Admiralty had just enjoined. In spite of all its complexities, the problem of exercising a general command of the sea was growing clearer. It was now established that the danger from the enemy's armed merchant cruisers was going to be much less than had been anticipated, and it was to deal with this class of ship that our own merchant cruisers had been commissioned. The altered circumstances were pointed out by the Admiralty in a general order on September 13, and a new function assigned to the auxiliary units. Henceforth they were, as far as possible, to work in conjunction with a regular cruiser in order to assist her in getting hold of enemy cruisers, and never to engage a ship they met unless she was distinctly of inferior force. By this system of coupling, the reach of the regular cruisers would be considerably extended, and the work of dealing with the elusive tactics of the enemy simplified.

 

But for Admiral Stoddart the work was heavy enough. For, besides his trade defence duties, he had still the Cameroons Expedition to cover, and it had developed in such a way as to make it clear that the cruisers attached to it could not be released for some time to come.

 

 

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CHAPTER XX

 

OPENING OF THE CAMEROONS EXPEDITION - AUGUST 15 TO OCTOBER 15

(See Map, p, 276 and Map 16 in case.)

 

It had, of course, been recognised from the first that the Cameroons would be a very different undertaking from Togoland. The colony, since its extension by the Franco-German agreement of 1912, had an area of nearly 300,000 square miles, and from the borders of Nigeria to those of the Gaboon, which Was now included in the French Congo, its sea-front stretched for some 200 miles. By our latest information the Germans had in the colony 170 white troops, and, including police, 2000 natives. It was therefore a question of a considerable expedition which was to be organised from our West African Frontier Force under General Dobell, the Inspector-General. Whether or not the French would be able to assist directly was at first more than doubtful. Owing to the recent cession of territory which they had been constrained to make to Germany, the position of their Congo Colony was very weak. Not only had the Germans obtained a perfect interior position, but their frontier had been brought up so close to the main French line of communication with the Lake Chad region as to menace it along its whole extent. The idea of the French, consequently, was to act purely on the defensive, and by seizing certain strategical points to pin the Germans down to areas where they could do least harm. Such operations would, of course, be valuable as a diversion, and the French were also ready to provide naval co-operation on the coast.

 

We, on our part, in accordance with the defence scheme drawn up some years before the war, had mobilised three columns from the Nigerian Force: one based on Maifoni on the Maidugari River near Lake Chad, another on Nafada to the westward, and a third, which was the strongest of them, at Yola, midway down the frontier. In the coastal area were two others, the Cross River or Ikom column, and the Calabar column. Though they were intended primarily as observation

 

Aug. 5-31, 1914

forces, their commandant was anxious to take the offensive. This was forbidden as premature, and they were to be confined to their assigned functions of reconnaissance, though the Yola or principal column was authorised, at the commanding officer's discretion, to seize Garua, the German station just across the frontier. Nothing, however, was intended at present beyond movements, analogous to those of the French, to draw the enemy from the coast and to prepare for combined action with the main expeditionary force later on.

 

On further consideration, however, the French were not content with naval co-operation in the main zone. At Dakar they had ready, with transports, a force of nearly 2000 Senegalese, with six guns. It was intended for Morocco, where General Lyautey urgently needed reinforcement, and it was only awaiting escort. This force they decided to use at Duala, and on August 15, at a joint conference held in the Admiralty, the plan of operation was settled. Nigeria could provide 1700 men and 10 guns, and Sierra Leone 600 men. A flotilla for inshore and river work was to be formed from the Nigerian Marine. Before, however, any move could be made it was necessary to ascertain whether the reports of German cruisers being based at Duala and of a German occupation of the Spanish island of Fernando Po were true. Not an hour was lost, and on the same day these decisions were come to Admiral Stoddart got the order under which Captain Fuller, was detached in the Cumberland to clear up the situation.

 

On the 23rd he left Sierra Leone with the gunboat Dwarf in tow, and a transport with reinforcements for Togoland. Lome was reached two days after the colony capitulated, and there he took possession of a Woermann liner, whose native crew had mutinied and forced their German officers to take the ship into a British port. Then, after looking in at Lagos to arrange for the organisation of the Nigerian flotilla, he went alone to examine Fernando Po. He was there on the last day of August. No trace of German occupation was found, and he immediately proceeded to Duala, where he found nothing but what appeared to be an armed ship patrolling the entrance. It was now necessary to report the condition of affairs to Nigeria, and as Duala was jamming his wireless he had to go back to Calabar before establishing a blockade. There, on September 1, he found that all outstanding questions had been settled. At first there had been some doubt as to how the command should be shared. The French proposal was that they should have command of the troops, and the British officers the command at sea, but on

 

Sept. 1-4, 1914

PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS

 

our urging the special qualifications and ripe local experience of General Dobell, they handsomely agreed that both commands should remain in British hands. At the same time, as their gun-vessel, the Surprise, had broken down and would require some time for repairs, they consented to let the armoured cruiser Bruix come on with the Dakar troops and co-operate with Captain Fuller.

 

The plan of operations had also been settled. The original idea was to establish a base in Ambas Bay some twenty-five miles to the westward of the Cameroon River. Here lay Victoria, a port connected by a light railway with Buea, the former capital, ten miles to the northward on the slopes of the Cameroon Mountain. The objectives of the first phase of the operations were laid down as Victoria, Buea, Duala, and particularly the wireless station. It had, however, just been reported that the route between Victoria and Duala was impassable during two months of the rainy season, which would soon be at its height. If this proved true Duala would have to be attacked directly, and a cruiser light enough to enter the river would have to be attached to the expedition. For this reason the Challenger (Captain Beaty-Pownall) was ordered to Sierra Leone, where the allied troops were to concentrate on September 10. (Challenger, 5880 tons, 11-6"; 8-12-pdrs.)

 

On September 3 Captain Fuller was back at Fernando Po with orders to gather intelligence and carry out a thorough reconnaissance in preparation for the expedition. He was still anxious that Victoria should be occupied as a first step, for whether or not it was suitable for an army base he regarded it, now that the tornado season was coming on, as essential for a base for the flotilla. Next day, therefore, when the Dwarf rejoined him he went there to make a close investigation. Intelligence that he was able to gather from friendly Kroomen quickly convinced him that it was useless as a military base, but, on the other hand, it was reported to contain a large store of provisions. As the colony was said to be short of them it was desirable to seize it, and he accordingly sent in a flag of truce expressing his intention to land, and threatening a bombardment if any opposition was offered. The demand was accepted, and as it, was clear no troops were in the vicinity, a party of seamen and marines was landed to inspect the town. It was soon found that the bulk of the stores had been removed since Captain Fuller first appeared on the coast. A few stocks, however, were discovered, and a guard of marines was left on shore to prevent their removal in the night. Similar precautions were taken at Bota, a little port in the

Sept. 5-7, 1914

west of the bay, through which passed the light railway from Victoria to Buea. Here a large store of supplies was discovered, and Captain Fuller decided to land a force and remove them in the morning. But no sooner had the work commenced than the bush was found to be full of troops, and presently a flag of truce came in to demand instant evacuation. As nothing was to be gained by resistance, the landing parties were promptly withdrawn, and, after warning the inhabitants, the Cumberland (right - Photo Ships) destroyed the store by gunfire.

 

It was now clear that the only adequate base was Duala itself. It was the actual seat of government, and not only had it an excellent harbour with good quays and a floating dock, but it was the starting point of the two main railways. From the town ran the Midland Line, of which 100 miles were completed to Edea on the Sanaga River and on to Eseka on the Nyong. At Bonaberi, on the opposite or northern bank of the Cameroon River, began the Northern Line, destined ultimately to reach Lake Chad, of which the first section of 100 miles was completed to the Manenguba Mountains. To Duala Captain Fuller could now turn his attention, for on September 5 he was joined by eight vessels of the Niger Flotilla:

 

Ivy	Nigerian Government yacht.
Moseley	Steam lifeboat.
Vigilant Vampire	Dispatch vessels.
Walrus Balbus	Tugs.
Alligator Crocodile	Motor launches.
They were mostly commanded by retired R.N.R. officers in the Nigerian service. Two more armed tugs, Remus and Porpoise, joined about ten days later.

 

Before leaving Victoria, however, he decided to try their mettle in seizing some lighters that were moored off the pier. The work was done in brilliant style by the Vampire and Walrus, and a cutting-out party from the Cumberland, and Dwarf. The lighters were all captured intact, and with this very useful addition to the flotilla he proceeded off the. Cameroon River.

 

The first essential need on that surf-beaten coast was to secure a safe anchorage at some convenient point for his small craft. The only place was inside Cape Cameroon and Suellaba Point, that is the entrance to the lagoon-like estuary by which the river reaches the sea, and before this could be accomplished it was necessary, in view of the Kroomen's reports of extensive mining, to sweep the estuary and approaches thoroughly. But, in fact, Duala was so wholly unprepared for defence, that the Germans had not a single

 

Sept. 8-11, 1914

 

THE ESTUARY OCCUPIED

 

mine and were only just beginning to extemporise substitutes. Nothing, therefore, was found, and so rapidly did the sweeping proceed that on September 9, after the two points had been searched by gunfire, the Dwarf was able to pass into the estuary. (Dwarf , Commander F. E. K. Strong, 710 tons, 2-4", 4-12-pdrs). It was known that a barrage of sunken vessels had been formed to block the river, and she at once discovered it at Rugged Point, some seven miles below the town. The patrol ship had fled at the first sight of her, but, seeing the Governor's yacht, Herzogm Elisabeth, coming out, the Dwarf promptly engaged her, and she quickly retired, apparently on fire, revealing as she re-passed the barrage that there was a practicable channel round the south end of it. Next day (the 10th) the Cumberland moved into the estuary and established a temporary base for the river craft inside Suellaba Point. The patrol ship was also seized. She proved to be the Hamburg-Amerika liner Kamerun (3660 tons), and was found beached and abandoned off Manoka Point.

 

(She had been loading timber in the Gaboon on August 1 when, war being imminent, she was summoned to Duala. She was given a guard of native troops and stationed in the estuary to give wireless warning of an enemy's approach. Her orders were to sink herself in the fairway if a large cruiser appeared, but to try to ram a small one. At the first appearance of the Dwarf, however, on the 8th, she ran full speed up the Manoka Creek till she grounded, and her people made off in the boats to Edea. (Diary of W Schmacher, chief engineer.))

 

The laborious work of preparing for the troops began at once. This same day two of, the Cumberland's steamboats penetrated the Lungasi River as high as Pitti, just below where the Midland Railway crosses it. On their way they chased and sank a large steam launch, and at Pitti they, in their turn, came under fire from entrenchments. Nevertheless, they landed, destroyed the telephone installation and made a valuable capture of papers which disclosed the enemy's scheme for defence for the Midland Railway. The sweeping, meanwhile, had been carried on up to and beyond the barrage. The Dwarf then passed it by the channel the Governor's yacht had shown her, and took up a position to prevent the obstruction being completed. Her boldness soon got her into trouble; for next day, as she was firing on a launch with a lighter in tow, she got caught by two field guns in a well-masked battery which had been established at Yoss Point to protect the barrage. She replied vigorously, but wisely retired at once, and though she had one bad hit on the bridge she succeeded in setting the battery on fire, and it never spoke again.

 

Sept. 11-19, 1914

By this time it was known to Captain Fuller that he was to have the valuable addition to his force which it had been decided would be necessary if Duala had to be attacked from the sea. The Challenger (right - Photo ships) was coming with the troops, and if a way could only be made for her through the barrage the fate of the town would quickly be settled. The work began at once, and while it proceeded the flotilla was assiduously nosing into every hole and corner of the multitudinous creeks that open out from the estuary along the coast on either hand. It was arduous and exciting work, for the creeks were tortuous and narrow, and at any moment the boats could be sniped out of the dense mangrove swamps that fringed them, and sometimes they were surprised by an armed vessel. Nevertheless, every inch was surveyed, with trifling casualties, and a number of launches were destroyed, while the Ivy and Dwarf took turns as guardship to cover the destruction of the barrage.

Needless to say, the Germans, in spite of their unpreparedness, exhausted all their ingenuity to stop the work. The Dwarf (right - Photo Ships) engaged their special attention. For her benefit they constructed a kind of infernal machine made of steel gas cylinders with percussion fuses and attached them under the bows of a launch. One of these engines was sent against her on the night of the 15th, when she was barrage guardship. The attack was duly made and a loud explosion heard. In Duala they counted it a sure success, but in the morning there was the Dwarf as usual. She had, in fact, detected the attempt in time, and under her fire the man in charge lost his head, lashed the helm wrongly before he leapt overboard, and the torpedo exploded against the bank. Next day she was sent to look after an armed vessel called the Nachtigal, after one of the founders of. the colony. She had attacked two of our boats the previous day and had been chased by the Ivy into the Bimbia River, the western outlet of the maze of creeks. There while the Dwarf was anchored for the night she suddenly appeared, and in spite of the point-blank fire that greeted her she was able to ram. The blow went fairly home, and the Germans might well hope the Dwarf was done for, but it was the Nachtigal that perished. When the two vessels separated the Dwarf quickly had her enemy in flames, and though badly holed was able to get back to Suellaba, where she speedily repaired her damages and was ready for her turn of barrage guard again. On the night of the 19th a second attempt on her was made with another infernal machine. Again aloud explosion was heard. But the launch had been detected and, sunk by a steam

 

Sept. 20-24, 1914

 

ARRIVAL OF THE TROOPS

 

pinnace, and again the morning revealed the irrepressible little ship off the barrage quietly guarding the boats that were mining a way for the Challenger.

 

The work was carried out by the divers and torpedo staff of the Cumberland under the most dangerous and difficult conditions. The first attempt, indeed, failed, but by the 22nd part of the obstruction had been sufficiently demolished to allow of a ship of 19 feet draught to pass. But even so the way was not clear, for the Germans had just succeeded laying a field of their extemporised mines a little above abreast of the Yoss battery.

 

Still, all the preparatory work that was needed had been done when next day (September 23) the Challenger appeared with six transports carrying General Dobell and his staff and the British contingent of the expeditionary force.

(British, contingent, under Colonel Gorges, was composed as under:

 

Artillery:

 4 guns, Sierra Leone Company, R.G.A.

1st battery, Nigeria Regiment (4 guns).

Section Gold Coast Artillery (2 guns)

 

Infantry:

6 companies West African Regiment.

4 companies 1st Battalion Nigeria Regiment.

4 companies 2nd Battalion, Nigeria Regiment.

2 companies Sierra Leone Battalion, W.A.F.F.

2 companies Gold Coast Regiment, W.A.F.F.

1 Pioneer Company, Gold Coast Regiment, W.A.F.F.

 

Total with army troops (engineers, railway, telegraph, etc.), 154 British officers, 81 British N.C.O.s, 2460 native rank and file, 10 guns, and 3563 carriers.)

The Bruix, with the French contingent, was following, but had not yet appeared. Nor had the Surprise, but she was known to be well employed elsewhere. No sooner were her repairs completed than there was an urgent call for her from Libreville, the capital of the Gaboon. There in Corisco Bay, where the territory ceded to Germany in 1912 reached the sea between the Spanish enclave and the new Gaboon frontier, two armed ships had been giving trouble. The Surprise (1895, 617 tons, 2-3.9", 4-2.5") was quickly on the spot, and by September 24 had destroyed both vessels, and driven the Germans from their entrenched, position on the Okoko beach, and so eliminated one possible raiding base.

 

At Duala, as there was already force enough, Captain Fuller and General Dobell lost no time in settling a plan of attack. A possible landing place had been found near Mbenga on the Duala side of the Lungasi River, from which point it was hoped to seize the Midland Railway and cut off

 

Sept. 25-26, 1914

 

the escape of the garrison that way, while the Challenger, who meanwhile had been lightened to 19 1/2 feet, was to endeavour to pass the barrage and with her fire prevent anything crossing to the Northern Railway. Early on the 25th, at slack tide, she was cleverly scraped through the gap that had been blown away, and though the Bruix and her transports were close at hand it was decided to lose no more time. Captain Puller, with the General, therefore went on board the Challenger and sent in a summons to surrender. Nothing was received but prevaricating replies, and the negotiation was prolonged till it was too late to do anything that day. The Challenger, however, was ordered to bombard next morning, and the commanding officers returned to Suellaba to greet the French who had just anchored there.

(The French contingent, under Colonel Mayer, was:

1 six-gun battery.

1 section engineers.

1 company European Colonial Infantry.

1st and 2nd Senegalese Battalions (4 companies each.).

In all, with transport, etc., 54 European officers, 364 other Europeans, 1859 native rank and file, 1000 carriers, and 200 animals - making the total force under General Dobell, 643 Europeans, 4319 natives, 4563 carriers and 16 guns, besides the naval field guns.)

 

As it was too late for them to take part in the attack, the operations went forward as arranged. Early on the 26th part of the flotilla, with advanced companies of troops, went up the Lungasi to try the Mbenga landing, while two transports, with the main body, waited at the mouth of the river till they heard the result. Two companies were landed by 6.30 and sent forward to occupy Yansoki, a village opposite Pitti, while the two powerful armed tugs, Remus and Porpoise, which had recently joined the flotilla from Nigeria, went on with another company to deal with the enemy's entrenched position at Pitti, and, if possible, to push on to the Yapoma Bridge and cut the railway. They were received with a heavy fire which it took them the best part of an hour to silence, but it was done at last, and, landing a party, they again destroyed the telephone. Further progress, however, proved impossible. A little further on a boom of felled trees was discoyered; all attempt to examine it was prevented by heavy maxim fire, and as nothing further could be done they retired. At Mbenga things had gone no better. The advance party had found the swamps too bad even to reach Mbenga Village, and, the troops were withdrawn.

 

The first attempt, therefore, seemed to be a complete failure, but, in fact, it was not. The governor and commandant had already left the town, and the threat of the

 

Sept. 27, 1914

FALL OF DUALA

 

reconnaissance on the main line of retreat was too much for the nerves of those who had been left in charge. Next morning (the 27th), as the allied commanding officers were reconnoitring Yoss Point with a view to forcing a landing there, loud explosions were heard and the wireless mast collapsed. Simultaneously a white flag was seen over Government House. Troops were promptly ordered up, but as they could not arrive for some time Captain Fuller offered to land his marines, and before evening Duala, with Bonaberi and the immediate environs, was surrendered unconditionally.

 

The capture had proved a much easier affair than had been expected, and the booty was large. All the railway rolling stock had been got away, but besides a whole company of 100 Europeans taken prisoners, there were still in the harbour all the Woermann and other ships that had been called in when the warning telegram was issued, though, as the captains explained, they might easily have got away to Brazil. Of these there were eight of the Woermann line and one Hamburg-Amerika ship, amounting in all to over 80,000 tons. Except for parts of their engines all were intact, and most of them had valuable cargoes and plenty of coal. (The reason why these ships remained at Duala appears to have been that in Germany, during the period of strained relations, insurance, against war risks could not be effected except on condition that ships should make the nearest safe port when war broke out and remain there.)

Two others were subsequently raised from the barrage, and the floating dock and dredger, both of which had been scuttled, were also salved, as well as a number of other vessels and launches, including the governor's yacht and a gunboat. Except, indeed, for the wireless installation and the rolling stock, there fell into our hands almost everything that was required to establish a base for further operations.

 

So far as the naval purpose of the expedition was concerned the object was already attained by the occupation of the port and the destruction of the wireless station, and immediately the Admiralty heard of it they inquired of Captain Fuller how soon he could return to the trade routes. He could only reply that the enemy was in force on all sides of the surrendered territory, which extended only 3 1/2 kilometres on the Duala side of the river, and 1 1/2 on the other, and that he could therefore give no probable date when the Cumberland could safely be spared. There could certainly be no question of her leaving for some time, for, as had happened in all the other enterprises of the same nature elsewhere, the naval object of destroying a hostile base and intelligence centre had insensibly merged into one of territorial conquest,

 

Aug. 22-Sept. 20, 1914

 

and on the following day it was decided to inform General Dobell that the ultimate end of the military operations was the complete reduction of the German colony. He was therefore to give his views and proposals, having regard to his own and the enemy's strength, of how the next phase of the operations could proceed.

 

Such an expression of views was certainly necessary. It was now obvious that the resistance of the enemy in the interior would be a very different thing from that they had set up on the coast. It would seem, in fact, that their policy was to abandon the coast, confident as they were or had been till recently, that the war would be brought to a victorious conclusion long before we could operate successfully in the interior. In the Hinterland, where reconnaissances had been allowed to develop into operations against strategical points within the German frontier, two of our columns had met with reverses, The Yola Column had failed in its attempt to seize Garua and had been forced to retire right back with serious loss. The Cross River Column had succeeded in occupying Nssanakang near the head of the Northern Railway on August 25, but on September 6 it had been surprised by a superior force brought up from Duala and driven out with the loss of two guns, five machine-guns and a heavy list of killed, wounded and prisoners. So serious was the resulting position that, so far from further offence being possible, preparation had to be set on foot for meeting the possibility of an attack on Calabar.

 

In the north the French main column operating from Fort Lamy had had no better success. It had failed to dislodge the Germans from Kusseri, and our own Northern Column, which had seized a post across the frontier in order to join hands with it, had to be withdrawn to reinforce the shattered Yola Column. It was clear, then, that a steady push inwards from the sea on the natural lines of communication would be our main chance, and there was little prospect - at least till the operation had passed beyond their coastal character - of the Cumberland being released. It seemed a waste of such a ship, but the old exigencies as usual were reasserting themselves. In. combined operations of this nature ships of force had always been found necessary, not for their own intrinsic fighting power, but because the support of the officers, crews, guns, boats and stores was indispensable to give effective weight and movement to the land forces.

 

Such assistance in this case, where it was a question of organising a sea base, was specially necessary - no less than for the operations which General Dobell had immediately in

 

 

Plan - Duala and the Cameroons Estuary

 

 

Oct. 1-6, 1914

WIDENING THE FOOTHOLD

 

prospect. The Germans, reinforced by the crews of the captured ships, had retired on three lines, up the Northern Railway from Bonaberi, up the Duala or Wuri River to Ybassi, and on the Midland Line towards Edea. His intention was to press them without delay on all three lines, and the French were at once to drive the enemy beyond the Lungasi River and seize the Yapoma Bridge. In a couple of days they had forced the Germans to retire across the bridge, but they then found they could not get on without the field guns of the Cumberland and Challenger and the assistance of their marines and boats in the river. The assistance was promptly sent, and on October 6 the Senegalese were able in a brilliant rush to carry the bridge and establish themselves on the other bank. To the westward the flotilla had cleared the enemy out of Tiko and other posts to which they were still clinging on the routes to Victoria and Buea.

 

The whole delta and estuary between the Bimbia and Lungasi Rivers was now in our hands, and the position at Duala sufficiently secure for further action. The same day that the Yapoma Bridge was taken, a reconnaissance in force, headed by the captured gunboat, re-named Sokoto, started up the river for Ybassi. There, however, so hot a reception was encountered that a retirement was necessary in order to reorganise. Meanwhile, the French ships and the Ivy had been detailed for patrolling the coast and dealing with the minor German ports. In these circumstances the Cumberland could not be returned to Admiral Stoddart, and Captain Fuller could only report that neither she nor the Challenger could be spared, at least until Edea had been taken, and that could not be expected before the end of the month.

 

For the present, then, there was no possibility of Admiral Stoddart providing for the distant section of his station off Pernambuco. For the African side he had enough - or rather would have had enough had it not been that he, too, came under the influence of the disturbance Admiral von Spee's movements were causing all over the world. As we have seen, on the other side of the Atlantic they had already drawn Admiral Cradock down to the southward, with the result that the Pernambuco area was again left without protection, and Admiral Stoddart, who had just heard the Karlsruhe had appeared there, had to recast the disposition of his reduced squadron in order to deal with her as best he could without the assistance of any of the British or French cruisers that were tied to the Cameroons.

 

 

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CHAPTER XXI

 

OPERATIONS OF THE GERMAN AND ALLIED SQUADRONS IN THE EAST EROM THE JAPANESE DECLARATION OF WAR TO THE MIDDLE OF SEPTEMBER

(See Map p, 286 and Maps 7 and 14 in case)

 

Widely as the existence of the German Pacific Squadron affected the dispositions of our Atlantic squadrons, it was naturally those of the Eastern Fleet that were most seriously disturbed. The entrance of Japan into the war, of course, did much to simplify the general problem, but, nevertheless, the disturbing effect was destined to continue for some time. The reasons for this were not so much naval as military and political. Neither the Admiralty nor the Admirals on the spot had much doubt that, with the Fleet of Japan thrown into the scale, the main German Squadron must sooner or later be driven across the Pacific. Their concern was rather how to deal with the detached cruisers which were an abiding menace to trade and still more to the troop convoys. Of these cruisers there were two at large in the area, Koenigsberg and Emden, besides the Prinz Eitel Friedrich and the Geier. The Nurnberg was also a possible raider, and in the Dutch ports and the Philippines were a number of enemy steam vessels which might be converted into commerce destroyers or used as colliers and supply ships. The patrol of the trade routes had therefore to be maintained and supplemented by a strict watch on the ports where these ships lay. Still, if the Navy had only had a clean sheet to work on, the task would, have been well within the capacity of the Eastern Fleet; but owing to the fact that the general military situation did not permit of the Imperial Concentration being postponed till there had been time to round up the enemy's prowling cruisers, the problem was difficult and complicated in the extreme. Indeed, it is not easy to see how the thing could have been done effectively but for the assistance which Japan so opportunely provided.

 

Her fleet, whose constitution differed considerably from our own, was admirably adapted for the work in hand. It was

 

Aug. 23, 1914

THE JAPANESE FLEET

 

the outcome, in fact, of rich and well-assimilated war experience only ten years old. Its backbone was a squadron of six modern battleships, two being Dreadnoughts, two similar to our "Lord Nelsons" and two of "King Edward VII" type. There were also five others dating from the late war, of which two were reconstructed Russian prizes; but it was its strength in cruisers that marked its special value to the common cause. Of these there were completed, or nearly ready, six battle cruisers, two being large ones of the British type and four smaller ones of a special Japanese design, and earlier in date than our "Invincibles," averaging about 14,000 tons and carrying four 12" guns, besides a heavy secondary armament. Then came eleven armoured cruisers dating from before the Russian War, two of which were prizes, and then twelve good light cruisers, four of which had been added quite recently. Besides this sea-going fleet, Japan maintained as the result of her recent experience, a large number of other vessels intended for coastal work and narrow seas. Most of them, but not all, consisted of obsolete types retained on the active list for this essential service. There were in all twenty-six of them (including three Russian prizes), classed as first and second class coast defence ships and first and second class gunboats; but if we may judge from the use to which they were put it was coastal attack rather than coastal defence for which they were intended.

 

The primary object of the Japanese Government was the reduction of Tsingtau. It was at once her own special interest in the war and the best service she could render to the Alliance. For this operation two fleets were constituted. The first fleet, or rather the main part of it, comprising three battleships (one "Dreadnought" and two "Lord Nelsons"), four light cruisers and a flotilla of destroyers with its leader, was told off primarily for escort duty, but until the troops were ready to move, it took up a position in the south of the Yellow Sea to guard Japanese waters against offensive action by Admiral von Spee. It had also a division of battle cruisers, but these were used to form special squadrons for seeking out the enemy in the Pacific. The second fleet included three old battleships and two coast defence ships of the first class, all five of them being Russian prizes, three armoured cruisers and a destroyer flotilla with a light cruiser leader. This was the attacking fleet, and to it the Triumph and her destroyer, the Usk, were attached. Practically all the rest of the active cruiser force was devoted in co-operation with our Eastern Fleet to keeping control of the trade and transport routes, hunting down the enemy's scattered cruisers and depriving

 

Aug. 24-25, 1914

 

him of his minor bases. As a first step the second-class battle cruiser Ibuki was sent with the new light cruiser Chikuma to join Admiral Jerram's flag at Singapore. The Japanese also took over the guard of the Formosa Strait and its adjacent waters down to the approaches to Hongkong with a force designated "The Third Squadron," which con sisted of the light cruiser Tsushima, two new first class gun boats and four of the second class. Admiral Jerram could thus devote his attention to the section of his station which extended from Hongkong to the Malacca Strait, and particularly to the Singapore area, to prevent Admiral von Spee from breaking into the Indian Ocean and attacking the Indian convoys.

 

The movement of these convoys constituted one of the most important factors in the situation. Their ports of departure were Karachi and Bombay, and the usual programme was that the convoys were composed of two groups of transports, one from each port, that from Karachi leaving the day after that from Bombay. They and their respective escorts then met at sea and made for a rendezvous at the British islands of Khorya Morya on the south Arabian coast. This formed the first stage of the voyage. The next was to Aden, and the third up the Red Sea to Suez. As the Koenigsberg was still unlocated, and believed to be cruising in or near the Indian Ocean, escort was a grave difficulty, since each group must be guarded by at least one ship capable of dealing with the German cruiser, and the Indian Marine ships did not come up to this standard. There was also the possibility that Admiral von Spee might appear on the scene. Not only, therefore, was the whole of Admiral Peirse's squadron absorbed in the work, but he had to be reinforced from the Mediterranean. It was for this reason that the light cruiser Chatham, had been sent to him, as well as the Duke of Edinburgh and Black Prince from, the 1st Cruiser Squadron, the two latter for the special purpose of dealing with the Red Sea. Moreover, in order to carry the rearrangement to its logical conclusion and bring the station limits into conformity with the strategical situation, the whole Red Sea, from Aden to Suez, was at Admiral Peirse's suggestion, transferred to his command.

 

The first echelon of the main Indian Expeditionary Force consisted of the Lahore Division with part of the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade. Being urgently needed for the security of Egypt, its first two groups were timed to sail on August 24 and 25, and the second two groups in the first days of September. The second echelon, consisting mainly of the

 

Aug. 25-31, 1914

EAST INDIES AND CHINA

 

Meerut Division and the rest of the Secunderabad Cavalry, was to follow about the middle of the month. There was also a single transport sailing for Mombasa with an Indian battalion, the advance guard of the reinforcements intended for British East Africa, and to her the Fox had to be devoted till she met the Pegasus of the Cape Squadron, a ship which, in spite of her inferiority in guns and speed, was held to be capable of giving "a good account of the Koenigsberg. Further, by the middle of September it was hoped to send, an expedition against German East Africa and three more battalions to Mombasa for British East Africa. Even with the increased force at Admiral Peirse's disposal it was found impossible to keep strictly to the time-table. Still less was it possible for him, with so much convoy work on his hands, to deal adequately with the trade routes, or to attempt to form a covering force to the eastward against the German squadron. Such cover, according to British ideas, was essential for regularising the position, and it was here the convention with the Japanese had an immediate effect. For as soon as it was known that they had declared war, Admiral Jerram was able to supply the necessary covering force from his own squadron. With this intention he had been concentrating his main strength at Singapore instead of making a sweep to the Mariana, Caroline and Marshall Islands, feeling sure that if the Germans were coaling there they would be gone before he could arrive. He therefore contented himself with arranging for the Askold, when she joined, to search the Mariana group, and then, if possible, to destroy the German wireless station at Anguar in the Pelew group.

 

Such intelligence of the enemy as was reaching him indicated that if the Singapore position was to be made good there was no time to lose. He had learnt that German auxiliaries were using the Dutch islands in the Java Sea, and there were other indications that pointed to at least a possibility that Admiral von Spee might be intending to concentrate to the southward of Sumatra for a raid into the Indian Ocean. Seeing how entirely Admiral Patey was occupied with the Rabaul Expedition, such a plan was quite, Possible, and Admiral Jerram alone could fill the wide gap between him and Admiral Peirse. He had decided, therefore, with the bulk of his squadron and the two Japanese cruisers, as soon as they arrived, to make a thorough search of the Dutch islands. His auxiliary cruisers were to be employed on the trade routes between Hongkong and Singapore and watching enemy ships in the Philippines. The two sloops Cadmus and Clio with five destroyers were formed into a

 

Sept. 1-14, 1914

 

squadron corresponding to the Japanese 3rd Squadron at Formosa, and were based at Sandakan in British North Borneo to watch the channels south of the Philippines between the Celebes and South China seas. A similar squadron, composed of the French gun-vessel D'Iberville and three French destroyers, was based at Penang as a patrol for the western entrance to the Malacca Strait. This patrol the Admiral subsequently strengthened with the Dupleix, since her engines were so defective that she could not act with the main squadron, and her commander, Captain Daveluy, was placed in command of the whole patrol. As for the two Russian cruisers, the orders of the Askold had to be cancelled, for by the time she and the Zhemchug reached Hongkong both had to be diverted to escort duty in order to take charge of three transports which were to bring British regiments from Singapore, Hongkong and Tientsin to Calcutta, and amongst them was the company of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry that had been doing so well in the Triumph. During the first fortnight of September, while group after group of the Indian Convoys were streaming away to Aden, the elaborately planned search of the Dutch islands was carried out by the Minotaur, Yarmouth, Hampshire and the two Japanese cruisers which joined on September 5, No hostile warships were seen, or heard of, but no less than thirty-seven German steamships were found held up in the Dutch ports, besides twenty-two in the Philippines. Nearly every steamer met was British, trade was brisk, and there appeared to be no difficulty in getting cargoes. The safety of British trade seemed, indeed, as complete as in time of peace. Yet the truth was it was on the eve of receiving its first shock in Eastern waters, and the most interesting feature in Admiral Jerram's movement is how near it came to preventing that shock from ever being given.

 

On August 30 a rumour had come in that the Koenigsberg had appeared about Sabang at the north end of Sumatra. Since her capture of the City of Winchester in the Gulf of Aden on the second day of the war nothing had been heard of her, and as her base at Dar-es-Salaam had been destroyed by the Astraea it was quite possible she was seeking new ground. Admiral Jerram had therefore sent the Hampshire (Captain H. W. Grant) to Acheh Head at the extreme north-westerly end of Sumatra to clear up the situation. Between this point and the Nicobar Islands, about 100 miles north-west of it, all the trade of the Indian Ocean in and out of the Malacca Strait has to pass, and from now onward it became a regular patrol station. But for the moment it was unoccupied, for on

 

Sept. 2-9, 1914

EMDEN'S FIRST ESCAPE

 

September 2, when the rumour of the Koenigsberg being in the vicinity proved to have no foundation, the Admiral ordered the Hampshire - in pursuance of his plan - to move down to search the west coast of Sumatra and the unfrequented chain of islands that lie along it. Nothing could have been better timed. For as the Hampshire started south to carry out her new instructions the Emden was coming up the same coast on the opposite course. After being detached with her collier, the Markomannia, from Admiral von Spee's squadron in the Marshall Islands, she had coaled at the German station of Angaur in the Pelew group. Thence she had gone through the little used Molucca Pass, and so by the Flores Sea to the Bali Strait, where she passed out into the Indian Ocean. Keeping well out of sight to seaward, she then made her way along the south of Java and past the Sunda Strait till September 4, when,in order to coal again from her tender, she came into the Sumatra coast somewhere behind Simalur or Hog Island, the most northerly of the Sumatra chain. Here it was she had the first of her narrow escapes. For it so happened that the Hampshire had been searching this same island only the day before on a rumour that the Koenigsberg was there, but finding nothing she passed on down the islands, and so must have been within an ace of running into the Emden next day. As it was she missed her, and the Emden was left a free run into Indian waters, while on the opposite course the Hampshire, still searching the islands, carried on to Padang, and the Admiral was searching round Java.

 

In this operation of the China Squadron Admiral Patey could take no share. Admiral Jerram's suggestion that his colleague should supplement it by a search in the Marshall, Islands was natural enough, for there Admiral von Spee was fairly certain to be if he was not coming to the Indian Ocean. He was, in fact, in the eastern part of the group when Admiral Jerram made the proposal. Thence it was that on August 29 he had detached the Prinz Eitel Friedrich and Cormoran to raid Australian waters with the object, so the crews were told, of misleading the British Admirals and facilitating his own escape to South American waters. After taking this precaution he himself put to sea and passed on eastwards into the solitudes of the Central Pacific. His movements and intentions were, of course, quite unknown, and in operating against Rabaul Admiral Patey had to use practically his whole force. The rendezvous which had been given for the concentration of the Australian squadron was Rossel Lagoon, in the islands off the eastern extremity of New Guinea, and here, on Sepember 9 Admiral Patey met the Sydney and Encounter, which

 

Sept, 10-11, 1914

 

had brought from Port Moresby three destroyers, two submarines, five colliers and the Australian armed transport Berrima with 1500 troops, under Colonel William Holmes, partly Australian infantry and partly Naval Reserve. The Melbourne was to join later, but for the moment, she was detached on a special mission to destroy the German wireless station at Nauru or Pleasant Island which lay 1000 miles away in the direction of the Marshall Islands. On September 10 the expedition proceeded for its objective, the Sydney being sent ahead with the two destroyers to reconnoitre Simpson Harbour and the adjacent anchorages, primarily to see if there was a defence patrol. But there was also the possibility that Admiral von Spee might be there. By 3.0 a.m. on the 11th, however, the Sydney was able to report. all clear, and three hours later the Admiral arrived with the Berrima, having captured a German collier, as he came in. The Sydney had on board two small landing parties of Naval Reserve men, and these she was now ordered to disembark at Herbertshohe and Kabakaul. The surprise was complete; no resistance was made, and the two parties began to advance inland to where the wireless station was now known to be. The party from Herbertshohe met with little opposition, but had no luck. They failed to reach the station and were recalled in the evening.

 

With the Kabakaul party it was different. The Germans had fled inland, but natives were about who pointed out a road leading to the wireless station. It was a narrow trail flanked by dense-bush, and before the men had advanced up it a mile they were fired on. The Admiral at once ordered the Berrima to the spot, and by 10 a.m. two more companies of Naval Reserve and two machine-gun sections were ashore. The advance was then resumed, but a force of about 150 black police under German officers and non-commissioned officers continued to resist. The Australian troops, however, new as they were, were equal to the occasion. While Admiral Patey was engaged in the Samoa Expedition they had had a long wait at Palm Island in Halifax Bay, Queensland, and it had been employed training them in landing and bush fighting. They were therefore quite at home, and by fighting their way through the bush, and avoiding the road which had been mined and entrenched, they gradually pushed the enemy back without much loss. At noon four companies of infantry were landed and moved up in support. Still progress was slow, and as there seemed no prospect of reaching the station that day an order was given for the troops to retire to the coast before dark. But just then a formidable entrenchment

 

Sept. 11-14, 1914

GERMAN NEW GUINEA

 

which defended the station surrendered, and by a smart piece of work the whole wireless installation was seized. As the Germans had destroyed the tower before retiring it was useless for our people to hold it, and taking away all the gear that the enemy had had no time to remove, the party returned to the coast, with the loss of two officers and four men killed and an officer and three men wounded. For the Germans further resistance was now hopeless, but the Governor, as on Admiral Patey's previous visit, had retired to Toma, ten miles inland, bent on making negotiations as dilatory as possible. This was the more annoying as the Admiral had just heard that the Australia as well as the Sydney and Melbourne would be required to escort the main Australian convoy to Aden, and that it was to start on the 27th. Early on the 12th, therefore, a summons was sent up to Toma by motor cycle, but by night there was no answer except that one would be sent next day. Meanwhile the Melbourne had come in to report she had destroyed the wireless station at Nauru, and the Berrima moved to Rabaul and occupied it with four companies of infantry and one of Naval Reserve.

 

Next morning there was a report that the missing Geier was at Kawieng on the north coast of New Guinea with a large merchant cruiser, and as the Melbourne was about to start for Sydney she was ordered to examine the place with the destroyer Warrego. Nothing was found except the Government yacht Nusa, which was captured and sent back with the Warrego. From the Governor no answer came till 5.0 p.m., and, it was then of so dilatory a nature that the Admiral and Brigadier agreed that next morning an advance should be made on Toma to arrest him. Between Toma and Herbertshohe was a ridge, and a plan had been captured showing that it was fortified. It was arranged, therefore, that the Encounter should shell it, next morning to clear the way for the troops. The plan was entirely successful, and when they drew near the place in the afternoon they were met by a flag of truce, saying that the Governor was ready to capitulate and would come in next day.

 

So far all was well, but the success of the day was marred by an unhappy accident. The Admiral had sent out the destroyer Parramatta and the submarine AE 1 (Lieut.-Commander T. F. Besant) to patrol east of Cape Gazelle. In the evening, according to orders, the Parramatta returned, but she returned alone, and nothing more was ever heard of the submarine. A prolonged search failed to find any trace of her, and so the first exploit of the Australian Navy was clouded

 

Sept. 14-15, 1914

 

by the loss of their first submarine, with her commander, two lieutenants and thirty-two men.

 

For some time there was doubt about the Governor's good faith. Information was obtained that there was a road which led from Toma westward to the coast at Pondo, and that he was probably intending to escape that way in the Geier or the Komet. As a precaution the Sydney was sent round to clear the matter up. The Governor, however, held to his word. He kept his appointment on the 15th, and after four hours' discussion the preliminaries were agreed. The capitulation covered not only Neu Pommern but the whole of German New Guinea - that is, all the German possessions in the Pacific which were administered from Rabaul, and these included all the Bismarck Archipelago, together with the populous island of Bougainville in the Solomons and Kaiser Wilhelm's Land in New Guinea, in all between 80,000 and 90,000 square miles. Thus all the eastern half of New Guinea and all the Solomon group were now in British hands, and Neu Pommern and Neu Mecklenberg were once more New Britain and New Ireland.

 

A base for further operations could now be established at Simpson Harbour. It will be recalled that under the original plan it was intended to use it for the occupation of certain German stations within reach - particularly Angaur and Nauru. But, as the Admiral had already pointed out, there was a serious objection to this course. The islands in question were not self-supporting, and to put a garrison in them would entail a regular system of supply ships. As to Nauru, this was confirmed by the Melbourne, and it was decided to defer both enterprises. The paramount call on Admiral Patey's squadron was for the escort of the Australian and New Zealand Expeditionary Forces for Europe, and their departure could no longer be delayed. The plan had just been settled. To avoid any possibility of an attack from Admiral von Spee the convoy was to proceed by the south of Australia, instead of by the usual route north-about through the Torres Strait. Fremantle in Western Australia was to be its concentration point. There it would be met by Admiral Patey in the Australia, and he would escort it across the Indian Ocean with the Sydney and Melbourne, as well as with the Hampshire from the China Squadron, which was to be detached for the purpose. This Admiral Jerram could well afford to do. He had just returned to Singapore from his fortnight's search of the Dutch islands and had found nothing stirring in his waters. He even suggested detaching, three of his best ships, Minotaur, Ibuki and Chikuma to

 

 

Plan - German New Guinea, with Inset of Rabaul

(click plan for near original-sized image)

 

 

Sept. 15-18, 1914

CONVOY PLANS UPSET

 

Simpson Harbour so as to cover the route of the Australasian convoy against a raid from Admiral von Spee. It was to carry out this urgent escort duty that on September 15, as soon as the capitulation was signed, Admiral Patey sailed with the Australia and Sydney, leaving the guard of the new base to the Montcalm, which had just arrived from Noumea. He had not gone far, however, before he had cause to feel seriously anxious for the safety of what he was leaving behind him. In the evening of the day after he sailed he received from New Zealand news of the German squadron having appeared at Samoa, and also heard from Admiral Jerram that the Minotaur and her Japanese consorts could not leave Singapore to take up their covering position till the 18th. It was not with any surprise, therefore, that in the night of the 17th he received from the Admiralty an order to return to Rabaul. Indeed, there was other news which had suddenly and profoundly disturbed the whole system in the East. The convoy arrangements were thrown into confusion and a far-reaching redistribution of force became inevitable.

 

 

---

 

 

CHAPTER XXII

 

THE EASTERN ELEET - FIRST EXPLOITS OF THE EMDEN

(See Maps 7, 13 and 14 in case)

 

In the afternoon, of September 14 - that is, the day after the British flag was hoisted at Rabaul - a startling wireless message was received at Calcutta to say that a German cruiser was operating off the Hoogly. It came from the S.S. City of Rangoon, which had just left the river and was hurrying back. When only a few hours out she had met the Italian S.S. Loredano, which on the previous day had been stopped by the Emden about 300 miles down the trade route to Colombo, and the Italian captain had observed that the raider had four prizes in company.

 

The surprise was complete. Although the Japanese had ascertained that the Emden was not at Tsingtau, nothing had been heard of her since the war began, and it was taken as fairly certain she was with Admiral von Spee. That she should have slipped through the net which Admiral Jerram had spread and suddenly appeared far up in the Bay of Bengal was beyond all calculation. No part of the Eastern seas, was regarded as more secure. Although, owing to preoccupation with the Indian convoys, we had not a single cruiser in the Bay, trade had quite recovered the shock of the outbreak of war, and so far as the shortage of shipping allowed was fast recovering its normal volume. So complete, indeed, was the sense of security expressed by the Indian Authorities that masters, in spite of Admiralty instructions, were in this section keeping to the usual track and steaming with undimmed lights. Had the most ordinary precautions been taken there must have been a much milder story to tell, but as it was the Emden had an easy task.

 

On September 5, when after so narrowly escaping, the Hampshire she left her secret coaling place in Sumatra, in company with the Markomannia she had steamed straight for Ceylon, and on reaching a point about 200 miles from the coast she turned northward, striking the Colombo-Calcutta track about 150 miles south of the latitude of Madras. Here.

 

Sept. 10-14, 1914

EMDEN IN BAY OF BENGAL

 

early on September 10, she captured a Greek collier, the Pontoporos, with 6000 tons of Bengal coal, and kept her for her own use. She then continued up the track, and about 250 miles south-east of Madras met the Indus of 8,413 tons, which was under charter as a transport for the next convoy from Bombay, and was on her way there empty from Calcutta. She was sunk by gun fire and her crew transferred to the Markomannia. The following afternoon, about 150 miles further up the trade route and due east of Madras, she met another, the Lovat, of 6,102 tons, similarly employed, and her she dealt with in the same way. Still proceeding up the track, she found nothing for some 250 miles, except about midnight on the 12th the Kabinga, a ship of 4,657 tons two days out from Calcutta to New York. As her cargo was American owned, she was spared, but ordered to follow her captor.

 

Next morning, the 13th, the Emden had better luck, for on this day she made two good captures. The first was the Killin, with 5000 tons of Bengal coal for Colombo. This ship, too, she sank by gun fire after transferring her crew to the Kabinga. The same afternoon she stopped the Diplomat, with 7000 tons of general cargo for London, including 30,000 chests of tea. None of these ships made any attempt to get away. All were on the direct track and all steamed quietly to meet the Emden, assuming she was a British cruiser. But now the luck turned. The next ship she met was the Italian S.S. Loredano. She, too, was stopped, and on her nationality being ascertained, she was asked to take over the prisoners. This her master, Captain Giacopolo, refused to do on the ground that he had insufficient provisions, and on being dismissed he promptly made back for the Hoogly. Thus it was he met and saved the City of Rangoon, a fine new ship with a cargo valued at well over half a million. And not only her; for, being equipped with wireless, the City of Rangoon was able to spread the alarm instantly, and so all ships about to sail were held up, including three more chartered transports which might well have shared the fate of the other two. She, too, returned to Calcutta, and it was not till she arrived that the details of the raid were ascertained.

 

But already the whole field was astir and the hunt was up. Admiral Peirse, in the act of preparing to get the second echelon of the Indian troops away, could do little. But Admiral Jerram on the 14th, when the first news came in, had just returned from his search round the Dutch islands, and had with flag at Singapore the Minotaur, Hampshire, Chikuma and Empress of Japan. The Yarmouth was also

 

Sept. 15-17, 1914

 

there in dock, the Ibuki was coming in from the Java Sea, and the Dupleix repairing at Penang. It was not till the night of September 15-16 that word of what had happened reached him. He at once ordered away the Hampshire and Chikuma in chase; the Yarmouth followed next day (the 17th). A few days later he took measures to watch the possible points in his own vicinity to which the Emden might return to coal. For this purpose the Minotaur and Ibuki were available for the moment. Minotaur was therefore sent to the west coast of Sumatra and Ibuki to the Cocos Islands, with orders to remain there until they were required for other duties which, as will be seen directly, the Admiralty had assigned to them.

 

The chasing ships were placed under Captain H. W. Grant of the Hampshire, and he was given a free hand. His plan was to make across to a point fifty miles east of Dondra Head in the south of Ceylon with the Hampshire and Chikuma, and then up the trade route to Madras and False Point; while the Yarmouth (Captain H. L. Cochrane) made for Rangoon, searching the Nicobar and Andaman Islands on the way; but as she developed machinery defects and had to put into Penang, he took her line himself and sent the Chikuma alone to Ceylon. The Dupleix, as soon as she was ready, was to take charge of the D'Iberville and the Malacca Strait patrol.

 

Such was the news that came hard on the heels of Admiral von Spee's appearance at Samoa. Up till this time his whereabouts had been quite uncertain. On September 7 the Nurnberg - last heard of at Honolulu - had appeared off the British cable station at Fanning Island in the Central Pacific, and after wrecking the apparatus and cutting the cable had disappeared again. Whether she was with the squadron or detached, as the Emden appeared to be, could not be known. The general belief was that Admiral von Spee was still lurking in the Caroline or Marshall Islands, and so strong was this impression that when it was found that neither Admiral Jerram nor Admiral Patey could get there, the Japanese had formed a special squadron to make the search themselves and incidentally to destroy the German base at Jaluit in the Marshall group. This force, which came to be known as the "First South Sea Squadron," was under Vice-Admiral Yamaya, and comprised two of the minor battle cruisers (Kurama, Tsukuba), one armoured cruiser (Asama) and a division of destroyers. It sailed from Yokosuka on September 14, the day the Emden was first heard of in the Bay of Bengal; but too late to have a chance of finding what it sought.

 

Sept. 7-15, 1914

VON SPEE AT SAMOA

 

Admiral von Spee was far away in the Central Pacific. On September 7 he had anchored to coal at Christmas Island. On the previous day the Nurnberg had rejoined him, and next morning had been detached to Fanning Island. By this time he knew that Samoa was in British hands. He had heard it at sea as early as September 3, and had been able to detect the presence of the Australia, with three other British ships and one Japanese. To retake the island, he knew, was out of the question. He could not provide a strong enough landing party, nor did he wish to waste ammunition and destroy German property by a bombardment, but he thought there was a possibility of surprising the ships which would probably have been left there on guard. He now determined to make the attempt, and on the 8th, leaving the Nurnberg with his supply ships, he started south with the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. On September 14 they approached Samoa from two directions to effect the surprise, unaware that the disposition which he was expecting to find had been deliberately avoided. It was just to frustrate such a venture that the defence of the place had been left entirely in the hands of the military. Not a ship of Admiral Patey's squadron was there, and without firing a shot the German cruisers disappeared to the north-westward.

 

With this episode the Admiralty had at last something on which it could take definite action, but the natural deductions were misleading. In the first place, since Admiral von Spee had come and gone without doing anything, it seemed fairly clear that, thanks to the rapid destruction of the German wireless stations, his information was defective, and that he had expected to find Samoa still a German possession. In the second place, his presence in the vicinity of Australasian waters tended to shake the conviction that the pressure of the Allied Fleets was forcing upon him a concentration in South American waters. The movement of the Dresden down the east coast and the disappearance of the Leipzig from Californian waters had tended to confirm the inference. Admiral Cradock, as we have seen, was moving down to the Magellan Strait in anticipation of Admiral von Spee's arrival, and on September 10 the Defence had been ordered out from the Dardanelles to enable him to deal with the on-coming enemy decisively. But the sudden discovery that the German Admiral was still in the Western Pacific, coupled with the appearance of the Emden in the Bay of Bengal, naturally modified the appreciation.

 

The Defence, which had reached Malta, had her orders cancelled; for now the immediate care was not South America,

 

 

Sept. 14-21, 1914

 

but the main Australian Convoy and the New Guinea Expedition, whose work was still unfinished, and on September 16 were issued the new instructions for the China and Australian Squadrons which had brought Admiral Patey back to Rabaul. The Australia, with the Montcalm, was now to cover the operation which the reserve of the Rabaul Expeditionary Force was about to carry out for the occupation of Friedrich-Wilhelm Harbour in German New Guinea, and when it was complete they were to go in search of Admiral von Spee's two cruisers. The instructions for the China Squadron were also reversed. To relieve the pressure on the Eastern Fleet the Japanese Government at this time had consented to place at Admiral Jerram's disposal another armoured cruiser, the Nisshin, one of the two they had purchased from the Argentine Government on the eve of the Russian War. With three Japanese cruisers now at their disposal, the idea of the Admiralty was that one of them with the Minotaur should take charge of the Australian Convoy in place of Admiral Patey, and, together with the Sydney, escort it from Fremantle to Aden.

 

As there was still plenty of time, Admiral Jerram, as we have seen, detached the Minotaur and Ibuki to watch the west coast of Sumatra and the Cocos Islands on the look-out for the Emden. As for the chase itself, the Admiralty instructions were that it was to be carried on with the Hampshire and Yarmouth, while the Melbourne would remain at Admiral Patey's disposal. It was also hoped that the two remaining Japanese cruisers, would be sent to Rabaul to assist him in bringing the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst to action. As the arrangement involved the China flagship leaving the station, Admiral Jerram was directed to shift the flag to the merchant cruiser Empress of Japan. But this seemed to him the waste of a good ship, and he had special use for her. On September 14 and 15 the Sandakan Patrol had captured two colliers, one the Tannenfels, a German ship from Batavia with 6000 tons of coal apparently intended for cruisers working in the Malay Archipelago, the other the Rio Passig, an American from Manila with 4000 tons, which had been to Yap, Angaur and Ceram in search of Admiral von Spee, It was a fine and timely haul by which the Sandakan Patrol well justified its existence, and Admiral Jerram was anxious to get the two prizes to Singapore. It was for this service he wanted the Empress of Japan, and in order to release her he received, permission to fly his flag ashore.

 

So everything was satisfactorily arranged to meet the new situation as the Admiralty saw it. But now it was that the political deflections already referred to began to

 

Sept. 21, 1914

FEELING IN THE DOMINIONS

 

distort it. Under the existing arrangement the New Zealand Convoy, which had grown to ten ships and was assembling at Wellington, was to leave that port on September 25 to join the Australian Convoy at St. George's Sound, Albany, and was to be escorted there by the three "P" class cruisers of the local squadron. It meant a voyage of over 3000 miles, and, in view of the last news of German movements, the New Zealand Government began to feel uneasy for the safety of their troops. Though the "P" class cruisers were incapable of dealing with anything more formidable than armed merchant cruisers, this in the opinion of the Admiralty was all the protection that was required. An attack from Admiral von Spee seemed out of the question. So bad, apparently, was his information that he could not know of the New Zealand Convoy, and if he did it was inconceivable that he would venture to steam 2000 miles southward into waters where he could get no coal, and where, for all he could tell, he would meet the, Australia. To increase the escort would mean that the further operations which lay before the New Guinea Expedition, would have to be abandoned, and so successful had been the policy of destroying the German centres of intelligence that the Admiralty were very anxious to complete the work. This view the New Zealand Government accepted, though still with reluctance, and it was settled on September 21 that the convoy would sail on the 25th.

 

But in loyally deferring to the Admiralty view they had not reckoned with public opinion. It was, of course, impossible for the people generally to understand the situation. Even less familiar than the public at home with real naval history, they had no basis of appreciation, except a vague impression that the old naval wars were a succession of rapid and brilliant victories, which rendered a cowed and impotent enemy incapable of interfering with our control of the seas. The patient and arduous preparation which made these victories possible and the no less toilsome work of reaping their fruits were almost a sealed book. It was not to be expected that they could appreciate the prolonged and methodical operations by which the Admiralty were making the Pacific untenable to the Germans and, by which alone it could be, made untenable. All they could see were the failures, important cables cut, raiders breaking through our lines and the main force of the enemy moving apparently at its pleasure.

 

Nor was the feeling confined to New Zealand. It spread to Australia. At first the confidence had been complete - so much so indeed that, as in the case of Canada, the readiness of both Governments to send off their transports unescorted

 

Sept. 13-18, 1914

 

had had to be restrained by the Admiralty. The reaction was all the stronger. Open complaints were heard of the management of the Australian Fleet and regrets that the two Dominions had not kept the control in their own hands. Then, at least, they would have had their splendid contributions to the Navy - the Australia and New Zealand - to guard their own men.

 

Fresh news of the Emden's exploits added fuel to the fire. After dismissing the Italian ship on September 13 she had left the main trade route for False Bay to coal, in company with her tender and her two prizes, the Greek collier and the Kabinga. The move took her to the coastwise track, and in the evening of the 14th, about thirty miles south-east of False Point, she ran into the Trabboch from Negapatam to Calcutta. This ship Captain von Mueller sank the same night, and then, as his wireless was telling him the Loredano had spread the alarm, he dismissed the Kabinga with his prisoners for Calcutta. He had first disabled her wireless, but he soon found it had been repaired and that she was talking to Calcutta.

 

Clearly he could not keep his cruising ground much longer, but his luck was not yet done. As he made for False Bay to coal, the Clan Matheson came up with her lights unobscured as usual, and she, too, was captured and sunk. But this was the end of it. All the 15th and 16th he cruised off the Sandheads, like Surcouf in the old days, but not a ship was seen. Wireless had closed the book on the game of the famous French privateers, and all sailings had been stopped. There was now no time to lose, and after coaling from the Greek collier off False Point he made across the Bay for Rangoon, in ignorance, of course, that that was the precise point for which Captain Grant was making in search of him.

 

In the evening of September 18, when the Emden, twenty-four miles south-east of the Rangoon River, was making over the crew of her last prize to the Dovre, a Norwegian ship with which she had fallen in, the Hampshire was coming north up the east side of the Nicobar Islands, Next day the Dovre put into Rangoon with her news, and about noon Captain Grant had it. He had unfortunately been compelled to proceed to Port Blair in the Andamans, for to his despair the Indian authorities kept sending him messages en clair, and he had to get to a cable in order to dispatch an urgent request that they should desist from thus revealing his presence. His chance of getting hold of the chase was already seriously compromised, but he held away again on a different course - keeping on to the northward instead of

 

Sept. 19-20, 1914

EMDEN AND KOENIGSBERG

 

going to Rangoon, in hopes of cutting the Emden off. At the same time the Chikuma was passing westward across the mouth of the Bay, and the Yarmouth was just completing her repairs at Penang. Unfortunately, Captain von Mueller had taken in the unlucky signals, and they assured him that several British cruisers were working to the south of him. Knowing, therefore, that the mouth of the Bay was dangerous ground, he coaled under way from the Markomannia in the Gulf of Martaban, and then held away to the westward just in time to cross ahead of the Hampshire, and thus he escaped her for the second time. Meanwhile Captain Grant, not finding the Emden where, with very accurate judgment, he had expected to intercept her, had decided to make a sweep round the head of the Bay to her previous cruising ground, while the Yarmouth, which was able to sail on the 20th, made a cast up to Rangoon inside the islands, and the Chikuma held on for the Colombo focal point.

 

The depressing effect of the Emden's escape was all the deeper since it did not come alone. Immediately on the heels of the news there was something even worse. For now the Koenigsberg, after her long disappearance, had come to light again with a startling suddenness. At Zanzibar was lying the Pegasus (Commander Ingles), She had been searching the coast about Dar-es-Salaam for intelligence of the missing German cruiser, and in the course of her cruise had developed defects which called for an adjustment of her machinery. For such work a protected anchorage such as Mombasa was desirable, but as Commander Ingles's general orders were to protect Zanzibar, and the place was inclined to panic whenever he left, he decided to do the work there - especially as a supply vessel with stores and men for his ship was due at the port. For some time there had been no wireless signs to indicate that the Koenigsberg was in the vicinity, but as a precaution the armed tug Helmuth was kept out in the South Channel as guard. The men slept at the guns during the night and steam was ordered at two hours' notice, Still, the position was highly unsatisfactory. For so weak and old a ship as the Pegasus to be left without support was in any case full of danger, but the urgent call of the Indian Convoy still stood in the way of a sounder disposition, and the Koenigsberg cleverly seized her opportitnity.

 

At 5.25 a.m. on September 20 the Helmuth observed a vessel coming slowly up the South Channel. As this entrance was forbidden to merchant vessels, the tug steamed out to warn her off. The stranger at once broke the German ensign, fired two rounds of blank and increased speed. She

 

Sept. 20-21, 1914

THE EASTERN FLEET

 

was clearly the Koenigsberg, but the Helmuth failed to get a warning to the Pegasus, which was lying off the town., At about 9000 yards the German opened fire, and before the Pegasus could reply she was straddled. In any case the British ship was outranged. She tried to return the fire, but all her shots fell short, and after about eight minutes, during which she fired some fifty rounds, all her engaged broadside guns were disabled. Notwithstanding her helpless condition, the Koenigsberg, after a pause of five minutes, continued firing on her, and then about half an hour after opening fire turned and steamed away without doing further damage.

 

The town was not touched. All the raider did ashore was to destroy a dummy wireless station. A large collier, the Banffshire, with several thousand tons of coal on board, was left alone, and with her boats did excellent rescue work; nor was the lighthouse or the cable interfered with. The Pegasus was still afloat, though she was badly holed on the water line and had lost twenty-four killed and fifty-five wounded, besides seven, including two officers, who died of their wounds. Her engines being found to be uninjured, an attempt was made to beach her, but it failed, and she turned over and sank. Hurried and nervous as had been the Koenigsberg's action, she had won a striking success. It is true such regrettable incidents were fully anticipated by the Admiralty when they found themselves involved in moving troops before they had had time to clear the seas. In this case the trouble was mainly due to the importunate demands of an outlying station for naval protection which there was no adequate means of providing. None the less, in public opinion a mistake had been made, and in Eastern waters the Navy had suffered an appreciable loss of prestige.

 

The best that can be said of the unfortunate incident is that it was not permitted to alter the policy on which we were launched. To the Indian Convoys the presence of the Koenigsberg was allowed to make no difference. The Bombay group of the second echelon had sailed that day, under escort of the Swiftsure, Fox and Dufferin, to the number of twenty-nine transports, including three with the balance of the force destined for Mombasa. The Karachi group of eleven sail started as usual next day (September 21) with the Dartmouth and Hardinge. Even the three Mombasa transports were not detained. In due course they parted company and proceeded independently with the Dartmouth and Fox for escort. Provision for hunting down the Koenigsberg was immediately made by ordering the Chatham, which had taken the last convoy up the Red Sea, to seek her out, and

 

Sept. 22, 1914

CONVOYS HELD UP

 

with her the Dartmouth was to work as soon as her convoy reached Mombasa. In addition, the Weymouth was ordered down from the Mediterranean for the same service, and thus to each of the German cruisers three of our own were devoted. It meant, of course, a further difficulty in providing for the Indian Convoys, but as the battleships Ocean and Goliath were already on their way to relieve the light cruisers of escort work, the difficulty would be overcome before the next big convoy was due to sail.

 

In face of the measures taken it was not likely that either the Emden or Koenigsberg could long keep going as they were, but this was a strictly naval view which could do little to quiet the prevailing uneasiness. All public opinion had to go upon was that, instead of the two raiding cruisers being brought to book, one of our own cruisers had been destroyed and half a dozen merchant ships sunk. To the Admiralty such events were but set-backs, incidental to their measured advance to a complete command of the sea, and. Inevitable if the lines of that advance were confused, as they necessarily were, by extraneous calls. But to the Australasian Governments, unversed in the inscrutable lore of the sea, they were only evidence that the Admiralty had failed; and with the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, as it seemed, within striking distance of their convoys, they could no longer rest assured that the Navy knew its business. The prevailing, anxiety was completed by a rumour that Admiral von Spee, after leaving Samoa, had gone to Fiji - that is, direct for the convoy route - and the result was that the New Zealand government felt that it could not allow its troops to sail as arranged, and the concentration of the transports at Wellington stopped. Disconcerting as this resolution was to the nicely-adjusted plans of the Admiralty, it was immediately recognised that there was but one thing to do. The appreciation of the effort the Dominions were making for the Empire was so keen that, in spite of the dislocations that were involved, there could be no hesitation in meeting their views.

 

There was, furthermore, an additional reason for taking this attitude. The same evening that the New Zealand Government announced its decision, news spread that the Emden had struck another blow of even higher daring than before. Since she had been located off Rangoon all trace of her was lost. Indeed, so entirely did she seem to have disappeared that on September 22 the Colombo-Calcutta trade route was declared open again. Yet that same evening, about 9.30, she appeared off Madras and began bombarding the

 

Sept. 21-24, 1914

 

Burmah Company's oil tanks which stood near the sea front. Two of them, containing nearly half a million gallons of kerosene, were set on fire and entirely consumed. A few shots also fell in the town, and some hit the British India S.S. Chupra which was lying there. In all five people were killed and a dozen or so wounded, but before more harm could be done the batteries opened fire and the Emden made off to the southward.

 

Once more her position was not a little precarious. Captain Grant, having searched False Bay that day, was coming down the coast; while the Chikuma, having coaled at Colombo on the 21st, was coming up the east side of Ceylon with two colliers for Madras in her charge. Thus when the Emden was off Madras the Hampshire was about 300 miles to the northward and the Chikuma little more to the southward, and she would have been much nearer but for the fact that by some misunderstanding she waited for instructions at Colombo after coaling instead of proceeding on her original orders to Madras,

 

Nevertheless the Emden was still in danger. At 6 a.m. on the 23rd she was reported off Cuddalore, 100 miles south of Madras, at which time the Chikuma, still steaming to the northward, was off Trincomalee, not much more than 200 miles away. Whether or not the Emden heard her, she must soon have turned to the northward, for at 2 p.m. she was reported from Pondicherry steaming away north-east. This course would take her almost direct to the Hampshire, who on her way down the coast was then not 150 miles north-east of Madras. But the course Captain von Mueller was taking was a false one, apparently intended to deceive; for as soon as he dropped the land he turned back to the southward, intending to make a dash at the Colombo focal point. So for the third time the Hampshire missed him, and probably on this occasion, as the two ships had been steaming to meet one another, by not much more than three hours. Still the Emden was far from safe, for the Hampshire held on down the coast, and as she approached, the Chikuma, having reached the north of Ceylon, turned back by Captain Grant's orders, to protect Trincomalee, which might very well be the Emden's next objective.

 

Her attack on trade in any case had not been a great success materially. During her week's cruise in the Bay, while she took seven ships, no less than sixteen got in or out of Calcutta unmolested, and twice she had been very near to being captured. Still, little as was the real impression she had made on the bulk of the trade, and nearly as our cruisers had come to success, the Madras episode was only another

 

Sept. 24, 1914

CONVOY PLANS RECAST

 

reason for deferring to New Zealand opinion. For again the trade routes concerned had to be closed, and once more he whole system of protecting the Australasian Convoys was thrown into the melting-pot. In order to meet the situation the Admiralty, while reiterating their conviction that the route from Wellington to Albany was safe, issued orders that the Minotaur and Ibuki, instead of acting as a covering squadron in New Guinea waters, were to proceed to Wellington to fetch the New Zealand Convoy, and then, after picking up the Australian transports at Fremantle, to escort the whole to Aden. Consequently the two cruisers had to be called away immediately from Sumatra and the Cocos Islands, where they were filling in time by watching the Emden. By their original orders they were to pick the convoy at Fremantle on October 4. Now they left their watching-stations in time to be there on September 29, and then carry on to New Zealand. Even so the sailing of the joint convoy would be delayed for at least three weeks, but there was no help for it, and the delay had to be faced.

 

As for the Nisshin, since she had no place in the plan, she was now at Admiral Jerram s disposal, and he ordered her away to reinforce the Sandakan Patrol, which seemed to be in danger. The Geier, Prinz Eitel Friedrich, and the Cormoran were still unlocated, and there were signs that the German colliers in the Philippines were getting suspiciously restless. One actually came out, but was at once headed back by the merchant cruiser Himalaya, and in these circumstances the possibility of a surprise attack on Sandakan could not be neglected.

 

Meanwhile the expedition to Friedrich-Wilhelm Harbour could proceed with the Australia and Montcalm. In pursuance of the previous arrangement Admiral Patey, just promoted Vice-Admiral, had returned to Rabaul with the Sydney in company on September 19, and on the 22nd, after detaching her to destroy the German wireless station at Angaur, started for his objective with the Australia, Montcalm, Encounter and the transport Berrima. On the 24th he was off Friedrich-Wilhelm Harbour. As the place had been included in the general capitulation signed by the Governor at Rabaul, he sent in a flag of truce to demand its surrender. No resistance was offered. In the afternoon troops and stores were landed, and after formally hoisting the British flag and proclaiming the occupation, the Admiral returned to Rabaul, leaving the troops in garrison.

 

The general situation in Far Eastern waters was now coming well in hand. The Sydney completed her work at

 

Sept. 21-23, 1914

 

Angaur on the 26th. Admiral Yamaya, moreover, was due at Jaluit with, the Japanese First South Sea Squadron on the 29th, and Tsingtau was invested both by land and sea. So by the end of the month the Western Pacific had been made untenable for any serious hostile force, and there could be little doubt - though, as we have seen, no undue risks were taken - that Admiral von Spee would be forced away to American waters. If any doubt remained in the minds of the naval authorities, it was now removed. On the last day of the month came news that on September 22 - the day, as it happened, that the New Zealand transports had been stopped - the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had bombarded the French port of Papiete in Tahiti, the principal island of the Society Group, and had sunk the gunboat Zelee.

 

On leaving Samoa Admiral von Spee had steamed for Suvarov Island, a lonely British possession about, 500 miles on the way to the French group of the Marquesas, where the Nurnberg was now bringing on the supply ships. Two of them, however, were to meet him at Suvarov. As the swell proved too great for coaling there, he took them on to Bora Bora, in the Society Islands. This group was also French, but the native authorities, mistaking the German nationality, allowed them to coal and buy provisions (September 21). Thence on September 22 he went on to Papiete, the capital of the group. His intention, it is said, was merely to demand supplies, but as the little batteries opened on him as soon as he appeared, he replied, with the result that he quickly sank the unarmed gunboat, whose guns were all ashore, damaged a German ship in the port, and set the town on fire. In this he defeated his purpose; for the conflagration spread so fast that he dared not enter the harbour, and so had to sail away for the Marquesas without getting what he came to seek.

 

News of the incident could only confirm the view which Admiral Patey had always held that the German squadron would take the route by Samoa and Tahiti in moving away to theAmerican coast, and so sure now were the Admiralty that this was the intention that they proposed that the New Zealand transports should move off without further delay and meet the Minotaur and Ibuki at sea. Possibly the proposal might have been accepted but for a new record of failure that had to be scored to the Admiralty account; for in the meanwhile the Emden had struck her blow at the Colombo focal area. Continuing on the southerly course which she had finally

 

Sept. 24-29, 1914

EMDEN OFF COLOMBO

 

adopted after leaving the Madras area, she ran down the coast of Ceylon, ahead of Captain Grant, and was not observed by the Chikuma at Trincomalee. The Markomannia was still with her, but the Pontoporos had been sent with a prize crew to a rendezvous on the west coast of Sumatra. It was not till they rounded the south of Ceylon that they found anything, but in the forenoon of September 25, some twenty-five miles south of Galle, they captured the King Lud. Being outward bound in ballast she was sunk at once by explosives, and in search of better luck Captain von Mueller held boldly on for Colombo. Arriving off the port at nightfall, he saw a large ship coming out with all lights burning, dogged her till she was fifty miles out, and about midnight overhauled her. She was the Tymeric, with £60,000 worth of sugar on board. She was sunk, like the King Lud, and the Emden carried on for the south of Cape Comorin, where the tracks from Bombay and Aden to Colombo converge.

 

Here, the following afternoon, she captured the Gryfevale, whose master was doing his best to keep off the converging tracks, and this ship Captain von Mueller kept. With his prize and the Markomannia in company, he then made towards Minikoi, the island which is midway between the Laccadive and Maldive Groups, and on either side of which, through the Eight Degree and Nine Degree Channels, run the usual tracks from the Red Sea. Between that point and Cape Comorin he next day (September 27) captured three more ships, Buresk, Ribera and Foyle, all on or near the usual track. The last two, like the King Lud, were outward bound in ballast, and they were both sunk. But the Buresk, which was captured in the dead of night, was a real godsend. She was a ship of 4,300 tons, with a full cargo of Welsh coal for Hongkong on Admiralty charter, and yet she, too, gave herself away by steaming on the direct track with all lights brightly burning. She was naturally added to the little squadron, and by sheer neglect of ordinary precautions Captain von Mueller's potentiality for prolonging his depredations was appreciably increased. After capturing the Foyle at 7 p.m. about 150 miles east of Minikoi, he did not tempt Providence further, but held away to the southward towards the Maldives to coal and clean his ship. The prisoners he dismissed in the Gryfevale, and it was early on the 29th when she put into Colombo that the whole story was known.

 

Regrettable as it was, the wonder is that the tale of loss was not much worse. In the three days the Emden was operating seven ships had been stopped by her, two into Colombo and five out, and in these usually thronged waters

 

Sept. 26-30, 1914

 

she had taken only half a dozen prizes, averaging less than 4000 tons, and half of them in ballast. Her cruise might well have been prolonged a day or two, for this time she was in little danger. The Chikuma reached Colombo to coal the same day as the Gryfevale, but Captain Grant, in the Hampshire, was half way across the Bay of Bengal steaming eastward. On the 26th, while the Emden was off Cape Comorin, he had put into Colombo to coal, and at 1.0 a.m. next morning, after calling the Chikuma from Trincomalee, he had left to proceed along the trade route to Singapore.

 

The reason for this was that the Dupleix, which, it will be remembered, had been the supporting ship of the Penang Patrol, was coming westward with a vessel laden with French artillery, and the Askold and Empress of Asia were just starting with the three transports in which were our Far Eastern garrisons now all bound for Europe. It was to give further protection to this convoy that he was making eastward for Acheh Head when the news reached him at midnight of September 29-30. He immediately turned back, ordered the Chikuma to Minikoi and the Yarmouth, which was coaling at Penang, to Acheh Head. But all was too late. Even the Chikuma did not get away till 8 a.m. on the 30th, and by that time the Emden was lost in the trackless wastes in the middle of the Indian Ocean.

 

Such, then, was the news which reached the New Zealand Government simultaneously with the Admiralty suggestion that their transports should not wait for the Minotaur and Ibuki. The exploits of the Emden had, of course, no real relation to the safety of the convoy, but the moral effect was none the less strong, and the result was a warm protest, against any change in the arrangements. In the face of it the Admiralty at once acquiesced, and, as it was impossible to provide a separate escort for the Australian convoy, both of them had to be delayed the full three weeks.

 

 

---

 

 

 

CHAPTER XXIII

 

ADMIRAL VON SPEE CROSSES THE PACIFIC

(See Maps 2 and 14 in case.)

 

The first week in October when the Australian Convoy should have sailed was marked with important developments in the general situation, both in the Atlantic and Pacific, where it still mainly turned on the movements of Admiral von Spee and the three detached cruisers, Emden, Dresden and Karlsruhe.

 

On the first of the month Admiral Patey, having secured our position in German New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago, had just put to sea with his squadron, Australia, Montcalm, Encounter and Sydney, with a view to intercepting Admiral von Spee if he should double back and try to enter the Indian Ocean. The two cruiser squadrons which the Japanese had formed for hunting down the enemy in the Pacific were now at sea, and the Admiral's idea was to cruise to the Carolines to try to get touch and concert operations with Admiral Yamaya, who, with the First South Sea Squadron, had left Yokosuka on September 14, the day Admiral von Spee was located off Samoa, and having occupied Jaluit on September 29, was now working in that area. In moving away from Rabaul Admiral Patey left behind him two German auxiliary cruisers, the Prinz Eitel Friedrich and her consort, the Russian Volunteer prize Cormoran. Intercepted calls had led him to suspect something was cruising north of New Guinea, and the Sydney had twice searched the suspicious area without success. The two German ships had, in fact, met at Angaur a week or so before the Sydney destroyed its wireless station. They had then separated in search of coal, and not knowing New Guinea was in our possession, had fixed their rendezvous at Alexis Bay, just north of Friedrich-Wilhelm Harbour. The Cormoran was actually hiding there when Admiral Patey was taking possession of the administrative capital, but was not discovered. When his back was turned both ships, finding Australasian waters too hot to hold them, had made off; Prinz Eitel Friedrich for the west coast of America, and Cormoran for the Western Carolines,

 

Oct. 1-2, 1914

VON SPEE'S RETREAT

 

after narrowly escaping the Satsuma of the Second Japanese South Sea Squadron at Yap.

 

The Geier was also suspected of being somewhere about. She had not been heard of for over a month, but news of her had just come in. It was that on September 4 she had captured at Kusaie, in the Eastern Carolines, the British S.S. Southport, which was lying there ignorant that war had broken out. Having disabled her prize's engines so that she should not get away, the Geier left her in the harbour and went off on a fortnight's cruise. No sooner was she gone than the master of the Southport, Captain Clopet, made up his mind to escape. Desperate as was the chance and short the time, the crew agreed, and under the clever engineer, Mr. H. Cox, they set to work to repair the engines, in spite of the almost hopeless condition to which they had been reduced. The eccentric gear of the mean and high-pressure engines and the intermediate stop valve had been removed as well as a good many of the tools, but after eleven days' work, by fitting the astern eccentric of the low-pressure engine to the high-pressure cylinder, and cutting out the middle cylinder, they got a semblance of a compound engine. True, it would not go astern, and if it was stopped might get on a dead centre and refuse to start again.

 

Nor was this the only trouble. They had over 2000 miles to go to reach a British port, and no provisions except what the island - which, like the rest, was not self-supporting - could provide. However, from the native king, whom the Germans had told to help him with food, Captain Clopet obtained 350 cocoanuts and 400 lb. of a root, which the natives only eat in time of famine. With this equipment, after infinite difficulty in getting their unhandy craft to sea, they started on September 18 with only a day or so in hand. Still, they escaped, and on the 30th put into Brisbane with their news, and another brilliant page added to the record of resource and daring with which the mercantile marine was to glorify itself in the course of the war. The exploit was recognised by an Admiralty letter expressing high appreciation of the captain's and the engineer's seamanlike and skilful conduct, and to each of them the Board of Trade presented a piece of plate.

 

On the day of her arrival at Brisbane came the news that Admiral von Spee had bombarded Tahiti. It reached Admiral Patey on October 2, and as there was now no immediate prospect of danger to the Indian Ocean he turned back to Simpson Harbour to get into touch with the Admiralty. Though the general expectation was that the German Admiral was making for America, there was still a possibility that he

 

Sept 1-4, 1914

JAPANESE CO-OPERATION

 

might be intending to carry out similar attacks at Samoa or even New Zealand, and the instructions Admiral Patey received were to proceed to Suva in Fiji and make that his base for operating in search of the elusive enemy.

 

This he could safely do, for on October 1 the Second Japanese South Sea Squadron left Sasebo for Rabaul, which was then intended to be their base for further operations. This squadron was under Rear-Admiral Tsuchiyama, and consisted of the Satsuma, a battleship with four 12" and twelve 10" guns, and two light cruisers, Yahagi and Hirado. But Admiral Jerram, whom the news from Tahiti convinced that Admiral von Spee was making for America, had a different arrangement to propose. His appreciation was that the Germans were bound for American waters to harass either the coast of British Columbia or our trade on the coasts off Chile and Peru, or possibly to pass into the Atlantic by the Panama Canal or the Strait of Magellan.

 

With provision for the latter alternatives he had no concern, but for the first two he suggested that the First Japanese South Sea Squadron should move on from the Marshall Islands and cross the ocean as soon as it was certain the Germans had done so, and that Admiral Patey, with the Australia and Montcalm should remain east of Australia. Meanwhile, during the absence of the Minotaur and Ihuki with the Australasian Convoy, he proposed that Admiral Tsuchiyama should co-operate with him west of longitude 140 degrees , which passes approximately through Tokyo, Yap and the centre of New Guinea, and that the First Squadron should work with Admiral Patey to the eastward of that meridian. In both areas there would thus be a squadron capable of dealing with Admiral von Spee should he turn back, and at the same time the escape of colliers from the Philippines could be effectually prevented. But before any definite arrangement could be made the doubt as to the German intention was finally cleared up.

 

In the evening of October 4 (local time) the Suva wireless ptation intercepted a message from the Scharnhorst in the German secret mercantile code, a copy of which we had captured. It read: "Scharnhorst on the way between the Marquesas and Easter Island." As Easter Island lies half way between Tahiti and the American coast there was little doubt as to what was in the wind, especially, as our station at Thursday Island, in the Torres Strait, had just taken in another warning. This message was enclair, and, translated, it ran: "Look out! Australia and all the large English ships have left Rabaul going east. The Japanese

Aug.-Sept. 1914

 

squadron is all over the place. To-day the English established wireless communication with Rabaul. Look out! "

 

If this intelligence was to be trusted - and, as will be seen directly, there was much on the American side to confirm it - the Eastern Seas were no longer threatened. The chief concern of the Admiralty was with the other side of the Pacific. Here, in North American waters, Captain Powlett was still operating with the Newcastle, Rainbow and Idzumo, trying to find the Leipzig, and protecting British and Japanese trade and the Canadian ports. But for this area there was little anxiety, for the Japanese had agreed to reinforce the squadron with the Hizen (formerly the Russian Retvizan), a small but fast battleship of 12,700 tons and 16,000 horsepower, built in America and captured at Port Arthur. Nothing had been seen of the Leipzig. Traces of her movements had been found by the Newcastle, but nothing definite was ascertained till early on October 1 a ship that had been attending her put into Callao with the crew of the British steamer Bankfields, which she had captured on August 25. On the same day there arrived at Guayaquil the master and part of the crew of the Elsinore, which she captured off Cape Corrientes in Columbia on September 11. They had to report that they had escaped from the Galapagos Islands, where they had been put ashore a week after being taken. These two pieces of intelligence could only raise a presumption that the Leipzig was operating to the southward, in expectation of Admiral von Spee's arrival.

All the probabilities, in fact, pointed to the waters in which Admiral Cradock was operating as the area most in danger, and his position was still far from secure. We have seen how, on taking over the South American station early in September, he had moved down to Montevideo with the intention of concentrating his squadron to the southward. His sweep down the coast - so far as the regular cruisers were concerned - was unproductive, but his armed merchant cruiser, the Carmania (Captain N. Grant), had met with better fortune. It fell to her duty in the southerly sweep to examine Trinidada Island, which was suspected to be a German coaling place, and where, in fact, the Dresden had coaled a month before on her way to the Pacific. Arriving there on September 14 - the day the Emden's activities were first known - the Carmania found off the western end of the island a large liner coaling from two colliers. The liner was the Cap Trafalgar (right - Cyber Heritage/Terry Phillips), a new ship of the Hamburg-Sud-Amerika Line, which on August 22, it will be remembered, when Captain Luce had moved north in search of the Dresden, had

Sept. 14, 1914

CARMANIA AND CAP TRAFALGAR

 

been able to escape from the River Plate. About a week later at a sea rendezvous she had met the gunboat Eber from South Africa, and had taken over her officers and her armament of two 4" guns and six pom-poms. Since September 1 she had been cruising for our trade, disguised as a Castle liner, but as the air was full of British wireless signals her attention was more absorbed in keeping out of harm's way than in hunting prizes, and she had done nothing. (Letter from her surgeon in Weser Zeitung, November 27, 1914. It is possible the intention was that she should cruise in South American waters in consort with the Kronprinz Wilhelm and Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, using Trinidada as a base. Three German colliers had been sent there, and the Kronprinz Wilhelm was in the vicinity when she sank the Indian Prince. If there was such a plan the fate of the Cap Trafalgar and the Kaiser Willielm Grosse prevented it from maturing.)

 

It seems as if evasion was still her object, for before the Carmania (right - Photo Ships), which was coming up at 16 knots from the north-east, had raised her hull she began making off to the southward, while her consorts dispersed. But very soon, as though she had ascertained the Carmania's class, she began to turn to the westward to close at 18 knots. By 12.10 the converging courses brought the range down to 8,500 yards, the Carmania challenged the enemy with a shot across her bows and the German replied with her after gun. At 7,500 yards the Carmania began independent control fire from all her port guns, and the Cap Trafalgar answered with rapid fire. As the range continued to fall the action grew very hot. At 4,500 yards the Carmania changed to salvoes, the second and third of which were seen to hit all along the water line. Most of the enemy's shot went high, so that the Carmania only suffered in her masts, funnels and ventilators. But now, since the Cap Trafalgar continued to steer as though to cross the Carmania''s bows, the range decreased so much we the German pom-poms began to tell. When, therefore, the range was down to 3,500 yards, Captain Grant began to turn away to starboard through about 16 points till his starboard guns bore. Till this time the Cap Trafalgar had kept her course, but she now began to sheer away to port, and Captain Grant, completing his circle, began chasing on her port quarter. It could be seen that her deck steam pipes had been cut: she was on fire forward and had a slight list to starboard. But the Carmania was also in trouble. A shell had passed through three thicknesses of plating without rsting, but had set fire to bedding under the fore bridge. As the fire main had been cut the flames could not be controlled, the fore bridge became untenable, and the fire dangerous. Still, as the wind was aft, the Carmania, by keeping

 

Sept. 14, 1914

VON SPEE'S RETREAT

 

on the enemy's port quarter, was able to continue the action.

 

It had now resolved itself into a stern chase in which the Cap Trafalgar soon began to develop the better speed. So fast did she gain that by 1.30 she was out of range, and to all appearance she had escaped. But it soon became evident that her list was rapidly increasing, and the fire on board her had taken such a hold that she was burning fore and aft. In this condition in a quarter of an hour she was suddenly seen to turn 16 points to port, and then capsize and disappear bows foremost. The fact was that she was already doomed, when the action ceased. She had four or five holes on the water line, the fire made her decks untenable, and her captain was killed. Orders were therefore given to abandon ship and blow her up; so, at least, the Germans report.

 

So ended the, first action that had been fought between two of the new class of armed merchant.cruisers - the only one, in fact, in which one of ours had been able to perform the original service for which they were designed, that is, dealing with the enemy's armed merchantmen - and it so happened that the action was fought the very day after the new order came out which changed their function.(See ante, p. 266.) The first test of their powers had ended in a victory for the British ship, but the German had undoubtedly made a good fight of it. So far as is known she had nothing but the Ebers armament, and that consisted of two 4.1" guns, six pom-poms and two machine-guns. (There were, however, reports that she fitted up one or more guns on or before leaving the Plate.)

 

The Carmania had eight 4.7" guns, and had suffered a good deal; she had five holes on the water line, her fore bridge with all its steering, communication and fire-control gear was destroyed, and she had lost nine men killed and twenty-six wounded. So precarious, indeed, was her condition at the end of the action that it was impossible to save the crew of the sunken enemy. The fire had still so strong a hold of her that Captain Grant had to keep on before the wind to subdue it. This course was the more necessary as smoke appeared on the horizon, and he believed it might well be coming from a German cruiser to which the Cap Trafalgar had been continually calling during the action. It was probably the Eleonore Woermann, one of the Cap Trafalgar's colliers, who picked up the survivors a couple of hours later and took them to Buenos Aires, where they were interned. But of her the Carmania saw nothing. Captain Grant had enough to do to save his ship, and as soon as the

 

Sept. 14, 1914

CRADOCK'S INSTRUCTIONS

 

fire was got under he made for Abrolhos Rocks, calling for assistance. It was not till the next afternoon that the Bristol picked him up and stood by till the Cornwall appeared, by whom he was escorted to the coaling base.

 

These two cruisers were taking part in the general movement southward which Admiral Cradock had ordered in anticipation of its being Admiral von Spee's intention to come through the Magellan Strait and make an attack on our trade in that quarter. On the day the Carmania fought her action new instructions from the Admiralty confirmed his appreciation. He was informed that the Canopus was on her way to Abrolhos and that the Defence was coming from the Mediterranean to reinforce him, but until she arrived he was to keep at least the Canopus and one County class cruiser with his flagship. After leaving in the north sufficient force to deal with the Dresden and Karlsruhe, which were still unlocated, he was to concentrate to the southward a squadron strong enough to meet the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, making the Falkland Islands his base. As soon as he had a force superior to the Germans he was to search the Magellan Strait, but was to be ready to break back and cover the River Plate if intelligence pointed that way.

(The text of the telegram was as follows -

 

"From Admiralty to R.-A. Good Hope, via British Minister, Rio. - (Sent September 14, 1914, 5.50 p.m.)

 

"There is a strong probability of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau arriving in the Magellan Straits or on the West Coast of South America.

"The Germans have begun, to carry on trade on the West Coast of South America.

"Leave sufficient force to deal with Dresden and Karlsruhe. Concentrate a squadron strong enough to meet Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, making Falkland Islands your coaling base.

"Canopus is now en route to Abrolhos. Defence is joining you from Mediterranean. Until Defence joins, keep at least Canopus and one County class with your flagship

"As soon as you have superior force, search the Magellan Straits with sqadron, being ready to return and cover the River Plate, or, according to information, search north as far as Valparaiso, break up the German trade and destroy the German cruisers.

"Anchorage in the vicinity of Golfo Nuevo and Egg Harbour should be searched.

"Colliers are being ordered to, the Falkland Islands. Consider whether colliers from Abrolhos should be ordered south.")

The Canopus was officially credited with a sea-going full speed of seventeen knots; that of the Good Hope and the "County" class was over twenty-two.

 

The instructions reached him at Santa Catharina, some 250 miles south of Rio, where he had just found Captain Luce's detachment, Glasgow, Monmouth and Otranto. For on his

 

Sept. 15-25, 1914

 

way down to the Magellan Strait, in accordance with his last orders to intercept the Dresden, Captain Luce had received a report that, the Dresden had coaled near Santa Catharina. Being out of touch with the Admiral, he could only use his discretion, and he had turned back in search. The report was false. For the Dresden, after coaling at Gill Bay on August 31, had pushed on again, and without venturing to approach the Strait had run to the Horn. There, on September 5, she put into Orange Bay, a spacious natural harbour which lies hidden and completely land-locked amidst the snows and glaciers of Hoste Island.

 

This, of course, was quite unknown at the time, and the Admiral decided to go down to the Strait with the Good Hope and Captain Luce's detachment, leaving the Bristol to patrol between Santa Catharina and the Plate, and the Cornwall between Rio and Cape San Roque. The Carmania and Macedonia were to assist them, but as the Carmania was unfit for action and the Macedonia had to escort her to Gibraltar for a refit, the two cruisers had to watch the whole Atlantic coast between them as best they could. It was a vast field they had to cover, and the Pernambuco area was left with no protection except what the Cornwall could provide when she was in the region of Cape San Roque; nor although, on fresh news of Admiral von Spee's movements, the immediate anxiety for the Magellan Strait was removed and Admiral Cradock's instructions to concentrate there were promptly modified, was any change made in the dispositions to the northward. The reason his last orders had to be altered so soon was this: it was on the very day they were issued that Admiral von Spee had appeared at Samoa and gone off on a false course north-west. From this it was assumed he intended returning to his original station, and that there was no present fear for Admiral Cradock's Squadron. He was accordingly told there was now no need to concentrate his cruisers, and was ordered at once to attack "German trade on the west coast of America and Magellan," for which two cruisers and an armed liner were suggested as sufficient force. The orders found him off the River Plate, where he intended to coal, but a succession of heavy gales so much delayed operations that it was September 22 before he could carry on to the southward, As he went down he obtained intelligence which emphasised the need of operating on the west coast, for it left no doubt the Dresden was there. It came from Captain Douglas Kinnier.of the Pacific Steam Navigation liner Ortega, with which Admiral Cradock fell in on September 25. Captain Kinnier's report was that he had

 

Sept. 18-26, 1914

DRESDEN AND ORTEGA

 

been fired upon by a three-funnelled cruiser on the other side of the Straits, and that the cruiser had a merchant vessel in company. It was clearly the Dresden, and her tender the Baden. Not only was this valuable piece of intelligence obtained, but Captain Kinnier had a story to tell which reflected the highest credit on his courage and resource.

 

He had sailed from Valparaiso with 300 French reservists on board, and had reached as far as Cambridge Island, about 100 miles short of the entrance of the Straits, when he was challenged by the cruiser. As he had only 14 knots and the German 21, escape seemed almost impossible. Still he resolved to try, and calling for volunteers for the stokehold he made away. The cruiser followed and opened fire. Such a chase could not last long, but behind Cambridge Islands, opens the unsurveyed Nelson Strait, into which he knew the cruiser would not dare to follow him, and for this perilous passage he made at his utmost speed. "In order to realize the hardihood of this action," wrote our Consul at Rio in his official report, "it must be remembered that Nelson Strait is entirely uncharted, and that the narrow, tortuous passage constitutes a veritable nightmare for navigators, bristling as it does with reefs and pinnacle rocks, swept by fierce currents and tide rips, with the cliffs on either side sheer-to without any anchorage." Yet all these dangers he faced with his 8000 ton ship, and by heroic exertion in the engine-room was able to make the entrance of the Strait and drop his pursuer before he had been hit once. And not only this, but by feeling his way with his boats he brought his ship out into Smyth Channel without a dent in her plates.

(Admiralty Press communique, Nov. 20. An Admiralty letter was sent to the Company expressing "their Lordships' desire to place on record their appreciation of the courageous conduct of Captain Kinnier in throwing off his pursuer by successfully navigating the uncharted and dangerous passage of Nelson Strait." He was given a temporary lieutenant's commission in the R.N.R., and awarded a D.S.C. (January 1). The Chilean Government, who on hearing of the chase sent a destroyer to prevent a violation of neutral waters, found on her report that only blank was fired, and that the chase was abandoned when the Ortega entered Chilean waters. Captain Kinnier's report goes to confirm this. He says the Dresden fired twice at his ship, " both shots being ineffectual.")

Upon this information it would seem that the Admiral decided to proceed with the squadron to the West Coast, and by this time the Admiralty had further information which, made it fairly certain the Dresden was there. It was sent to him on September 26, the day after he met the Ortega, though it is uncertain when the telegram reached him. It was to the effect that on the previous day a three-funnelled cruiser, probably the Dresden, had passed Punta Galera near

 

Sept. 26-30, 1914

 

Valdivia some 800 miles up the Chilean coast, going northwards. In corroboration of this report a private message, stated that the Seydlitz, which for a month past had been lying at Valparaiso, was hurriedly coaling. Two days later the British ship Galicia reported having seen on the 26th a steamer without lights off Coronel exchanging signals with the German steamer Santa Isabel, which had reached the port on the previous day. All this indicated clearly that the enemy was becoming active on the west coast.

 

Whether or not Admiral Cradock knew all this, he now assembled his squadron off Cape Virgins and entered the Strait, intending to call for further intelligence at Punta Arenas. On the way there he was continually intercepting call-signs between German men-of-war and merchantmen. They could not be deciphered, but on arriving at Punta Arenas on September 28 he learnt from our Consul that the enemy were probably using Orange Bay as a base. It further appeared that one of the merchant ships in the harbour recently sailed with a large amount of live stock and fresh provisions, and had returned a few days later empty. There was every possibility, therefore, that at last he had run the chase to earth, and he immediately decided to attack. The movement was made in the utmost secrecy.

 

Informing the Chilean Admiral who was there that he was bound for Valparaiso, he stole away without lights after midnight and made for the difficult Cockburn Channel. It was known at all times to be dangerous, and it had not been surveyed since 1820, but time was everything to the Admiral and he decided to take the risk. It was no light task. "The navigational abilities of Commander Scott," the Admiral wrote in his report, "in piloting the squadron in thick weather, with intermittent snow-storms, through this little charted channel, and again, to ensure arriving at daybreak off Orange Bay, round Cape Horn, inside Barneveldt Rocks in snow storms and darkness, call for the most favourable comment."

 

Still the thing was done, and the Admiral had all fair to carry out the surprise he confidently expected. The idea was that possibly, besides the Dresden, the Leipzig and Nurnberg were also there with store ships and colliers. The bay had several good exits, and it was necessary so far as possible to dispose the force so as to guard them all. The ships were therefore made to close the place gradually from different directions, and then at the given signal each rushed in by a separate entrance. But not a thing was there. The bay was empty, nor could the picket boat that was sent ashore find a trace of the enemy having been there.

 

Oct. 1-7, 1914

CRADOCK'S NEW ORDERS

 

The disappointment was severe, but a new scent was quickly picked, up. Wireless messages passing between the Peruvian and Chilean Authorities were intercepted, stating that two German cruisers had been off the south coast of Peru the previous day.

 

Before any action could be taken, however, it was necessary to go to the Falkland Islands to coal. It was not till October 3 that the Glasgow and Monmouth could start again to join the Otranto, which had been left in the Strait at Punta Arenas. Here she intercepted various messages which seemed to idicate that some enemy's ships were at Hermite Islands, just west of the Horn. The Admiral therefore proceeded there at once, at high speed, and ordered the Glasgow division to meet him at the island west-about. All ships had been much delayed by violent weather. It was now at its worst, and only by suffering all that the seas of that region can inflict could the movement be carried out. Again nothing was found, and the Admiral ordered Captain Luce to resume his sweep northward with his division as high as Valparaiso, and try to obtain stores and warm dothing. He himself, in the Good Hope, remained to take another look into Orange Bay, but all he found was an inscribed tablet showing that the Dresden had been there on September 8, 9 and 10.

 

The situation, however, was now more clearly defined, for it was on the day before Admiral Cradock started to search Hermite Islands that the Fiji wireless station was intercepting the message from the Schamhorst, which as we have seen, left very little doubt that Admiral von Spee was making for Easter Island. At the same time New Zealand reported that he was calling up the Dresden. The Admiralty at once passed the information to Admiral Cradock, telling him to be prepared to have to meet the Schamhorst and Gneisenau, and possibly a "Dresden" scouting for them, and that the Canopus, which had reached Abrolhos, was to accompany Glasgow, Monmouth and Otranto, the ships to search and protect trade in combination." If, however, he meant to go himself in the Good Hope, the Monmouth was to remain on the east coast. This was important, for the east coast trade had now fully revived. It was of the utmost consequence to the vitality of the home country that it should not be again checked, and an Italian ship had recently reported having sighted the long-lost Karlsruhe in the Pernambuco area near St. Paul Rocks. The message which was sent off on October 5 missed him at the Falklands, nor did he receive it till the 7th, just as he was leaving Orange Bay to return for coal to his base.

 

Oct. 8, 1914

 

It was only one of many such delays, and they must be appreciated if what followed is to be rightly judged. The fact was that communications with the south-eastern part of the Atlantic Ocean were specially slow and uncertain. We had a wireless station at Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands, to which the Uruguayan Government permitted the transmission of messages in cipher from their station at Cerrito near Montevideo, but from Punta Arenas the Chilean Government would only permit official messages en clair. (British Consul (Punta Arenas) to Foreign Office, October 2,)

 

In addition to this difficulty the whole district is subject to frequent and continuous atmospherics, with the result that messages had generally to wait two or three days before they could be made, and in bad cases as much as a week would elapse. A previous warning of what was threatening had been sent by the Admiralty on September 30, but this never reached the Admiral at all. It was to inform him that the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had bombarded Papiete and sunk the French ship Zelee on the 22nd, and had left steering north-east.

 

Admiral Cradock's own discovery that the Dresden had been in Orange Bay placed him in no little difficulty. On the information which the Admiralty had, their appreciation of what he had to deal with differed necessarily from his own, and he had no doubt they under-estimated Admiral von Spee's force. He therefore lost no time in telegraphing an account of his visit to Orange Bay and the deductions he made from it. Instead of only one light cruiser the Germans would almost certainly have three, Dresden, Leipzig and Nurnberg. Accordingly he informed them that he intended to concentrate at the Falklands to avoid a division of his force; also that he had ordered Captain Luce not to go beyond Valparaiso till the German cruisers were again located. At the same time, in view of his appreciation of the enemy's strength, he suggested that the Essex should be detached from the North American Squadron to relieve the Cornwall on the Rio-Cape San Roque patrol, so that the Cornwall could come south, and also asked whether the Defence was to join him. (See Appendix D.) She had, in fact, been stopped at Malta on September 16, two days after he was told to expect her, when the news was received that Admiral von Spee had appeared at Samoa. On the 18th she was ordered back to the Dardanelles, but no intimation to this effect had been sent him.

 

Still more disturbing was the strategical problem with which he was saddled. He could not see how it was to be solved with a single squadron acting on the west coast.

 

Oct. 8, 1914

CRADOCK'S APPRECIATION

 

In a further telegram he submitted, therefore, that in the event of the enemy's heavy cruisers and others concentrating there it was necessary to have a British force on each coast strong enough to bring them to action. For if a single concentrated force were sent to the west the enemy might well evade it and destroy all our coaling bases on the Atlantic side, in which event the squadron would be unable to follow them, and they might possibly reach the West Indies.

 

Both messages he sent off on October 8, but for the best part of a week there was no answer. Persistent atmospherics baffled all the attempts of the Admiralty to get into communication with him. The second message was received on the 11th, the first not till the evening of the 12th. At Whitehall it was a moment of extreme pressure. The Naval Division was just completing its retreat from Antwerp, the question of evacuating Ostend, and possibly of having to re-embark the IIIth Division and VIIrd Cavalry Division was urgent, the new phase of the enemy's submarine activity was at its height, and the Canadian Convoy was on the point of making its perilous entry into the Channel. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Admiralty took a day or two to settle a plan for meeting the danger in the Pacific.

 

The menace to the West Indies and our South American trade was not the only one they had to face. Two other points had to be regarded as within Admiral von Spee's reach. The first was our expedition to the Cameroons. Here the base at Duala was still in process of organisation, and operations to drive the Germans from their points of retreat had commenced. They began on the river line at Ybassi with a combined naval and military column of some strength under Colonel Gorges. Besides six armed river craft, the flotilla had the Mole, a Nigerian dredger which had recently joined, and a lighter, each armed with a naval 6" gun, and with them was a detachment of 100 bluejackets and a field gun, all under the command of Commander The Hon. Bertram Freeman Mitford of the Challenger. The military force, which was under Lieutenant-Colonel E. Vaughan of the West African Regiment, comprised eight companies of native infantry, half a company of pioneers and 600 carriers. Leaving Duala early on October 7, they easily overcame the opposition they encountered, and next morning the troops were disembarked three miles below the town for the attack. By 11.30 a.m. it was launched, but was suddenly met by so heavy a rifle and machine-gun fire from the dense bush that no progress could be made. Fortunately it was ill-directed, and eventually was silenced by the naval

 

Oct. 8-10, 1914

VON SPEE'S RETREAT

 

6" guns. A strenuous effort was then made to get a footing in the town. But by this time the troops were too much exhausted by the heat for a final rush, and as they were fast losing cohesion Colonel Gorges decided to call them off for the night. It was done without much loss, except that the Balbus, which was towing the armed lighter, took the ground so hard that she had to be abandoned. On further consideration it seemed wiser to withdraw, right back to Duala and reorganise the column in accordance with the knowledge they had obtained. This was now being done, and at the same time reconnaissances of the Sanaga and Nyong Rivers were being carried out with a view to assisting the coming French advance against Edea. The first reports were unfavourable, and with the failure of the first attempt on Ybassi it was clear that unless the base was made secure from an attack by sea there could be no prospect of reducing the colony within any calculable time.

 

Far more serious, however, was the case of German South-West Africa. Here a considerable extension and modification of the original plan had been found necessary, and further naval responsibilities were entailed. The idea of landing a column in the north at Walfisch Bay had been abandoned, owing to the difficulty of dealing with both that base and Luderitz Bay with the naval forces available. After some delay incidental to getting home the Cape Garrison, the Luderitz Bay column was in place, and the last of the Cape Garrison had passed on homewards under convoy of the Astraea; but the column under Brigadier-General Lukin, which was based at Port Nolloth and was operating against the enemy's southern frontier, had received a check. Whether, in face of the opposition he was encountering, he would be able to carry out the offensive operations which the plan assigned to him was now more than doubtful. It was certainly highly inexpedient that he should try, for it was only too evident that the loyalty of the commandos on his right under Colonel Maritz was not to be trusted. A new plan was therefore submitted by the Union Government on October 8. It was based on concentrating practically the whole of their available striking force on a single effort from Luderitz, Bay. The troops already assigned to that line of operation were to be reinforced by fresh units from the Cape and by the bulk of the Port Nolloth force. The plan further provided for forming as soon as possible a new column, which was to strike from Walfisch Bay along a railway which was to be built from the base to Swakopmund. The escort work and base protection involved would absorb the whole

 

Oct. 10-12, 1914

THE BOER REVOLT

 

capacity of the Cape Squadron, but the Admiralty cordially approved the plan and agreed to do what was wanted.

 

Here, then, was another point which might well be Admiral von Spee's objective. As things stood this was probable enough, but the danger was rapidly intensified. It was on October 10, two days before Admiral Cradock's anxious representation of the dilemma in which he found himself came to hand, that the new plan was approved, and next day the whole situation in South Africa was upset by news that Maritz had deserted to the enemy with his commando and was threatening to invade the Union territory with German help in order to raise a revolt. With the last of the regular garrison well on its way home, and with the Union forces already far involved in German territory, the situation was very serious, and the appearance of Admiral von Spee on the coast might well turn the scale. It was a possibility which could not be ignored, and it added the last complication to the problem which the Admiralty had to solve.

 

As a first step they sent the Albion, which was now with Admiral Stoddart to Ascension, there to await orders from the Cape, and Admiral King Hall at once ordered her as guardship to Walfisch Bay to relieve the Kinfauns Castle. All further movement of troops was stopped, martial law was proclaimed, and the Union Government asked for the services of the Hyacinth and the two merchant cruisers Kinfauns Castle and Armadale Castle. In this request Admiral Jackson, who was still advising on the oversea operations, concurred, but at the same time he pointed out that special naval protection must be provided against the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. It was of the first importance that they should not pass South America without being reported, and in his view the best initial disposition was a force strong enough to fight them concentrated at the Falklands, and numerically sufficient to watch for them at all salient points. To provide for this the old "County" class cruiser Kent, who had just completed her steam trials after commissioning for the North American Station, was already under orders to join Admiral Cradock instead by way of Cape Verde.

 

It was not entirely on the principle of a single concentration, nor on that suggested by Admiral Cradock for two adequate squadrons, that the Admiralty formed their plan. Something of a compromise between the two was adopted. When on October 12 the Admiral's messages of the 8th had come to hand, in which he pointed out the increasing difficulties of his position, and the doubt whether they could be met by a single concentration, the whole problem was again

 

Oct. 14-15, 1914

 

taken into consideration. One point at least was clear. All idea of cruising against the enemy's trade on the west coast must be postponed. For the moment Admiral von Spee's Squadron, and that alone, must be the objective, and this being so, the cardinal need was to make such a disposition of the force available as to ensure as far as possible that the enemy should not get through into the Atlantic unfought. (See Appendix D.) As Admiral Cradock had himself submitted, there was an obvious danger of the Germans escaping in this way if the squadron went up the Chilian Coast, and of having our coaling stations and trade in the Atlantic at their mercy for an indefinite time. The outcome of the deliberations was that on October 14 a telegram went out to Admiral Cradock informing him that his plan of concentrating the Good Hope, Canopus, Monmouth, Glasgow and Otranto was approved "for combined operation." He was further told that a second squadron was to be formed for the River Plate Area, under Admiral Stoddart, who was to come down in the Carnarvon to Montevideo, where he was to have under his flag the Cornwall and Bristol, and the two merchant cruisers Macedonia and Orama, and where his squadron would be completed by the Defence, called once more from the Mediterranean, but the Essex was to remain in the West Indies.

 

Admiral Cradock's own proposal had been to concentrate at the Falklands, but as a new squadron was being formed for the east coast and combined operations were spoken of, he appears to have assumed that his original orders of October 5 stood, and that he was to concentrate all his squadron on the west coast "to search and protect trade" in co-operation with his colleague. For two reasons no concentration on either side could take place for some time. Captain Luce was already involved in the sweep up the Chilean coast which he had been previously ordered to carry out. After the barren search of Hermite Islands he had carried on northward, leaving the Otranto to guard a secret coaling base which he had established near the western end of the Straits, and in the evening of October 14 a message from him reached the Admiralty saying that the Glasgow was off Coronel with the Monmouth, and was going on to Valparaiso for supplies. Next day he was there, reporting the harbour full of German ships, some of which had been out supplying cruisers, but having ascertained the Government would not allow them to sail again, he went off, without disclosing his destination, to his secret coaling base, to await there the Admiral and the Canopus, according to his last instructions.

 

Oct. 15-22, 1914

CRADOCK'S DIFFICULTIES

 

The other difficulty was the Canopus. The Admiralty had calculated she would reach the Falklands on October 15, but, in fact, owing to bad weather, she did not appear till a week later, and even then she required two or three days for an overhaul before she was fit for sea again. Her poor steaming powers were the Admiral's special anxiety, for it seemed to him to render it impossible to perform what he believed the Admiralty expected of him. As to the position he was to take up, it is clear he did not mistake the purport of the orders he received; for when the Admiralty knew that the Glasgow was at Valparaiso, they did not order Captain Luce to the Falklands, but merely repeated the order that he was not to go further north. Admiral Jackson's idea of a full concentration at the Falklands had, in fact, been dropped, and Admiral Cradock prepared to move to the west coast as soon as the Canopus should arrive, but not without misgiving.

 

On October 18, when he knew how the old battleship had been delayed, he warned the Admiralty that so long as she was with him the strategical speed of his squadron could not exceed 12 knots, but he would trust that circumstances would enable him to force the enemy to action. These last words show that his order to "search and protect trade" led him to believe he was expected to seek out the enemy and bring them to action as best he could. Accordingly, on October 22, as soon as the Canopus appeared, he sailed to join the rest of the squadron at the western coaling base. He could not wait for her to be overhauled. The time for Admiral von Spee's appearance was already past. He decided, therefore, to go round the Horn to see the enemy did not escape that way unobserved, and told the Canopus to meet him on the other side by way of the Straits.

 

The calculation as to Admiral von Spee's movements was fairly accurate. He had reached Easter Island. There he was joined by the Leipzig and Dresden, and after a stay of six days sailed again on the 18th, with his two heavy cruisers and three light cruisers, as Admiral Cradock was sending off his last Message to the Admiralty. The destination of the German squadron was Mas-a-fuera, a lonely island some 500 miles west of Valparaiso, where they were to meet the colliers and supply ships that had been awaiting them in Chilean ports.

 

 

---

 

 

CHAPTER XXIV

 

REAPPEARANCE OE THE KARLSRUHE, EMDEN AND KONIGSBERG

(See Map 2 in case.)

 

On the day Admiral Cradock left the Falklands the situation was further complicated by the reappearance of the Karlsruhe, which up to this time he believed had joined Admiral von Spee in the Pacific. Since September 2, when news of the capture of the Bowes Castle off the Spanish Main had been received, nothing definite had been heard of her, but as several ships engaged in the South American trade were reported overdue, the Admiralty had left no stone unturned to locate her. Every rumour was carefully investigated by our Intelligence, Officers, but in spite of all efforts she had hitherto succeeded in completely covering her tracks.

 

Now, however, it became known that before sinking the Bowes Castle on August 18 she fell in with the Patagonia of the Hamburg-Amerika Line - a collier that Captain Koehler had found at Puerto Rico and ordered to bring him coal to a rendezvous off Barbados from St. Thomas. He then proceeded along the Brazilian coast and coaled from her near the mouth of the Amazon. Thence the Karlsruhe carried on across the line to another rendezvous at Sao Joao Island, where a small collier she had found at Curacao met her by appointment. This was the Stadt Schleswig, which was emptied and sent away to Maranham with the crew of the Bowes Castle.

 

Captain Koehler's intention now was to take up a cruising-ground north of Fernando Noronha on the main trade route between Europe and the South American ports. (See Map 12 in case.) Having coaled again on August 30 at another secluded anchorage somewhere between Ceara and Cape San Roque, he made for his chosen station, and on the 31st got in touch with two Hamburg-Sud-Amerika liners, Asuncion and Rio Negro and the Norddeutscher Lloyd Crefeld, which had been dispatched from Brazilian ports to find him. All of them were ordered to a rendezvous off Rocas Reef, which he apparently intended to make his base, and to that point he proceeded himself, accompanied by his original tender the Patagonia.

 

Aug. 6-Sept. 4, 1914

KARLSRUHE AND KRONPRINZ

 

Here he had one of his many narrow escapes; for on August 28, only two days before his arrival, Captain Luce, with the Glasgow, Monmouth and Otranto, had visited the place in search of the Dresden and her colliers. Nothing was then in the anchorage, and the swell was found to be so bad as to make it appear unlikely the Germans would be able to use the island as a base. Captain Luce therefore carried on with a sweep to the southward, and so missed the Karlsruhe's three tenders by about forty-eight hours.

 

Nor was this the end of Captain Koehler's good fortune; for as he approached the rendezvous he sighted and captured the British steamship Strathroy with over 5000 tons of Welsh coal for the Brazilian Government. It was a splendid windfall that was quite unexpected. She was, of course, taken on to Rocas, where, under the lee of the island, the three supply ships were found securely at anchor. But Captain Koehler, it would seem, found the place unsuitable for his purpose as Captain Luce had expected; for on September 1 the prize was sent away, apparently to his last secret coaling place west of Cape San Roque, in charge of the Patagonia. This ship was then to proceed to Pernambuco with mails, and there is no record of her ever having rejoined. Captain Koehler, with the Crefeld in company to act as a scout, steamed northward to take up the station he had selected on the 2nd parallel, south latitude, about 100 miles north of Fernando Noronha, where the various tracks begin to converge closely and the trade normally assumes its highest density.

 

His chances of success were further increased by the fact that his original consort, the Kronprinz Wilhelm, was in the vicinity. Since Admiral Cradock, on August 6, had caught her with the Karlsruhe in the act of being armed, the two ships had been entirely separated, and the Kronprinz Wilhelm had been cruising independently. On August 16 she is said to have coaled near the Azores, and on the 27th she certainly stopped and released a Russian barque about 1000 miles to the southward of the Azores on the direct line to Rocas Reef. It would look as though she may have heard where Captain Koehler was, for on September 3 she was with the Asuncion, which apparently had been left at a rendezvous near Rocas Reef with the Strathroy's crew on board. Next day she could be heard by Captain Koehler calling him, but he would make no reply for fear of attracting British cruisers, which his wireless room told him were not far away.

 

His precaution was natural. The area he had chosen for his cruising ground was precisely that which Admiral Stoddart would have been guarding had he had a cruiser available.

 

Sept. 1-7, 1914

KARLSRUHE AND KRONPRINZ

 

The area, however, was not altogether neglected. Apart from Captain Luce's recent visit, the Macedonia was passing through on her way to the South American station, and it was on September 1 that Admiral Stoddart had detached the Cornwall to search St. Paul Rocks. Admiral Cradock also, as we have seen, on his way down to South America was making an independent search of the same waters. Three days later Admiral Stoddart received orders that the Cornwall and Canopus were also to go to South America, and all these ships would pass through the area in which the Karlsruhe was operating.

 

In spite of the fact that the South American trade was just recovering from the first shock of the war, Captain Koehler had no great luck at first. But on September 3 he had another welcome windfall. This was the Maple Branch, a ship of 4,338 tons, with a general cargo for Chilian and Peruvian ports. It comprised everything he most wanted: livestock, tools and marine and other stores of all description. Full justice was done to her contents, and then she was sunk.

 

While this was going on the Kronprinz Wilhelm was equally fortunate. Getting no reply to her call she had gone off to the southward, and on September 4, some 200 miles to the eastward of Pernambuco and well off the track, she fell in with and captured the Indian Prince from Brazil to New York with coffee, rubber, hides and general cargo. This ship was treated like the Maple Branch. The Kronprinz. Wilhelm then disappeared, and nothing more was heard of her for a long time. For the Karlsruhe, also, there now came a barren period. Owing to vessels observing the Admiralty instructions for diversion nothing more was seen for three days, and then the Karlsruhe had to move off for coal to the secret place, where his prize the Strathroy was lying. So far, then, the Karlsruhe's cruise had been anything but as productive as she had expected. But, on the other hand, the good fortune that had saved her from the Glasgow had not deserted her. While she had been revelling in the good things the Maple Branch brought, Admiral Cradock in the Good Hope passed her about fifty miles to the eastward as he hurried back from St. Paul Rocks to join his new squadron at Pernambuco and to look into Fernando Noronha on his way. Nor did the German luck end here. For while, the Maple Branch was being sunk the Cornwall, who after examining St. Paul Rocks had carried her search further on, reached a point not fifty miles to the eastward of where the Karlsruhe was cruising, but then by sheer perversity of fate she turned back according to her

 

Sept. 10-17, 1914

KARLSRUHE AND CANOPUS

 

instructions in order to coal at Sierra Leone. Before she had gone far, however, she received her new orders to join the South American Squadron, and steamed away for Pernambuco, as the Karlsruhe was making for her secret base on the coast of Brazil. Having coaled there from the prize Strathroy, Captain Koehler was on the way back to resume his station, when he again narrowly escaped falling in with the Carmania, who at this time was coming down from Admiral Hornby to join the new squadron, and must have crossed his track very close. By September 10, however, he was back again unobserved on his old ground, and there he lay stopped with the Crefeld and, Rio Negro thrown out on either hand as a screen against enemy cruisers, while at the same time they served as scouts to increase his range of vision. Yet for three days not a ship was seen.

 

Everything kept out of their way, but at 6 a.m., September 14, they fell in with the Highland Hope - a frozen meat ship of 5000 tons from Liverpool to Buenos Aires in ballast. She was caught steaming without lights but close to the track, and here her captor was again in jeopardy. For now the Canopus was coming along straight down the trade route, and was very near. At the same time a Spanish passenger ship homeward bound saw the little throng of ships and inquired by wireless what they were. The Karlsruhe answered, "Convoy of British ships," and the Canopus, taking in the Spaniard's signal, asked for her position. The Karlsruhe of course heard the British message, and it was enough to warn her that her station was too dangerous to hold. Accordingly, without a moment's delay, she sank her prize and hurried off to the westward, and so left the Canopus to pass on without finding a trace of her.

 

Her intention now was to transfer her activities to the route between New York and South America which passes round the shoulder of Brazil, and here, some 300 miles from the scene of her last capture, she took a new position. At first this route seemed as deserted as the other, and she was just about to leave it in despair in order to coal when one of her scouts saw smoke about fifty miles to the eastward. It proved to come from the British steamer Indrani, which was carefully avoiding the usual track in accordance with Admiralty instructions. She was chased and captured, and found to contain 7000 tons of coal from Virginia for Rio. Insured for £62,000 besides her cargo, she was one of the most valuable prizes yet taken, but the raiders' satisfaction was somewhat jarred by a wireless message taken in a few days later from the German Consul at Pernambuco asking if they knew where she was, as he had bought the cargo. Presumably the

 

Sept. 17-30, 1914

KARLSRUHE'S CAPTURES

 

purchase was made for the benefit of the German cruisers. The ship, at any rate, was exactly what Captain Koehler wanted. She was therefore retained, and while the Karlsruhe carried on with the Asuncion to the secret base, she was left in charge of the Crefeld and Rio Negro. Manned by a prize party and the Chinese part of her crew, she henceforth became part of the squadron, and under the name of Hoffnung continued to serve the German cruiser as a tender till the end came.

 

In spite of this fortunate capture, the Karlsruhe's career was still far from encouraging. Since her escape from Admiral Cradock on the second day of the war she had been cruising for four weeks and had only taken five ships, while she had been nearly caught four times. But now prizes came faster. On September 20, having picked up the Crefeld and Rio Negro, she was back on her old ground across the trade route north of Fernando Noronha. Here on the 21st and 22nd she took three more prizes of 3000 to 4000 tons: the Maria, a Dutch ship with wheat for Ireland, and the British outward bound ships Cornish City and Rio Iguassu with coal for Rio. As most of it was of inferior quality both these ships were sunk, and so was the Maria, notwithstanding that she was neutral and wheat had not been declared absolute contraband. On this day, also, the Italian ship Ascaro, homeward bound, was overhauled, but was allowed to proceed, and she it was who a week later, on her arrival at St. Vincent, gave the first news of where the Karlsruhe was working. A Swede was also stopped on her way to Buenos Aires, but she made no report of what, she had seen.

 

At this time Admiral Cradock was making his sweep southward to deal with Admiral von Spee. The Cornwall, Bristol and Macedonia had been left to look after the Northern Area, but as the limit of their patrol area was Cape San Roque, the fertile zone which the Karlsruhe had chosen was left undisturbed. For the enemy it was a fine opportunity, but having as yet no knowledge of Admiral Cradock's movements, Captain Koehler made little use of it. The time, in fact, was chosen for overhauling his ship. For four days he was engaged on the work in the deserted waters to the westward of the route, and on September 28, when the work was completed, he had to make for his secret base again to coal. On the way, however, he met the Asuncion, which had cleared the last of the Strathroy's coal and then sunk her. He accordingly coaled from the Asuncion at sea, and after sending her away to get intelligence from the coast, made back to his original hunting-ground, labouring heavily with deckloads of coal

 

Oct. 1-7, 1914

BRITISH CRUISERS' SEARCH

 

that barely left the guns free to be worked, so that his ship was in no condition either to fight or run had an enemy cruiser appeared.

 

He arrived on October 1, and next day the Asuncion appeared with information that Admiral Cradock, with the Good Hope, Monmouth and Glasgow, had gone south, and the less welcome news that the Cap Trafalgar had been sunk by the Carmania. Feeling now fairly safe, he took a position off the east side of the track and about 100 miles from St. Paul Rocks. But although the Argentine maize was now beginning to move and the route was more crowded, two more barren days passed. As it became clear that the trade was not following the main track, the Crefeld was sent out forty miles to the eastward, where she would be on the Las Palmas-Pernambuco track, and there, on October 5, she sighted smoke. After a two hours' chase the ship was captured, and proved to be the Farn from Barry to Montevideo, which in avoiding her proper track had got upon the other. She had on board nearly 6000 tons of best Welsh coal. It was the last thing he wanted at the moment, for he could not take another ton, but he sent her away to a rendezvous to the westward where the Asuncion was waiting, intending to dispatch her to Admiral von Spee as soon as he knew his position.

 

The great gain from his last capture was that it seemed to indicate that he had found the line on which the trade was proceeding. But now he was once more disturbed. Again and again he had been forced to move by hearing British cruisers near him, and now another was calling. She seemed to be patrolling the route where he was working, and during the night her wireless grew so strong that to avoid her he moved his squadron right away to the eastward. The precaution was certainly a wise one. The three ships which Admiral Cradock had left behind in the northern section of his station had just begun a thorough search of the Karlsruhe's zone of operations. While the Bristol examined the north coast of Brazil where the German base lay, the Cornwall and Macedonia dealt with the focal area. On October 6 Rocas Reef was visited, and the Cornwall, after looking into Fernando Noronha, made up the trade route for St. Paul Rocks, so that during the morning of the 7th she actually passed over the spot where the Farn had been captured some thirty-six hours before.

 

The fact that she thus missed her prey was not the end of our ill.luck; for the movement which drove Captain Koehler off the usual track, also pushed him upon that which

 

Oct. 6-13, 1914

KARLSRUHE'S CAPTURES

 

a great part of the trade was actually taking, and so by pure accident he stumbled upon his richest spell of success. On each of the next four days a ship was captured - on October 6 and 7 two grain ships, Niceto de Larrinaga and Lynrowan, from Buenos Aires to London and Liverpool; on the 8th and 9th two, Cervantes and Pruth, with grain and nitrates from the west coast. All four of these ships, after useful stores had been removed, were sunk by explosives.

 

Captain Koehler had now to move to the westward to the rendezvous where his colliers, Asuncion and Farn, were waiting. The latter was the ship he intended to send to Admiral von Spee, but till he could arrange a rendezvous he meant to use her for a scout and decoy. As he approached the rendezvous three ships were seen upon it instead of two, and one of the three made off. The mystery was soon explained. The Farn by hoisting the red ensign had induced a British ship to approach, and the flying ship was the Asuncion, which had mistaken the Karlsruhe for an enemy.

 

The British ship which was by this ruse entrapped, was the Condor, from New York to South American ports with a rich general cargo of provisions, dynamite and oil - everything, in fact, that the Karlsruhe wanted most, and it was only the purest bad luck that had sent her into the German hands, for she was keeping wide of the general track - so wide, indeed, that she had reached the unfrequented spot which Captain Koehler had chosen for his rendezvous. During the 12th and 13th, while our nearest cruiser, the Macedonia, was patrolling the trade route between Rocas Reef and St. Paul Rocks, and the Edinburgh Castle, on her way to join Admiral Stoddart, was coming down to the eastward of her, the prize was emptied amidst great rejoicing, and then sunk.

 

It was now high time for the Karlsruhe to be coaling again, but an important step had first to be taken which could no longer be delayed. Owing to so many captures - six in the last week - the number of prisoners was becoming a serious anxiety. There were now over 400 on board the Crefeld, of twenty different nationalities, and already, before the last batch of captures, there had been trouble with them owing to overcrowding and insufficient food. Not but what Captain Koehler did his best, and the stores of the last prizes had eased matters, but it was impossible to, keep them much longer. Accordingly, he decided at the cost of revealing his whereabouts to send the Crefeld to a neutral port, and on October 13 she parted company.

 

Her destination was Tenerif e, with orders that she was not to put in there till the 22nd. For another ten days, therefore,

 

Oct. 14-18, 1914

STODDART'S NEW COMMAND

 

Captain Koehler considered he could remain safely where he was. But, in, fact, his sphere of operations was already known. A fortnight earlier, on September 28, the Ascaro, the Italian ship he had stopped and released, arrived at St. Vincent, Cape Verde, and though several other neutrals had been spoken, she was the first to report what she had seen to the north of Fernando, Noronha. Beyond the fact that many ships on the route were overdue, the extent of the Karlsruhe's depredations was unknown, and though the area was in Admiral Stoddart's station, he still felt unable to spare a ship to occupy it. As we have seen, however, three of Admiral Cradock's cruisers were working it, but as soon as Admiral Stoddart knew that his colleague was moving into the Pacific to meet Admiral von Spee's squadron, he informed the Admiralty that he intended to search the area of St. Paul Rocks, Fernando Noronha and Rocas Reef with the Carnarvon, Albion, Marmora and Empress of Britain. Before he was ready to start, however, Admiral Cradock's suggestion for forming a second squadron for South America had been received and adopted by the Admiralty, and it was now, on October 14, that they had directed Admiral Stoddart to proceed with his flagship to Pernambuco and take up the new command, as "S.N.O. north of Montevideo." On arrival he was to proceed down the trade route to Montevideo and take under his orders the Cornwall, Bristol, Macedonia and Orama. He was also to have the Defence, which had been ordered out from the Mediterranean and was already on her way to join him, and his special instructions were "to keep sufficient force ready to concentrate in case the German squadron from the Pacific escapes past Admiral Cradock."

 

His immediate objective, however, was the Karlsruhe and her squadron. By October 18, after refuelling at sea, they were back across the trade route north of Fernando Noronha, and on that day they captured the Glanton with coal from Barry to Montevideo. As they were full up with fuel and could not spare another prize crew, she was sunk. For six days longer Captain Koehler maintained his position, so that had Admiral Stoddart been allowed to carry out his intended sweep down the route he could scarcely have failed to run into the Karlsruhe's squadron. As it was, he left St. Vincent on October 15, and at 3.30 a.m. on the 20th passed within ten miles of the spot where the Glanton had been captured on the 18th; but although the German squadron was still in the vicinity, he reached Pernambuco next day without having seen anything. The Defence followed him down at about a

 

Oct. 22, 1914

KABLSRUHE IN DANGER

 

week's interval, but she had no better luck, for by that time Captain. Koehler was gone.

 

By October 22 he knew that the Crefeld's arrival would give away his position, and he thought he could hear that British cruisers were about him. But, in fact, they were all as far away from him as they had ever been. The Defence had just left St. Vincent. Admiral Stoddart had just reached Pernambuco, where he heard a credible report that on the 20th the Karlsruhe had been taking in supplies a little east of Macau, about seventy miles west of Cape San Roque, and he at once ordered the Bristol, which was coaling at Abrolhos Rocks, to search the place, and the Edinburgh Castle, which having coaled there was on her way to Pernambuco, to assist her in the same region. The Cornwall was also at the base waiting for Admiral Stoddart, and acting as guardship there while the Macedonia was coaling and overhauling machinery.

 

Still, all that Captain Koehler could tell of what was going on was that there was a dangerous stir amongst the British cruisers in his vicinity, and that the Karlsruhe would incur too great a risk of capture by remaining where she was. Moreover, for some time she had found little but neutrals on the trade routes, and it was clear that British ships were being diverted. (It is said that the Farn, when she approached the Condor under British colours, got her to pass the Admiralty warning to take a course west of the usual track. Studt: Der Karlsruhe.) Captain Koehler therefore determined to change his plan of action entirely. His idea was now to leave the trade alone till it had had time to recover confidence and revert to his original scheme of raiding West Indian ports.

 

This operation appears to have held an important place in the original German war plans, for two rendezvous for colliers and storeships had been arranged in West Indian waters. One was close to the Karlsruhe's original hiding-place at Plana Cays in the Bahamas, and the other about 250 miles east of Trinidad. Both had been discovered by our West Indian cruisers, and on September 12 the Berwick had found at the latter the three vessels, which had left port the day war was declared or shortly afterwards. One, at least, had been originally to the northern rendezvous, but she had been called down about August 16, and ever since it would seem they had been waiting where they were found, a fact that would indicate that the arrangements of the German Admiralty for supplying their cruisers were not so complete as at one time they were popularly supposed to be. All three ships were captured and brought in by the Berwick, but

 

Oct. 15-25, 1914

CAPE VERDE STATION

 

whether the loss was known to the Karlsruhe does not appear. (The prizes were Spreewald, German merchant auxiliary from St. Thomas; Lorenzo, American, and Thor, Norwegian, chartered at Newport News ostensibly for the Hamburg-Amerika Co. Lorenzo and Thor had between them over 3000 tons of coal and nearly 200 tons of stores.)

 

Important as was the new venture, Captain Koehler seemed loth to leave the waters where he had done so well. Till the last safe moment he clung to his cruising ground, and on October 23 was rewarded by capturing the Hurstdale of Liverpool with 4,600 tons of maize from Rosario to Bristol. She was sunk at once. The next day - the last one that was safe - brought nothing, and on the 25th, after detaching the Rio Negro, Asuncion and Indrani with instructions for the next few weeks, he held away with the Farn to carry out his raid on the West Indies.

 

Meanwhile, since Admiral Stoddart had left the Canary-Cape Verde station, there had been no little anxiety lest the Karlsruhe should appear there, and owing to the passing of transport convoys the moment was anything but opportune for Admiral Stoddart's departure. When on October 15 he started for Pernambuco, he left Captain Buller of the Highflyer in command of the station, but later, in the day he received an order from the Admiralty that the Highflyer was to take over from the Astraea the transports that were coming up from the Cape, as that ship was urgently required in connection with the new plan of operations against German South-West Africa. This left nothing for patrol routine except three merchant cruisers, and at the same time intelligence came in that a German collier was at Las Palmas waiting to supply German cruisers. There was a strong probability that the expected cruiser was the Karlsruhe. The Kent was therefore ordered to join Captain Buller's command instead of going on to Admiral Cradock, and to her the Astraea's convoy was to be handed over. On reaching Admiral de Robeck's station she was, in her turn, to hand over to the Vindictive and return to search the Canaries, where there were fresh indications that the Germans were preparing a base.

 

No sooner had the Kent started than the rumour of the Karlsruhe being in the vicinity gathered strength. On October 21 the Victorian, which had been refitting at Gibraltar, reached Las Palmas to find the collier had gone to sea and that signal lights, believed to come from the Karlsruhe, had been seen off the south of the island. As the Kent and her convoy were passing she hurried off to warn her, and in

 

Oct. 21-31, 1914

KARLSRUHE AND DE ROBECK

 

doing so passed another German ship in the dark without seeing her. The collier, which was the Walhalla, got into Tenerife, and so did the other ship.

 

She proved to be the Crefeld, and to have startling news. For fourteen hours the Spanish Authorities kept it concealed, but then it became known that she had on board the crews of no less than thirteen vessels which the Karlsruhe had captured or destroyed between August 31 and October 11.

 

It was clear drastic measures must be taken promptly, but what they should be was not so evident. The immediate effect of the news was to give increased colour to the rumour about the Karlsruhe being in the Canaries and Cape Verde Area, since she was not likely to remain on the scene of her recent exploits for fear of capture. Indeed, Admiral Stoddart's first care on reaching his new station had been to order the Bristol and Edinburgh Castle to search the coast where the Karlsruhe's secret base was believed to be. He also ordered the Kent to co-operate with them, not yet being aware that she had been held back on his old station. To secure that station further it was necessary to call on the Coast of Spain station.

 

There, in spite of the difficulty of maintaining a watch on the Peninsular ports with his decadent squadron, Admiral de Robeck had managed to make a sweep to the Azores, where he captured a large Hamburg-Amerika liner, the Graecia, which had been hovering there for a month calling up German warships. His freedom of action had, indeed, been considerably enlarged by the recent detailing of the Bacchante and Euryalus as regular convoy ships between Home and Gibraltar. But for this he could scarcely have left the convoy route. Two groups of transports were moving in his station, besides the Cape Garrison. One was homeward bound with the last of the old Mediterranean Garrisons, and the other, consisting of twelve ships, outward bound with the 1st Wessex Territorial Division for India. As it was, he was able to make a thorough search round the Azores, and on completing it he went down himself to the Canaries in his flagship the Amphitrite, And there he remained for he found the Spanish Authorities so lax in the matter of interning the German auxiliaries that were there that he decided not to leave till he had seen the situation regularised. This he skilfully accomplished in a remarkably short time, considering how strong was German, influence in the islands.

 

Nor was this the only point his vigilance was able to make. Here, as elsewhere, the successful protection of our trade rested in a great measure on our power of cutting off

 

Oct. 25-28, 1914

AUSTRALIA AND THE CAPE

 

communication with the enemy's cruisers. This we had not been able to do entirely, for, as the Admiral found out, a private wireless installation was being constantly used by German and Austrian consular officers to send cipher messages relating to shipping. No such privilege for consulates was generally recognised, and in this case there was no need for it, since the cable connections were excellent. Cipher wireless messages, indeed, could serve no special purpose except for communicating secret intelligence and orders to ships at sea. One intercepted by the Victorian on September 6 was actually sent to and acknowledged by Captain Koehler of the Karlsruhe. On these grounds, at the Admiral's instigation, our Foreign Office made representations to Madrid. The Spanish Government were at first reluctant to take action, pointing out that the privilege was permitted to both sides. But, as the Admiral objected, the privilege was of no use to us, while it practically furnished the Germans with a means of communication which was otherwise out of their power. For this reason what was being permitted amounted to unneutral service. After some negotiations the Spanish Government admitted the justice of our contention, and, thanks to Admiral de Robeck's persistence, cipher wireless messages were altogether forbidden.

 

The Canary-Cape Verde area was thus well secured against any attack that was likely to be made upon it, but on the Cape station things had rapidly gone from bad to worse. The movement which Maritz had initiated, had been spreading with alarming rapidity. General Beyers, who at the outbreak of the war had resigned his command of the Union Forces, had joined him, and De Wet was raising the back veldt commandoes with the declared intention of re-establishing the old Boer Republics. General Botha was taking the field in person against them, but so serious was the situation that it was felt he should not be left to his own resources. From one quarter only could assistance come. The New Zealand troops had just reached Australia under escort of the Minotaur, Ibuki, Philomel and Pyramus, and the combined convoy was in process of concentration at Albany, where the two fast light cruisers Melbourne and Sydney replaced the Philomel and Pyramus. With such a force and its powerful escort the situation in South Africa could be met, and on October 25 the British Cabinet decided that as a precautionary measure the whole combined convoy must come to Europe by way of the Cape instead of Egypt. On October 28 the New Zealand contingent joined the concentration at Albany, and the final arrangements were made for the troops, to

 

Sept. 27-Oct. 12, 1914

EMDEN AND HER COLLIERS

 

proceed to their new destination in three groups, according to the speed and coal endurance of the transports.

 

It meant, of course, a very serious distortion of our Imperial concentration, but until South Africa was made secure again that concentration could never be consummated. The necessity had to be faced, but not for long. On the day the decision was taken the cloud was lifted. At Commissie Drift, near Rustenberg in the Transvaal, General Botha had soundly defeated the rebels. Both Beyers and Maritz were in flight over the German border, and so far as they were concerned the rebellion was over. As soon as the news was fully known it was clear the internal situation was well in hand, and on October 30 the convoy was ordered to proceed as originally intended to Colombo, escorted by Minotaur, Ibuki, Melbourne and Sydney.

 

Though the reversion to the original plan left the naval defence of the Cape as unsatisfactory as ever, there was no suggestion of decreasing the Australian convoy's powerful escort. It was a suggestion that could hardly be made at the moment, for although there was nothing near the convoy track except the Koenigsberg and the Emden, the latter had just reappeared in a manner to shake confidence in the ability of the local forces to deal with her. (See Map 13 in case.)

 

The shock was all the greater because since her disappearance after her raid on the Minikoi area at the end of September the operations against her had met with considerable success. On October 9 Admiral Jerram heard that a Greek ship was lying off Pulo Tapak, an island on the west coast of Sumatra near the south end of Simalur - that is, in the waters from which he had always believed the Germans would operate. He at once warned Captain Grant, who promptly detached the Yarmouth, then on patrol off Acheh Head, to investigate. On the 12th she reached Pulo Tapak, and there she found the Emden's Greek prize Pontoporos, and not only her but the Emden's regular tender Markomannia taking in coal from her. The Pontoporos Captain von Mueller had ordered to Simalur after his raid on Madras. On leaving the Minikoi area, he had taken his other prize, the Admiralty collier Buresk, down to Felidu Atoll in the Maldives, and having coaled from the Markomannia, which he had also kept with him, he sent her off to Simalur to refill with coal, while he himself continued down the Maldives to the Chagos Archipelago, taking the Buresk with him. Both the vessels at Simalur were now captured, the Markomannia with 1300 tons of coal and the Pontoporos with 5000. The latter ship the Yarmouth took away to

 

Oct. 1-20, 1914

EMDEN AT DIEGO GARCIA

 

Penang, the other she sank, and thus the Emden's fuel was reduced to the coal in her bunkers and what was left in the Buresk.

 

Meanwhile Captain Grant, having searched the Laccadives and Maldives as far south as Male, was patrolling south of Ceylon with the Hampshire and Empress of Asia, No tidings of the Emden were to be had beyond the fact that from September 28 to October 1 she had been coaling off Felidu atoll. After hearing of the capture of her colliers at Simalur, Captain Grant was convinced she must still be somewhere to the southward, and decided to make for Diego Garcia in the south of the Chagos Islands. As this place had till recently been a coaling station of the Orient Liners engaged in the Australian frozen meat trade, it was a likely point for her to make, and at daylight on October 13 he started in search of her, taking his merchant cruiser with him in accordance with the recent standing orders. The scent was now hot. After coaling off Felidu Atoll from the Markomannia, Captain von Mueller had actually gone on to Diego Garcia. He had in his possession an old chart which showed the abandoned trade route as still existing, and for the best part of a week he cruised south and west of the islands expecting a rich harvest. But not a ship was seen and on October 9 he went into Diego Garcia to coal from the Buresk. The reception was all he could desire. In that remote and now lonely British colony the inhabitants were still unaware that a war existed, and instead of his visit being opposed or even resented, a cordial interchange of courtesies took place, and Captain von Mueller was given every facility for heeling his ship to clean her bottom and for coaling at his leisure. The work was completed by the morning of the 10th, and he sailed again northward in search of fresh adventures, apparently straight into the arms of the two British cruisers. Unfortunately, however, while the Emden made her way northward through the Maldives, Captain Grant, in his eagerness to reach Diego Garcia, was steaming down well to the eastward on the direct route from Colombo to the Chagos Islands, and he passed the Emden at a distance of about 300 miles. On the 15th at Diego Garcia he learnt the truth - that the Emden had gone north five days before - and he immediately started back for Colombo.

 

Scarcely had he coaled there and resumed Ins patrol south of Ceylon when, on October 20, the St. Egbert put into Cochin on the Malabar coast with the crews of six more British ships which the Emden had captured between Minikoi and Ceylon. With considerable daring Captain von Mueller had returned

 

Oct. 16-19, 1914

EMDEN OFF COLOMBO

 

to the scene of his last exploits, and from the 16th to the 19th, during Captain Grant's sweep to the southward, there was no British cruiser on the spot. True, an attempt had been made to recall the Askold, which in company with the Dupleix was escorting a Franco-British convoy to Suez, but the message reached her so late that she was obliged to go on to Aden to coal.(The convoy was Arcadia, Nile, and Carnarvonshire with British troops from Tientsin, Hongkong and Singapore, El Kantara with French troops, and Cordillere with munitions from Japan.)

 

The miscarriage was the more regrettable, for amongst the new batch of captures was the Exford, an Admiralty collier with 6000 tons of Welsh coal for Hongkong, and thus at the moment when the Emden's career was practically at an end through the capture of her supply ships, she received a new lease of life. All the other prizes, except one, which was a dredger, were large, and the number included the Troilus of the Blue Funnel Line, a vessel of 7500 tons, homeward-bound from Yokohama, and only twenty-five hours out from Colombo, with a cargo insured for £130,000. The captures were:

 

Clan Grant	(3,948 tons), Clan Line, outward bound to Calcutta, War Risks £30,600.
Benmohr	(4,806 tons), Ben Line, Leith to Yokohama, valued at £50,000.
Chilkana	(5,146 tons), British India, Middlesbrough to Calcutta, War Risks £77,000.
Exford	(4, 542 tons), Tatem S.N. Co., Cardiff to Hongkong with Admiralty coal, War Risks £32,500.
Ponrabbel	(473 tons), dredger for Tasmania from Port Glasgow.
Troilus	(7,562 tons), Blue Funnel Line, War Risks £129,115.
St. Egbert	(5,596 tons), Yokohama to New York, War Risks £54,600, neutral cargo.

 

The first two ships of the new haul were captured close to Minikoi, and the third in the Nine Degree Channel. The Emden then steamed eastward and captured the rest off the coast of Travancore, between the direct tracks from Aden and Bombay to Colombo. All were sunk except two, the St. Egbert, to which, on account of her neutral cargo, the prisoners were transferred, and the Admiralty collier Exford, which was kept as a tender. Most of the ships captured were duly following the routes given to them officially. But as we have seen effective deviation at this nodal point was practically impossible. Still, as evidence of how well-advised were the Admiralty instructions, it is to be noted that during the four days the area was left unguarded while the Emden was at work in it fourteen steamers passed outward and five homeward unmolested.

 

Not only did the Admiralty instructions keep most of

 

Oct. 20-21, 1914

HAMPSHIRE AND EMDEN

 

the trade out of Captain von Mueller's way, but the cruiser dispositions that were immediately made came within an ace of punishing his bold return with disaster. The moment Captain Grant heard the news he went off again with both his ships to Felidu Atoll to search the Maldives. This he could now safely do, for the Yarmouth, having taken over from the Zhemchug off Penang a convoy of four French transports with troops and stores, had brought it on to Colombo, leaving the Russian cruiser to search the Nicobars and Andamans for any German colliers that might be there, and the Yarmouth was now ordered to the Minikoi area. The result of Captain Grant's movement was that the Emden had another miraculous escape. Still, her luck stood by her.

 

After sinking his last prize and dismissing the St. Egbert with his prisoners, Captain von Mueller stood to the southward, with the Buresk and Exford in company, till about noon on the 20th, when he was in the latitude of Colombo. He then turned to the south-eastward to give Dondra Head in Ceylon a wide berth. As he came on, the Hampshire and Empress of Asia began their sweep west-south-west towards Felidu Atoll, so that they must cross the Emden's tracks By midnight it looked as if nothing but a miracle could save her. At ordinary speed they would have clashed just after sunrise. But, eager as Captain von Mueller was to make off as fast as possible, he could not get more than nine and a half knots out of his prizes. From his log it is clear the trouble caused him considerable anxiety, but, in fact, it was the stroke of luck that saved him. Had he done a knot or so more, or even had he kept away another point or two to the southward, he must have run right into Captain Grant. As it was, about 7.30 the two British cruisers passed across his course from ten to twenty miles ahead of him. The morning was dark, with heavy clouds and passing showers. A spell of rain must have come on in the nick of time, for neither captain saw the other, and once more the Emden escaped the Hampshire, this time by minutes.

 

Yet she was only out of the frying-pan into the fire. Captain von Mueller had decided the time had come to shift his ground altogether to the eastern part of the Indian Ocean, and in the afternoon of the 21st he detached the Exford to a rendezvous north of the Cocos, which had also apparently been given to his colliers at Simalur. He was still quite unaware of what had happened to them. Indeed, his intelligence all through was very meagre. His success was won by very simple means. The stories that prevailed at the time degrees o ingenious wireless calls and the like had little or no foundation: he had not even a direction meter to locate the calls

 

Oct. 16-26, 1914

ZHEMCHUG AND EMDEN

 

he heard. His method had simply been to take up a position in a fertile area and hunt smoke, which from a crow's nest on his foremast he could see at a distance of thirty-five miles. But now whenever smoke was seen he turned his stern to it and hurried on. It was not till he had made a point 200 miles south of Dondra Head that he held up for the Nicobar Islands, where he intended to coal before commencing operations in the new field. Here, as we have seen, the Russian light cruiser Zhemchug, of almost equal force, was carrying on a search for the Emden's colliers:

 

Ship	Year	Tons.	Knots.	Guns.
Zhemchug	1904	3,130	23	8-4.7"
Emden	1909	3,544	25	10-4.1"

 

The Japanese light cruiser Chikuma was also in the vicinity working the Acheh Head Patrol. At Singapore the light cruiser Yahagi, of the 2nd Japanese Squadron, had just arrived with the French transports from Saigon, but she was under orders to join the Australian Convoy at the Cocos Islands in place of the Nisshin, which had run on an uncharted rock outside Sandakan and had to go into dock at Singapore. In Penang, the base of the Malacca Strait Patrol, was the D'Iberville with three destroyers, Fronde, Pistolet and Mousquet. Here, on October 26, they were joined by the Zhemchug, who, after completing her search of the Nicobar and Andaman Islands, had come down the coast of Burmah through the Mergui Archipelago, and received permission for a week's overhaul of her main engines. On the previous evening Captain von Mueller anchored with the Buresk at Nankowry Harbour in the Nicobars.

 

What was in his mind was a raid on Penang, where he expected to find the Dupleix, though she was actually at Aden, and after coaling he dismissed the Buresk to a sea rendezvous and started on his daring enterprise. Though the port contained three French destroyers, it had no fixed defences, and for this reason our cruisers when visiting the place, having in mind the fate of the Pegasus at Zanzibar, were in the habit of laying out anchors so that the ship could quickly bring her broadside to bear on the entrance. The Harbour Master, Commander Mclntyre, R.N.R., and Lieutenant Maund, R.N., who was serving in the Zhemchug, urged this and other precautions on the Russian captain, and Lieutenant Maund each night took charge of the signal station at the military headquarters. Little else, however, seems to have been done, except that one French destroyer went out to patrol at night and a picket boat was on guard. The other two destroyers were alongside the quay, and the D'Iberville was overhauling her engines.

 

Oct. 28, 1914

EMDEN AT PENANG

 

This was the position when, shortly after 5.0 a.m. on October 28, a cruiser with four funnels (for Captain von Mueller had just rigged a dummy one) appeared entering the harbour. She was painted dark grey like our own ships, and was flying a flag that was taken for the white ensign. The picket boat let her pass without challenge or giving the preconcerted warning, and the Zhemchug did not shift her position. When within three-quarters of a mile of her the supposed British cruiser hoisted German colours, and directly afterwards fired a torpedo. It took the Zhemchug aft and flooded the engine room, and then, as the Emden ran past her, Captain von Mueller opened fire at 300 yards.

 

The surprise was complete and resistance hopeless. Scarcely any of the Russian guns were even cleared away, nothing but a perfunctory harbour watch was being kept on board, and the Emden ran on untouched past the French destroyers, who were equally unready. On coming abreast of the D'Iberville, which was the innermost ship, she turned and, without firing on the French gunboat and destroyers, ran out again to pass the Zhemchug, which was now burning fiercely. At point blank range the Emden fired into her again and gave her another torpedo. There was a huge column of flames and debris, and in a minute the Zhemchug went down, only a quarter of an hour after the first shot was fired. Such was her inglorious end, as though the curse of the ill-fated Baltic Fleet, in which during the Russo-Japanese War she had seen her first service, still clung to her. (Out of a complement of 340 she lost 1 officer and 90 men killed, and 2 officers and 106 men wounded.)

 

As for the Emden, content with her bold and brilliantly executed exploit, she ran on out till, at the northern entrance, she came upon the Glen Liner Glenturret, which was just stopping for a pilot. This ship was bound for Yokohama with Government ammunition for Singapore and Hongkong, and was flying the Explosive flag. Regardless of the two destroyers in the harbour, the Emden, with fine effrontery, stopped to take possession of her, and had already lowered her boats when what appeared in the still dim light to be a cruiser was seen coming in. The boats were recalled, and the Emden stood on to face the expected action. But it proved to be only the French destroyer Mousquet returning from patroh She made a gallant fight of it with guns and torpedoes, but all in vain, and in seven minutes she went down. So the affair ended. There was no time to go back to the Glenturret, for the other French ships were getting under way. Still, the Emden stopped long enough to pick up the survivors

 

Oct. 9-30, 1914

KOENIGSBERG LOCATED

 

of the Mousquet, from whom she heard the Pontoporos had been captured, and then she made off to the northward and disappeared.

 

Such was the tale that reached the Australian Government as the great convoy was finally assembling for its departure. It was tempered, indeed, by the news that on the day after the Penang raid General Botha's victory at Commissie Drift had been completed by the dispersal of the Eastern Transvaal rebels at Treurfontein; and furthermore, by the time it was settled that the convoy was to proceed after all to Aden, all danger from the Koenigsberg was over. Ever since, on September 20, she had destroyed the Pegasus at Zanzibar she had been lost, and had consequently remained a standing menace to the convoy route, and absorbed an annoying amount of our cruiser force. From the last day of September onwards an extremely active search had been kept up by a division of three light cruisers, Chatham, Dartmouth and Weymouth, under the direction of Captain Drury-Lowe of the Chatham, and there was also at Mombasa the Fox, waiting for the expedition from India to German East Africa, which had been long delayed owing to the need of getting the main force to Egypt as soon as possible.

 

She, of course, could not move far, but the other three ships hunted out every conceivable hiding place on the German coast and in the adjacent islands again and again, There was little result, except that the Koenigsberg seemed paralysed by their activity. No capture had been reported since she took the City of Winchester, nor had our cruisers much luck in finding her tenders. On October 9, however, the Dartmouth, which was looking round Casuarina Island in the Mozambique Channel, captured a German tug from Beira, which was supposed to be serving the missing enemy. Ten days later Captain Drury-Lowe anchored in the Lindi River to search it for the fourth time, and sending his cutter up the river, found the German East African Liner Prasident, a ship of 3,385 tons. She, too, was believed to be communicating with the Koenigsberg. She was flying the Red Cross flag, but not being painted white or on the list, she was captured and disabled. From her papers it was found that on September 15 coal had been sent to the Koenigsberg in lighters from Lindi to Sarari, six miles up the Rufuji, and German charts seized on board showed the river was navigable by a ship of the Koenigsberg's class. Accordingly, after being called elsewhere by a false report, Captain Drury-Lowe arrived at the Ruflji Delta on the 30th, and there he found her lying up at Sarari with her collier and three small steamboats. It was impossible for the Chatham

 

Nov. 1, 1914

THE GREAT CONVOY SAILS

 

to reach her, and as natives reported that the creek up which she lay was mined and defended by guns and entrenched troops, Captain Drury-Lowe sat down to blockade her till he could make arrangements for a flotilla attack.

 

It was on the last day of October that he was able to report he had run the Koenigsberg to earth, but to the Australian Convoy, which was to sail next day, it could make no difference. Pressing as the need was for reinforcing the Cape station, the wide extent of sea which so large a convoy must cover rendered it dangerous to reduce the number of ships allotted for its escort. As it was, the Yahagi, which should have joined the convoy at the Cocos Islands, was no longer available, for Admiral Jerram had found it necessary, so soon as he heard of the Emden's exploit at Penang, to divert her to join the Chikuma in hunting down the irrepressible raider. The arrangements therefore stood, and on November 1, before the news of the Koenigsberg reached Australia, the great convoy sailed for Colombo under escort of the Minotaur, Ibuki, Melbourne and Sydney. Nor was any call made upon Admiral Patey. With the Australia, Montcalm and Encounter he was still at Suva maintaining the covering position which he had been ordered to take up, and hourly expecting instructions to proceed to South America in chase of Admiral von Spee. He had urged to be allowed to do this in the middle of the month, but no fresh orders came, and he had to continue cruising in the Fiji-Samoa area.

 

The Japanese were still occupied with the main part of their fleet in the siege of Tsingtau, and so was the Triumph. Their two South Sea Squadrons, as arranged, were operating in concert with Admiral Patey on either side of longitude 140 degrees , which is roughly the dividing line between Polynesia and the Malay Archipelago, and there they were keeping an eye on the as yet unoccupied German, islands to the eastward and the numerous German ships in neutral ports to the westward, as well as Honolulu, where the long-lost Geier had appeared.

(The fate of most of the small German raiders was by this time known.

 

The Planet had been found at Yap by the Japanese Second South Sea Squadron, when on October 7 they went there to take possession of the island, and she sank herself as they approached.

 

The Komet early in October was found to be hiding on the North coast of New Britain, and using her wireless for intelligence purposes. An expedition against her was organised at Rabaul consisting of the captured Government Yacht Nusa under Lieut.-Commander J. M. Jackson, R.N. and some Australian infantry under Lieut.-Colonel J. Paton. Between them they managed a very clever surprise, and on the 11th the Komet was seized undamaged with her wireless gear intact. She was added to the Australian Fleet as the gunboat Una.

 

Eber put into Bahia on September 4, and was in due course interned here with her officers and crew by the Brazilian Government.)

Nov. 1, 1914

JAPANESE CO-OPERATION

 

In that port she had been making good her defects, and so lax were the American rules about internment that the Japanese thought it necessary to watch her, not only with the armoured cruiser Asama but also to detain there the small battleship Hizen, which had been under orders for Esquimalt to reinforce the Anglo-Japanese Squadron on that coast. They had also agreed to take over the eastern part of the Indian Ocean - that is, from 90 degrees east longitude, which took in the Andamans and Nicobar Islands, to the Sunda Strait, and for this purpose were detaching Vice-Admiral Tochinai with two armoured cruisers, Tokiwa and Yakumo, to form a third squadron with the Nisshin, Chikuma and Yahagi.

 

Nothing, therefore, was available for the Cape except the Goliath, which on the day the Koenigsberg was run to earth, had arrived at Mombasa with the main force of the German East African Expedition; but she had developed serious defects which needed attention, and before she could move a disaster had occurred which rendered much more drastic measures in the highest degree urgent.

 

 

---

 

 

CHAPTER XXV

 

THE BATTLE OF CORONEL, NOVEMBER 1

(See Maps 14 and 15 in case.)

 

We have seen how on October 22 Admiral Cradock left Port Stanley in the Falklands to make a sweep round the Horn, leaving the Canopus to meet him at the other side of the Straits. We have also seen how the Admiralty instructions seem to have left him no doubt that he was to operate with his squadron on the west side, while Admiral Stoddart guarded the east, and how he considered himself still bound by the order of October 5 (received by him on the 7th) to search for the enemy. That this was so is made quite clear by a further message which he sent home late on October 26. He had just joined Captain Luce's detachment at the secret base, and was now more deeply impressed than ever with the impossibility of doing what he understood was expected of him. With the force at his disposal he could see no way of bringing to action a squadron so fast, efficient and homogeneous as that of Admiral von Spee. Referring to the order of October 5 and the importance of an early success, he submitted that with the Canopus in company it was impracticable, owing to her slow speed, to seek out and destroy the enemy's squadron. The Canopus was only fit for escorting and guarding his colliers. He intended, therefore, to employ her on that duty and had ordered Admiral Stoddart to send him the Defence. In doing so he cited his own failure to bring the Karlsruhe to action on August 6, and suggested that her depredations should be ignored till a ship of superior speed could be sent to deal with her.

(The telegram as received was as follows, but there is reason to believe its text was mutilated in transmission:

 

"With reference to orders contained in Admiralty telegram received Ootober 7 to search for enemy, and our great desire for early success, consider it impracticable, on account of Canopus's slow speed, to find and destroy enemy's squadron. Consequently have ordered Defence to join me after calling at Montevideo for orders. Canopus will be employed on necessary convoying of colliers. From experience of August 6, most respectfully submit not to oppose depredation of Karlsruhe. May it continue until she meets vessel of superior speed."

 

The mean trial speed of the Karlsruhe was 27.6 knots - that of the Defence 23.3. From Admiral Cradock's first orders (see ante, p. 309 note) it would appear that the Defence was to be given him not to deal with the Karlsruhe, but to make his squadron strong enough to meet Admiral von Spee.)

Oct. 27-28, 1914

 

When the message came to hand next day (the 27th) it was found, owing to mutilation in transmission, difficult to see precisely what Admiral Cradock wanted, and after due consideration a plan was adopted, which differed radically from that which it is now evident the Admiral had in mind. It was decided definitely to keep the force available in the South American area divided into two squadrons of about equal strength. The immediate reason seems to have been fresh news of the Karlsruhe. The Defence had reached Pernambuco on October 25, and next evening there arrived a Norwegian ship which had been stopped by the Karlsruhe three days before. She reported that as late as October 23 the German cruiser was still on the trade route, and with this information the Defence had at once put to sea, but not to hunt the Karlsruhe. Her immediate orders were to relieve the Cornwall as base guardship at Abrolhos Rocks and send her to join the Bristol, Macedonia and Edinburgh Castle, who were engaged in a thorough search of the Fernando Noronha area and the north coast of Brazil. Directly the Admiralty knew of Admiral Cradock's call for her they countermanded it.

(The telegram ran: "Defence" is to remain on East Coast under orders of Stoddart. This will leave sufficient force on each side in case the hostile cruisers appear there on the trade routes. There is no ship available for the Cape Horn vicinity. Japanese battleship Hizen shortly expected on North American coast. She will join with Japanese Idzumo and Newcastle, and move south towards Galapagos.")

Quite apart from the heavy demand which the hunt for the Karlsruhe made upon Admiral Stoddart's squadron, they did not consider that Admiral Cradock required any addition to his force. Their plan was to move the North Pacific Squadron - that is, the Idzumo, Hizen and Newcastle - southward to the Galapagos Islands and by this means they calculated that if Admiral von Spee had gone north he would meet a superior squadron and be forced down to the Glasgow and Monmouth, and that these ships would be able to draw him on to the Good Hope and Canopus (The Monmouth's speed was inferior to that of all the German ships except the Leipzig. (See post, p. 360.))

 

The telegram to Admiral Cradock, which was sent off in the evening of October 28, perhaps never reached him - in any case it was too late to affect his movements. (It was received by the Glasgow, and Captain Luce is of opinion it probably did reach the Admiral.) On the 27th, still hoping, it would seem, to receive a modification of the instructions which, as he conceived them, appeared impracticable, he detached the Glasgow northward again to

 

Oct. 27-31

CRADOCK'S SEARCH

 

Coronel, where he could expect to hear from the Admiralty by way of Montevideo. Captain Luce's further instructions were to send telegrams, to obtain intelligence and to intercept a German sailing ship which was said to be making for Santa Maria Island off Coronel. Next day he called up the Canopus and her colliers from the Straits, his intention being, as soon as he heard Captain Luce's intelligence, to proceed northward with the squadron and coal at Juan Fernandez, where there were friendly French interests; and while awaiting the Glasgow's report, he detached the Otranto to look into Puerto Montt, the southern terminus of the Chilian west coast railway.

 

The Glasgow, in her search for the German sailing ship, arrived off Santa Maria on the evening of the 29th, but with the Admiral's approval waited till next morning before going into Coronel. During the afternoon she took in many wireless messages in cipher, apparently German. This she reported to the Admiral, who at once decided to sail at 6 a.m. on the 30th with the Good Hope and Monmouth and stand to the northward. The Canopus was also close at hand. Indeed, just as he was coming out he met her with the two colliers she was escorting. Unfortunately, however, he found she required a twenty four hours repair on her high-pressure piston gland, and he had to order her into the anchorage to carry out the work. At the same time he informed Captain Luce, in view of the indications he had taken in, that the visit to Coronel was a consideration secondary to the search for the enemy, and accordingly, as the wireless signals continued strong during the night, the Glasgow cruised to the westward and north-westward of Santa Maria Island during the 30th and the night of the 30th-31st.

 

Next morning the Otranto rejoined the flag. She had reached Puerto Montt in the afternoon of the 30th, and finding the place entirely pro-German, had left again at 6 a.m. on the 31st, without having obtained any information. The Glasgow was more fortunate. At 1 a.m. on the 31st, being then off Coronel, she had heard the Leipzig's call sign, apparently addressing a merchant ship very close, but saw nothing then or at daybreak. Upon this or other indications Admiral Cradock seems now to have formed the opinion that Admiral von Spee was making for the Northern objective area - that is, the Galapagos Islands and the approaches to the Panama Canal. So far as is known he was not yet aware of the Anglo-Japanese Squadron that had been told off to that area, and he may well have believed, on the information he had, that the duty of protecting it rested on his shoulders. Whatever his motive, what he now did was to call up the

 

Oct. 31-Nov. 1, 1914

 

Canopus to proceed with her two colliers to St. Felix (Lat. 26 degrees 18' S., Long. 80 degrees 11' W.), a lonely island over 500 miles to the northward of Juan Fernandez, the place where previously he had intended to coal.

 

His immediate anxiety was for intelligence, and his next step was to order the Glasgow definitely to go into Coronel, to dispatch and collect telegrams with instructions to sail on November 1 as convenient. On reaching the port at 6.20 p.m. on the 31st, she sent off the telegrams which the Admiral had drafted at the base, in one of which he explained his dispositions and his intention of moving northward, coaling at St. Juan Fernandez, but without again mentioning that the Canopus had been devoted to the escort of his colliers. By the time it reached the Admiralty the new Board was installed, with Lord Fisher as First Sea Lord, and one of their first acts was an effort to improve the precarious position in which Admiral Cradock found himself. The Defence was immediately ordered to join him, and in informing him of this they made it clear he was not expected to act without the Canopus. He was to keep his squadron concentrated on her, detaching the Glasgow to get touch with the enemy, and to make every effort to form a junction with the Defence at the earliest possible moment. He was also told that the Germans believed him to be in Corcovado Bay - an impression which must have been due to the Otranto's visit to Puerto Montt.

 

Prompt as was the action taken it was too late - the telegram never reached him. Before it could arrive he had given the Glasgow an order to meet the squadron at noon next day (November 1) at a rendezvous fifty miles west of Coronel. By the time she arrived both she and the squadron were taking in strong German signals. They still seemed to indicate that the Leipzig was somewhere to the northward, calling up merchant vessels, and the Admiral formed a line of search. On the orders he had he could hardly do less. Doubtless if he had received the last explicit telegram from the Admiralty defining exactly what was expected of him, he would have left the Glasgow to investigate and prepared to fall back on the Canopus. But he had been previously told to "be prepared to have to meet" the enemy and to "search" - expressions, which, taken together, a British officer in his position could only interpret as an order to "seek out the enemy and destroy him." As this could not be done if he had to drag the old battleship along with him, he appears to have felt that by the unwritten law of the Service an ordernto seek out must override all others. It may be, of course,

 

Oct. 12-31, 1914

VON SPEE'S MOVEMENTS

 

that as a fortnight had gone by from the date at which the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been expected to appear in Chilean waters, he was confirmed in the belief that they must have gone north to the Panama area. The probability of being ordered to co-operate with our North Pacific squadron may therefore have influenced his decision to take the risk he did. Otherwise it is scarcely credible that with a squadron relatively so weak and with his two best units, Good Hope and Monmouth, newly commissioned and still quite raw at their gunnery, he would have gone to meet two of the smartest and most seasoned cruisers in the German Navy, each of them of equal force with his flagship.

 

If this was indeed his belief, he was soon to be undeceived. On October 12 Admiral von Spee had arrived at Easter Island with the Nurnberg in company, and there he found the Dresden. This ship, after her failure to capture the Ortega, had cruised up the trade route nearly as high as Coronel. As she found nothing, she turned back, keeping further from the coast, till September 29, when she went off to Mas-a-Fuera, There she coaled from the Baden, which had been acting as her tender ever since she left West Indian waters, and which now proceeded to tow her to Easter Island. She reached it two days before Admiral von Spee, and on October 14 the Leipzig turned up and completed the concentration. For a week the squadron lay there resting, revictualling and making its preparations without hindrance, for in that lonely Chilean possession, which was nothing but a cattle ranch, the semblance of authority that existed was quite unable to assert neutrality. Thence he was therefore able to obtain all he required, and on October 18, while Admiral Cradock was still waiting for the Canopus at the Falklands, she sailed, fully replenished, for Mas-a-Fuera.

 

There, on October 27, he was joined by the Priny Eitel Friedrich, driven from her proper cruising area in New Guinea waters by the Australian Squadron. By this time he must have heard that British cruisers had been at Valparaiso; for the same day (the 27th) that Admiral Cradock reached his secret base, he sailed again, and at noon on the 30th he was fifty miles west of Valparaiso. In.that vicinity he cruised out of sight and sent in the Prinz Eitel Friedrich, who chased a British ship, the Colusa, so close into the port that a Chilean gunboat had to intervene. Next day, having certain news that the Glasgow was at Coronel, Admiral von Spee at once decided to move in to cut her off, but, as we have seen, she left just in time to escape him and just too soon to be able to inform the flagship of his presence. Thus about the time Admiral Cradock

 

Nov. 1, 1914

 

began his sweep northward, believing he had nothing but the Leipzig before him, the whole German Squadron was about sixty miles north of Arauco Bay. They too believed they had a single enemy cruiser (the Glasgow) in their clutches, and the intention was, as they neared Coronel, for the Nurnberg to steam past to see if she was still there, while the rest formed on an arc twenty miles distant from the harbour.

 

Such was the strange position at 2.30 p.m. on November 1, by which time the Glasgow had rejoined. Neither admiral knew that the other was present, and each believed he had nothing more serious in hand than cutting off an isolated cruiser. While the British flagship proceeded N.W. by N. (mag.) at ten knots, the squadron was ordered to take up stations on a line N.E. by E. (mag.) from the flag in the order Good Hope, Monmouth, Otranto, Glasgow, at fifteen miles apart. For some time past it had been blowing strong from the south-east, and it was in a fairly heavy sea that the squadron proceeded to take up the prescribed formation. Two hours later, at 4.20 p.m., the line of search was still incomplete when the Glasgow sighted smoke on the starboard bow, and a few-minutes later altered course to S; 84 degrees E. towards it. Five minutes later the Otranto, which was then about two miles W. N. W. of the Glasgow, signalled to her that she also had seen the smoke. In another quarter of an hour the Glasgow knew the long-expected crisis had come. She had made certain what ships were causing the smoke and at 4.40 reported them as the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and a German light cruiser. In another five minutes she was able definitely to determine their course. They had turned towards her, and signalling to the flagship, "Enemy's protected cruisers in sight, steering between S.E. and S.," she turned away at full speed to S. 65 degrees W. in order to close the Good Hope, which had promptly turned towards the enemy. The Monmouth and Otranto followed her lead. The Canopus, which had left Vallenar Roads at 9.0 the previous morning, was still nearly 300 miles away to the southward toiling slowly with her colliers through the heavy weather on her long vojage to St. Felix, and quite unable to give any support.

 

It is not without emotion that one contemplates the feelings of so fine an officer when suddenly he found himself face to face with the hopeless situation into which, against all his protests and better judgment, he clearly believed himself to have been forced. A cloud that can never be lifted has fallen on one of the most tragic moments in our Naval history. All we can ever know is the silver lining.

 

Nov. 1, 1914

THE SQUADRONS IN CONTACT

 

For whatever he thought and felt, Admiral Cradock did not flinch.

 

When about 4.30 the Glasgow located the enemy, they were still coming down the coast in order to take up their encircling position off Coronel. The flagship Scharnhorst was outermost and the Nurnberg innermost, but, having chased a small steamer, she was out of sight to the northward, and as the Dresden had been told to keep touch, she, too, was twelve miles astern. Admiral von Spee's squadron was thus a good deal dispersed, and he only had steam for fourteen knots, but as soon as he sighted two of the British squadron to the S.W. he ordered all boilers to be lighted, recalled the two light cruisers, and, without waiting for them, began to chase with his other three ships in line ahead, working rapidly up to twenty knots. He was careful, however, to keep his enemy four points on his starboard bow. "The wind was south," he says, "force 6, with a correspondingly high sea, so that I had to be careful not to be manoeuvred into a lee position. Moreover, the course chosen helped to cut off the enemy from the neutral coast." (Admiral von Spee's Official Report. This report with that of the Glasgow, is the main authority. The two are in substantial agreement as to ranges, movements and the general course of the action.)

 

In anticipating such a manoeuvre by his enemy he was not far wrong. Widely as Admiral Cradock had allowed himself to be separated from the ship which the Admiralty relied on to give him strength for the encounter, there is no sign of his having attempted to avoid action. It is probable that having regard to the relative speeds and positions of the two squadrons he judged it impossible to fall back on the Canopus without first being brought to action, and thought his best chance, as the sun was setting behind him, lay in forcing an engagement while he had the advantage of the light.

 

As we have seen, as soon as the Glasgow had made out(what the enemy were and that they were steering for her, she turned back, and with the Monmouth and Otranto steamed at full speed towards the flagship. This was at 4.47, and about 5.0 Admiral von Spee saw them running off to the westward, the Glasgow's course being actually S. 65 degrees W. As well as she could for the enemy's continual jamming, she was reporting the character and movements of the Germans. She had sight of the Good Hope at 5.0, and ten minutes later Admiral Cradock signalled for all ships to raise steam for full speed and to concentrate on the Glasgow - that is, on the ship which was nearest the enemy. The course

 

Nov. 1, 1914

 

of the three cruisers in closing the flagship was about W. by S., and to this Admiral von Spee conformed about 5.10, altering again to the S.W. ten minutes later, but it was not till nearly 6.0 that he sighted the Good Hope. By this time Admiral Cradock had his squadron in line ahead in the order Good Hope, Monmouth, Glasgow, Otranto. The signal had been made at 5.47 and he was leading about S.E. to cross in front of the enemy, who was then distant about twelve miles. As, however, the Otranto could do no more than 15 knots, he seems quickly to have found that on the course he was steering he could not effect his purpose, for at 5.55 he inclined away to starboard (S. 20 degrees E.). (Captain Luce in his report says the enemy had turned S. when the signal was made, but the published German chart shows them still keeping S.W.)

 

Even this would not do, and judging apparently that nothing was left to him but to force an action on parallel courses he signalled to alter to south (mag.). There can be little doubt what his intention was, for no sooner was the squadron steady on the new course than he made an obvious effort to close the enemy. At 6.04, according to the report of the Glasgow's navigator, the "British Squadron turned four points together to port towards the enemy, with a view to closing them and forcing them to action before sunset, which, if successful, would have put them at a great disadvantage, owing to the British Squadron being between the enemy and the sun." The enemy, however, refused by immediately turning away in succession to port, and so kept the range at about 18,000 yards.

 

So at least it appeared to our squadron. According to the published German track chart, Admiral von Spee certainly did turn away about three points at this time, but it is not certain that he saw the British movement clearly, or that he realised an attempt was being made to force an action. His own account was that, having frustrated what he took to be an attempt to get inshore of him and to windward, and having in the effort drawn well ahead of his squadron, he was content to wait for the rest to come up. "The enemy," he says, "was, amiable enough not to disturb us in this." (This is from his private letter. The British turns are not shown on the German track chart.)

 

This, however, is tantamount to saying he did avoid action at this time, and Admiral Cradock, finding he could not close in the direct manner he had attempted, turned back in about five minutes into line ahead to a course that was south (mag.). But he had not given up the idea of forcing an action, or, at least, he must have realised that an action was now inevitable practically on

 

Nov. 1, 1914

MANOEUVRES FOR POSITION

 

the enemy's terms, and that the little chance he had was to bring it on while he still had the advantage of the light.

 

The two squadrons were now steaming to the southward on slightly converging courses, and at 6.18 Admiral Cradock ordered speed to be increased to seventeen knots, and then, after making the general signal for close attention to the flagship's movements, altered one point towards the enemy, signalling to the Otranto to proceed at her utmost speed. He next called up the Canopus and informed her he was going to attack the enemy there and then, giving his position as Lat. 37 degrees 30'S., Long. 74 degrees 0' W. (This position was actually fifty miles south of where he was.) This signal the Canopus, who was steering to the northward at 10 knots, took in, and replied at once: "My position 41.10 S., 76.20 W., Course N. 10 W.," - that is, she was over 250 miles away.

 

By this time the Dresden had come up into the line, and Admiral von Spee, who when Admiral Cradock last altered towards him had answered by a corresponding turn away, now (6.47) altered back again one point towards the British, and as Admiral Cradock saw that both the German light cruisers were in station, he reduced speed to sixteen knots, possibly to cover the Otranto. He still kept pressing her to use her utmost speed, but she could only reply that against the head seas she could do no more; but she was coming up on the Glasgow, and when the Admiral slowed down she hauled out to starboard, and, seeing an action was imminent, asked if she was to keep out of range. No clear reply could be had, and, having no battle value, she kept away on the Glasgow's starboard quarter.

 

The sun was now setting in a stormy sky. The Germans tell of heavy clouds with driving showers that obscured the failing light, but the western horizon was all aglow. (British officers state that they saw nothing of the clouds and rain on which the German authorities insist.) So long as the sun was still visible the light was all in Admiral Cradock's favour, but in these circumstances the Germans refused to fight. As soon, however, as it had gone down the advantage was turned against him, for while the Germans were almost lost in the obscurity of the eastern horizon, he was clearly silhouetted against the afterglow. For this Admiral von Spee had been working. " I had manoeuvred," he says, "so that the sun in the west could not disturb me. The moon in the east was not yet full, but promised good light during the night, and there were rain squalls in various directions." Under such conditions of light, with heavy seas breaking over their engaged bows,

 

Nov. 1, 1914

 

what chance had our comparatively old ships, which had had no opportunity of doing their gunnery since they were commissioned for the war, against the smartest shooting squadron in the German service, and that squadron superior in numbers, design, speed and gun power?

 

BRITISH
Ship.	Classification.	Completed.	Tons.	Trial Speed.	Armament.
Good Hope (Flag) (Capt. P. Francklin)	Cruiser.	1902	14,100	23.0	2-9.2", 16-6"
Monmouth (Capt. F. Brandt)	Cruiser	1903	9,800	22.4	14-6"
Glasgow (Capt. J. Luce)	Light cruiser	1910	4,800	25.3	2-6", 10-4"
Otranto (Capt. H.M. Edwards) (not in action)	A. M. C.	-	-	-	4-4.7"
GERMAN
Scharnhorst	Cruiser.	1907	11,420	23.2	8-8.2", 6-5.9", 18-22pdr.
Gneisenau	Cruiser.	1908	11,420	23.5	8-8.2", 6-5.9", 18 -22 pdr.
Leipzig	Light cruiser.	1906	3,200	22.4	10-4.1"
Dresden	Light cruiser.	1908	3,592	24.0 designed	10-4.1"
Nurnberg (not in action)	Light cruiser.	1908	3,400	23.5 designed	10-4.1"

Total in action

British = 28,700,tons, 2-9.2", 32-6in, 10-4in guns

German =29,632 tons, 18-8.2in, 12-5.9in, 20-4.1in, 36-22pdr (3.4in) guns

The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had both a great reputation for good shooting; the latter had won the Kaiser Prize for the Cruiser (China) Squadron the previous year.

 

It was a minute or two after 7.0, when the sun had just set, that Admiral von Spee opened fire at a range of about 12,000 yards. Even then his line was not properly formed. While the British ships were accurately placed at two cables apart, in the German line there were five cables between the Gneisenau and Leipzig and seven between the Leipzig and Dresden. Notwithstanding that all ships were rolling heavily in the ugly seas, the shooting of the two big German cruisers was excellent from the outset. The Scharnhorst's first shots were a salvo of three guns, which burst on the water beautifully together and 500 yards short of the Good Hope. Her third salvo apparently hit the Good Hope's forward 9.2" gun,

Nov. 1, 1914

THE ACTION

 

for the Otranto observed a sheet of flame near the forward six-inch casemate, and the big gun was not fired throughout the battle. The Gneisenau fired salvoes at the Monmouth, whose forecastle also was on fire in three minutes, although she is known to have been stripped of paint and woodwork. The Leipzig fired on the Glasgow, but failed to hit her, as the range was too great for her smaller guns. By this time our ships had also opened fire, each on her opposite number in the enemy's line, except the Otranto, who, owing to the range at which the action was fought, was unable to take any effective part in it. Her captain was quick to realise that, owing to the great size of his ship and the relatively short range of her guns, she could serve no purpose, except as a mark for the enemy to range on. For a time, therefore, he tried to confuse their aim by zigzagging and altering speed, but finally, after the Gneisenau had put two shells over his fore bridge - one salvo fifty yards on his starboard bow and another 150 yards astern, he drew right out of the line to the westward and stood by, watching the action.

It quickly became general. By 7.10 the Leipzig was straddling the Glasgow, and the Dresden was also firing at the Glasgow and possibly at the Otranto, while the two big cruisers dealt with the Good Hope and Monmouth. And every minute the tactical disadvantages under which our ships entered the fight increased. The heavy seas were sending up bursts of spray in the faces of our gunners, their telescopes were obscured, and in the growing darkness our spotters in the tops could not mark the fall of our shot. The smoke of the, leading German ships driven down their line by the strong south-east wind, frequently veiled the Leipzig from view of the Glasgow, the only British ship of whose firing we have any detailed account, but the rest can have fared no better. She had opened fire at 7.5, when the range-was estimated at 10,000 yards. From the first the impossibility of observing the fall of the shot and the indistinctness of the target reduced her chance of hitting to a minimum, and her firing was consequently very slow. At 7.14, finding she was getting astern of station, she increased speed, but reduced again at 7.19, about which time a 4.1" shell from the Leipzig broke up, without bursting against the conning-tower support in the Captain's fore cabin. All this time the Glasgow could see the two leading British ships were being heavily punished without being able, in the adverse conditions, to make any effective reply. The Monmouth had yawed. out of the line to starboard, and she never quite got back into station. Another fire broke out in her after part, and

 

Nov. 1, 1914

 

she began to lose distance. The Glasgow, in order not to mask her fire and to avoid the projectiles intended for her, had to conform by keeping on her port quarter, but later on she moved back and steamed on a line midway between the courses of the Monmouth and Good Hope.

 

The Germans were now almost invisible. There was nothing to lay on except the flashes of their guns, while they continued to hit their well-defined targets with salvoes fired at the rate of about three a minute. The result could be seen upon the Monmouth. She had managed to subdue her fire aft, but at 7.25 her forecastle burst into flames again and burned for five minutes. At 7.30 the Leipzig ceased fire, and was thought to have changed places with the Dresden. In any case both of them soon started firing on the Glasgow, and she could see neither. All she could dimly make out were the two large cruisers, and with her forward 6" gun she was firing on the Scharnhorst, and claims several hits and a conflagration in the fore part of the enemy. Her after 6" gun was trained on the Gneisenau, and is credited with a hit under the enemy's after turret with a lyddite shell.

 

As for the Good Hope, who had received salvo after salvo as the two lines kept converging, she was by this time in a forlorn condition. Almost constantly since the commencement, of the battle, she had been on fire, and at 7.35, when, although Admiral von Spee for the past quarter of an hour had been edging away, the range was down to 5500 yards, she was seen to be altering course to port towards the enemy, as though in a last desperate effort to sell her life dearly. But five minutes later another large conflagration started in her, perhaps a recrudescence of the original fire near the forward 9.2" gun. The Monmouth was in little better condition, but the Glasgow was still practically untouched and able to hit back. The moon was rising, and right under it she kept catching sight of a light cruiser, upon which she fired. In return she got her first bad hit a 4.1" high explosive shell, which burst fair on her water line below the seamen's mess deck over the port outer screw; it stove in the ship's side and made an irregular hole about six feet square, in appearance almost as if the ship had been rammed, but it did nothing to stop her fighting on.

 

But by this time it was evident the flagship was nearing her end, though she was still firing. She could be clearly seen very close to the enemy, with her funnels lit up by flames around her bridge. At 7.45 she began to lose way, and dropped from about eight cables on the Glasgow's port bow till, five minutes later, she was midway between the Glasgow

 

Nov. 1, 1914

END OF THE ACTION

 

and the enemy. It was now quite dark; the moon was obscured by clouds and occasional rain squalls, when suddenly the gloom was rent with an immense explosion where the Good Hope was dimly burning. It took her amidships; her fore part gave out a huge sheet of flame rising 200 feet high; her firing ceased; but what looked like her after part could be faintly seen in the glow of flames which occasionally rose out of it. For a moment so near was the Good Hope to the enemy that some of the Glasgow's gunners thought it was the German flagship that had gone and not our own, but they were soon undeceived.

 

By 7.52 the converging courses had brought the range down to 4,600 yards and Admiral von Spee had drawn slightly ahead and was edging inwards. The Good Hope was silent, and he was now concentrating on the Monmouth, but whenever the Glasgow's guns flashed she received the attention of the whole German line. Shortly after 8.0, therefore, she ceased fire. It was now just an hour since the first shot had been fired, and the action was clearly decided. The Good Hope was nowhere to be seen, and the Monmouth, having turned away to the westward and succeeded in extinguishing her fires, had also disappeared from the Germans' view. The Glasgow followed her round, and by 8.15 found her turning to the northward. She had continued her turn nearly sixteen points in order to get her stern to the heavy seas, as she was down by the head and making water badly forward. But by this time the moon had risen above the driving clouds, and under it the Glasgow could make out the enemy coming up from E.S.E., as it seemed, in line abreast.

 

Admiral von Spee had, in fact, ordered his light cruisers to make a torpedo attack as soon as the British ships ceased fire, but hitherto they had not been able to find anything. Now it was clear that in a few minutes they must sight the three British ships unless they got away at once. The Glasgow, therefore warned the Monmouth to keep as much as possible to the northwestward. She was unable to do anything to help her - her own escape had, indeed, been almost miraculous. Throughout the action, unarmoured as she was, she had been fighting in the line, and she calculated that some 600 shells had been fired at her; of these five had hit on the water line, but not fatally, as the coal had saved her, and though the Captain's cabin had been wrecked, she had not been on fire. Now that the flagship was gone, escape was the only possibility, and she made off at full speed to the westward, followed by the Otranto. So for the time the

 

Nov. 1, 1914

 

three ships escaped; for Admiral von Spee was endeavouring to make a circuit round his enemy's line to get them against the moon, but, owing, to the course the British ships had taken, they foiled the manoeuvre, and he found nothing. About 9.0, however - at which time he was going northwest - he heard firing some ten miles off to the northward, and carried on for the sound of it.

 

It was the Nurnberg engaging the ill-fated Monmouth. Having been thrown out of the chase in the early part of the day, the German cruiser had been making desperate efforts to get up with her squadron, and since dark had been steering for the flashes of the guns. When they ceased there was nothing to guide her, and by ill luck, as she was groping her way through the dim moonlight, she came near enough to the Monmouth to make her out. By this time the damaged ship had a list of ten degrees to port, and steam was escaping dangerously amidships. As the Nurnberg approached her the list increased so much that she could not use her port guns, and the Germans could open fire on her with impunity at close range. "To me," wrote Admiral von Spee's son, who was a sub-lieutenant on board, "it was dreadful to have to fire on the poor devil no longer able to defend herself, but her flag was still flying."

 

The Nurnberg, in fact, ceased firing for several minutes to let her surrender, but in the Monmouth there was no such thought. From the earliest Tudor days British ships had established a reputation that they would always sink rather than surrender. In later times the tradition had not always been maintained, but in the present war there was in this respect, as in so many others, a reversion to the old indomitable spirit - not only, it must be said, in our own Service, but in that, of the enemy as well. Had the Monmouth chosen to surrender she could easily have done so. As it was, there was no choice for the Nurnberg but to give her the only end she would accept. It came quickly. The Nurnberg had to make but one more run, pouring in a lacerating fire at point-blank range, and then the defiant British cruiser capsized. To the last her flags were flying and still flew as she went down. Every soul on board was lost, for the sea was too high to permit of the Nurnberg lowering her boats. Smoke, too, was seen to the south-east, and the German had to be careful. It proved of course to come from the rest of her squadron, and so the action ended with a combined search for the lost Good Hope, while the Glasgow and Otranto gradually-swept round to the southward, and made off independently to join the Canopus.

 

Nov. 1-3, 1914

AFTER THE ACTION

 

Whether it was by interpreting the Glasgow's signals to her or by direct intelligence from Valparaiso, Admiral von Spee had reason to suspect there was a British battleship in the vicinity. He believed her to be a "Formidable" ("Queen" class, as he calls her), and appears to have been uneasy about his position. "Against this ship," he wrote the day after-the action, "we can hardly do anything; If they had kept their forces together we should most likely have come off second best." (Kieler Neueste Nachtichten, April 20, 1915. It is said he had heard from Chile that Canopus had passed through the Straits.)

From this remark it is possible to infer that he considered the Admiralty plan might well have involved him in an action against superior force, but whether he meant that he would have avoided action if the battleship had been present is not clear. His subsequent conduct seems to imply that he was not inclined to take the risk. His squadron was practically untouched. He had suffered no hits of any importance, and, it is said, had only fhree men wounded. Yet the day after the action he proceeded with his two large cruisers and the Nurnberg northward to Valparaiso, leaving the other two light cruisers at sea to look out for some colliers which he was evidently expecting, and incidentally perhaps to search for the Glasgow and Otranto., After staying there the permitted twenty-four hours he went back to Mas-a-Fuera, while the three British ships were making their way with all speed to the Falklands; and at Mas-a-Fuera, for some unknown reason, he remained inactive, making no use of his victory, while the British admiralty was stung into an activity which, for reach and completeness, had never been equalled in our annals.

 

On whom the responsibility for the disaster lay must always be a difficult question to decide, since we can never tell what was in the Admiral's mind. It can be urged on the part of the Admiralty that even if their instructions lacked something in precision and completeness, they had a right to expect he would never suffer himself to be separated from the ship they had given him specially to ensure his safety; but "safety" was a word he hardly knew. Whether under the conditions of the meeting it was possible for him to have declined action till he had fallen back on the Canopus is doubtful. If it was, then his conduct may be regarded as Quixotic; but even so we can do no less than remember him as we remember Sir Richard Grenville of the Revenge. Possibly no better judgment will ever be passed than that which was pronounced by Mr. Balfour, when as First Lord of the Admiralty he unveiled the Admiral's memorial in York

 

Nov. 1, 1914

 

Minster. It was a year and a half after the event, when opinion had had time to mature, and this is how he concluded his eulogy: - " What, then, was his design in attacking a force obviously greatly superior to bis own; a force which, except by some extraordinary accident, some stroke, of unexpected fortune, he could not expect successfully to cope with? Was it that he refused to count the risks? Such deeds of uncalculating daring make our blood tingle within us. Yet there is, after all, a higher wisdom than such calculation, and a higher courage than such daring, and that higher courage I believe Admiral Cradock to have possessed. Why, then, you will ask me, did he attack = deliberately, designedly, intentionally - a force which he could not have reasonably hoped either to destroy or put to flight ? I think a satisfactory explanation can be given. Remember what the circumstances of the German squadron were. The German Admiral in the Pacific was far from any port where he could have refitted. No friendly bases were open to him. If, therefore, he suffered damage, even though in suffering damage he apparently inflicted greater damage than he received, yet his power, great for evil while he remained untouched, might suddenly, as by a stroke of the, enchanter's wand, be utterly destroyed.

 

Admiral Cradock could only judge by the circumstances that were before him, and if he judged that his squadron, that he himself and those under him, were well sacrificed if they destroyed the power of this hostile fleet, then I say that there is no man, be he sailor or be he civilian, but would say that such a judgment showed not only the highest courage, but the greatest courage of unselfishness; and that Admiral Cradock, by absolute neglect of personal interests and personal ambitions, had shown a wise judgment in the interests of his country. . . . If I am right - it must be to a certain extent a matter of conjecture - but if I am right in the account which I have given of the motives which animated him, there never was a nobler act, unsuccessful though it was, than that which he performed off the coast of South America. We do not know, we never shall know, what were the thoughts of Admiral Cradock when it became evident that, out-gunned and outranged, success was an impossibility. We shall never know what he felt when the setting sun on that evening threw his own ships up clearly against the bright western sky, a mark for his enemies, and at the same time rendered his own fire difiicult and ineffective by placing them in the shade. He must have realised then that his hopes were dashed for ever to the ground, that his plan had failed. . . . His body is

 

Nov. 1, 1914

CORONEL

 

separated from us by half the world, and he and his gallant comrades lie far from the pleasant homes of England, Yet they have their reward, and we, looking at what they attempted, and judging what they did in the light of what they attempted, are surely right in saying that theirs is an immortal place in the great roll of naval heroes."

 

 

---

 

 

CHAPTER XXVI

 

CRUISER REDISTRIBUTION AFTER CORONEL - THE TURKISH INTERVENTION - FATE OF THE KOENIGSBERG, EMDEN AND KARLSRUHE – FALL OF TSINGTAU

 

Realising all that the Coronel disaster meant, the new Board as it entered office had to face an ugly situation. For reasons which now seem insufficient, the available force in the decisive area had been divided into two inadequate squadrons and the normal result had followed. Coming, as the disaster did, on the top of the still unpunished exploits of the Karlsruhe and Emden, it had inflicted a serious blow to our naval prestige, at a moment when, as it happened, prestige was peculiarly important, and in addition to the moral effect it had exposed our command of the Atlantic to real menace

 

Had the trouble stood alone it would have been grave enough, but it was far from standing alone. There were several complications which gravely deepened the sinister impression and increased the difficulty of removing it. As we have seen, the activity of the German submarines had recently made the Grand Fleet's bases for the moment untenable, with the accidental consequence that we had lost one of our finest battleships. But as a new battle cruiser, the Tiger, and three more powerful battleships, Benbow, Emperor of India and Queen Elizabeth, were just completing for sea, and as the preliminary anti-submarine defences for Scapa were well forward, this difficulty was not very serious. The gravest complication was that affairs at Constantinople had just reached the final crisis.

 

Early in October it had become clear that the Germans, in collusion with Enver Pasha, the Minister of War, were doing their best to force the Porte into joining the Central Powers openly. The special ambition of Enver and his party was the re-conquest of Egypt. It fell in precisely with the German plan of dealing a mortal blow to the British Empire by wresting from us the Suez Canal. This adventurous policy the Turkish Neutrality Party, headed by the Grand

 

Oct. 1914

ATTITUDE OF TURKEY

 

Vizier, were resisting with all the obstinacy they could muster. Unfortunately, as was known only too well to the Entente Embassies, there was no personality amongst them fit to cope with Enver and Talaat, and by the middle of the month it was admitted to our Ambassador, that they had not been able to stop preparations for an Egyptian expedition. Bedouins were being employed to dig wells on the frontier, and there were strong indications of a scheme for mining the Canal and Gulf of Suez in order to catch our transports that were passing to and from India. The second large convoy from Bombay was entering the Red Sea, and the Wessex Territorial Division was due, outward bound. The latter had even to be held up at Port Said till adequate patrols could be established against the threatened danger, not only on the line of passage, but also in the Gulf of Akaba, at the head of which the Turks were concentrating troops, and apparently intended to establish a flotilla base. So inflammable was the situation, that the War Office ordered our outposts at El Arish and Nekhl to be withdrawn, but on October 27 the Wessex Division was allowed to sail under escort of the Dupleix. Next day 2000 Bedouins were reported to be advancing on the Canal from Nekhl, and it was quickly recognised that the crisis was at hand.

 

The truth was that the Germans had come to realise that the hour had arrived when the hand of the reluctant ministers must be forced. Owing to the judicious way the almost hopeless situation had been handled at Constantinople, the Entente Powers were still holding their own. The Grand Vizier and the Heir Apparent were as stubbornly opposed to the Germans as ever, and so was the truculent Jemal Pasha, Minister of Marine, out of his professed sympathy with France and his personal antipathy to Enver Pasha. The majority of the Ministers, indeed, were inclined the same way, and so sullen and widespread was the anti-German feeling which our Ambassador and his colleagues were fostering that the Germans saw it could not be overcome by fair means. Accordingly, they and their apt pupil, Enver Pasha, fell back on the notorious Prussian device. Sir Louis Mallet, some weeks earlier had warned our Foreign Office that he might be beaten by the Ministers being unable to prevent the Goeben committing an act of provocation in the Black Sea, and his apprehension was well founded. In the last days of the month Admiral Souchon, without saying a word to Jemal and without the knowledge of the opposing Ministers, suddenly took the combined German-Turkish Fleet into the Black Sea. On October 29 the

 

Oct. 28-29, 1914

TURKISH INTERVENTION

 

Ministers received a wireless message from the German Admiral to say that his flotilla had been treacherously attacked by the Russian Fleet, and that in retaliation he had bombarded some of the Russian coast towns. The message was false - no such attack had taken place - it was all an unscrupulous device to force the hand of the Turkish Government.

 

So glaring, indeed, was the pretence, that the Germans themselves did not adhere to it. Another justification was afterwards put forward, entirely different and equally false. The Breslau and the Turkish cruiser Hamidieh had gone to sea first with a division of destroyers, and the Goeben followed with two minelayers. The new story was designed to give the impression that in the morning of October 28 they encountered the Russian minelayer Prut, with a couple of destroers, about to lay a minefield in territorial waters off the entrance of the Bosporus so as to prevent the two sections of the Turkish Fleet uniting. As this was an act of war, the Goeben, it was asserted, sank her by gun-fire on the spot and took her crew prisoners, to the number of three officers and seventy-two men, and proceeded at once to attack the Russian coast. (Ludwig: Die Fahrten der Goeben und der Breslau, pp. 87, et seq; Otto von Gottberg, Kreuzerfahrten und U-Boots Taten, p. 73.))

 

What really happened was that after steaming eastward about 100 miles, presumably to join the Breslau and Hamidieh, Admiral Souchon headed himself for Sevastopol with a minelayer, while the rest of his ships made for other objectives. The Russian Fleet, as he knew, had just returned there to coal after a cruise, and during the night of the 29th he proceeded to mine them in. Then with two destroyers sweeping in front of him, he began to draw in in order to bombard the port. But before he was in really effective range he was fired on, and after a fifteen minutes' bombardment at long range he was hit three times and made off. The Russian Fleet was in no position to pursue, but three destroyers gave chase, and before they were shaken off had killed fourteen men on board the Goeben by gunrfire. Admiral Souchon, according to the plan he had conceived, was now making for the Strait of Kertch, where another minefield was to be laid, and on the way he fell in with a large ship of 5,500 tons. This was the Prut, which, according to the Russian Staff Report, was at this time a transport and unarmed. She tried to run herself ashore, but her commander, Lieutenant Roguzski,

 

Oct. 29-30, 1914

ADMIRAL SOUCHON'S TRICK

 

finding it impossible to escape, opened his Kingstons, blew a hole in the bottom of his ship and perished with her. The prisoners that were taken were the survivors rescued from the water by the Turkish destroyers.

 

The Prut story, therefore, affords no better justification of the cynical attack than the other. She was not a minelayer, she was not caught off the Bosporus, nor was she encountered till after the treacherous bombardment had taken place not only at Sevastopol but elsewhere. For the Goeben's crime was intensified by what the other ships were doing. While the Admiral was before Sevastopol, some of the destroyers were raiding the harbour of Odessa, where they surprised and torpedoed a gunboat and damaged the electric works before they were driven off. The Breslau and Hamidieh went north-east, and after bombarding the open town of Theodosia in the Crimea, they proceeded to Novorossisk, an oil port on the Circassian coast. There a gunboat had preceded them with a summons to surrender, and on the demand being refused they together bombarded the place for two hours, and practically destroyed it, with its oil tanks and all the shipping in the port. Having thus ruthlessly involved the Turks in unpardonable outrage, the ships returned severally to Constantinople.

 

The news of what had happened, as it was falsely telegraphed by the German Admiral, threw the Ministers into a state of great agitation. Jemal is said to have been furious, and to have declared openly that if ill came of it, Souchon should be the first to hang. The Allied Ambassadors had just demanded an explanation of the Bedouin raid across the Egyptian frontier. The Ministers could give none, for they denied all knowledge of it; but as to the naval incident, since they had not yet fathomed the shamelessness of their protector, they could not doubt the Admiral's word, and ended in endorsing his action. Still the Allied Ambassadors, suspecting a trick, counselled patience, and it was in this highly critical situation that the British Cabinet consented to keep the loss of Audacious secret for a time. In the evening of the 30th, however, Sir Louis Mallet was instructed to present an ultimatum. It was to the effect that unless the Turkish Government dissociated themselves from the unprovoked acts of hostility on Russia by carrying out their repeated promises to remove the crews of the Goeben and Breslau, and undertook to do this within twelve hours, he was to ask for his passports. Before the time expired the fleet had returned, and the German trick was laid bare. It was quickly found that Admiral Souchon's story would not bear

 

Nov. 1, 1914

TURKISH INTERVENTION

 

a moment's examination. A stormy meeting of the Ministers followed, at which the Grand Vizier and his friends struggled passionately to retrace the fatal step. In the end a resolution in favour of neutrality was carried, but one for dismissing the German officers was lost. There was still some hope that the sullen weight of opinion behind the Grand Vizier and the Minister of Marine might yet save the situation, but it was quickly shattered by the action of the Russian Imperial Government. Not for the first time, they took a grave step regardless of their Allies. On September 18 they had concluded an agreement with Rumania which had never been communicated to London nor, so far as is known, to Paris. Now they went still further, and without a word to anybody they declared war on Turkey. This independent demarche was, in the circumstances, not unexpected, and it had been so far anticipated that both the French and British Ambassadors had received instructions to follow the lead of their Russian colleague. Accordingly, on November 1 they left Constantinople, and in pursuance of the terms of the joint ultimatum delivered the previous evening, Admiral Carden was given orders to commence hostilities.

 

So Sir Louis Mallet's prolonged struggle ended in defeat, but much had been gained. With the scales weighted against him by the requisition of the two Dreadnoughts and the failure to stop the Goeben, and with his eyes open to the insidious character of the opposition that surrounded him, he had by skill and patience postponed the evil day till Egypt was safe and the Navy had secured the Eastern high way. As the two highest authorities in the British Government and those most nearly concerned declared, when all the facts were before them, he had fought a splendid rear-guard action, and its value to the Empire was as great as the struggle had been desperate.

 

Since September 20, when Admiral Carden had been appointed to the Mediterranean command, he had been watching the Dardanelles. The Indomitable had rejoined the Indefatigable, and he had also the French battleships Verite and Suffren, and the light cruisers Dublin and Gloucester, with three submarines, twelve destroyers, and their parent ship Blenheim. The Defence, as we have seen, had been sent to Admiral Stoddart. Of the three remaining ships of the 1st Cruiser Squadron, the Black Prince and Duke of Edinburgh were on escort duty in the Red Sea, and the Warrior on guard at Alexandria as senior officer's ship in Egyptian waters, and to these minor services these three fine ships had- been tied, notwithstanding the critical situation, in South American waters. (On November 1, the day Coronel was fought, an Admiralty memorandum pointed out that the best value was not being obtained from these ships, and directed that as soon as possible they should be relieved by older light cruisers from the Irish Station and reconstituted as a squadron for Home Waters.)

 

Nov. 1-3, 1914

FIRST BOMBARDMENT

 

With the Home Authorities there was still a forlorn hope that a prompt demonstration by the Dardanelles squadron might yet cause a reaction against German influence and save the situation. Accordingly, late on November 1, while the battle of Coronel was being fought, Admiral Carden was instructed, on the earliest suitable day, to bombard the outer Dardanelles forts with his armoured ships at a range which would render the Turkish guns innocuous.

 

Already on the previous day, in anticipation of hostilities, he had received authority to cut out a minelayer which was reported to be in the Gulf of Smyrna, and two destroyers, Wolverine and Scorpion, were detached for the purpose on November 1. On entering the Gulf they found a large armed yacht lying at Vourlah Jetty. On her being summoned to come out she was set on fire by her own people, and burned so rapidly that there was nothing to do but sink her by gunfire. Half a dozen heavy explosions which occurred before she went down proclaimed her to be a minelayer, and a smaller vessel alongside, which seemed to be carrying mines, was destroyed by similar explosions. As nothing else could be found in the Gulf, the destroyers considered their mission complete and rejoined the flag on November 2.

 

At dawn next day, November 3, Admiral Carden approached the Dardanelles to carry out the bombardment. He himself, with the two battle cruisers, took the batteries at Sedd-el-Bahr and Cape Helles on the European side of the entrance, while the French battleships dealt with, those on the opposite side at Kum Kale and Orkanieh. Each group of ships made one run at long range, lasting about ten minutes, during which time the British fired forty-six rounds of 12" and the French thirty rounds. The practice was very good; salvo after salvo fell into the forts, while, though the Turkish fire came near, no ship was hit. Towards the end of the run a violent explosion was seen on the European side, and Admiral Carden withdrew.

 

The actual results were, of course, difficult to ascertain, but Mr. Palmer, our Vice-Consul at Chanak, was able to give some idea of it. The magazine at Sedd-el-Bahr certainly blew up, and an American ship, which came out shortly afterwards, reported the fort in ruins. At Kum Kale, though

 

Nov. 1-5, 1914

TURKISH INTERVENTION

 

the material damage was less, the casualties were severe. The highest estimate was 600, the lowest 150, including 40 Germans. Turkish officers reported the men to have been demoralised by the accuracy of the fire, but the moral effect was purely local. At Constantinople it was put about that the ships had been driven off, and as the attack was not renewed, it is to be feared that the impression made was rather the reverse of what had been intended.

 

Simultaneously steps of less doubtful import were being taken for the security of Egypt. At Port Said was the Black Prince, who, since she had brought up her convoy from India, had been engaged with the Warrior in taking possession of the enemy ships which had sought refuge in the Canal at the outbreak of war to the number of twelve large German steamers, including the Norddeutscher Lloyd Derfflinger of 9000 tons, and one smaller one, as well as two large and one small Austrian. She was now ordered to relieve the Warrior at Alexandria, and Captain Borrett, in the Warrior, was instructed to proceed off El Arish, stop any troops advancing on the coast road, and generally to act in place of the withdrawn outpost. The Minerva, which with the Northbrook had arrived on October 30 with a convoy containing the 1st Indian Cavalry Division, was ordered to Akaba on similar service. Two destroyers were sent to Port Sudan as a patrol against minelayers, and the Malta torpedo boats were ordered to the Canal to relieve the patrol destroyers for more active duty.

 

These arrangements sufficiently secured the situation for the time, but no one could foretell how much heavier the intervention of Turkey would make our naval responsibilities in the Eastern Mediterranean. The new war, which was actually declared on November 5, meant an immeasurable complication of the duties of the fleet, and it asserted itself as a culmination of all the rest at the moment when the new Board learned that the whole existing scheme of distribution had been thrown out of gear by Admiral Cradock's defeat. Apart from fresh anxieties in Home Waters and thc Mediterranean, every vulnerable point all over the world lay exposed to a telling blow from Admiral von Spee. It was widely felt that, whatever the cause, the whole problem created by the existence of his squadron had not been successfully managed, and nothing but the widest grasp, a bold realization and acceptance of risks and the utmost promptitude of action could avail to restore our command.

 

But the Admiralty were equal to the occasion. At all costs the exposed positions must be protected; and not only this at all costs the danger must be ended once for all. It must

 

Nov. 4-6, 1914

EFFECTS OF CORONEL

 

be seen to, that whatever might be Admiral von Spee's objective, in whatever quarter he might choose to appear he should find himself confronted with a squadron not merely superior, but so superior as to leave no possible doubt as to the result. All chance of failure must be eliminated and a blow given so prompt and decisive as to bury the memory of all past miscarriages. The material, if rightly used, was sufficient. Already on the day the new Board had taken over their duties they had done their best to mend the faulty disposition they had found by immediately ordering the Defence to obey Admiral Cradock's orders to join him. It was, of course, too late. Not till November 3 did she arrive at Montevideo, and next day the news of the disaster reached the Admiralty. Their first step was to order Admiral Stoddart to concentrate his armoured ships, Carnarvon and Cornwall, on the Defence at Montevideo, and at the same time the Canopus, Glasgow and Otranto, whose fate was not yet known, were told to go there too, without making the Falklands, if they possibly could. The Kent from the Canary-Cape Verde Station was also directed to join as had been originally intended. In company with the Highflyer she had been hunting for the Karlsruhe, on persistent reports that that ship had been seen on the Moorish coast. She had just come to Sierra Leone to coal, and was able to start next day. So much was done for the immediate safety of the ships which had survived the action and to protect the trade which was most directly exposed. For the moment the Falklands were abandoned in order to secure the essential concentration at the immediately critical point, but it was only for the moment.

 

On the same afternoon drastic steps were taken to deliver the retaliatory blow. In the utmost secrecy Admiral Jellicoe was called on to send two of his battle cruisers, Invincible and Inflexible, to Berehaven for urgent foreign service. The Admiral commanding the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron to which they belonged was to shift his flag to the New Zealand, for the Invincible was now to carry that of Admiral Sturdee. He was now handing over the duties of Chief of the Staff which he had carried out since the beginning of the war. For he it was who had been selected to command this splendid force and restore the situation. To further his mission he was given the fullest powers. His command indeed was unprecedented, embracing as it did a wider extent of sea than had ever yet been committed to a single admiral. He went out as Commander-in-Chief in the South Atlantic and Pacific. In the Atlantic his northern limit was 5 degrees north

 

Nov. 4-8, 1914

CRUISER REDISTRIBUTION

 

latitude - that is, the line from the north of Brazil, to Liberia; but if the movements of the enemy should cause him to come north of that line the Admiral of any station he entered would come under his orders. The idea was that he should proceed with the utmost dispatch to South America, take Admiral Stoddart under his command, and carry on with the concentrated force to the key position at the Falklands to seek out and destroy the enemy. With such a squadron he could count on being able to deal decisively with Admiral von Spee if he came south to break into the Atlantic. If, however, he should go north, either to pass through the Panama Canal or attack Canadian territory or Japanese trade, it was intended he should encounter a no less formidable opposition. The Newcastle and Idzumo were already there, the Asama and Hizen were at Honolulu watching the Geier, and Admiral Patey, in the Australia, was at Suva with a fast collier which he was keeping intact in anticipation of the orders he now received.

 

The Admiralty plan was for the Idzumo and Newcastle to come south as far as San Clemente Island, off the south end of California. There, unless later information of the German movements permitted a more southerly concentration, the Hizen would meet them and also the Australia. Admiral Patey on arrival would take command of the new squadron, which would then move south to find the enemy. To this project the Japanese agreed, and not only this, but they also expressed their readiness to send their First South Sea Squadron to replace Admiral Patey between Fiji and the Marquesas in case the Germans should break back. They even went beyond their word; for on November 8, when the American authorities at Honolulu finally interned the Geier and her tender, the Japanese ordered both the Hizen and Asama to proceed to San Clemente. They also reinforced their First South Sea Squadron with another armoured cruiser; so that it now comprised Kurama, Tsukuba and Iwate, and was superior to that of the Germans.

 

The Pacific, as well as our South American trade, was thus well provided for, but in South West Africa lay another possible objective at which Admiral von Spee might strike. It offered a promising field, and was now quite inadequately guarded. De Wet and other Boer leaders were still keeping alive the embers of the rebellion which General Botha's victory had damped down, and the appearance of the German Squadron on the coast in superior force would certainly fan the flames and as certainly upset all the Union plans for the conquest of German South-West Africa. There was no time

 

Nov. 4-6, 1914

THE CAPE AND CAMEROONS

 

to spare, and the day the news of Coronel arrived the Goliath and Dartmouth, which were on the East African Station looking after the Koenigsberg, were ordered to join the Albion at the Cape. But as two days later it was found that the battleship could not start at once, other arrangements were made. The only ship of force which could arrive as soon as Admiral von Spee was the Minotaur (Captain Kiddle). She had left. St. George's Sound on November 1 in charge of the Australian Convoy, with the two light cruisers Melbourne and Sydney and the Japanese battle cruiser Ibuki. Now that the German squadron had been located so far away it was impossible for any one to contend that so powerful an escort was necessary, and on November 6 Captain Kiddle was ordered to leave the convoy in charge of Captain Silver of the Melbourne, and take his ship by way of Mauritius to reinforce the Cape Squadron.

 

Had this arrangement stood alone it would have left the South-West African coast with a squadron whose constitution was as defective as that of Admiral Cradock. It was good enough to defend the exposed bases of the Union Expedition, but if concentrated it would not have speed enough to force an action on Admiral von Spee. But, in fact, it was only part of the disposition that was actually made, for it was combined with certain steps which had to be taken to guard the waters to the northward. Besides our West Coast Colonies there was the Cameroons Expedition, which was still in progress and might possibly furnish an objective for Admiral von Spee. (See Map 16 in case.)

 

During the past month substantial progress had been made. In the extreme north our Maidugari column had succeeded in joining hands with the French, and reinforced by them with about 500 Europeans and natives and a couple of guns, had, by a concerted operation, driven the enemy out of the whole of the Lake Chad region down to the 11th degree of latitude. Here, however, the Germans held a strongly entrenched position at Mora, and the French commandant sat down before it to await reinforcements. It was clear, therefore, that the complete reduction of the colony must be a prolonged affair, since in the south the enemy clung to their baffling policy of retiring into the Hinterland as the pressure on the coast increased. On October 12 another mixed column had started up the river from Duala for a second attempt on Ybassi. It was about the same strength as the first, but this time a clever surprise was effected by landing the troops on both banks, with the main force on the opposite bank to that which had been tried before. The result was

 

 Oct. 14-21, 1914

CRUISER REDISTRIBUTION

 

that on the 14th the place was occupied with very little loss and left in charge of a garrison, while the flotilla returned to Duala. Meanwhile, the Bruix and Surprise were down the coast bombarding the ports Kampo and Kribi, but without landing. They then proceeded northward to the Nyong River, where they found the Ivy had already effected a landing and destroyed the telephone. She was, in fact, engaged with the flotilla in making a thorough survey of that and the Sanaga River in preparation for the next important operation. Its objective was Edea, and the plan was of some elaboration in order to obtain a concentric movement. While the main body of the French was to advance from the Yapoma Bridge along the railway, two flotilla columns with allied troops would converge on the place from the south-west and south. The first, with which went the Mole, the 6" gun lighter, the armed tugs Remus, Sir Frederick and Porpoise and the dispatch vessel Vigilant, was to move up the Sanaga River, the larger vessels from the sea and the lighters, one with 150 British troops, direct from the Duala Estuary by the Kwakwa Creek, which joins the Sanaga River at a mission station called Lobetal. Here the two sections would combine. The main body of the troops, to the number of about 1000 French infantry and as many carriers under Colonel Mayer, was to go by the Nyong River in six transports, escorted by the Cumberland, Dwarf and Surprise, and to proceed by river as high as Dehane, some twenty miles south of Edea.

 

One great advantage of the scheme was that the Germans believed that Edea could not be approached from this side by any serious force. It was only the admirable and patient survey work that made it possible, and even so the navigational difficulties were so great that progress was slow. It was on October 20, after the Northern Railway had been cut six miles up by a small British force sent to occupy Maka, that a start was made. The Kwakwa column left early, and the rest at sundown, and next day the main or Nyong column succeeded in crossing the bar, but not without loss. A German prize tug that was towing the 6" gun lighter took the ground and had to be abandoned, and to prevent further delay the lighter was sent back to Duala with the Dwarf. But this was not all. A whaler, in which was Captain Fuller with some of the chief staff officers, capsized in crossing the bar, and the Director of the Nigerian Marine and two other very valuable lives were lost. (Lieutenant H. A. Child, R.N. (Retd.), Director of the Nigerian Marine; Commander S. B. Gray, R.N.R. (Retd.), Chief Transport Officer; Captain A. A. Franqueville of the French Military Staff.)

 

Still, it was a fine piece of

 

Oct. 22-Nov. 3, 1914

PROGRESS IN CAMEROONS

 

work, considering that ships of the size of the transports had never been known to enter the river before. So rapidly was the feat performed that the advanced guard of the French was able to start up the river the same evening towards Dehane. The success was only emphasised by what happened to the Sanaga column. It, too, arrived off the river to time, but in the bad weather that prevailed was unable to attempt crossing the bar till next day. As for the Kwakwa column, it met with such sharp opposition from entrenchments short of Lobetal that it had to retire.

 

This, however, was the last check. On the 22nd the Nyong column, in spite of every kind of navigational difficulty, was able to occupy Dehane, and next morning began to advance on Edea, leaving a small British garrison behind it. The same day (the 23rd) the Kwakwa column, having evacuated its wounded at Duala, tried again, and this time reached Lobetal unopposed and occupied it. Simultaneously the Tapoma column began to advance along the railway. The following morning the Sanaga column, after bombarding suspicious points at the entrance of the Kwakwa creeks without drawing any reply, joined hands with the Kwakwa column at Lobetal, and next day began its advance towards Edea on both banks of the river. Twice, so thick was the bush, the troops had to be re-embarked. About midday on the 26th, as they were seeking a final landing-place amidst loud demonstrations of friendliness from the natives, they heard that the Nyong column had occupied Edea a few hours earlier. It afterwards transpired that the sound of the 6" gun at Lobetal, combined with the surprising news that a large force had reached Dehane by river, was too much for the fortitude of the garrison, and that they had retired hastily by rail and road eastward towards Yaunde, which lies up the Nyong river about 100 miles above Edea. It was not till next day that the Yapoma column, which had been delayed by breaches in the railway, arrived to join hands with the other two.

 

So at small cost, thanks to the well-combined plan which the surveying officers had made possible, the surprise had been effected. The operation was a complete and almost bloodless success, and no sooner was it ended than preparations were begun for treating Buea and the Northern Railway in a similar manner. In the meantime, however, it was necessary to do something for the Ybassi garrison. The Germans had reoccupied the banks below, and on November 1 a small column was sent up to relieve it. This was successfully done on the 3rd; but as the river was rapidly falling and water

 

Nov. 5-9, 1914

CRUISER REDISTRIBUTION

 

transport would soon be impossible, it was decided to withdraw the garrison temporarily. The evacuation was carried out on the 9th, and nothing left but a minor post at the junction of the Dibamba River with the Wuri, twelve miles below Ybassi., While this was going on the Ivy and Vigilant looked into the various small ports lower down from Kribi to Kampo and, sending parties ashore, destroyed or removed all the telephones with little or no opposition.

 

From the impunity with which these operations were carried on it was clear the Germans had practically abandoned the coast, but the power of reaction they had been displaying emphasised the need of keeping up the pressure. The new combined operations against Buea were to begin on November 10, and the latest experience had shown how much depended on naval co-operation. But since the fall of Edea the Admiralty had been pressing more strongly than ever for the release of the Cumberland in order to complete their distribution to meet Admiral von Spee. To this General Dobell urgently demurred. The Pothuau was coming to relieve the Bruix, and as her captain was senior to the captain of the Challenger it would mean change in the naval command. Seeing in what cordial harmony he was acting, with Captain Fuller, the General regarded such a change as highly undesirable - a view in which the captain of the Bruix concurred. Not only were the Cumberland's 6" guns essential to success, but as the main part of the combined work fell to the Nigerian Marine it was highly inconvenient not to have a British officer in command. Eventually, on General Dobell's repeated entreaties, representations in this sense were made to the French Government, who readily agreed that the Pothuau should pay no more than a flying visit for the present. Till the end of November the existing arrangement was to stand. Not till then was it possible for Admiral von Spee to appear, but by that date the Cumberland, was to have all her main armament on board again ready to join the new West Coast Squadron which it had been decided to form.

 

This was the furthest to which the Admiralty could go. It was necessary to provide ere long for the area, and ships were very hard to find. The Cape Verde Squadron, deprived as it was of the Kent, could lend but little assistance. Indeed, it was in obvious danger itself. The only possibility was to draw upon the Mediterranean, and there at the moment ships could ill be spared. It had already been decided in principle that to make up for Admiral Jellicoe's loss of the two battle cruisers, the whole of the 1st Cruiser Squadron was to join him. In any case, two such fine ships as the Black Prince

 

Nov. 9-12, 1914

ATLANTIC SQUADRONS

 

and Warrior were wasted as guardships for Egypt, and on November 6 they were ordered to proceed to Gibraltar, the French consenting to supply their place till other British ships arrived. Two of their older units, the battleship Bouvet and the cruiser Amiral Charner, were told off for the service, and to relieve them the Vengeance had been called down from the Channel, the Doris from the Irish Station and the Proserpine from the Gibraltar Patrol.

 

Urgent as was the call of the Grand Fleet for the 1st Cruiser Squadron, the Warrior and Black Prince were not to join it at once. The plan was that they should first form, with three French ships of similar type, a new squadron for the Southern Atlantic. It was to be under a French Admiral, and was to sweep down the African coast so as to protect the weak Cape Verde Squadron, the French and British West Coast Colonies and the Cameroons, and if Admiral von Spee tried to strike north of the German South West African Colony to drive him on to Admiral King-Hall's squadron. On the proposal being laid before the French Government, they referred it to Admiral de Lapeyrere, their Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean, but he was only able to express his great regret that he could not spare the ships, and we had to rest on our own resources. Admiral de Robeck was therefore directed to shift his flag to the Warrior, and, taking the Black Prince, Donegal and Highflyer under his orders, to proceed to Sierra Leone and await orders. Here he would be able to call on the Cumberland if necessary, and so a fifth squadron was provided superior to that of the Germans.

 

This arrangement was not completed till November 12, and on that day the last link in the vast chain was forged. The only area that had remained unprovided for was the North American and West Indies Station, which Admiral von Spee might possibly strike through the Panama Canal. By the rules which governed its international status it was permitted for three warships of any one nation to pass through at one time, while three others, even of the same nation, could wait at either end. (The 10th Rule, established by President Wilson's proclamation of November 13, provided that "there shall not be, except by special arrangement, at any one time a greater number of vessels of war of any one nation including those of the allies of a belligerent nation, than three in either terminal port and its adjacent terminal waters, or than three in transit through the Canal; nor shall the total number of such vessels, at any one time, exceed six in all the territorial waters of the Canal Zone under the jurisdiction of the United States.") It was therefore possible for Admiral von Spee to take his squadron through without, seriously breaking his concentration. As it was also known that he

 

Oct. 26-Nov. 12, 1914

CRUISER REDISTRIBUTION

 

had put into Valparaiso with the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Nurnberg after the action, and had left again the following day (November 4), it was possible he could reach Panama before Admiral Patey, with the new North Pacific Squadron, could get into position to stop him.

 

In such an event the West Indian Division, as well as allied ports in the islands, would be in danger. Besides his own ship, the Berwick, Captain Clinton-Baker, who was still in command of the division, had only the Essex, Condi and Descartes. In the New York area Admiral Hornby had his flag in the Glory, which had just rejoined from escort duty with the Canadian convoy, and besides he had the Lancaster, Suffolk, Caronia and the Canadian cruiser Niobe. The two divisions, if concentrated, might together be able to give a good account of the German squadron; single-handed, neither could face it, nor could either area be left unwatched. In this difficulty Admiral Hornby's orders were to watch the Canal from November 12 onwards with two of his fastest cruisers, which were to keep touch with the enemy should he appear, but were not to get engaged with superior force.

 

These orders were issued on November 8, at which time Captain Clinton-Baker was about to search certain points in the Caribbean Sea where the Karlsruhe was reported to have a base. The probability of her appearing in those waters was increased by the fact that on November 2 the captain of the Vandyck, a new 10,000 ton ship of the Lamport and Holt Line, reached Para and reported that he had been captured by her on October 26 between Ceara and Maranham. (See Map 12 in case.) We now know that Captain Koehler was actually on his way to raid Barbados and Fort de France in Martinique. At the British island he would have found no ship to meet him, but Fortune was weary of her favourite, and after bestowing the finest windfall that had yet fallen to his lot, deserted him.

 

On October 26, the day after he left his old ground and was approaching the track from Trinidad to Brazil, he was surprised to sight the high white superstructures of a large passenger ship, and by noon she was captured. This was the Vandyck, then bound from Buenos Aires to New York, and, besides over 200 passengers, mostly American, she was carrying mails, treasure and a rich general cargo, including 1000 tons of frozen meat. It was an extraordinary stroke of fortune. Having been warned by the Bristol after passing Rio, she was keeping away from the route, and using no light or wireless. It was a pure chance that the Karlsruhe fell in with her in changing

 

Nov. 1-4, 1914

END OF THE KARLSRUHE

 

stations, and the worst of it was that she was by far the finest prize the lucky raider had yet encountered. The ship was retained till she could be gutted, but next day (October 27) the passengers, together with the crews of the last two prizes taken on the old ground, Glanton and Hurstdale, were crowded into the Asuncion, which was sent away to Para with orders not to make the port till November 1. During the night, as the Karlsruhe was taking in provisions from the Vandyck, another ship came quietly up to them and was taken. She was the Royal Sceptre of London, with a cargo of coffee valued at a quarter of a million; but it was neutral, and as the ship was old and worn out they had to let her go. At daylight the Vandyck was sunk.

 

Captain Koehler then proceeded on his way. His intention was, besides making surprise attacks on British and French possessions, to disturb the trade routes to Trinidad and Barbados. It was at the latter place he meant to make his first attempt. He knew there were several large passenger steamers lying there, and was calculating on a resounding blow to our prestige like those which the Emden had dealt in the East Indies. On November 1 he coaled from the Farn, and, leaving her behind, carried on for his objective with the Rio Negro and Indrani. By sunset on November 4 they were only 300 miles short of Barbados, and in high expectation of what lay before them. Captain Koehler was on the fore-bridge, and the greater part of the crew were assembled forward to listen to the band, when suddenly a terrible explosion shattered the ship. There were cries of "Torpedoed," but as the flame and smoke cleared it was seen that the whole fore part had been blown off, and with it had gone the captain, one lieutenant and 259 petty officers and men. For twenty minutes more the after-part floated - just long enough for the tenders to take off all the survivors, to the number of 17 officers and 129 petty officers and men and then all was over. The cause of the tragedy is a mystery that cannot be solved, nor was it till a month later, when the Rio Negro with the survivors succeeded in evading our blockade and reaching home, that it was known even in Germany that the Karlsruhe was no longer a danger to our trade. Even then her fate was kept secret (Aust., Die Kriegsfahrten, S.M.S. Karsruhe) and for long after she had ceased to exist she continued to occupy our cruisers and hamper oor dispositions. The measure of success she had achieved was too great for her possibilities of further damage to be ignored. In the three months of her career as a commerce raider she had taken or sunk sixteen British

 

Oct. 28-Nov. 10, 1914

CRUISER REDISTRIBUTION

 

vessels, and one Dutch on British charter. Their gross burden totalled over 76,000 tons. The value of ships' and cargo was over a million and a half, and with our West Indian cruisers preoccupied with watching the Canal, she might well have added considerably to the total. As it was, by the time the great combination for dealing with Admiral von Spee was well on foot, one source of complication was removed, and within a few days at the other end of the world another clearance had been made.

 

Since the daring raid on Penang on October 28 the Emden had not been heard of, but on the same principles of coordinating all the available material in a comprehensive scheme for her destruction, a disposition had been worked out for the Indian Ocean from which she had even less chance of escape than had Admiral von Spee. It was not done without difficulty, for in the same theatre of operations there were two other preoccupations which could not be neglected, and in a measure tended to cramp the combination against the Emden. The first was the failure of the expedition against Tanga in German East Africa. (See Map 7 in case)

 

On October 31 the Goliath and Hardinge had arrived at Mombasa from India, with the Bangalore and Imperial Service Brigades, and here, unfortunately, the Goliath broke down, so that when on November 2 the expedition reached its objective it had nothing but the Fox to support it, for the Chatham, Dartmouth and Weymouth were absorbed in the first efforts to get at the Koenigsberg in the Rufuji River. Still, the landing at Tanga was successfully effected. On the 4th it was completed, and an advance on the town began. During the attack, however, owing partly perhaps to insufficient artillery support from the sea, the raw troops were not able to face the fire they met, and so complete was the rout that there was nothing to do but bring them away. This was very cleverly managed without the enemy's knowledge, and by the 6th the troops were all in their transports again.

 

It was at best a most regrettable affair. The work of rendering the Koenigsberg impotent, which the Admiralty had directed was to take precedence of all military considerations, however urgent, had better success. The first object of the operations, which were under Captain Drury-Lowe of the Chatham, was to block her in, and this he proposed to do by sinking the collier Newbridge in the mouth of the branch up which she lay. On November 6 the Kinfauns Castle arrived with a seaplane, with which the enemy's position could be determined. At daylight on November 10 the collier was

 

Nov.10, 1914

THE KONIGSBERG BLOCKED

 

taken in by Commander Fitzmaurice of the Chatham, escorted by the armed steamer Duplex, and the steamboats of the three cruisers armed and protected. On entering the river they came under a hot fire of Q.F. and machine-guns which the guns of the ships could not subdue, but in spite of it, they carried on, and succeeded in sinking the blockship fairly across the channel and getting off the men with very few casualties. Having by this skilful operation imprisoned the Koenigsberg, at least for the time, the next step was to endeavour to destroy her. But this was no easy matter. She lay so high up amongst the tall jungle that fringed the river that the cruisers' guns could not reach her and gunboats could not see her. She could only be got at with the aid of troops or by bombing. But no troops were available, and the seaplane that had been sent was unequal to bombing attack. Till better machines could be procured or troops became available, nothing further could be done. But the cruisers had still to remain to blockade the river, not only to prevent supplies reaching the Koenigsberg but to see she did not clear the obstruction and break out.

 

On this side of the Indian Ocean, therefore, the situation was far from satisfactory, and no end could be seen to the preoccupation it was causing. On the Asiatic side, where lay the other preoccupation, there was quite another story to tell. For there had been carried out one of the best-managed combined operations of the war.

 

Since the end of September it had become clear that in view of the increasing hostility of Turkey something definite must be done to uphold our interests in the Persian Gulf, particularly to protect the refinery and pipe line of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, in which the Government had recently acquired a large interest. The terminal and refinery had been established at Abadan, an island which lies in the Shatt-al-Arab - that is, in the channel by which the Tigris and Euphrates reach the sea after their junction at Kurnah. So great were the interests at stake that no sooner was the danger realised than it was decided to send up a military force to the Gulf by way of a demonstration to check German propaganda amongst the Arabs. But it was obvious that it must be done in such a way as not to alienate the Sheikhs or prejudice the delicate situation at Constantinople by committing a provocative act against Turkish territory. At the same time it was necessary that the force should be of considerable strength, and that it should be on the spot ready to act before anything was known of its movements. It was decided, therefore, to detail the whole of the VIth Indian

 

Oct. 1-15, 1914

TURKISH INTERVENTION

 

Division, and to send off one of its brigades under Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, with the next Indian. Convoy as though it was required for Egypt. (16th Brigade: 2nd Bn. Dorset Regt., 104th (Wellesley's) Rifles, 20th Infantry, 117th Mahrattas, and H.Q. and two batteries of the 1st Brigade, Indian Mountain Artillery.) When well to sea it would break off and proceed straight to the place d'armes that had been selected. This was the island of Bahrein, which lies in a bight on the south side of the Gulf, midway between the entrance and the Shatt-al-Arab. (See Map p. 394.) It had been claimed at various times by Turkey, Persia, and ourselves, but now, although not actually a British Protectorate, we had a Political Agent established there, and the Sheikh had practically entrusted his foreign relations to the Indian Government. Only 250 miles from the Shatt-al-Arab, it was well-situated as a place d'armes, but so long as the Koenigsberg or the Emden was at large it would require naval cover.

 

The key of the situation in the Gulf area was the ancient and still famous port of Basra in the Shatt-al-Arab, a little above Abadan, and it was likely enough that one or both of these cruisers might seek to repeat there the part which the Goeben had been playing so successfully at Constantinople ever since she had found it impossible to keep the sea. What gave colour to this possibility was that the Turks were protesting with all the effrontery of their German masters against the ships of our Gulf Division remaining in what they called Turkish waters. The division now consisted of three ships, which had been ordered to patrol the Shatt-al-Arab.

 

In the middle of October, when after the Allies failure to save Antwerp, things looked specially critical in the Bosporus, the sloop Espiegle (Commander Nunn), which had been taken away from the Colombo area just before the Emden appeared, was in the Karun River off the friendly Persian town of Muhammera, below Basra (Though nominally a Persian subject the Sheikh of Muhammera was at least semi-independent, and in 1910 we had given him a special assurance against infraction of his autonomy by Persia or any other Power); the Indian Marine ship Dalhousie, which had been guarding the oil works at Abadan, had come out of the river to establish a watch at the entrance of the Gulf, while the sloop Odin (Commander Wason) was outside the outer bar of the Shatt-al-Arab; but as all of them were too inferior to the Emden to afford the cover the expedition required, it was arranged to give it the support of a battleship. In this case, of course, where, as at Luderitz Bay, it was a question of covering a combined expedition, the device was unexceptionable. The ship selected was the Ocean,

 

Oct. 16-Nov. 7, 1914

THE PERSIAN GULF

 

which had just reached Aden from Gibraltar, and Captain Hayes-Sadler, who commanded her, was to be in charge of the naval operations.

 

On October 16 the Gulf transports sailed in company with the main convoy for France and the Mombasa Expeditionary Force. The first or Bombay section of the great combined convoy was escorted by the Swiftsure, Goliath and Dufferin, and the second or Karachi section by the Duke of Edinburgh and Hardinge. On the third day out, at the rendezvous where the two sections came together, the Ocean met them, and she with the Dufferin and the Gulf contingent parted company, while the Goliath and Hardinge went off with the East African Force. Reaching Bahrein on October 23, the Gulf Expedition waited there till on the 30th news came of the German attack in the Black Sea. General Delamain was immediately ordered on to the Shatt-al-Arab, and the India Office directed that a second brigade was to be got ready to follow him. Next day, the 31st, the Admiralty sent authority to commence hostilities against Turkey, together with special operation orders for the disposition of the ships.

 

The Espiegle was to come down to protect the oil works, the Odin to remain off the bar, and the Dalhousie to be at Bushire as a wireless link with the Indian cable. By the evening of November 3, the day the Dardanelles forts were bombarded, the convoy was off the outer bar, which the Ocean could not cross, and Captain Hayes-Sadler devoted the following day to arming the tugs and launches, fitting the minesweepers, and to general preparations for forcing a passage past the guns which guarded the entrance of the river near the old Turkish fort at Fao. On the 5th, the day war was declared, the outer bar was crossed. Next morning Captain Hayes-Sadler in the Odin, with an armed tug manned from the Ocean, silenced the guns outside Fort Fao - the fort itself being in ruins - and then landed some 600 troops, with a party of the Ocean's Marines and a section of Mountain Artillery, under Colonel Rosher. There was no opposition. Reinforcements followed quickly, and during the night the fort was occupied and the guns thrown into the river.

 

In the meantime the Espiegle had dispersed a Turkish force that had established itself higher up opposite the ruined village of Abadan, and on the 7th, while the landing force at Fao, having completed its work, was being withdrawn, General Delamain with the rest of the brigade moved up the river till he was in sight of the oil refinery works at the north end of Abadan Island. Next day he went on board the Odin,

 

Nov. 8-10, 1914

TURKISH INTERVENTION

 

and with Captain Hayes-Sadler searched for a suitable landing place. A firm, high bank with deep water was found two or three miles farther up on the west or Turkish side, at the point where the river begins to bend round Muhalla Island. Here lies a village called Saniyeh, and at this spot the whole brigade, with the exception of a small garrison left at Fort Fao, was encamped by the evening of the 10th. The brigadier had been instructed not to advance further till the arrival of Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, who was in command of the force, and had already left Bombay with the 18th Infantry Brigade, the 10th Brigade R.F.A., and the bulk of the divisional troops. General Delamain, therefore, decided to entrench himself where he was and cover the oil works till his chief appeared. The position that had been secured was all that was required for the moment. It had been attained easily enough, thanks to a very smart piece of work, creditable alike to the foresight of those who prepared it and to the readiness and resource of the naval and military officers who carried it out.

 

Simultaneously an equally rapid, and unexpected blow was delivered in the mouth of the Red Sea. At Sheikh Syed, opposite Perim, and just outside the northern limit of the Aden Protectorate, a mixed force of Turks and Arabs was reported to be assembling. Here a strong work known as Fort Turba was in a position, if adequately armed, to command the passage between Perim and the mainland. The force which the enemy had assembled was also strong enough to threaten Perim itself, and Aden and the Indian Government thought it advisable to deal with it at once. The means were at hand.

 

Another large convoy with five infantry brigades and the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade had left India for France and Egypt on November 2, under escort of the Duke of Edinburgh, Swiftsure and Northbrook, the Duhe of Edinburgh being under orders for home to join the Grand Fleet. The troops were urgently required in France, but the assent of the Home Authorities was obtained for a detachment of them to undertake the operation on their way, provided it would not delay the convoy more than twenty-four hours Accordingly, on November 8, as the convoy approached Aden, Captain Henry Blackett in the Duke of Edinburgh, with the City of Manchester and two other transports, containing three battalions of Indian Infantry under Brigadier-General Cox, was sent ahead at full speed. At daybreak on the 9th he closed the fort, and after laying it in ruins without drawing a reply, he led the three transports to a point within the Strait, near Sheikh Syed. Here a landing was at once effected in the face

 

Nov. 9-10, 1914 1914

SHEIKH SYED AND EMDEN

 

of considerable opposition and a galling fire, and the Duke Edinburgh was able to keep it under sufficiently for a covering position to be seized without much loss. The disembarkation could then proceed, and early in the afternoon, when half the troops were ashore, an advance was made, still in the face of opposition, to clear the enemy away from the vicinity of Fort Turba. The enemy, however, eventually made off before it, and by night all the surrounding heights were occupied. Then, the following morning, without any interference, Captain Blackett was able to land a demolition party at the fort. It was found to contain only five light guns. These were destroyed, the work itself was completely dismantled, and by 6 p.m. all the troops were on board again, and the transports hurrying on to rejoin the convoy after a very clean and rapid piece of work.

 

It was subject to these preoccupations arising out of the new Turkish war that the plan for ending the Emden's career had to be elaborated. As soon as Admiral Jerram heard of the Penang raid he sent the Yahagi, which had been intended to meet the Australian convoy, to join the Chikuma and maintain with her a patrol from Rangoon to Acheh Head. He also sent on the Empress of Russia, which had just reached Singapore, to Colombo, so that for the Colombo-Minikoi area and the Colombo-Calcutta trade route Captain Grant soon had the Hampshire, Yarmouth, Askold, Empress of Russia and Empress of Asia, while the Admiralty ordered down the Gloucester from the Mediterranean to increase the force of fast light cruisers. Now, that the Koenigsberg was blockaded, they intended also to use the Weymouth and Dartmouth who had been hunting her with the Chatham, but as soon, as the news of Admiral Cradock's defeat arrived they ordered the Dartmouth to the Cape. The Weymouth, on her way to join Captain Grant, was to proceed by Providence Island, Diego Garcia, the Maldives and Minikoi. To complete the scheme they requested that all the Japanese squadrons not engaged in the von Spee combination should draw to the westward into the vicinity of Sumatra and the Dutch Indies, so as to deny to the Emden every loophole and every place of shelter as far westward as the 90 degrees meridian, which runs through the middle of the Bay of Bengal. This the Japanese Government readily undertook to do, and the whole scheme was to be complete by the middle of November.

 

Meanwhile, over the only area of the Indian Ocean which was as yet unguarded, the Australian convoy would be passing with its powerful escort. The focal point of this area was the cable centre at the Coco's Islands, where the Eastern Telegraph

 

Oct. 30-Nov. 8, 1914

THE EMDEN

 

Company's cables to Mauritius, Batavia, and Perth in West Australia diverged, and where there was also a wireless station. Admiral Jerram had for some time regarded it as a likely place to attract the Emden's attention, and being unable to place a cruiser there he had instructed the station staff how to give immediate warning of a surprise attack, and had furnished the officials in charge with the call signs of all the ships in the surrounding waters. The convoy was steering off the usual track on a course that would take it past the east side of the islands, and at dawn on November 8 - being then a week out - it was about 230 miles south-east of them. Here the Minotaur received the order which, as we have seen, had been sent out on the 6th, that she was to proceed to the Cape in place of the Goliath. Captain Kiddle at once handed over his charge to Captain Silver of the Melbourne, and parted company, while the convoy held on with the Melbourne, Sydney and Ibuki; and not without anxiety, for they had lost the Minotaur just as they were approaching what was regarded as the most dangerous point, where, for all they knew, the Koenigsberg as well as the Emden might be on the look-out for them.

 

In fact, at that very hour the Emden, with the Buresk in company, was rejoining her other collier, the Exford, at the rendezvous Captain von Mueller had given her forty miles north of the Cocos. The Exford had been waiting there since October 30, expecting other ships, probably the Pontoporos and Markomannia, That the former had been captured Captain von Mueller learned from the survivors of the French destroyer Mousquet, and after dismissing them in a prize called the Newburn, which he had taken after leaving Penang, he went away to meet the Buresk at Simalur, his original coaling-rendezvous, on the coast of Sumatra. Having picked her up there he carried on as far as the Strait of Sunda at the south end of the island. He was there at noon on November 5. What his purpose was is unknown. He did not go through the Strait, but almost immediately turned to the southward and made for the Exford's rendezvous with the intention, as Admiral Jerram expected, of raiding the Cocos cable station, but in entire ignorance of the Australian convoy. During the morning of the 8th he passed across their course about 250 miles ahead of them. They had been keeping rigid wireless silence, but Captain von Mueller must have heard the Minotaur acknowledging her orders for the Cape, for in dismissing the Exford preparatory to his attack he warned her to steam north-north-west, as there was British wireless in the opposite direction.

 

Nov. 9, 1914

THE EMDEN AND THE CONVOY

 

For himself, however - over-confident, perhaps, in the luck that had clung to him - he took no precautions. In the harbour there was nothing but the proprietor's schooner Ayesha, and seeing all clear, he went close in at daybreak on November 9, with his dummy funnel again set up, and a landing-party of sixty, with a machine-gun, in boats under his quarter. But the dummy funnel was so badly rigged that the telegraph officials immediately realised the situation, and with admirable promptness sent out the S.O.S., and calling up the Minotaur, told her en clair that a strange ship was entering the harbour. Then they were jammed, but they got a message through on the cable to Admiral Jerram as the German boats made for the shore. He at once ordered the Hampshire and the two "Empress" liners, which were in the Colombo area, to steam at full speed to meet the convoy, and directed the Yakumo and three destroyers to the Sunda Strait to meet the Philomel and Pyramus, who were approaching it on their way from Fremantle to Singapore.

 

During the night the convoy had passed forty miles east of the Cocos, and was about fifty-five miles north of them when, shortly before 7.0 a.m., the Melbourne got the warning. The problem which Captain Silver then had to decide immediately was not without difficulty. Though he had been told by Captain Kiddle that the Emden was expected at the Cocos, he did not know the Koenigsberg was located and held. For all he could tell the two cruisers might be in company. Should he, therefore, carry on or should he attempt to destroy the cruiser known to be in reach? There was little doubt he should follow the old-rule of attacking "the enemy in sight." But what should he detach for the purpose? By an equally venerable rule he must not leave his convoy himself. If two enemy cruisers were present it would be best to detach the Ibuki, as the most powerful ship, but, on the other hand, the two might attack the convoy, and for that reason the Ibuki should remain. Accordingly, with no little self-control, which the Admiralty fully approved afterwards, he detached Captain Glossop in the Sydney. By 7.0. she was away, but to the urgent entreaties of the Japanese captain he had reluctantly to turn a deaf ear, and the two remaining cruisers took station to the southward to cover the convoy.

 

Meanwhile, the German landing-party had seized the station and smashed the instruments, but not before the Superintendent had got off a message to London and the three stations with which he was in cable communication. The Germans then blew up the wireless mast and demolished the

 

Nov. 9, 1914

THE EMDEN.

 

whole installation. Thorough as was the work of destruction, it was done with all possible consideration, and little that was not connected with communications was touched. With the cables they were not so successful. They had no proper tools for cutting and were confused by spare lengths laid out to sea to save burying ashore. They had, in fact, only succeeded in cutting that to Perth when smoke was seen on the horizon and the Emden sounded the recall. (See The Zodiac (Eastern Telegraph Co.'s Journal), Vol. VIII, p. 125, February-March 1915.) This was shortly after nine o'clock in the morning. A quarter of an hour later the two ships could see each other, and so rapidly was the Sydney coming down from the north-east that Captain von Mueller found it necessary to abandon the shore party and put to sea without delay in order to get room for manoeuvre. For his intention was to fight, and believing he had only one of the comparatively weak light cruisers of the East Indies Squadron to deal with, he steamed out to the northward to meet her (Emden, 3,592 tons, 1908-9, 24.12 knots (T.S.), 10-4.1" guns, 2 torpedo tubes. Sydney, 5,400 tons, 1912-13; 25.7 knots (T.S.), 8-6" guns, 2 torpedo tubes.)

 

As the Emden crossed the Sydney's bows at less than 10,000 yards Captain Glossop turned to the northward on a parallel course, and so at 9.40 the unequal action began by the Emden opening fire at 9,500 yards (See Plan p.384.) It was a calm, clear morning, and her shooting was brilliant from the first. She straddled the Sydney at once, while the Sydney, having over-estimated the range by 1000 yards, began by sending everything far over. It was not till the twelfth round, so the Germans say, that she secured a hit; but, on the other hand, though the enemy's shell showered aound her, the danger-space of the Emden's 4" guns at that extreme range was very small, and, hot as the action was, the Sydney, beyond having one control station disabled, suffered very little. Moreover, though nominally the Sydney had little more than a knot the advantage in speed, she had at least four knots actual superiority, and Captain Glossop was able to keep the range open as he liked. Maintaining his speed, he rapidly drew ahead, until about ten minutes after the action had begun the Emden circled 8 points to starboard and stood to the eastward, as though to cross him astern. By this time she had been repeatedly hit. As her range-finder had been shot away her firing was less accurate and her troubles rapidly increased. Very soon after her turn, her steering gear seems to have been disabled, and her first funnel and foremast were shot away. She could only steer with her engines, and fire slackened.

 

Nov. 9, 1914

EMDEN AND SYDNEY

 

For so terrible was the effect of the British lyddite that whole gun crews were swept away together, and, seeing how many men she had had to leave behind at the Cocos, she had no reserves. Still, in spite of losses and constant fires, she continued the hopeless action gamely.

 

To counter her last movement the Sydney made a corresponding turn to port and slowed down, and so for a short time they were fighting on opposite courses. But soon the Emden doubled back north-west. She was burning fiercely aft and was clearly in great distress. Her fire, which at first had been at the rate of ten shots a minute per gun, was slackening more and more and growing wilder. Her object seemed to be to close, and Captain Glossop did not seek to thwart her. Keeping his course and low speed he let the range fall to 5,500 yards, and then, having fired, a torpedo which missed, turned away 12 points to starboard and increasing to full speed, opened out the range again. The Emden, who could not reply, since both her torpedo tubes had been put out of action, conformed with a similar turn, and the two ships were once more fighting at long range on parallel courses, with the British cruiser somewhat ahead.

 

The action had now lasted about forty minutes, and both the Emden's fire control positions and her two remaining funnels were gone. She was holed all over and was burning fiercely fore and aft. Indeed, so smothered was she in smoke that at one time it was believed she had gone down. But she was soon seen again making to the eastward, and the Sydney, who had drawn well ahead of her, held on the same course, till about 10.30 the Emden suddenly turned away and doubled back 16 points to starboard. Captain Glossop promptly conformed with a similar turn and continued to engage her with his port battery at about 7000 yards. The Emden, though she still kept firing with the few guns she had left, was now at his mercy. Both ships were heading about north-west as though to pass on either side of North Keeling but in another half hour (11.20 a.m.) it was clear the German was sinking and was endeavouring to beach herself on the island. Captain Glossop then put on full speed to cut her off, but it was too late, and with her flag flying still she ran hard on the reef on the south shore.

 

For an hour and forty minutes she had made a gallant fight against superior force, but it was clear she was helpless. Captain Glossop therefore left her and gave chase to the Buresk, which could be seen making off to the northward. She was quickly overhauled, and forced to strike her flag, but when a prize crew was sent on board it was found the

 

Nov. 9-12, 1914

THE EMDEN

 

Germans had opened her inlet valves and so damaged them that she could not be saved. Having taken off her crew and the British prisoners he found on board, Captain Glossop left her, and at 4.0 p.m. returned to the Emden. Her flag was still flying, and as no answer was made to his repeated summonses to surrender, he had to open fire again. The result was a useless massacre, and it was not till after the second salvo had torn the helpless ship that she showed white flags and sent a man aloft to haul down her colours. Why this was not done before was never explained.

 

Pitiable as was her condition, Captain Glossop had now to leave her for the night in order to get back to the Cocos to deal with the landing party before dark. On the way, however, he felt compelled to stop to pick up men who had been blown out of the Emden during the action and were still keeping themselves afloat. Owing to this delay it was nightfall before he reached the island, and he then found that the landing-party, when they saw how the action was going, had seized the proprietor's schooner and had escaped with her in the dusk.

 

The structural damage which the Sydney had suffered was very slight. Of her crew she had lost only four killed and twelve wounded, and she returned at once to the North Keeling to rescue the survivors of the Emden. The wreck was found to be in a pitiable condition. Her decks were a shambles, and the work of rescue was extremely difficult, for she had beached herself on the weather side of the island, and the send of the sea was very heavy. As the prisoners were numerous their parole had first to be taken, that "while in the Sydney they would cause no interference with the ship or fittings and would be amenable to the ship's discipline," The work then commenced and lasted till 5.0 p.m. As soon as it was done the Sydney went round to the lee side to pick up some twenty men who had managed to get ashore. But it was not till next morning (November 11) that all were on board and she could follow the convoy to Colombo. Captain von Mueller himself was saved, and he stated that the dead numbered 7 officers and 108 men. The prisoners on board were 11 officers, 9 warrant officers, and 191 men, of whom 3 officers and 53 men were wounded. In the crowded decks little could be done for them. Four died of their wounds, and it was no small relief when at midnight on the 12th, thanks to Admiral Jerram's prompt orders, the Empress of Russia met: them, and it was possible to transfer to her all the prisoners except the few most serious cases which it was dangerous to move.

 

ggg

 

Plan - Cocos Islands; Action Between Sydney and Emden, November 9

 

 

Nov. 1914

FALL OF TSINGTAU

 

So ended the episode of the Emden, which recalls the most famous exploits of the old French raiders. Not only had Captain von Mueller obtained a high measure of success both in the actual damage he had done and the strategical and economic disturbance he had caused, but he had won the admiration of his enemy for the skill, resource and boldness with which he had maintained his position so long, and for the chivalry and humanity with which his duty had been discharged.

 

So striking, indeed, was the career of the Emden that her end almost overshadowed a much greater success. The news of her destruction followed within two days that of the fall of Tsingtau. The combined operations against the German Pacific base had occupied little more than two months, compared with the eight which it took the Japanese to capture Port Arthur from the Russians. The first landing began on September 2 in the Gulf of Pe-chi-li, eighty miles north of Tsingtau. Moving southward across the Shantung Peninsula, the cavalry seized the railway at Kiao-chau, and then, on the 18th, the rest of the troops were landed in Lo-shan Bay, about fifteen miles north-east of the German defences, and the fortress was isolated. On the 22nd the British troops arrived from Taku and Wei-hai-wei under escort of the Triumph, and on the 27th the attack on the advanced German positions began.

 

Most important of them was a hill on the German right, known as Prinz Heinrich Berg, which overlooked the whole place. The experiences of Port Arthur and 208 Metre Hill had taught that in combined operations of this kind the vital necessity was a good observing position. Without such a position the guns both afloat and ashore could do little more than give a covering fire for the infantry. Upon the fixed defences they could make no decisive impression. Accordingly Prinz Heinrich Berg appears to have been the primary objective of the Japanese, and on October 17 it was captured in a night attack. Siege guns were then called up from the Japanese base, while an observing station was rapidly organised on the hill. By the 31st all was ready for the grand attack and, although for three days the weather was too bad for the ships to take part in the bombardment, the place surrendered in a week (November 7).

 

Thus three months after the war began, Far Eastern Waters were permanently barred to the enemy, and the Japanese were free to take their place in the world-wide combination that had been designed in Whitehall.

 

 

---

 

 

CHAPTER XXVII

 

SECURING THE COMMAND IN EGYPT AND THE EAST – THE PERSIAN GULF OPERATIONS AND PROGRESS OF THE CAMEROONS EXPEDITION

 

The embarrassing effects that can be produced by a single well-handled raider have seldom been better exemplified than in the career of the Emden, and in her case the extent of the disturbance may be measured by the relief which her destruction afforded in almost every area of our naval operations. It happened at a most opportune moment, when the demand for cruisers and torpedo craft had become specially insistent. The number of ships of these classes whose attention she had been occupying, directly or indirectly, on the convoy and trade routes was very considerable The greater part of them were now released at a stroke, and they were streaming towards and up the Red Sea for the stations where they were required.

 

The principal calls were in Home Waters and the Mediterranean. At home the increasing activity of the German submarines and the exigencies of a closer blockade demanded every light cruiser and destroyer that could be spared, while the detaching of the two battle cruisers - and it soon became clear that a third would have to be taken - in order to deal with Admiral von Spee raised in the Grand Fleet a specially insistent demand for the powerful ships of the 1st Cruiser Squadron which hitherto had been allotted to the defence of Egypt and the Red Sea. The need for removing these ships made the call of Egypt particularly urgent. It was just a week after the opening of hostilities with Turkey that the Emden had been destroyed, and during that time the menace of an immediate invasion from Syria had been growing stronger every day. Long before the war it had been settled in view of such an invasion that the proper line for the defence of Egypt was not the desert frontier but the Canal, and the merits of that line depended materially on the fact that it lent itself to naval co-operation with the land forces. Since the main new fact in military tactics which the experience of the

 

Nov. 10-11, 1914

EGYPT AND EAST INDIES

 

war had brought out was the increasing importance of heavy artillery, such co-operation was more than ever essential, and owing to the removal of the Emden from the board, ships were now available.

 

Chief amongst them was the Swiftsure. As we have seen, she, together with the Duke of Edinburgh, was at the moment escorting a large convoy of Indian reinforcements - the same convoy which dealt with Sheikh Syed. As usual, her limit was Aden but as her services would now no longer be required for escort in the Indian Ocean, she was immediately ordered to carry on with the convoy to Suez. In the meanwhile the Home Counties Territorial Division, which reached Port Said for India on November 11, was ordered to stand fast in Egypt. Further security would be provided by the cruisers proceeding homewards, for the Gloucester, Melbourne, Sydney, Hampshire and Yarmouth were all ordered to the Mediterranean for further instructions, while the Dartmouth and Weymouth carried on for the Cape.

 

This left in the Indian Ocean nothing of importance except two groups, both of which were engaged in coastal work: one, under Captain Drury-Lowe (Goliath, Chatham, Fox and Kinfauns Castle), was operating against the Koenigsberg in the Rufiji River and in support of our troops in East Africa; the other, consisting of the battleship Ocean, the sloops Espiegle, Odin, and attached armed vessels, was attending the Persian Gulf Expedition. As both were independent combined operations there was little to require the presence of Admiral Peirse on the station. The Egyptian zone was far more important, and as it was obviously impossible to conduct the defence of the Canal and the Red Sea from India, it was decided to form a new station in the threatened area, and recall the Admiral to command it with his flag in the Swiftsure. The only doubt was the Persian Gulf, but on being consulted he agreed that the conduct of those operations could well be left to Captain Hayes-Sadler of the Ocean, and accordingly he proceeded to Suez with all speed to take personal charge of the new extension of his command.

 

The Gulf operations had, in fact, been going as well as could be desired, thanks to the foresight and secrecy with which they were instituted. We have seen how, by the evening of November 10, General Delamain and Captain Hayes-Sadler had their whole force ashore at Saniyeh above the oil works on Abadan Island, about ten miles below the junction of the Karun River at Muhammera. There they had entrenched to await the arrival of General Barrett and

 

Nov. 14-17, 1914

PERSIAN GULF

 

the reinforcements he was bringing.

(The Persian Gulf Expeditionary Force ("Force D," as it-was called) consisted mainly of the Vlth (Poona) Division. It comprised the 16th Brigade under Brigadier-General Delamain (2nd Dorsets, 104th (Wellesleys) Rifles, 20th Infantry, 117th Mabrattas); the 18th Brigade which came with General Barrett under Major-General C. I. Fry (2nd Norfolks; 120th Rajputana Infantry, 7th Rajputs, 110th Mahratta L.I.); and the 17th Brigade under Brigadier-General W. H. Dobbie, which left India about November 20 (1st Oxford and Bucks. L.I., 119th Infantry, 22nd Punjabis 103rd Mahratta L.I.). The Divisional Troops were the 33rd Cavalry; 10th Brigade R.F.A., two batteries Indian Mountain Artillery, 48th Pioneers. The transport included the 52nd Camel Corps and the Jaipur and Bharatpur transport.)

He reached the camp early on the 14th, and hearing that a Turkish force was concentrating at Saihan, four miles up, the river, he at once ordered General Delamain to push out a reconnaissance in force. The enemy were found entrenched at the edge of the palm groves that fringed the river, but, with the help of the Odin, they were quickly turned out, and, as soon as they were seen to be in full retreat, the force returned to camp.

 

The way was now clear for an advance. It was essential to continue the initial success as speedily as possible, for under German influence a Jehad had been proclaimed, and to prevent the movement taking hold of the Arabs, General Barrett had been authorised to push on to Basra as soon as he was in a position to do so. This port - the "Bussorah" of the old East Indian trade - had been from time immemorial the great emporium of Mesopotamian trade. (See Map, p. 394.)

 

Lying seventy miles from the mouth of the Shatt-al-Arab, it was the highest point that sea-going vessels could reach, and it was here the wondering Eastern poet came in touch with the men "that go down to the sea in ships." The place it had always held in Arab imagination was enshrined in some of the best-known tales of the Arabian Nights, and it still held good. Its occupation, therefore, quite apart from its strategical value, could not fail to make a deep and lasting moral impression. Accordingly, although owing to the difficulties of the landing place General Barrett had not been able to get all his artillery ashore, he decided to move on November 17. Prompt action was everything, and the difficulty of the guns could, in a measure, be compensated by the sloops and gunboats in the river. Captain Hayes-Sadler arranged that he should move with the troops with the Odin, Espiegle and two armed launches. The only trouble was that owing to the screen of palms, ship fire could not be relied on to any great extent - indeed, it could only be controlled by megaphone from the masthead - but it was General Barrett's design to get on the right flank of the Turks and drive them on to the ships.

 

Plan - Operations near Basra

(click plan for near original-sized image)

 

 

Nov. 17-19, 1914

ADVANCE ON BASRA

 

At dawn the troops were moving, and by 9.0 the enemy was located, to the number of 4,000 Turks and 1,500 Arabs with twelve guns, some six miles up the river. They were entrenched at an old fort a little above Sahil, but their right extended so far to the westward and into such difficult ground that it was impossible to turn it, and the plan of attack had to be changed. Rain had made the open ground in front of the position very heavy, but, nevertheless, General Barrett determined to attack their centre and left on either side of the old fort, which seemed to be the key of the position. He was met with a damaging fire from well-served field guns and machine-guns, which, beyond dropping a few shells into the old fort, the ships could do little to counter. Still, by 1.15 p.m., in spite of every difficulty and some considerable loss, he had put the enemy to flight. The ground was too heavy, and the artillery fire which covered the rout too formidable, for immediate pursuit. The ships, however, were able to shell and set fire to the enemy's camp which lay inland from the Police Station in rear of the position, and General Barrett decided to form an entrenched camp on the river bank at Sahil in order to clear his wounded and get up stores preparatory to striking at Basra.

 

It was soon found that the enemy had fallen back to another position at Balzaniyeh, just beyond the long island of Dabba, whose lower end is opposite Muhammera and the mouth of the Karun river. It was from our loyal adherent, the Sheikh of Muhammera, that all the information was coming, and he had to tell also that an obstruction had been formed in the main or north channel of the river at the head of Dabba Island. Here a Hamburg-Ainerika liner, which had been engaged in the Gulf trade till the war forced her to take refuge in the Shatt-al-Arab, had been sunk in the fairway with smaller vessels on each side of her. As General Barrett had to rely entirely on river transport, this was a very serious obstacle. Still, in order to protect the Sheikh from an Arab attack with which he was threatened, General Barrett resolved to push on as soon as he could move, and meanwhile, on the 19th, Captain Hayes-Sadler went up in the Espiegle to see what could be made of the obstacle.

 

As he approached it he was fired on by a 500-ton gunboat, the Marmariss, by an armed launch, and by a battery of four 15-pdr. Krupp guns which had been established on the left of the Turkish position at Balzaniyeh and commanded the obstruction. The fire was returned with such effect that the armed launch was quickly sunk, the Marmariss put to flight up the river, and the battery silenced without the

 

Nov. 20-22, 1914

PERSIAN GULF

 

Espiegle having received a single hit. The obstruction was then examined in peace, and it was found that the channel was not completely blocked, a possible passage having been left between the sunken liner and the island. On his return to the General, therefore, it was arranged that an advance on Balzaniyeh should be made at daylight on the 21st. The armed launches would support the right of the force by proceeding up the boat channel, which ran south of Dabba Island, while the Espiegle, Odin, and the Indian Marine ship Lawrence, which had just arrived, engaged the fort and endeavoured to force the obstruction. (The Lawrence was the last of the six Indian Marine ships to join. She was transferred to the Navy on the outbreak of war with Turkey.)

 

Till the evening of the 20th, however, it was very doubtful whether the advance could be made as arranged, since it had still been found impossible to land all the guns. The question was in debate when a boat came down from Muhammera with the surprising intelligence that the Balzaniyeh position had been evacuated. Whether, or not as a result of the Espiegle's action of the previous day, the Arabs had begun to desert, and a retreat up the river had been decided upon. Nor was this all. The gunboat Marmariss, which after her short action with the Espibgle had retired to Basra, had gone on up the river. With her had fled the Valis of Basra and Baghdad, and the whole garrison of Basra had embarked in dhows and river steamers and was in full retreat on Amara, a hundred miles up the Tigris. To ascertain the truth, Captain Hayes-Sadler went up again to the obstruction next morning. Finding the position deserted, he proceeded to clear the passage of the wire hawsers that barred it, and scarcely was the work done when a launch appeared with a deputation from Basra confirming the news that the place had been evacuated and begging for the British to come up and save it from looting Arabs.

 

Captain Hayes-Sadler at once returned to the camp and suggested embarking two battalions in river steamers. The General agreed, and the ships Espiegle, Odin and Lawrence immediately started for Basra. By 3.0 p.m., in spite of great difficulties from the tide rushing past the obstruction, all three of them had passed up. Stopping only to dismantle the guns which they found abandoned in the fort, they pressed on, and by 5.0 p.m. were anchored off the Custom House of Basra. It was on fire and beset by looting Arabs. One blank round sufficed to disperse them, and a party was landed to take possession of the quays and extinguish the fires. Next morning (November 22) further large parties went ashore and

 

Nov. 22-23, 1914

BASRA OCCUPIED

 

set to work systematically to clear the town and to hoist British flags on all the public buildings, including the German Consulate, whose staff were made prisoners. A few hours later the two advanced battalions arrived under General Fry to relieve them, and thus order was completely restored before any serious harm was done. In the course of the afternoon the main force appeared, and on the 23rd General Barrett made his formal entry into the town. Under the British flag, surrounded by the paraded troops and bluejackets, Sir Percy Cox, the British Resident and Chief Political Officer, to whose knowledge, and skill much of the success was due, read a proclamation. It announced that the British had now replaced the Turkish flag and administration, and at the same time the neighbouring friendly sheikhs were assured by letter that Basra would never again be allowed to pass under Turkish authority. To complete the consolidation of our position, steps were next taken to secure Kuweit, which lies at the head of the Gulf on the Arabian side. The Sheikh, an old friend, to whom we had just sent an increased garrison for his protection, was now informed that his territory would be recognised as an independent principality under British protection, and this was done by treaty shortly afterwards. (Kuweit, or Koweit, was claimed by the Turks as part of the Ottoman Empire. In 1899, however, the Sheikh placed himself by treaty within the British sphere, and later on, by a further, treaty, we secured all the points within his country, to which the terminal of the Baghdad railway might be brought.)

 

 

Thus, to the high credit of all concerned, in less than three weeks after the declaration of war with Turkey we had a firm hold on the water gate of Mesopotamia. The effect could only be to enhance our local prestige so materially that we could regard the allegiance of the friendly Arabs as confirmed, while at the same time we had secured a place d'armes from which we could deal with any attempt of the Turks to seize the oil fields at Ahwaz through Persian Arabistan. So far reaching, indeed, was the moral effect likely to be that Sir Percy Cox urged that the flowing tide should be used to its utmost, and an immediate advance made on Baghdad. In some quarters the idea received considerable support; but both the India Office and the Government of India, though fully alive to the political importance of ultimately occupying the old Arab capital, regarded the project as premature, owing to the difficulty of the communications and extent of existing engagements in relation to the military and naval force available. They therefore suggested the less ambitious scheme of further securing the defensive position already attained

 

Nov. 24-Dec. 4, 1914

PERSIAN GULF

 

by occupying Kurnah, a place some forty-five miles above Basra, where the Euphrates and Tigris flowed together into the Shatt-al-Arab. It was naturally a point of high strategical importance, which from its situation was not only easily defensible but also covered the whole of the fertile tracts along the Shatt-al-Arab. On November 27 this plan was sanctioned, and General Barrett was authorised to undertake the operation with one brigade, or so much of his force as he deemed necessary. Accordingly, the General decided to commence the new movement on December 3, by which time his 17th Brigade and the remainder of his divisional troops would arrive at Basra to complete his force.

 

The difficulties of the operation were mainly navigational. For above Basra sea-going ships did not proceed, and the river was uncharted. There was nothing to go by but military maps without soundings, and it was the season of lowest water. Captain Hayes-Sadler had, however, already made a reconnaissance in anticipation of the advance to ascertain whether Kurnah was occupied. On the 25th he groped his way up in the Espiegle, with the Odin and the armed launches Miner and Mashona in company, till six miles below Kurnah he sighted the Marmariss retiring up the Tigris. Pursuit was impossible, for three miles further on they were brought up by shoal water and an obstruction against which the Odin disabled her rudder. Here they came under shell fire from Kurnah and rifle fire from the banks. It was soon silenced, and they were able to locate a lighter sunk in the fairway. At dusk they returned, without any casualties, to report that they had selected a good defensible landing place at Um Rash, a friendly village on the left bank about two and a half miles below the junction of the rivers and out of sight of Kurnah. Accordingly, in the afternoon of December 3, as the remainder of the division was reaching Basra, the Kurnah detachment started up the river under Colonel Frazer in four steamers, escorted by the two sloops, the Lawrence and three armed launches, Miner, Lewis Pelly and Shaitan, two of the transports being also armed, each with two 18-pdr. R.F.A. field guns. (The column consisted of one company Norfolks, half company Sappers and Miners, 104th Rifles, and 110th Mahratta L.I., with the gun teams of the R.F.A.)

 

Anchoring for the night ten miles below Kurnah, they proceeded again at daylight next morning (December 4), and as they approached the landing place were fired on by two guns at the village of Muzereh, which lies back on the left bank some two miles or more from the selected landing place.

 

Plan - Operations near Kurnah

(click plan for near original-sized image)

 

 

Dec. 4-7, 1914

ADVANCE ON KURNAH

 

As Kumah itself stands in the fork of the two rivers, it could not be reached without crossing one of them. From the left bank of the Shatt-al-Arab, on which the troops had landed, it was the Tigris that barred the way, and at Muzereh the Turks had entrenched a position to prevent access to its bank. Under cover of the ship fire however, the troops were all safely landed by 9.0 a.m., and an immediate advance began against the Muzereh position. While the Odin - which in spite of her disabled rudder had accompanied the force - guarded the camp, the Espiegle and Lawrence with the two armed transports supported the attack. It had to be made over a perfectly flat plain without cover of any kind, but the ships managed to draw most of the artillery fire till it was silenced, and about 11.0 the position was carried. The troops then began to push on through the palm groves that lay between them and the Tigris, and the launches were ordered to advance with them. But so hot was the fire as soon as the bend of the river brought them in sight of Kurnah, that the Miner was soon holed and had to return and beach herself. But by this time the troops were also withdrawing. It had been ascertained that the Turks had escaped across the Tigris into Kurnah, and it was, moreover, clear that, whether or not the bulk of the Turkish forces were retiring as high as Amara, they had left an unexpectedly strong rearguard at the junction of the rivers. It was now, indeed, Colonel Frazer's opinion that Kurnah could not be taken except by crossing the Tigris and attacking it from the north. This he could not do with his existing force. He therefore decided to return to the Um Rash camp and ask for reinforcements.

 

The river steamers, with the wounded and prisoners, were sent down to fetch them, and at dawn on the 6th General Fry arrived with the rest of the Norfolks, two more Indian battalions and another battery R.F.A., which brought the whole force up to 2,300 men with sixteen guns, and made it slightly superior to the estimated strength of the enemy. As the General intended to establish himself at Muzereh before trying to cross the Tigris, he had to wait for a mule transport train to work between the village and the Um Rash camp. No movement was therefore made that day, and in the interval the Turks reoccupied the Muzereh position. In the afternoon they even attempted to attack the camp, but the effort was promptly crushed by the ships and the artillery. Early next morning (December 7) the mules arrived, as well as a mountain battery for which the General had also asked, and at 9.0 the advance began. As the troops moved out of camp the ships and launches weighed and anchored again further up, where

 

Dec. 7-8, 1914

PERSIAN GULF

 

they had a clear view of the town. They were met with a heavy fire both from Kurnah and Muzereh, which they returned, while under cover of the ships' guns the attack developed, supported by a wide turning movement on the enemy's eastern or left flank. Still, so severe was the rifle fire from Muzereh that Captain Hayes-Sadler scraped his way over the soft mud still further up to assist the field artillery in subduing it. In this they were successful, and about 1.0, as the turning movement on the east developed, the village was stormed by the Norfolks. Pursuit through the palm groves towards the Tigris followed without pause, and to support it Captain Hayes-Sadler sent the launches ahead and determined to move on till the mud and the obstruction stopped him. This he did, but by 3.30 he had to recall the launches, for the Shaitan had been disabled and her commander killed by the heavy fire that had been encountered. Still, by this time the action was practically over, for it was found the Turks had made off up the Tigris, and the General decided to bivouac at Muzereh for the night, where were collected 180 prisoners and three guns.

 

The work of the following day (December 8) was to get the troops across the Tigris, and at 8.30 a.m. Captain Hayes-Sadler sent the launch Lewis Pelly up to reconnoiter. In spite of the enemy's fire, she got within a quarter of a mile of the junction, but was then forced to withdraw, and as he could not get at the obnoxious guns where he was, Captain Hayes-Sadler decided to try to pass the obstruction. This, by careful sounding, he accomplished soon after 11.0, and, with the two armed transports on his port beam, began firing on Kurnah with lyddite. The result was all that could be desired. At an early hour half a company of Sappers, covered by the 104th Rifles, had been dispatched to the northern edge of the palm groves to arrange a means of crossing the river, and the Norfolks and 110th Light Infantry were moved up in readiness. By the time the flotilla operied fire the Sappers, by swimming the Tigris, had run a wire hawser across to the opposite bank, and having got hold of a dhow from a friendly Arab, were establishing a ferry or flying bridge a mile and a half above the town. By this slender means the 110th Light Infantry began to cross, while about a mile higher up the 104th Rifles, which was the wing battalion, found three more dhows and received permission from the General to go across also. Thanks, as it would seem, to the Turks' preoccupation with the Espiegle's lyddite and the field guns in the transports, as well as an infantry diversion in the palm groves opposite the town, neither movement was observed

 

Plan - Lower Mesopotamia to the Head of the Persian Gulf

(click plan for near original-sized image)

 

 

Dec. 9, 1914

SURRENDER OF KURNAH

by the enemy, except for some snipers in dhows moored under the bank lower down. As soon as the passage was complete both battalions and a mountain-gun section advanced under Colonel Frazer on Kurnah, the 104th making a wide sweep to take it in rear. They actually captured three towers which formed part of the defences, but so slow had been the crossing with the means at hand that the General thought it too late to press the attack and engage in street fighting that.day, and at 3.30 he ordered Colonel Frazer to break off and bivouac at the flying bridge.

 

The ships continued to fire till sunset, and then held their ground in readiness to support the attack next day. But, in fact, Kurnah had had enough. Early in the middle watch a small steamer was seen coming down the river with all lights burning and blowing her siren. She proved to be a flag of truce with Turkish officers wishing to discuss terms of capitulation. As Captain Hayes-Sadler could not communicate with the General, he insisted on surrender at discretion. To this the officers agreed, and promised to return and meet the General in the morning. They kept their word, and during the afternoon of December 9 the British flag was hoisted over Kurnah. With the surrender of the place the number of prisoners was brought up to forty-five officers and nearly 1000 men, including the Vali of Basra and the Turkish Commandant. The British casualties ashore in the three days fighting were twenty-seven killed and 292 wounded. Afloat they were very slight, amounting to no more than two killed and ten wounded, but amongst the killed was Lieut.-Commander Elkes, R.N.R., who had so gallantly commanded the Shaitan.

 

From a defensive point of view the operations had given at small cost all that was required. Anything further would be in the nature of offence, and for that it was necessary to wait till the situation in France and Egypt and the maturing of the New Army permitted a sufficient force to be allotted to this subsidiary theatre. With Kurnah firmly in our possession we had definitely secured at the head of the Persian Gulf a sound strategical position which, besides all its other material and moral advantages, finally clenched our command of Eastern waters.

 

In the Cameroons a similar situation had been reached, which, though less satisfactory from a military point of view, served to deprive the colony of any naval value to the enemy. As we have seen, it was on November 10, the same day that General Delamain disembarked his force in the Shatt-al-Arab, that the carefully elaborated plan against

 

Nov. 10-12, 1914

THE CAMEROONS

 

Buea was set in motion. (See Map, ante. p. 276.) As in that which had been so successful against Edea, it was based on three columns, but in this case the troops were almost entirely British. While the French held Yapoma and Edea, the main column, of nearly 1000 men, under Colonel Gorges, was to go by water to Tiko, the nearest point of the Duala creek system to Buea, and thence it would advance by land a distance of about twelve miles.

(Main Column: Colonel Gorges. Two naval 12-pdr guns; 1st Battery Nigerian Regiment; 1st Battalion Nigerian Regiment; one Pioneer Company Gold Coast Regiment; one company Senegalese; Signal Detachment West Indian Regiment. Total, 943 rifles and six guns.)

The second column, about 600 strong, under Major Rose, would move from Susa on the Northern Railway westward to the Mungo River, where a flotilla would meet it. A combined advance would then be made to Mpundu, where they would be within six or seven miles of Colonel Gorges's line of advance, and would come under his command.

(Second Column: Major Rose. One section artillery, Gold Coast Regiment; Composite battalion; two sections Pioneer Company Gold Coast Regiment; Signal Detachment. Total, 690 rifles, six guns.)

The third column, under Colonel Haywood, also starting from Susa, was to push up the Northern Railway to Mujuka, a military post twenty-five miles west of Ybassi and some thirty miles inland from Buea on the German line of retreat.

(Third Column: Colonel Haywood. Two Mountain Guns; 1 1/2 company West African Regiment; 2nd Battalion Nigerian Regiment.)

Besides the flotilla work on the Mungo River and for the capture of Tiko, the Navy had special functions of its own. Its main business was to seize the port of Victoria and the shore end of the Buea light railway, and it was also to make a demonstration further north off the port of Bibundi "to cause the enemy to withdraw towards the Northern Railway."

 

It was with this demonstration that the operations were begun on November 10 by the Dwarf. The next two days she spent in visiting two small ports that lay beyond Victoria, and in the night of the 12th she anchored in company with a transport off Bibundi, On the same day the main column started for Tiko with the flotilla in which were the Cumberland's two 6" guns, under Captain Beaty-Pownall of the Challenger. The two other columns also left Susa, and during the afternoon Major Rose's column met the Mungo Flotilla, headed by the captured German gunboat Sokoto, at Mbongo. In company with it they continued to advance the same day on both banks of the river, and halted for the night at Diongo. Simultaneously the Ivy, with the Porpoise, Vigilant, and a

 

Nov. 13-15, 1914

A COMBINED ADVANCE

 

transport conveying the Cumberland and Challenger's Marines, with the Bruix as supporting ship, left the Suellaba base for Victoria.

 

On the following day (November 13) the Dwarf with her own boats and those of the transport made an elaborate pretence of landing, and after waiting till dark for the alarm to spread, sent a party ashore to cut the telephone wires. The demonstration seems to have had the desired effect, for it was learnt later that news did spread in the interior that a landing in force had taken place. In any case there was nothing left to give trouble at Victoria. At daylight the Ivy and her squadron appeared and sent in a summons to surrender in an hour on pain of bombardment. It was refused, and at 9.0 a.m. all the ships, including the Bruix, opened on Victoria and the adjacent port of Bota. Under cover of the fire the latter place was occupied by the Marines without opposition, and by 10.30 they were advancing on Victoria. The elaborate entrenchments which defended it were found unoccupied, and within the next hour the place was in their possession. The railway was undamaged, a quantity of rolling stock was captured intact, and next day was devoted to clearing the beach of land mines and restoring the leading marks of the port.

 

Everywhere else the combination was also going like a clock. Even before the landing at Bota had been effected, the main flotilla had driven the enemy from their trenches at Tiko, and that point, too, was occupied without opposition. On the Mungo River there was the same story to tell. At Mpundu the Germans would not face the flotilla, and by the time the troops arrived the Sokoto and her mosquito consorts had cleared it, so that the same afternoon the column could begin its march to join hands with the main column, which started at daylight the next morning (the 14th) from Tiko. While the Marines were making themselves at home in Victoria the two columns met. Very little opposition was encountered. The enemy seemed demoralised by the bewildering complexity of the operation and the speed with which it was carried out. The result was that by the afternoon of the 15th not only was Buea occupied, but the railway column was in possession of Mujuka, and the Force could be warmly congratulated on an exceedingly well-planned piece of combined work, skilfully and boldly executed.

 

On the British side, then, all was clear for a further advance into the interior, but on the French side the situation was not so satisfactory. Reconnaissances from Edea, in which Colonel Mayer had. been engaged, proved that the country

 

Nov. 18-Dec. 1, 1914

THE CAMEROONS

 

between Edea and the sea, including Dehane and a place called Ebea, near the mouth of the Lokundje River, had been reoccupied by the enemy, and it was necessary to clear the district before the Allied right could move in harmony with the left. To this end General Dobell concerted a plan similar to those which had already succeeded so well. A French force was to advance from Edea on Dehane, where an armed vessel proceeding up the Nyong River was to meet it. Another French column was to land at Longji and march on Ebea, while a flotilla with the British Marines made for the same objective up the Lokundje. When these operations were complete the French coast column would march to the port of Kribi, the headquarters of the district, and occupy it with the support of the Dwarf and Ivy. A reconnaissance conducted by the Ivy on November 19 and 20 as high as Dehane confirmed the report that the enemy were in force both there and at Ebea, but she could also give the satisfactory intelligence that the larger vessels of the flotilla could still reach Dehane in spite of the falling waters.

 

On November 26 the movement began from both directions. Next morning the Lokundje Flotilla entered the river, and during the day the French coast column was successfully landed at Longji. But here progress was checked by news that the Ebea column had been repulsed above Dehane. The coast column, therefore, hesitated to advance on Ebea till the Longji district had been thoroughly reconnoitred. This was not our way of conducting coastal operations; our best masters of the art had, always set surprise higher than reconnaissance. The French Service, however, did not distinguish so clearly between coastal and regular land operations, so our Nyong Flotilla had to be withdrawn and the lighter part of it sent up the Lokundje to expedite matters.

 

There it found no trouble in dealing with the outposts it came across. They were all dislodged and one of the, posts occupied. But by the 30th the French commander was convinced he could not carry on without reinforcements, and the flotilla returned down the river to await their arrival. Next day, however, word came that none were available. Gerieral Dobell, in fact, was about to launch a column he had been organising at Mujuka to follow up his success at Buea. Its object was, by clearing the rest of the Northern Railway, to strike a blow at the Germans who had retreated that way and at the same time to relieve the persistent pressure which the enemy was maintaining on the central sections of the Nigerian frontier, and thereby preventing the Nigerian Column from co-operating with him. He had, therefore, no troops to spare. Consequently, to the

 

Dec. 2-4, 1914

RESULTS OBTAINED

great regret of the British Staff, the attempt on Dehane and Ebea had to be abandoned, and the French contented themselves with occupying Kribi while the operations on the left wing proceeded.

 

It was on December 3, the day the port was occupied, that the Mujuka Column started under Colonel Gorges. Some little opposition was encountered, but by the 10th the railhead at Nkongsamba was in his hands, with a quantity of rolling stock and two aeroplanes.

 

With this success, what may be regarded as the first stage of the operations was brought to a conclusion. Its general effect was that, although in the occupation of the interior less progress had been made than was hoped, the whole of the coast that had any importance, with all the ports, was denied to the enemy, and the Cameroons had ceased to be a naval factor before the time expired when the Cumberland was due to leave. But Captain Fuller did not go with her. The Pothuau had arrived, and the conference with the British officers had convinced Captain Cheron, who had come out in command of her, that a change of naval command was highly undesirable. He suggested, therefore, that while he remained as Senior Naval Officer, Captain Fuller should exchange ships with Captain Beaty-Pownall and continue to issue naval orders as Senior Naval Officer on General Dobell's Staff. In this arrangement, which the Governor of Nigeria and General Dobell warmly supported, the Admiralty and the Ministry of Marine concurred; and not only this, but it was agreed that the Cumberland should leave behind her the guns she had lent, as well as all officers, steamboats and gear which were essential to the working of the flotilla, and that Captain Beaty-Pownall should take her straight home to have them replaced. Accordingly, on December 4, the Cumberland sailed and the Pothuau took her place. But scarcely had she arrived when it was known that the main danger to the success of the further operations was past. On the other side of the Atlantic the blow had been struck which finally made all serious interference from the sea impossible.

 

 

---

 

 

 

CHAPTER XXVIII

 

OPERATIONS LEADING UP TO THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLANDS

(See Maps 2 and 14 in case.)

 

While Captain Hayes-Sadler and General Delamain had been making their final preparations for forcing an entrance into the Shatt-al-Arab, and Captain Fuller and General Dobell were making theirs for the capture of Buea, the great combination for redressing the consequences of the Battle of Coronel was starting into action. At midnight on November 5 the Invincible and Inflexible had left Cromarty. Their original orders were to go to Berehaven to fill up with coal, but as the Invincible, which was to carry Admiral Sturdee's flag, required docking and repairs, and as it was necessary to take out all possible stores for Admiral Stoddart, both ships were directed to go to Devonport. Proceeding round the west of Ireland, they arrived on the 8th. Here, when the dockyard officials had examined the Invincible, they reported that the work which was required upon her could not be completed till the 13th. For the Admiralty a week's delay was inadmissible, and an order was immediately telegraphed that she must sail at latest on the 11th, and that if her defects had not been made good by that time the necessary dockyard hands must go with her and be sent back as opportunity offered. So fine was the response that the two ships put to sea at 4.45 p.m. on the 11th.

 

Two days earlier - just as the Sydney was finishing off the Emden - Admiral Sturdee received his sailing orders. They directed him to proceed to St. Vincent, Cape Verde, but, as it was just possible Admiral von Spee might move north to the Panama. Canal, he was warned that he might be diverted on passage to the West Indies. On existing indications, however, the German squadron was expected on the southeast coast of America, and in default of further orders Admiral Sturdee was to proceed to the Abrolhos Rocks rendezvous, where he would find Admiral Stoddart's squadron concentrated, and on his way down he was to call to his flag the Bristol and Macedonia, which were then searching in the

 

Nov. 9-11, 1914

COMPLETING THE NET

 

Rocas area for the Karlsruhe and her colliers. For the sake of perfecting the concentration against the main body of the enemy and providing Admiral Sturdee with light cruisers, that ship was to be left to do her worst. But only for a time. The morning after Admiral Sturdee's orders were signed news came in of the Emden's destruction, and within a few hours it was decided to bring the Sydney and Melbourne into the Atlantic. Seeing that the Australia had already been ordered to the Californian coast; it was a serious draft on the Commonwealth Navy. There were still German auxiliary cruisers about, and further contingents of troops for Europe would soon require escort. The Australian Government were naturally anxious, and asked to have the whole situation explained. In reply the Admiralty informed them of the measures which had been taken, by means of the two Japanese South Sea Squadrons, to secure the safety of Australian waters and to meet the eventuality of Admiral von Spee breaking back, and explained that the two Australian light cruisers were far too valuable to be used for anything but the most active work that had to be done. The Commonwealth Government at once agreed. So, leaving the Australasian convoy to the Ibuki and Hampshire, the two light cruisers hurried on to Malta.

 

There still remained one further step to take to complete the world-wide combination, and before Admiral Sturdee sailed arrangements had been made which would render his diversion to the West Indies unnecessary in any case. The fact was that the old apprehension for the North Atlantic trade routes had been re-awakened. Since the first week in the war they had been undisturbed, but now there were rumours that the Germans intended to send out battle cruisers to raid them. It was reported, indeed, that the Von der Tann had actually broken out. The reports came from sources that could not be ignored, especially as a bold stroke against the slender British force which was watching the large German liners at New York might well let them loose to prey on our trade. It was difficult to believe that Admiral von Spee's movement across the Pacific was not part of some larger plan, and quite possibly the idea was to combine an attack on our Plate and Brazil trade with one on the northern routes. The stopping of both these arteries of commerce at the same time - even for a few weeks – would place us in a very difficult position, and it was certainly the most effective plan for influencing the war that appeared to be within the resources of the German Navy. In any case the menace was too probable to be neglected, and even at

 

Nov. 9-12, 1914

EVE OF THE FALKLANDS

 

the cost of still further weakening the Grand Fleet it was decided to draw upon it for another battle cruiser. Accordingly, on November 10, Admiral Jellicoe had orders to detach the Princess Royal to reinforce our New York division, but so secret was the matter kept that even Admiral Hornby was not informed she had been ordered to join him.

 

Coming, as it did, so closely after the loss of the Audacious and the Gorleston Raid, the demand was a very serious one to make upon the Commander-in-Chief. True, the splendid new battle cruiser Tiger had just joined him, but it would be some time before so raw a ship could be regarded as an efficient battle unit, and as for the promised 1st Cruiser Squadron, there seemed little prospect of its being able to join him till Admiral von Spee had been dealt with. All that could be done was to lay the whole situation before him and show how the possibility of Admiral von Spee coming through the Panama Canal, defeating the West Indian Squadron and releasing the armed liners in New York, rendered the detaching of the Princess Royal imperative. The risk, such as it was, had to be run. It. was entirely in accordance with the old principle that the Grand Fleet was not only our main concentration, but the reservoir on which we had to draw to meet all such eventualities, and on November 12 - the day on which it was calculated the Germans might be off Panama - the Princess Royal secretly left Cromarty for Halifax.

 

By this time all anxiety as to the surviving ships of Admiral Cradock's squadron was at an end. On November 8 the Canopus and Glasgow had reached the Falklands, and on orders already issued they carried on to join Admiral Stoddart, who was concentrating at the River Plate. The third ship, Otranto, having sufficient coal, was proceeding there direct from the Strait. The first appreciation had naturally been that Admiral von Spee would follow up his victory by delivering a blow at the east coast trade routes. This was now doubtful. He had not been heard of since November 4, and the only new information was an intercepted message which seemed to indicate that his rendezvous was Mas-a-fuera. It was possible, therefore, that he would have to be sought out on the west coast, and if this was so the Falkland Islands became essential as a coaling base and must be protected. In these circumstances the previous orders of the Canopus were cancelled, and on November 9 Captain Heathcoat Grant was directed to remain at Port Stanley; moor his ship so as to command the entrance, and co-operate with the Governor for the defence of the place. On receiving

 

Nov. 9-12, 1914

ADMIRAL STODDART

 

these orders from Admiral Stoddart he turned back and reached Port Stanley on the 12th to find the Germans had not yet appeared.

 

Meanwhile Admiral Stoddart, with his flag in the Defence, was off the Plate with the Carnarvon, Cornwall, and Orama. The Otranto, which had come direct without going to the Falklands, had also joined him. On the 9th - the day the Canopus was turned back - he received orders to remain where he was long enough for the Glasgow to join, and, as it was still possible the Germans would appear on his station, to fall back northward to the Abrolhos coaling station and protect the colliers. If Admiral von Spee should appear there and attempt to destroy them, he was authorised to engage him. On the 11th the Glasgow arrived, and Admiral Stoddart sailed in pursuance of his orders, sending the Orama to search Trinidada Island on the way. It was a happy inspiration, for she was hardly clear of the estuary when she sighted a ship which ran from her south-eastwards. The chase was soon overhauled, and the crew, after setting her on fire, took to their boats.

 

She proved to be the Navarra of the Hamburg-Amerika Line, which had left Pernambuco on September 24 with munitions and supplies for the German cruisers, and seems to have been wandering in search of them ever since. On October 9 she had been seen by a British ship entering the Strait of Magellan, and next day was at Punta Arenas. She seems to have left immediately, probably to meet the Kronprinz Wilhelm, who is known to have detached a tender to look for her about this time. The Navarra, when sighted, was steering towards Trinidada, and the Kronprinz Wilhelm appears to have been moving down to meet her, for on October 7 she had sunk a British steamship called La Correntina 270 miles east of the Plate. This vessel was one of our defensively armed merchantmen, with two 4.7" guns mounted astern, but, having left home before the outbreak of war, she had no ammunition on board. Her fate, however, was not known till more than a month afterwards, when a German steamship brought her crew into Montevideo, together with those of two French sailing ships which had been captured subsequently. After seeing the Navarra sink and rescuing the crew, the Orama carried on for Abrolhos. In reporting the fortunate occurrence Admiral Stoddart begged that it should be kept secret.

 

Up till this time he had not heard that Admiral Sturdee was coming out, but on November 11, the day the battle cruisers sailed, he was informed. On November 17 Admiral Sturdee put into St. Vincent, Cape Verde, to coal, and on the

 

Nov. 17, 1914

EVE OF THE FALKLANDS

 

same day Admiral Stoddart reached Abrolhos Rocks. He found there the Edinburgh Castle, which had been left on guard, and the Kent, so that besides the Defence he had three armoured ships with which to meet Admiral von Spee should he appear. But he had no light cruisers. The Bristol and Macedonia were still searching for the Karlsruhe, and the Glasgow had to go into Rio to dock and repair the damage she had received in the Coronel action. So exasperated were the Brazilian authorities by this time, as were also those of Chile, by the insolent disregard of then neutrality which the Germans had been displaying, that for the Glasgow they extended "benevolence" to its utmost limits. She received the most cordial welcome, was allowed to remain five days till she was in a better condition than when she began the war, and when she left she was not permitted to pay the dock charges. Considering how strong was German influence in Brazil, and that the cruiser was part of a defeated fleet, it was high testimony in a neutral of a desire to be just, and the exhibition of good-will was one which our Navy should be slow to forget.

 

While Admiral Stoddart was thus getting into position and the Canopus was completing arrangements for the defence of the southern base, Admiral Hornby to the northward was disposing his squadron to meet the eventuality of Admiral von Spee coming through the Panama Canal. His intention was to concentrate the Glory, Essex, Lancaster, Berwick, and Condi as a fighting squadron in the West Indies, leaving the Suffolk and Caronia to watch New, York. But, on informing the Admiralty of his plan, he was told the Princess Royal was coming, and that he was to shift his flag from the Glory to the Suffolk, and send the Glory down to join the Lancaster and Berwick. He at once suggested keeping the Glory for New York: and sending the battle cruiser to the West Indies. But he was told that the Princess Royal must remain north to meet the contingency of a heavy cruiser breaking out of the North Sea, though, as the Suffolk required dockyard repair, the Glory was ordered not to move south for the present. Whatever grounds there were to anticipate that the enemy's plan was to send out battle cruisers, it seems certainly to have been expected by the Germans in South America. Some weeks later the Plate wireless station was intercepting daily calls to the Seydlitz, Moltke and Von der Tann, although we knew that all these ships were then in the North Sea. An additional reason for not being in a hurry to send the Princess Royal to the West Indies was that such indications as we had pointed to Admiral

 

Nov. 4-14, 1914

VON SPEE'S MOVEMENTS

 

von Spee not having moved to the northward. On November 13 the Leipzig and Dresden appeared at Valparaiso. They left again next day, but the whole German squadron was reported to be off the port, and a suspicious collier was known to be at Punta Arenas, apparently waiting for the German squadron to come south.

 

But, in fact, the report of Admiral von Spee being off Valparaiso was false. On leaving that port, as we now know, on November 4 he had gone back to Mas-a-fuera, which he had appointed as a rendezvous for his two detached light cruisers. There he arrived on November 6, to find that on the previous day the Leipzig had arrived in company with two of his own colliers, Amasis and Santa Isabel, and also with a prize, the Valentine, a French four-masted barque of 8000 tons. The following day the Baden joined, with another, the Norwegian ship Helicon, of 1,600 tons. Both prizes were full of Welsh coal, which Admiral von Spee proceeded to transfer to his cruisers and regular colliers. The work was still in progress when, early on the 8th, the Prinz Eitel Friedrich joined, followed later by the Dresden with yet another prize. This was the Sacramento, but whether this was not a meeting by appointment rather than a genuine capture is more than doubtful. (The Sacramento was the Hamburg-Amerika ship Alexandria which had put into San Francisco on August 8. After obtaining an American register, she left under her new name on October 15 for Valparaiso with fuel and supplies and eluded the Newcastle which was on the look out for her. On her arrival empty at Valparaiso on November 20, her master asserted he had been stopped by a German cruiser and been made to give up his cargo under duress. But his story was not believed, and the ship was interned, with the cordial consent of the United States Government; see A. Alvarez, La Grande Guerre Europeene et la Neutralitie du Chile, pp 266-7.)

 

 Her, too, it was decided to clear in spite of the delay it would involve and the continued violation of Chilean territory. Why Admiral von Spee waited so long before following up his success is not apparent. It can hardly be that the captured coal was essential for further operations, for he had several colliers awaiting orders in Chilean ports. Possibly he, too, may have received the rumours that German battle cruisers were breaking out of the North Sea to join hands with him. There was certainly an expectation to this effect prevalent in the squadron, for under date November 23 an officer of the Gneisenau entered in his diary that he had been told that the Seydlitz and Moltke, loaded with ammunition, were making their way into the Atlantic, and about three weeks later, as we have seen, the Montevideo wireless station was making daily calls to these two ships, as well as to the Von der Tann.

 

Nov. 15-21, 1914

EVE OF THE FALKLANDS

Admiral Von Spee may, therefore, have been simply standing by to give them time to appear, so that nothing was lost in transferring the captured coal. By the 15th - that is, after over a week's stay - the work was complete, and he sailed for St. Quentin Bay in the Gulf of Penas, about 300 miles north of the Magellan Strait, where his other colliers were to meet him. Two days later - the 17th - he met the Dresden and Leipzig at a sea rendezvous about 400 miles south of Mas-a-fuera. Their news was that on the way from Valparaiso they had captured the North Wales, the collier which Admiral Cradock had ordered on to Juan Fernandez from his secret coaling base near the Straits and which they caught making her way back to the Falklands with 700 tons of coal on board. She, too, was sunk, but her consorts the storeship Crown of Galicia, which was three days ahead, got through without being sighted.

 

Oh November 21 the squadron reached St. Quentin Bay, and there they found two large colliers awaiting them. One was the Norddeutscher Lloyd S.S. Seydlitz, which had stolen out of Valparaiso without a clearance shortly before the battle of Coronel. The other was the Kosmos liner Memphis, which had come from Punta Arenas, also without clearance. Two days later a third ship joined them. This was another Kosmos liner, the Luxor, which had been lying in Coronel since September 6. On that day she began taking in 10,000 tons of coal, and she had succeeded in getting 3000 tons on board before the Chilean authorities put a stop to it. Still, in defiance of them, she managed to slip out during the night of November 18 with a large supply of provisions besides the fuel. Her departure from Coronel was at once reported to the Admiralty, and they thus became aware that Admiral von Spee was still trying to take in coal somewhere on the west coast, but nothing further was yet known of his movements. It was enough, however, to assure them that Admiral Sturdee would be in time to deal with the German squadron if it attempted to attack the Plate routes, since by the time Admiral von Spee reached St., Quentin Bay, Admiral Sturdee had left St. Vincent and was well on his way to Rocas Reef, which he intended to search as he passed down.

 

The situation was thus so well in hand that a modification of the combination was possible. It was specially important to find something to take the place of the battle cruisers in the Grand Fleet as soon as possible, and it was now felt that the Warrior and Black Prince could be spared. The formation of a new African squadron under Admiral de Robeck was no

 

Nov. 13-24, 1915

SOUTH AFRICA

 

longer necessary. It was therefore cancelled. On November 19 he was ordered to return to the Amphitrite and resume the command of the 9th Cruiser Squadron, while the Black Prince, Warrior, and Donegal were ordered to join Admiral Jellicoe. In their place the Defence was to reinforce the Cape Station. With the Defence, Minotaur, and Albion, as well as the light cruisers Weymouth and Dartmouth from the East Indies and the Hyacinth and Astrcea of the original squadron, it was strong enough. Orders went out accordingly on November 22, Admiral Stoddart being instructed that as soon as Admiral Sturdee arrived he was to remove his flag from the Defence and send her away to St. Helena at fifteen knots to join the Cape Squadron.

 

Her presence at the Cape was urgently required, for until she arrived it was impossible to resume the plan of operations against German South-West Africa. Ever since the rebellion had broken out these operations had been suspended, but it was now mastered. The successes of the Union forces had continued without interruption. On November 13 the back of the movement had been broken, when General Botha, assisted by Colonels Brand and Brits, had defeated De Wet at Bantry, Mushroom Valley and Honderkop, and on that day, with a view of freeing the Union forces for opening the campaign against the Germans, a notification had been issued offering an amnesty to all rebels who surrendered by November 21.

 

By that time De Wet had suffered two more reverses, and the rebels were coming in in such large numbers that the Government decided they need no longer delay operations. On November 23, therefore, they informed Admiral King-Hall that they proposed to send an expedition to Walfisch Bay about December 12, a date which was next day advanced to the 2nd. But they had calculated without the far-reaching effects of the German Pacific Squadron. Admiral King-Hall at once saw the dangers that beset the project so long as Admiral von Spee was unlocated, and telegraphed home for instructions. The difficulty was that, owing to the mystery which surrounded the movements of the German Admiral after the Battle of Coronel and the unhappy experience of the battle itself, the Admiralty had felt compelled to send him a strict order to keep his squadron concentrated. In the middle of the month, therefore, he had recalled the Albion, which had been stationed as guardship at Walfisch Bay, and had gathered all his ships at Simonstown and Table Bay. As the two East Indies light cruisers Dartmouth and Weymouth had arrived and the Minotaur was close at hand, it would, of

 

Nov. 23-24, 1914

EVE OF THE FALKLANDS

 

course, be possible for him to escort the expedition to Walfisch Bay; but as the place had still no adequate coast defence, he would have to protect it, and in view of his orders to remain concentrated, the only way to do it was to keep the whole squadron there. This would leave the southern base at Luderitz Bay exposed to attack, as well as the whole line of supply from the Cape, 750 miles long. The crucial trouble was the difficulty raised by endeavouring to act from two bases 250 miles apart, and the nearest 500 miles from the main source of supply. The risk, however, would be greatly reduced by using the nearer base alone, and he was ready, if the Union Government chose to take the lesser risk, to convey an expedition to Luderitz Bay, but he could not take it to Walfisch Bay till the Defence joined, which meant he could not sail till December 14. So entirely, however, did General Botha's plan of campaign depend on acting from both bases simultaneously that the Union Government decided to postpone the expedition for a fortnight.

 

Thus was the old law exemplified, and a conspicuous modern instance afforded of how a belligerent by keeping a force concentrated at sea may hamper military operations - even in a quite distant theatre by forcing a corresponding concentration on his enemy. In this case the reaction of our enemy's concentration was strengthened by the mystery which continued to shroud his movements. At the Cape vague rumours led to a belief that Admiral von Spee was then actually crossing the Atlantic. But this the Admiralty soon ascertained to be unntrue. On the same day that the Union Government decided to re-open operations, our Consul-General at Valparaiso was able to report that he had information direct from Mas-a-fuera with the names of all the ships present on November 15. He also stated that it was believed they had been depositing a store of coal on the island, and that the Chilean Government, to assert its neutrality, was going to send ships to destroy it. The information was amplified next day (the 23rd) from an intercepted German message, which left little doubt that Admiral von Spee was at St. Quentin Bay.

 

The news had a marked effect on Admiral. Sturdee's instructions. It seemed to indicate that if he was to bring the German squadron to action he would have to seek it on the west coast. On November 24, therefore, orders were sent out that after joining up with Admiral Stoddart he was to move south to the Falklands, which he was to use as his base, and then move to the Chilean coast, searching the channels and inlets of Tierra del Fuego and keeping his big

 

Nov. 26, 1914

ORDERS TO ADMIRAL STURDEE

 

ships from being seen in the Straits. He was further informed that the Australia and Admiral Patey's Anglo-Japanese Squadron would be at the Galapagos Islands on December 2, ready to move south, and that the Japanese First South Sea Squadron would probably be moving eastwards from Fiji to the Marquesas Islands.

(This squadron was being reinforced by the light cruisers Chikuma and Yahagi from the Indian Ocean after the destruction of the Emden. The Ikoma was also to join. The Iwate was being transferred from the 1st to the 2nd Squadron, which was concentrating at Truk Island in the Eastern Carolines. The Ibuki and the Nisshin were also to join it there, while the other two cruisers which had been under Admiral Jerram - Tokiwa and Yakumo - were recalled to Japan to join the first South Sea Squadron. The two squadrons were, therefore, now constituted as follows:

 

FIRST SQUADRON, Vice-Admiral Yamaya (Base, Suva, Fiji), battle cruisers Kurama, Tsukuba, Ikoma, armoured cruiser Iwate, light cruisers Chikuma, Yahagi

 

SECOND SQUADRON, Rear-Admiral Matsumura (Base, Truk, Carolines), battleship Satsuma, battle cruiser Ibuki, armoured cruiser Nisshin, light cruiser Hirado, destroyers Umikaze, Yamakaze.)

These orders Admiral Sturdee received at the Abrolhos Rocks rendezvous when he reached it on November 26. He found there the Carnarvon, to which Admiral Stoddart had just shifted his flag, Cornwall, Kent, Glasgow (now thoroughly repaired), Bristol, and Orama. The Defence was also waiting there in order to transfer to the Invincible the Poulsen wireless gear with which she had been fitted. As a link the afterwards famous Vindictive, similarly fitted, was on her way to Ascension, and by this means it was hoped to get over the difficulty of communicating, which had been found so troublesome in Admiral Cradock's case. Admiral Sturdee's first care was to select his three fastest colliers and dispatch them in advance on separate courses to the Falklands. Then having rigged the Poulsen gear and coaled, he arranged for the Orama to escort the rest of them - five in number - to his new base, while he took the united squadron down inshore of them.

 

To any one who at this moment could have surveyed, the vast theatre of operations it would have seemed that, in

 

Nov. 26-Dec. 1, 1914

EVE OF THE FALKLANDS

 

spite of the rapidity with which, the British combination had been organised, it was too late. For on the day Admiral Sturdee reached Abrolhos Rocks, Admiral von Spee left St. Quentin Bay for the Falklands. Besides the two large cruisers he took with him the Dresden, Leipzig, and Nurnberg. The Prinz Eitel Friedrich was detached, as the Emden had been, to act independently as a commerce raider on the west coast. The three colliers Seydlitz, Baden, and Santa Isabel, and possibly another, remained with the squadron. The Memphis, and Luxor, after having been swept, were dismissed, and both on their arrival in port were interned, the Memphis at Coronel by the Chileans and the Luxor at Callao by the Peruvians. So, as Admiral Sturdee came southwards, the German squadron was steaming towards the Horn, but in weather so tempestuous that they could sometimes make no more than five knots; the colliers were unable to keep touch, and so great were the seas that no formation could be preserved.

 

It was on November 28, two days after the Germans started for the Falklands, that Admiral Sturdee left the Abrolhos rendezvous. By that time the crews of La Correntina and of one of the French sailing vessels which the Kronprinz Wilhelm had captured had been brought into Montevideo by her tender, the Sierra Cordoba, and it was thus known that a fortnight earlier she had been working on the sailing track some 300 to 400 miles off Santos. Admiral Sturdee, therefore, decided to make a sweep for her, and went down the route with his squadron in extended order, covering a front of fifty miles. But, in fact, she was no longer there, for after her second French capture, the barque Anne de Bretagne, she had gone to the northward to take up the Karlsruhe's old cruising ground, from which the Bristol and Macedonia had just been withdrawn. Had he held on, therefore, he would have formd nothing, but, as it was, a report from our Charge d'Affaires at Rio the same evening that the Von Spee squadron was 400 miles from Montevideo drew him off in that direction. It was not till December 1, when the Bristol, which had been sent into Rio for intelligence, rejoined him, that he knew the report was false, and he then set his course for the Falklands.

 

But, meanwhile, another report of the whereabouts of the German squadron had come to hand. It had been received on November 29 from Iquique in the extreme north of Chile, and it stated that at least three cruisers had been off that port the previous day. This looked so much like a move for the Panama Canal that Admiral Hornby was

 

Dec. 1-6, 1914

VON SPEE AT THE HORN

 

ordered to send the Princess Royal to Jamaica at once. Captain Osmond Brock, who commanded her, was to become Senior Naval Officer for the West Indies, and his orders were to keep up communication with Admiral Patey, with whom wireless contact had just been established by the Berwick.

 

The news, which was false, made no difference to Admiral Sturdee. He continued his way down, and on December 3 his squadron was completed by the junction of the Macedonia, which had been away at Sierra Leone to coal and make good defects. By that time he was off the Plate, and, as his course to the Falklands now began to diverge more and more widely from the coast, there was increasing risk of the German squadron slipping by him. On November 25 the Canopus at Port Stanley had taken in a signal that Admiral von Spee had actually rounded the Horn, but this was unknown to Admiral Sturdee, and on December 4 he got a message which left him in no doubt he could safely carry on as he was. It came from our Consul-General at Valparaiso, and stated that the Prinz Eitel Friedrich had been sighted off the port early that morning. From this fact the Admiral concluded that the whole German squadron was probably there.

 

His deduction was erroneous. Admiral von Spee had actually rounded the Horn at midnight on December 1-2, but, instead of going on, had called another halt. In the morning his light cruisers sighted and captured the British four-masted barque Drummuir about thirty miles from Staten Island, and, as she had on board 2,800 tons of anthracite, which she was taking to San Francisco, she was towed into the mouth of the Beagle Channel, and there, under Picton Island, the squadron anchored to discharge her cargo into the cruisers and colliers. The work took three days, and it was not till noon on December 6 that they put to sea again. The Drummuir was towed out and sunk, and then the course was finally set for the Falklands.

 

It is evident, therefore, that but for his delay in clearing his last captme Admiral von Spee would have reached Port Stanley at least two days before Admiral Sturdee. What he expected to find there was a British squadron coaling. It was believed to consist of the Canopus, Carnarvon, and possibly the Defence, Cornwall and Glasgow. According to two of the survivors of the Gneisenau he obtained this information from a Dutch ship the day after leaving Picton Island. On the strength of it, so the two men asserted, his intention was to draw the British to sea and destroy them. He could then occupy the Islands and demolish the wireless installation, and for this operation landing-parties were told off.

 

Nov. 12-Dec. 7, 1914

EVE OF THE FALKLANDS

 

Assuming the prisoners' statement to be correct, it may be taken as certain that, as the Canopus was there alone, he would have attempted to destroy her. Whatever success he might have met with, his power of fighting Admiral Sturdee must have been seriously crippled; for Captain Grant had had full time to complete his preparations for defence.

 

Having returned to the Falklands on November 12, he attempted to place the ship in position in Port William, the outer harbour, but, finding the weather rendered this impracticable, he moved into Port Stanley, the inner, harbour, which is practically a lagoon accessible from the outer harbour by a very narrow entrance. (See Map 17 in case.)

 

At one end lies the little settlement, at the other he moored his ship, and eventually, finding it impossible to keep her steady, berthed her on the mud, as he was specially authorised to do by his instructions. The outer entrance was closed with a row of electric mines constructed out of old oil drums, and a picket boat with dropping gear patrolled outside. Three batteries were also established and armed with 12-pdrs, and an observation station set up ashore as a fire-control position for covering all points from which an attack could be made on the wireless installation. (The wireless station, was at the eastern end of the Murray Heights, about three-quarters of a mile W.S.W. from Hooker Point.)

 

The work was exceptionally laborious, and it had to be done in a continuous succession of hurricanes of snow and hail. In the midst of the work the stores ship, Crown of Galicia, came in after her escape from the German squadron, and her stores were cleared and stowed in the Admiralty sheds which had been built some years before but never yet used. The new King Edward Memorial hospital was also equipped by the medical staff of the ship, and all through the weather never ceased to justify its evil reputation. It was not till December 4 that all was done and the Canopus was snug in her mud berth at the eastern end of the harbour.

 

Thus sturdily prepared, the deserted little colony was waiting for the blow to fall. Ever since November 25, when the message came that Admiral von Spee had doubled the Horn, they had been expecting attack. Day by day the anxiety grew, but not till the forenoon of Monday, December 7, did the signal station report a single sail. Then without warning Admiral Sturdee's whole squadron appeared, to the great relief of all concerned. His intention, as signalled to the squadron the previous day, was to commence coaling at once and leave again on Wednesday, the 9th, in

 

Dec. 7-8, 1914

STURDEE AT THE FALKLANDS

 

the afternoon, in order to get round the Horn before the enemy came east. As his own colliers had not arrived and there were only three in the harbour, the whole squadron could not coal simultaneously, and, moreover, the Bristol required engine repairs. The arrangements, therefore, were that the Carnarvon, Bristol, and Glasgow should coal first, and the two battle cruisers next. These five ships could then sail, if desirable, on Tuesday, leaving the Kent and Cornwall to follow. The orders for the squadron, except the Bristol, were to keep steam for twelve knots at two hours notice, and for the guardships, to be ready for fourteen knots at half an hour. Till Tuesday morning the Inflexible was to be guardship and afterwards the Kent. On arrival all the ships anchored in Port William within the minefield, except the Bristol and Glasgow, which went into Port Stanley, and the Macedonia, which was told off to patrol during the night ten miles from the entrance.

 

After anchoring, the Admiral signalled for all captains, and a conference was held. Of news, beyond persistent rumours from Brazil, probably spread by Germans, that Admiral von Spee intended to make for South Africa, there was very little. Since, however, the German squadron had not appeared, it seemed obvious the report of their having passed the Horn must have been false. The last indication the Admiral had to go upon was the appearance of the Prinz Eitel Friedrich off Valparaiso, and there seemed little doubt that the squadron should get to the west coast as soon as possible. The arrangements, therefore, stood as settled the previous day.

 

By 6 a.m. the Carnarvon and Glasgow had finished coaling, but a hitch had occurred with the Bristol, for the coal in her collier was found to have deteriorated so badly that it could not be used, and she had to wait for the Glasgow's. There was thus only one left for the battle cruisers, but, fortunately, one of the squadron colliers now appeared, and she was ordered at once to the Inflexible, who was able to begin coaling at 7.20. The Bristol still had her fires drawn, the Cornwall had an engine opened up at six hours' notice, and neither she nor the Kent nor Macedonia had begun to coal. Thus the squadron was in no condition for action, when, half an hour later (7.50), the signal station which the Canopus had established on Sapper Hill above the town reported the startling news that two strange ships of war were approaching from the southward.

 

 

---

 

 

CHAPTER XXIX

 

THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLANDS, DECEMBER 8

(See Maps 17 and 18 in case.)

 

When Admiral von Spee was at Valparaiso after the action off Coronel, it is said he refused to sanction any celebration of his victory by the German colony. Even at the club he declined to drink to the confusion of the British Navy, and in conversation seemed to be impressed with a foreboding that his career would soon be brought to an end. From the first, when he was eluding observation amongst the South Sea Islands, his movements showed that he was under no delusions as to the crushing superiority of the Allies on the high seas, and now he could scarcely doubt that swift retribution must follow the blow he had been fortunate enough to deliver to British prestige. It was a blow certain to let loose all the latent energy and resource of the oldest and most powerful of the navies, and it was probably for this reason he had been unwilling to visit the Falklands. His only chance was evasion; and it was believed that the Canopus and other ships were at Port Stanley. Still, if prisoners can be believed, he had been persuaded by the captain of the Gneisenau and his own Staff, against his better judgment, to attempt to destroy whatever might be found there.

 

In these circumstances he naturally approached the islands with caution. The captain of the Gneisenau, with his own ship and the Nurnberg, was sent ahead to reconnoitre, and as a first step to destroy the wireless station by gun fire. It was this detachment which at 7.50 on December 8 was sighted from the signal station, The surprise was complete. Admiral Sturdee was not intending to sail till the evening, and there had been so many false alarms of late that little notice was taken at the moment. Indeed, so busy was the flagship coaling that the Glasgow in the inner harbour, who took in the signal, fired a gun to ensure immediate attention.

(Canopus passed the alarm at 7.50. Invincible's signal log records the Canopus signal at 8.0. It also notes that Glasgow fired a gun at 7.56. Kent was ordered by signal to weigh at 8.10, and the general signal "to prepare to weigh " was made at 8.14.)

7.50-9.15

ENEMY'S APPROACH

 

That Admiral Sturdee had reached the Ealklands just in time was a stroke of luck which the judgment and energy of the Admiralty fully deserved, but he had been caught at a disadvantage, and the prospects, should the Germans press home an attack without delay, were far from pleasant. Still, but for the Admiral's foresight it might have been worse. After a long run down from Brazil the engineer officers would naturally expect the ships to be put at long notice to give them a fair chance of overhauling. But in view of the uncertainty of the situation Admiral Sturdee had felt obliged to put them at two hours, and but for this precaution the end might have been very different. The Glasgow and Bristol were at once ordered to raise steam for full speed, but as the Glasgow was also repairing machinery she could not be ready for two hours, while the Bristol, who had both engines opened up, reported she would be unable to move till 11.0. The battle cruisers had not completed coaling, but the general signal to prepare to weigh was made, and at half-past eight "Action" was sounded off and coaling ceased.

 

By this time the signal station reported more smoke away to the south-westward, and a quarter of an hour later the Kent, who had just taken over guard duty, passed down the harbour. Her orders were to join the Macedonia, which was now anchored at the entrance, and observe the enemy. At the same time the Canopus reported the Gneisenau and Nurnberg were eight miles away and the main body of the enemy twenty miles. As the leading ships continued to come on, the Macedonia at 9.15 was recalled inside the harbour, and the colliers were cast off so as to leave all ships free to fire. While this was going on a third patch of smoke was reported by the signal station. It must have come from Admiral von Spee's three colliers, which apparently had orders to make for Pleasant Road, about twenty miles south-west of Port Stanley.

 

Meanwhile the two advanced ships were coming rapidly on, steering, as it seemed, for the wireless cation near Hooker Point, and the Canopus could hope that the precautions she had taken might avail to avert the surprise taking effect. Having previously made all preparations for indirect laying from his fixed platform, Captain Heathcoat Grant at 9.0 asked leave to fire. A quarter of an hour later the two advanced ships could be seen to turn to the north-east, and off the Wolf Rocks, some six miles short of Cape Pembroke, they eased down with their guns trained on the wireless station. By this time Admiral Stoddart had the Carnarvon ready, and was ordered to clear for action and engage the enemy as they

 

Dec. 8, 1914. 9.15-10:0

 

rounded Cape Pembroke. But the Canopus had first to say her word. Her gunnery officer was established ashore in an extemporised observation hut, and as soon as he judged the range to be down to 11,000 he gave the signal. She fired with both guns of the fore turret. The shots fell a long way short, but the Germans hoisted their colours, and putting their helms hard aport, made away to the south-east. As they did so she tried again, this time with a salvo at extreme elevation. Again the shots were short, but only by a hundred yards or so, and to many observers it seemed that some fragments of shell or a ricochet hit the Gneisenau at the base of the after funnel. It was useless to fire again, and in a few minutes (9.31) the enemy altered back 8 points and slowed down as though intending to engage the Kent, which was now well outside the entrance of Port William. So menacing was the movement that the Admiral signalled the exposed cruiser to close the flag. But before she could act on the order the danger was past; for five minutes later (9.40), as the Gneisenau opened the harbour, the dense columns of smoke that hung over it from the British ships firing up showed there must be something more than had been expected inside, and, worse still, there could be made out what looked like tripod masts.

 

Seldom, perhaps, did a sanguine captain receive a severer shock. Though reports of the Invincible having come out had appeared in American papers, no word of what was in store for him had reached Admiral von Spee. She had last been heard of in the Mediterranean, and nothing was further from the thought of the captain of the Gneisenau when he advised an attempt on the Ealklands than her sudden appearance at the islands. Fully understanding what he had helped to bring upon the squadron, he turned without more ado directly away from the port and made off at high speed to rejoin the flagship.

 

It was now a quarter to ten, nearly two hours since the enemy's smoke had first been sighted, and all ships, except the Bristol, had steam up. The Glasgow, which had already weighed, was ordered to join the Kent, and Admiral Stoddart was directed to go out and take charge of the look-out ships. At 10.0 the rest of the squadron weighed and proceeded through, the minefield in the order Inflexible, Invincible, Cornwall. As they came down the harbour the Glasgow reported the enemy going off to the south-eastward as hard as they could, and she and the Kent put on full steam to keep touch.

 

The foul weather that had been so persistent had now passed away. The sea was calm, with a clear blue sky and

 

10.0-11.10

THE CHASE BEGINS

 

a light cold breeze from the north-west. Visibility was at its maximum, and as the squadron cleared Cape Pembroke Light the enemy's five ships could be clearly seen on the south-east horizon hull down. The Glasgow, which had passed the Kent, was well ahead signalling their movements. As Admiral von Spee saw the British ships and could clearly make out the tripod masts of the battle cruisers, he had increased speed to join his advanced division, and the nearest ship was judged to be over fifteen miles from the harbour mouth. This must have been an over-estimate, but in any case the enemy had secured, a long start, and in those latitudes no one could count on the favourable weather conditions lasting. So without more ado Admiral Sturdee made the signal for " general chase."

 

The moment recalls many others of famous memory when the same exhilarating signal was made; it had been the prelude of some of the most decisive successes in our records, but conditions had changed, and it was soon found that it could not be strictly followed. In the effort the battle cruisers had made to work rapidly up to full speed, they were belching forth such volumes of dense smoke that in half an hour the Admiral found it necessary to do something to reduce the trouble. The enemy could not be seen, but at 10.48 the Glasgow reported them twelve miles distant. It was clear our ships were gaining, and the Admiral thereupon (10.50) signalled to the Inflexible that he was easing speed to 24 knots to lessen the smoke, and to the Glasgow to keep three miles ahead. (There is a clerical error here in the official despatch. It gives two miles, but the logs of both Invincible and Glasgow record the signal as three miles.) He then took the further step of ordering the Inflexible to get gradually on his starboard quarter and keep clear of the smoke.

 

The freedom of "general chase" was thus already broken into, but more was soon to come. The Carnarvon and Cornwall, in spite of the reduction of speed, were lagging far behind, and to an inquiry from the Admiral (11.7) as to how fast they could go the Carnarvon replied 20 knots and the Cornwall 22. He had just ordered the Cornwall to take station on the Carnarvon's starboard quarter, and informed the Inflexible he had reduced to 19 knots. His idea was to avoid getting his squadron scattered too widely, and there seemed no reason for excessive hurry. The enemy were now well in sight from the flagship, their funnels and bridges showing above the horizon, and the Glasgow reported them doing no more than 15 knots. It was clear he had the speed of them and could follow their motions. Accordingly, as it was very desirable that the Carnarvon and Cornwall, which were now some five

 

Dec. 8, 1914. 11.10-11.32

 

miles astern, should be given a chance of getting up, he decided not to press the action at once. With this object, at 11.26 the signal was made to proceed at 20 knots. The effect of it, combined with the previous signals which had given the squadron a tactical formation for the approach, was finally to annul "general chase."

 

At the same time his attention was called in another direction. The Bristol, who by the extraordinary exertions of her engine-room staff had managed to get out, signaled that three strange ships were off Port Pleasant. The information had come from two ladies at Port Darwin who had been watching the proceedings, and had seen Admiral von Spee's colliers arrive. (Port Darwin is in Choiseul Sound, south-west of Port Pleasant.)

(..... appointments to the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire for services in or for the Oversea Dominions, Colonies and Protectorates, in connection with the War. The appointments to date from the 1st January, 1918:

 

To be Officers of the said Most Excellent Order.

Mrs. Muriel Harriet Felton; for services rendered to the British Squadron on the occasion of the Naval Battle off the Falkland Islands 8th December, 1914. (London Gazette) )

While one remained on the look-out the other went to the telephone and warned the Governor. The message, which reached the Canopus at 10.50 just as the Bristol was coming out, was passed on to her., Owing to the German jamming of our wireless much time had been lost, and prompt action was needed. There had been numerous reports of German reservists gathering at South American ports, and though the strange ships might be colliers, it was quite possible they were transports carrying a landing force to seize the islands. Captain Fanshawe of the Bristol was therefore ordered to take under his command the Macedonia, which was not intended to follow the squadron, and with her to seek out and "destroy the transports."

 

Having made up his mind not to press the action at once, Admiral Sturdee at half-past eleven signalled that there, was time to take the next meal. Ships' companies had thus an opportunity of cleaning up, for in some of the ships every one was still black with coal-dust and in coaling rig, a very undesirable condition for going into action. At the same, time he altered course to close the enemy, and the affair settled down toa plain stern chase. At first the movements of the enemy had been difficult to make out. Up till 11.15 Admiral Sturdee had been steaming parallel to them, approximately eastward. Then the Glasgow was able to report that they were altering to starboard, and at 11.25 he conformed by an order to turn together to east by south (mag.). This brought him again on a course parallel to the enemy, but as soon as he had given the signal for a meal he inclined 2 more points together to starboard, which brought him to south-east by east on a converging course. It could be seen that the enemy was well concentrated, with the Gneisenau division leading, but Admiral Sturdee's efforts to close up his own squadron proved

 

 

Plan - The Battle of The Falklands, Position at 12.51 P.M

 

 

12.0-1.20

THE FIRST SHOTS

 

unavailing. (There appears to be some doubt as to the German formation. Some observers say they were in quarter line (that is, in echelon). According to an officer of the Dresden, on seeing the British battle cruisers "Station-keeping ceased and each of our ships endeavoured to escape at her utmost speed." This seems improbable. What appears to have occurred is that when the two divisions concentrated, Admiral von Spee formed astern of the Gneisenau and Nurnberg and then turned away in quarter line.)

 

In spite of the reduction of speed Admiral Stoddart was unable to get up. He could force no more than 18 knots out of the Carnarvon, and as the Cornwall had 4 knots in reserve she was ordered to go ahead (12.5). Still, Admiral Sturdee kept his speed down to 20 knots, but at 12.20 the enemy could be seen altering to starboard, and their formation to be breaking up as though they were reforming. Admiral Sturdee decided to seize the moment to press the chase. It was impossible to wait longer for his unfortunate colleague - he was now about 6 miles astern - and speed was increased to 22 knots.

 

The enemy was now going south-eastward, direct before the wind and shrouded in their own smoke. Admiral Sturdee could only hold on as he was, but at the same time he ordered the Inflexible to open to 5 cables. Speed was being quickly worked up, till by 12.50 it was 25 knots, and as they were fast overhauling the enemy the Admiral made the general signal to engage. The Leipzig, being the rearmost and slowest ship, could not stand the increasing speed and was falling astern, and shortly before one o'clock, when the Inflexible had her at 16,000 yards, Captain Phillimore opened fire. The flagship joined in a minute or two later, and at the same time course was altered 2 more points together to starboard in order to close, and speed increased to the utmost possible. No hits were obtained, but as the range diminished shots fell so close that at times the Leipzig was lost to view in the splashes.

 

It was clear things could not last as they were: something had to be done to save the lagging German cruiser, and Admiral von Spee took a decision which did him and his Service the highest honour. Determined to sacrifice himself and his two heavy cruisers to save the rest, which after all could do the greatest service to his country in harrying our trade, he resolved for the honour of the flag and to facilitate their escape to accept action. About 1.20, therefore, he signalled to his light cruisers to scatter and make for the South American coast, while he with the armoured ships fought it out to the end. With that the three light cruisers broke off to the southward, and the Admiral turned his two ships about

 

Dec. 8, 1914. 1.20-2.10

 

6 points into line ahead, and headed away at his utmost speed to the north-eastward out into the ocean. It was a fine manoeuvre, but Admiral Sturdee had provided for it in his battle instructions, and without any signal being made his light cruisers broke away in chase of those of the enemy, while the two battle cruisers turned together through 7 points, and were thus brought into line ahead abeam of the enemy before he could complete his turn.

 

So about 1.20 the main action began with the Invincible ranging on the Gneisenau and the Inflexible on the Scharnhorst, and Admiral Stoddart now ten miles astern trying vainly to get up with them by cutting the corner. During the turn the Gneisenau had slowed down to let the flagship pass ahead and as soon as the Admiral had taken the lead he began to return the British fire. The range, however, which was still about 14,000 yards, was too great, and the enemy's shots fell about 1000 yards short. But it quickly diminished, for Admiral von Spee promptly led four more points inwards, and as soon as it was down to about 13,000 yards, he altered outward again to a course parallel to the British, and just as our two battle cruisers had exchanged targets with the change in the German line the Invincible was hit. The hit appeared to be due not to straddling but to the flagship having come within the extreme range of the German guns.

 

Admiral Sturdee therefore at once (1.44) turned away 2 more points together to port, and the range rapidly opened out again as the action continued. The enemy were firing deliberately to husband their ammunition, which had not been replenished since Coronel, but the range was now too great for the fire to be effective. The British did little if any better, the fire of the Inflexible being specially loose since, stationed as she was, she was so. smothered with the flagship's smoke that spotting was impossible. The after guns of the Invincible were almost as badly blinded, and very few hits had been scored when, by two o'clock, the range had opened out to over 16,000 yards and both sides ceased fire. In order to renew the action Admiral Sturdee led round 4 points to starboard, and then signalled for 4 points more together (2.5). While the evolution was proceeding the enemy was blotted out in the smoke, and when he was in view again he was seen to have altered some 10 points to starboard and to be making off to the southward 17,000 yards away in the direction in which his light cruisers had disappeared. Admiral Sturdee at once increased speed again, and another stern chase began. As it proceeded at the utmost speed he kept altering a point or

 

 

Plan - The Battle of The Falklands, Position at 1.30 P.M.

 

 

2.10-3.15

THE MAIN ACTION

 

two together to starboard - that is, towards the flying enemy's course. This was done, we are told, partly to clear his own smoke, which was as dense as ever, but the effect was that by 2.45 the range was down again to 15,000 yards, and turning a couple of points to port, so as to bring all his broadside to bear, he re-opened fire.

 

For five mimites Admiral von Spee held on as he was and made no reply, but then he began to turn to port through about 9 points, and coming thus into line ahead again made as though to cross the British course. Admiral Sturdee promptly responded with a parrying turn through 6 points to port, and as the two forces came once more broadside to broadside the enemy re-opened fire. They were now abaft the beam on a converging course, and the range was rapidly falling. Still Admiral von Spee held on. His object evidently was to close to his own distance in order to bring his secondary armament into play. It was here lay his only possible advantage over his enemy, and by many it was regarded as a real advantage.

 

The omission of secondary armament from the early Dreadnought ships was the point on which critics had most severely condemned the type. One of the sharpest recent controversies had divided specialists on the question, and it must have been perfectly familiar to Admiral von Spee. Now for the first time an opportunity had arisen of subjecting the difference of opinion to the actual test of battle. From this test Admiral Sturdee did not flinch. Keeping on as he was he allowed the range to fall, and when it was down to about 12,500 yards (2.59) the Germans began to fire with their 5.9" guns. All Admiral Sturdee did was to signal for 2 more points together to port to keep the range as it was, and presently (3.10) as the range continued to fall he edged away another couple of points and brought it back to about 12,500. (Admiral Sturdee in his despatch says it fell by 3.15 to 10,000 yards, but this is not in accordance with German observations.)

 

During this period the action was at its hottest. Both sides were securing hits, but the British ships appear to have suffered little. With his superior speed Admiral Sturdee was easily able to keep his distance, and the enemy's 5.9" guns at their extreme range did little to affect his fire. Though some immaterial damage was done to superstructures, no casualties occurred. The gunnery conditions, however, were very bad. The smother of funnel smoke from the battle cruisers made accurate spotting or laying impossible for either side. Still, the British 12" so far asserted their mastery that by 3.10 the Gneisenau had taken a list, and in another five minutes the Scharnhorst, which was burning in places

 

Dec. 8, 1914. 8.15-3.37

 

and whose fire was slackening, had her third funnel shot away.,

 

By this time (3.16) the smoke, interference had become so intolerable that Admiral Sturdee turned together sharply through 18 points outwards and to windward to clear it. He thus came on the opposite course with the Inflexible leading. For the first time she had a clear view of her target and was able to make more satisfactory practice. But in five minutes, as they drew abreast of the enemy, Admiral Sturdee turned 4 points together to port to head across their wake, and this brought the Inflexible abaft the flagship's beam, and smoke interference was almost as bad as ever. Still, hitting continued, and the Gneisenau's list had increased so much that her secondary armament would no longer reach, and it ceased fire. As for the Scharnhorst, she was even in a worse condition, as could now be plainly seen.

 

At 3.30, by which time the battle cruisers were well on his port quarter, Admiral von Spee turned suddenly 16 points to starboard in succession and stood to the north-westward, as though to parry the British manoeuvre by crossing Admiral Sturdee's bows. If so it was a desperate expedient, for as the Germans went about the flagship was almost hidden by the smoke from bursting shell and internal fires. "Her upper works," writes an eye-witness," seemed to be but a shambles of torn and twisted steel and iron, and through the holes in her side, even at the great distance we were from her, could be seen dull red glows as the flames gradually gained the mastery between decks." (A Naval Digression, by G.F, p.196.)

 

She seemed to many to be entirely beaten, but as soon as, the turn had brought her previously disengaged side to. bear she renewed her fire almost as briskly as ever in spite of the condition she was in. The range even permitted her to bring her secondary armament into play again. For when the Germans made their bold threat to cross ahead - if such it was – Admiral Sturdee had countered with a 2-point turn inwards and held that course, till in five minutes his adversary was forced to turn away. The range was then down to 12,000 yards or less, and as the enemy seemed to have abandoned his threatened manoeuvre, Admiral Sturdee turned outwards again to open out beyond the reach of the enemy's 5.9" guns.

 

The crisis of the action was now at hand, but the precise movements till it culminated cannot be determined with any certainty. According to the Admiral's despatch the Inflexible during the last turn had edged into the flagship's wake. On the other hand, the Inflexible's officers say she

 

 

Plan - The Battle of The Falklands, Positions in Main Action 4.17 P.M. To 4.24 P.M.

 

 

3.40-4.17

END OF THE SCHARNHORST

 

gained the lead by the 3.15 turn together and maintained it. "Then," says her gunnery officer, "for the first time I experienced the luxury of complete immunity from every form of interference," and that from the time Admiral von Spee made his sixteen-point turn he fired on the Scharnhorst, which had become his opposite in the line. "I was now," he wrote, "in a position to enjoy the control officer's paradise: a good target; no alteration of course and no next aheads or own smoke to worry me."

 

Owing to this and similar conflicts of memory all that can be said with any confidence is that after Admiral Sturdee had opened out the range, he began to incline inwards to maintain his selected distance from the enemy. During this period both British ships, whatever may have been their relative positions, record firing on the Scharnhorst. She was suffering more terribly than ever, and losing speed so rapidly that by 4.0 our ships had fairly overhauled her and had begun to turn more sharply inwards. (Between 3.25 and 3.57 - the decisive half-hour - Invincible logs 6 signals to alter course, but it cannot he determined whether they were seen or obeyed by Inflexible, for none of them appears in her signal log.) She was still firing gamely with her remaining guns when, in the words of the gunnery officer of the Inflexible, "she suddenly shut up as when a light is blown out." At the same time she lurched away to starboard, heading for our ships, and it could be seen she had a heavy list and was in her last throes.

 

The Inflexible, which at this time it is agreed was leading, at once turned back to starboard to get at her old adversary, the Gneisenau, on the opposite course and then to cross her wake and engage her from leeward. Captain Phillimore thought the Admiral would do the same, but he had just turned towards the Scharnhorst, and was holding on for the beaten ship. By this time, with her flag still flying, she had turned over on her beam ends, and it looked as if the Gneisenau were going to stand by her. But Admiral von Spee's last signal to her was to save herself, and after a moment's hesitation she was seen to be carrying on.

 

Admiral Sturdee had promptly inclined to starboard to deal with the Gneisenau at closer range, and this course he kept till at 4.17 the Scharnhorst disappeared. Not a soul of her crew was saved: there could be no thought of rescue, for the Gneisenau demanded all his attention. The smoke was now drifting straight down the range between the Invincible and the enemy, and Admiral Sturdee, being scarcely able to see his target, turned back to starboard to get out of the smother. Then as soon as he was clear he began to

 

Dec. 8, 1914. 4.20-5.10

THE FALKLANDS

 

engage the Gneisenau on the opposite course at ranges of from 10,000 to 12,000 yards. At this time she suffered severely from both battle cruisers. Shell after shell got home; her No. 1 turret was knocked out and one stokehold was full of water. When the Invincible had run on thus for about ten minutes and the range opened out as she passed the enemy, Admiral Sturdee began to circle right round again, as though to get on a parallel course. But owing apparently to the difficulty of seeing exactly what the Gneisenau was doing, he continued the manoeuvre till he was heading nearly westward and on a course which diverged from that of the enemy.

 

His movement, however, enabled the Carnarvon to get well up. The Inflexible had also rejoined, for when the flagship had run back to her she conformed to the Admiral's last turn and so came up on the flagship's starboard beam. Thus all three ships were together again, and the Admiral signalled to form line ahead. But so badly was the smoke drifting down the range that in this formation neither the Inflexible nor the Carnarvon could get any clear view of the target. At last, so completely was the Inflexible blinded by the smother, that after trying to pass the flagship to windward, she broke back in desperation right out of the line 14 points to port and held away to get clear. She had no order to do so, but Admiral Sturdee afterwards expressed approval of her independent action. He himself held on, inclining to port sufficiently to bring his course parallel to that of the Gneisenau.

 

Then by putting on full speed and making further small turns inwards he began to get into a position well on her bow. The Carnarvon, being unable to keep up with the flagship, dropped astern. The Inflexible, having run through the smoke, found herself, at 4.50, heading to cross astern of the Gneisenau. As she was seen to be still firing vigorously on the Invincible, the Inflexible kept her course and re-opened fire with her starboard guns. During the next few minutes many hits were marked, but the Gneisenau still held on, and at 4.58 the Inflexible checked fire and turning 12 points to starboard towards the Admiral brought her port battery to bear at about 12,000 yards with a clear target (5.01). As the enemy's speed dropped the Carnarvon was soon able to join in, and in this way the ill-fated Gneisenau was receiving a concentrated fire from three separate bearings.

 

It was high, time to make an end. Over four hours had passed since the first shot was fired, and a drizzling rain had come on in which the target was growing fainter every minute.

 

 

Plan - The Battle of The Falklands, Positions in Main Action 4.44 P.M. To 5.01 P.M.

 

5.10-6.2

END OF THE GNEISENAU

 

But the end was very near. In the first ten minutes of the new phase the Gneisenau had lost a funnel; she was evidently suffering severely; her speed had dropped to 8 knots; fore and aft she was burning, and her shots came slower and slower. Still, for half an hour she endured the concentrated fire, replying with well-timed but badly spotted salvoes, till all her 8" ammunition was spent. Then at 5.30 she was seen to turn towards the Invincible, which had reached almost ahead of her, and to stop with a heavy list to starboard. Admiral Sturdee at once swept round to close. At the same moment the Inflexible was making a similar movement. After his independent turn Captain Phillimore had run on for about ten minutes, taking full advantage of the clear target. He had then turned back 12 points to starboard, bringing his other broadside to bear, and presently began, like the Commander-in-Chief, to make small successive alterations to port to keep on a course parallel to the Gneisenau.

 

At 5.30, seeing the distress she was in, he, too, turned towards her. She was listing more and more and burning furiously, but, still undefeated, she from time to time fired a gun, and her fire had to be returned. After a few rounds, however, she was again silent. She was thought to have struck, and "Cease fire" was signalled. But in another minute she began again, and the signal had to be annulled. The Inflexible then continued her turn through 16 points to run past her with her starboard broadside bearing. The Admiral at the same time was coming up on the enemy's starboard quarter. But, in fact, there was no more to be done. The Gneisenau's gallant struggle was over at last. In about a quarter of an hour she was again silent and was seen to be going. All the British ships at once turned in to close at 20 knots; but they were still 3000 or 4000 yards away, when very suddenly she heeled over on her beam ends. For a minute or so the remnants of her crew could be seen walking on her side, and then she plunged down to join her sister.

 

It was a splendid fight she had made against hopeless odds, and the British ships pressed on eagerly to the work of rescue. Some 600 of her men had been killed or wounded, she could no longer fire a gun, but even so there had been no thought of surrender. When there was no longer any hope of escape, her sea-cocks, it seems, had been opened and all hands ordered on deck. So they made sure she should sink fast enough to avoid falling into British hands; otherwise, perhaps, many lives might have been spared. As it was, by lowering all boats that would float and throwing out ropes and life-belts the moment the spot was reached, some 200

 

Dec. 8, 1914. 1.25-1.30

 

of her complement of 850 were picked up, but of these many failed to survive the shock of the icy cold water, and all these were buried next day with full military honours.

 

How unequal had been the contest is shown by the little the British squadron had suffered. Amongst the ships' companies, in spite of the enemy's excellent gunnery, there had not been a single casualty. The Invincible, who received most of the enemy's fire, was hit about a score of times, and though much knocked about above the armour belt, had suffered no material injury worse than having a strut of her foremast carried away. The Inflexible had only a few scratches, and the Carnarvon was not touched.

 

By 7.30 the work of rescue was completed. It so happened that the scene of the last act had already witnessed part of the general action, for some three hours before the last shot was fired the chase of the enemy's light cruisers had passed close to the spot. Since they broke away nothing had been heard of them. Anxious to pursue his success, Admiral Sturdee had called up his three cruisers as soon as the Gneisenau went down. From the Kent and Cornwall there was no reply, and it was not till the boats had returned to the ships that he received a message from the Glasgow to say how her chase had sped.

 

When about 1.25 the German light cruisers broke away they headed at first to the southward, and when the chase, began they were ten or twelve miles ahead of their pursuers. As the British ships had nominally no superiority of speed over the enemy, the result could only be doubtful. Of the German ships the Dresden was the fastest, for although her designed speed was given out to be 24-knots, she seems to have been capable of a sea speed of 27. Next to her came our own light cruiser the Glasgow, good for over 25 knots, but our two armoured cruisers, Cornwall and Kent, were 23-knot ships, and even so the Kent had the reputation of being the lame duck of her class, and had seldom attained her designed speed. Of the other two German cruisers, the Nurnberg was a 23.5 knot ship, and the Leipzig by design had 22 knots, but she was a bad steamer, and really slower by a knot or so. Fortunately, none of the German ships was in a good condition when the war broke out, and after four months' continual cruising their boilers were not calculated to stand severe pressure. This was unknown to us at the time; but the outcome could not be doubtful if we could only get to grips. For the German light cruisers had nothing heavier than 4.1" guns, and excellent as these guns were, not only as compared with our own inferior 4", with which

 

1.30-3.35

THE LIGHT CRUISERS

 

the Glasgow was mainly arrned, but even outranging our older pattern of 6", they were no match for the weight of metal of the fourteen 6" which the two armoured cruisers carried.

 

At first the enemy kept together, and when about 1.30 the chase had fairly begun the Nurnberg was the centre ship, with the Leipzig about a mile away on her starboard beam, and the Dresden perhaps 4 miles ahead on her port bow. The Glasgow, doing under her 25 knots, rapidly over hauled and passed our two armoured cruisers, which were going neck and neck, and crossed ahead of them after the Dresden. But this idea Captain Luce, who was senior officer, soon had to abandon. It was quickly evident that our armoured cruisers, if they were gaining at all, were gaining so slowly that the only chance of bringing the enemy to action before it was too late seemed to be to attack the rear most ship. At 2.15, therefore, he slowed down sufficiently to allow his two consorts to close without ceasing himself to gain on the Leipzig.

 

By 2.45, as the enemy had been continually edging to port, the direction of the chase was about south-by-east, and so it was they all passed close to the spot where the Gneisenau afterwards sank. Captain Luce, who was still nearly 4 miles ahead of our armoured cruisers, was, in fact, actually in these waters when, at 2.53, finding himself within 12,000 yards of the Leipzig, he opened fire on her with his forward 6" gun. She accepted the challenge with spirit, and, turning to starboard to bring her broadside to bear, replied. It was evident at once that her 4.1" guns were equal to the range, while the Glasgow's 4" were hot. As soon, therefore, as the enemy began to straddle him, Captain Luce also turned to starboard to open but the range, and carried on thus till the Leipzig ceased fire and turned back again to follow her consorts. Once again the manoeuvre was successfully performed, and though the enemy's fire was very accurate as long as she could keep the range down, the Glasgow was only hit twice, and her casualties were very light. Thus at small cost Captain Luce's object was attained, for each time the Leipzig turned and tried to close she lost more ground, so that our armoured cruisers gradually crept up. They were still neck and neck, the Kent doing wonders at 24 knots, and after 3.30, in reply to a query from the Glasgow, they could signal they were gaining.

 

This must have been obvious to the enemy, for soon after they began to scatter, the Nurnberg inclining away to port while the Dresden, who had maintained her lead, went to starboard and soon disappeared in the south-west.

 

Dec. 8, 1914. 3.36-6.0

 

Already (3.36) Captain Ellerton had settled with Captain Allen of the Kent that he would take the Leipzig with the Cornwall, while the Kent took the Nurnberg. As for the Dresden, it was clear that her speed left nothing to be done with her.

 

By 4.0 the two armoured cruisers were nearly within range. Captain Luce was now holding on after the Leipzig on her starboard quarter, and seeing his supports coming up he kept his speed till the range fell to 9000 yards and his 4" guns would tell. The two armoured cruisers were coming up slightly on the enemy's port quarter and had them almost in range. About 4.15 both of them opened fire, but their shots fell short. The Nurnberg was making away to the eastward with the Kent after her. The Leipzig had inclined to port till she was heading about south-south-east, and the Cornwall followed, continuing to fire on her, but receiving no reply, as the enemy was still fully occupied with the Glasgow. In another ten minutes the Cornwall began to straddle her fairly, and seeing the chase thus well in Captain Ellerton's grip, Captain Luce circled round to starboard to join him, his idea being to produce the maximum effect of fire by both ships engaging her on the same side. As he passed athwart the Leipzig's wake he smothered her with his other broadside, and ceasing fire as he neared the Cornwall, passed under her stern, and came into action again when he was clear.

 

The Leipzig was already heavily engaged with the Cornwall and was clearly doomed. She was being hit time after time. In less than a quarter of an hour her fore-topmast was shot away, and the same shot killed her gunnery lieutenant. At this time Captain Ellerton was steering a slightly diverging course from the chase so as to keep his starboard guns bearing, but just before 5.0, as the range was opening out unnecessarily, he turned sharply to starboard and brought his other broadside into play. Already the Leipzig was suffering severely under the cross fire of the two British ships, for, owing to the tactics adopted, there was no mutual interference. Her speed, too, was falling so fast under her punishment that they were able to turn as they liked and to keep the range anywhere between 10,000 and 7000 yards. For nearly an hour these tactics were continued, the Cornwall from time to time closing in and firing her foremost group of guns, and then, as soon as the Leipzig began to hit, altering outwards again and giving full broadsides till the range became too great. This went on till 6.0, when the drizzling rain came on and began to obscure the target, and as the chase was still fighting gamely Captain Luce signalled to close. The range was soon reduced to 8000 yards, and then the Cornwall began

 

6.0-9.23

END OF THE LEIPZIG

 

to fire lyddite. The effect was immediate. A surviving German officer described it as terrific, and the loss of life fearful. She was in an inferno of dark smoke and flashes from the bursting shells, every salvo hit, and in a few minutes she was burning. Still she continued to fire, and still her pursuers closed. By 6.35, when a message came in to say the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were sunk, the range was down to 7125 yards, and the Cornwall, being now again in position to bring her whole port broadside to bear, was doing worse damage still and starting fresh fires, till the Leipzig was ablaze fore and aft. Her fire now came only in gasps, but still she fought on, and continued to hit as her assailants drew closer and closer. Nor was it till past 7.0, four hours after the Glasgow had first opened fire, that her last gun was silent.

 

No ship could have done better against such odds. As the two British cruisers drew in to ascertain if she had struck, she was seen to be a wreck. Her mainmast was gone as well as two funnels; she was all ablaze, from, where her mainmast had stood to her stern, as well as right forward, but her ensign was still flying defiantly on what was left of her foremast. It was difficult to know what to do. She seemed still to be moving through the water, and might yet be able to fire a torpedo. Captain Luce, therefore, after waiting for half an hour, decided he must finish her at close range. At 7.50 both ships re-opened fire. There was no response. It was known afterwards that, having fired her last remaining round, the beaten ship had opened her sea-cocks and about 150 men had collected amidships between the two burning ends hoping to be saved. The slaughter in consequence was terrible, but soon they succeeded in burning two green lights; then the British ships ceased fire and stopped, believing it was a signal of surrender. Presently, as nothing further happened, they crept on again, coming up directly under her stern out of torpedo danger. At a quarter to 9.0 boats were ordered out, and Captain Luce signalled to her he was sending to save life. Still there was no reply, but by this time she was heeling over heavily to port, a mass of flames and smoke, and, when the boats were already picking up the survivors who had taken to the water, she turned on her beam ends and quietly disappeared (9.23).

 

Prompt as was the work of rescue, and though many men had been seen to leap into the sea, only five officers and thirteen men were saved alive. The intense cold and choppy sea that was getting up had done for the rest. Amongst those lost was her gallant captain, who, although he was one of the few unwounded and had been cheering on his men till the last,

 

Dec. 8, 1914. 4.0-5.30

 

could not be found, to the great regret of all who had seen his unflinching fight. As for the British cruisers, in spite of his prolonged resistance, they had suffered very little. The ships themselves were not materially damaged. Though the Cornwall had been hit eighteen times and had a list to port, she had not a single man hurt, while the Glasgow had not been hit more than twice, and her casualties were one man killed and four wounded.

 

The last scene had been enacted between 70 and 80 miles to the southward of where the Gneisenau had gone down. As soon as the Commander-in-Chief heard of it, being anxious to pursue the chase of the Dresden and Nurnberg, he asked for the position, but after so many turns our cruisers could give nothing definite. Both of them, moreover, had been holed, and as both ammunition and coal were very low, they were in no condition for a further chase, even if they knew in what direction to go. But of the Kent and Nurnberg they could give no news at all, having completely lost them since the Kent parted company, nor could they get any answer to their calls.

 

But, in fact, there was no cause for anxiety, though when the chase began there seemed little prospect of success. A notoriously bad steamer, the Kent was nearly seven miles astern and her engine-room staff were already strained with eight hours full speed. But when once she had settled down they performed miracles and made her surpass herself. By forcing fires with all her woodwork they soon had her steaming as she had never steamed before, doing, they said, up to 25 knots. For nearly an hour she thus flogged along, till by 5.0, when the sky became overcast and the wet mist was beginning to obscure the horizon, the range was down below 12,000 yards, and the Nurnberg opened fire with her stern guns. The shells went right over, while the Kent's 6" would not yet reach. Even ten minutes later, when the Kent opened fire, the shells seemed still to fall short, but as the mist and rain thickened spotting became very difficult, and owing to the tremendous vibration set up by the hard-pressed engines, range-finders were of little use.

 

The shooting of the Nurnberg was excellent, but although during this part of the chase her shells fell thick round the Kent, only one got home. In spite of the difficulty of spotting, the Kent, as was afterwards known, scored, two hits, one in the after steering flat below the waterline, which killed all the men in it except one. But in less than half an hour things began to improve very fast. For some reason she found herself rapidly overhauling the chase. The fact was that the Niimberg's boilers were in such bad condition that in her

 

 

Plan - The Battle of The Falklands, Action between Kent and Nurnberg, 5.35 P.M. to 6.36 P.M.

 

 

5.45-6.30

KENT AND NUERNBERG

 

effort to escape she had burst two of them, and her speed had dropped to 19 knots. So rapidly then did the Kent gain, that in a quarter of an hour it was obvious an action could not be avoided, and at 5.45 the Nurnberg turned boldly 8 points to port and brought her broadside to bear. As the light was fast failing in the drizzle, Captain Allen was only too glad to accept the invitation. He had no thought of a long-range action at that hour - it was a case of quick work or failure - and, responding with a turn of only 6 points, he settled down on a converging course. By the time the two turns were complete the ships were abreast at only 6000 yards. The action was now very hot, and as the range fell the Kent's shooting could be seen to be all that was desired. Being able to keep before the enemy's beam, Captain Allen had no fear of torpedo, and continued to close the range till, at 6.0, it was down to 3000 yards; then, unable to endure the punishment, the Nurnberg turned sharply away to starboard.

 

Captain Allen responded, but in order to keep his guns bearing he turned rather less and the range opened again. Still he continued to hit, and in ten minutes the enemy was on fire, with her fore-topmast gone and only two guns alive. Moreover, she had been losing speed so fast that the Kent had been able to run right past her, and begin to circle, 8 points to starboard to cross her bows. Unable to parry the movement, the Nurnberg responded with a similar turn to port, as though to ram, as some thought, but possibly also because it was necessary to bring her other broadside into action. It was a fatal movement, for as she came bows on Captain Allen was able to rake her with all his starboard guns at 3500 yards. The effect was decisive. Amongst other hits, two 6" shells burst, together on her forecastle and destroyed all her forward guns. Still she completed her turn, and for a minute or two the action was on opposite courses; but before he was quite abeam Captain Allen swung round outwards to keep out of torpedo danger, and having in this way gained a position on her starboard bow, he gave his fresh gun crews on the port side their turn.

 

The end now could not be far off. By 6.25 the Nurnberg had lost nearly all her way, and the Kent had to come round, 16 points so as not to draw away from her. Before the turn was complete she was seen to be quite silent, and Captain Allen ceased fire. The shattered enemy was lying stopped and a wreck 5,500 yards away. She had a heavy list, was down by the stern and burning fiercely under the bridge and forecastle, without any sign of life. But apparently she was not sinking, nor in the bad light could it be seen whether she

 

Dec. 8, 1914. 6.30-9.0

 

had struck. Captain Allen, therefore, steamed towards her, and not till he had closed to 3,300 yards could he see that her flag was still flying. There was nothing to do but open fire again, but it was only for five minutes, for just before 7.0 she hauled down her colours. It was no shame to her after fighting so gallantly for an hour and a half against so superior an adversary. Only two of the Kent's boats could possibly float, and they had been hastily patched up and were already gone to the rescue when, just before 7.30, she turned over to starboard and sank quite quietly. Search for survivors was kept up till 9.0, when it was quite dark. A few men were found floating lashed to hammocks, but many of these were dead from the cold, and albatrosses were attacking even the living. In the end only seven men were saved alive. The Kent, on her part, suffered very little. She had been hit nearly forty times, but beyond having her wireless room wrecked so that she could not communicate, there was little structural damage done. So well, indeed, had her armour and casemates served her, that in spite of the excellence and rapidity of the enemy's gunnery she had lost only four men killed and twelve wounded, and of these casualties ten occurred in a casemate through a lucky shell igniting some cartridges.

 

Though the Nurnberg was the last ship of the German squadron to be brought to action, she was not the last to go. Some forty miles to the south-westward the Leipzig, though she had ceased fire, was still afloat when her sister went down.

 

The colliers had already been captured some hours earlier. When at 11.45 Captain Fanshawe of the Bristol received Admiral Sturdee's order to chase them with the Macedonia, he had run some fifteen miles to the eastward after the squadron. Turning at once to the west-south-west, he met the Macedonia at 12.30, and the two ships ran on in company to the southward past Port Pleasant (See Inset to Map 17 in case.). Though they passed it at a distance of only a dozen miles to the southward they could see no sign of the colliers. For another hour Captain Fanshawe kept on as he was, but still sighting nothing, at 2.0 he turned south-east - that is, the direction in which he had seen the German squadron disappear. Then almost directly he received a signal to say that the ships he was seeking had been seen from Fitzroy, the settlement near Port Pleasant, retreating at full speed. A minute or two later he could make out the smoke of two steamers on his port bow, and made away east by south in chase.

 

There were, in fact, only two of them, the Baden and

 

2.0-8.30

AFTER THE ACTION

 

Santa Isabel. When they saw the squadron being chased they had remained at anchor awaiting orders. The third ship, the Seydlitz, had been ordered to keep in sight of the squadron as hospital ship, but finding the British cruisers were nearer than her own, she had made off to the east-southeast to avoid them. By 3.0 Captain Fanshawe had the other two in sight, and after chasing for half an hour more fired a couple of guns and ordered them to stop. They were then taken possession of, but owing to the wording of Admiral Sturdee's order some doubt arose as to what to do with them. The signal had said "Sink the transports," but they proved not to be transports; on the contrary, they were full of coal and a rich cargo of stores, which would be of great value to the fleet. Captain Fanshawe, however, considered himself bound by the letter of the signal, and without waiting to report the nature of his captures, he removed the crews to the Macedonia and ordered her to sink the Baden by gun fire, while he dealt with the Santa Isabel. At 7.0, after both of them had been riddled on the waterline and were seen to be settling, he hurried off eastward to try to rejoin the Admiral, leaving the Macedonia to stand by till the prizes sank and then to take the prisoners to Port Stanley. It was not till half an hour later that he knew the result of the action, and that the sacrifice of so much valuable material had been quite unnecessary.

 

The news of the victory had been sent to the Bristol en clair, and the Seydlitz took in the signal. She had just heard from the Baden that her two consorts had been captured, and was hurrying off at her utmost speed on a southerly course. The result was she had a very narrow escape, for some time after 8.0, through the thickening squalls of rain, she was aware of a man-of-war firing slowly some four miles away on her beam. It must have been the Cornwall or the Glasgow firing the last shots into the Leipzig. But in the gathering darkness they could not see her, and after swinging round to the westward she finally hurried off to the southward to find comparative safety amongst the icebergs.

 

Of the Dresden no trace could be found. So soon as the Gneisenau had sunk, Admiral Sturdee had endeavoured to find out from his cruisers in what direction she had gone, and in the meanwhile, to ensure the safety of the Orama and the eight colliers she was bringing down, at 8.30 he ordered the Carnarvon away to the northward to meet them and escort them to Port Stanley. He himself, with the two battle

 

Dec. 9-11, 1914

 

cruisers and the Bristol, was sweeping in a south-westerly direction at 18 knots for Staten Island to cut off the Dresden if she tried to round the Horn, and he had ordered the Bristol to follow him. Of the Kent and Nurnberg he could get no news, but when he knew that the Glasgow and Cornwall had settled the Leipzig he signalled to them (11.25 p.m.) to proceed to the Magellan Straits. The Glasgow replied that both ships had fired away nearly all their ammunition and that the Cornwall had only 250 tons of coal. Admiral Sturdee therefore directed them to return to Port Stanley and coal, and he himself held on as he was keeping the Inflexible with him. Nor was any fresh order at this time given to the Bristol, so that the Straits were left without any British ship to watch them. As he afterwards explained, his appreciation of the situation was that, so far as he then knew, two of the enemy's light cruisers had got away, for as yet he had had no news of the Kent and Nurnberg.

 

With only three ships available, he considered he could only search a limited area, and as he knew that the German squadron had coaled in the south of Tierra del Fuego before the battle, he judged that was the most likely area in which to find the missing ships. For these reasons he continued on as he was, keeping all three ships with him, and by 10.30 a.m. on the 9th was within fifty miles of Staten Island. Here the weather turned so hopelessly thick that further search seemed useless, and as by this time he had also heard that prisoners from the Leipzig had said the light cruisers orders were to make for the south-east coast of America, he turned and made a wide sweep to the north-north-west, signalling to the Bristol, who had not yet been sighted, to steer north and search the western group of the Falklands. For twenty-four hours the sweep continued, but with no result, and about 10 a.m. on the 10th he gave up the search and made for Port Stanley north-about. Here the Kent came in soon after to report how she had sunk the Nurnberg, but it was not till the second day after his arrival that he had any news of the lost Dresden.

 

His intention was, after coaling and repairing damages, to divide his squadron into three divisions to search for her - one for Tierra del Fuego, one for the east coast as high as Montevideo, and the third for the coast of Brazil. On the 11th, however, he received other instructions from the Admiralty, where the escape of the Dresden was not yet fully realised. These instructions laid down a scheme of operations against the three cruisers not forming part of Admiral von Spee's squadron, which were still believed to be working in South American waters, namely, the Prinz Eitel Friedrich,

 

Dec, 11-13, 1914

NEWS OF THE DRESDEN

 

Now know to be near Valparaiso, the Karlsruhe, whose end was still unknown, and the Kronprinz Wilhelm, which had not been heard of since she sank the Correntina off Montevideo. The Prinz Eitel Friedrich was to be dealt with by the Allied North Pacific Squadron - that is, less the Australia, which was to pass into the Atlantic by the Panama Canal. The rest, Newcastle, Idzumo and Asama, were to sweep south from the Galapagos Islands, but Admiral Sturdee was also to send the Kent and a merchant cruiser to work up the Chilean coast to meet them. The Admiral himself was to deal with the other two raiders, and for this purpose was to divide the squadron into two parts. For the south-east coast area the Carnarvon, Glasgow and two merchant cruisers would remain where they were under Admiral Stoddart. All the rest were to move north, the Canopus returning to her duty as guard-ship at Abrolhos Rocks, and there also the Dartmouth would shortly arrive from the Cape.

 

The following day however (December 12), these orders were modified on news of the failure to find the Dresden and a growing anxiety for the situation in Home Waters. The, two battle cruisers, he was informed, were wanted for the Grand Fleet as soon as possible. He was therefore to leave Admiral Stoddart in command of all the other ships to search for the Dresden, and as soon as she was dealt with they were to move north to look for the other two. He was further told that the Australia being too big to go through the Canal was coming home by way of the Falklands. At the same time the Melbourne, which after reaching Gibraltar had been ordered to the Azores, was directed to hasten to Bermuda for instructions, as the Karlsruhe was reported to have been seen at the Bahamas.

 

An hour or so after these orders were sent off an urgent message reached Whitehall from our Consul at Punta Arenas to say that the Dresden was there in the Magellan Strait. Admiral Sturdee's orders were immediately modified so far that he was authorised to use his discretion for taking action against her in spite of the need of getting his battle cruisers home as soon as possible (December 13, 4.45 p.m.). Four hours later, when it was known that the Chilean Authorities meant to allow the Dresden to coal, he was definitely ordered to press the chase so that she might be destroyed and not interned.

 

These instructions Admiral Sturdee had anticipated. The news that the Dresden was at Punta Arenas reached him at 3 a.m. on December 18. It was thirty-six hours old, and so busy was he coaling and repairing the damages suffered in the action that the Bristol was the only ship ready for sea.

 

Dec. 13-19, 1914

 

In less than two hours she was away, and at 8.30 the Inflexible and Glasgow followed, the division being under the orders of Captain Phillimore of the Inflexible. Later on Admiral Stoddart, with the Carnarvon and Cornwall was sent to search the Patagonian coast, and next morning, according to Admiralty instructions, the Kent and Orama left for the west coast in search of the Prinz Eitel Friedrich. He himself decided that he could best meet the general requirements by proceeding home at once, leaving the Inflexible to follow not later than December 29. Accordingly he started home on the 16th, but next day the Admiralty sent a final order that both the battle cruisers were to come home at once, filling up with ammunition at St. Vincent, Cape Verde, on their way, and that the search for the Dresden was to be left to Admiral Stoddart. In the meantime it had been found at Punta Arenas that the bird had flown, and on the 19th the Inflexible, which had passed out into the Pacific, turned back for home, leaving Admiral Stoddart to direct the unending search for the Dresden.

 

So ended the series of chases and actions known as the Battle of the Falklands. Of the five cruisers and three tenders which composed Admiral von Spee's squadron one cruiser and a tender had escaped, and by British tradition the victory could not be regarded as quite complete. Since one of them was a light cruiser, it had not rendered those waters free, but it had removed the squadron which had so long and so seriously disturbed our strategy. It was, in fact, as the Germans admitted, a fine strategical victory. Tactically it had less claim to distinction owing to the marked superiority of the British squadron, but Admiral Sturdee could claim, that by his method of conducting the action he had destroyed a powerful enemy squadron without material injury to two capital ships which it was essential to return to the Grand Fleet with their fighting power intact.

 

The risk of detaching them had been considerable, but the Admiralty by sure judgment accepted it and so had succeeded in bringing to bear at the right time and place an overwhelming superiority of force. It may be said that the fortunate meeting at the Falklands was mainly a point of luck, but it was luck fairly won on Nelson's golden rule of never losing a wind, and in any case those who designed the operation fully deserved all the credit due to plans which obtained so large a measure of success without any diminution of naval strength. What the action meant to the course of the war was that in little more than four months the command of the outer seas had been won, and we were free to throw practically the whole weight of the Navy into the main theatre.

 

 

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APPENDIX A

 

The actual constitution of the High Seas Fleet on the eve of war was, according to our intelligence, as follows, but it is doubtful whether the whole of it was ready for sea. It is believed that four of the twenty-three, battleships and the Derfflinger did not join till some months later.

 

GERMAN HIGH SEAS FLEET

Commander-in-Chief, Admiral von Ingenohl.

FLEET FLAGSHIP

Battleship, Friedrich der Grosse (10 12")

 

FIRST BATTLE SQUADRON

In command, Vice-Admiral von Lans.

Second in command, Rear-Admiral Gadeke.

 

1st Division - Ostfriesland (flag), Thuringen, Helgoland, Oldenburg (all 12-12")

2nd Division - Posen (2nd flag), Rheinland, Nassau, Westfalen (all 12-11")

 

SECOND BATTLE SQUADRON

In command, Vice-Admiral Scheer.

Second in command, Rear-Admiral Mauve.

 

3rd Division - Preussen (flag), Schlesien, Hessen, Lothringen (all 4-11")

4th Division - Hannover (2nd flag), Schleswig-Holstein, Pommern, Deutschland (all 4-11")

Reserve ships – Elsass, Braunschweig (both 4-11")

 

THIRD BATTLE SQUADRON

In command, Rear-Admiral Funke.

Second in command, Rear-Admiral Hebbinghaus.

 

5th Division – Kaiser, Kaiserin, Koenig Albert, Prinzregent Luitpold (flag) (all 10-12")

 

CRUISER SQUADRON

In command, Rear-Admiral Hipper.

Second in command, Rear-Admiral Maass.

Third in command, Rear-Admiral Tapken.

 

Battle Cruisers - Seydlitz (flag) (10-11"), Moltke (10-11"), Von der Tann (3rd flag) (8-11"), Derfflinger (8-12")     

Light Cruisers - Koln (2nd flag), Mainz, Stralsund, Kolberg, Rostock, Strassburg (all 12-4.1in)

 

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APPENDIX B

 

GRAND FLEET

Commander-in-Chief: Admiral Sir John E. Jedlicoe, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.

Chief of Staff: Rear-Admiral C. E. Madden, C.V.O.

 

Fleet Flagship: Iron Duke (ten 13.5", twelve 6"), Captain E. N. Lawson.

Attached ships: Light Cruiser Sappho, Commander G.V.C. Knox. Destroyer Oak, Lieutenant-Commander D. Faviell.

 

FIRST BATTLE SQUADRON

Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, K.C.B., C.V.O.

Rear-Admiral H. Evan-Thomas, M.V.O.

All battleships, except Marlborough, (10-12")

Marlborough (10 13.5") flag of V.A., Captain E. P. F. G. Grant.

St. Vincent, flag of R.A., Captain W. W. Fisher, M.V.O.

Collingwood, Captain J. C. Ley.

Colossus, Captain The Hon. E. S. Fitzherbert,

Hercules, Captain H. H. Bruce, M.V.O.

Neptune, Captain A. T. Hunt, C.S.I.

Superb, Captain P. Vaughan Lewes,C.B., D.S.O.

Vanguard, Captain C. S. Hickley, M.V.O.

Light Cruiser: Bellona, Captain Percy M. B. Royds.

 

SECOND BATTLE SQUADRON

Vice-Admiral Sir George J. S. Warrender, Bart., K.C.B., K.C.V.O.

Rear-Admiral Sir Robert K. Arbuthnot, Bart., M.V.O.

 

All battleships, 10-13.5in

King George, flag of V.A, Captain G. H. Baird.

Orion, flag of R.A., Captain F. C. Dreyer, C.B.

Ajax, Captain Sir A. J. Henniker-Hughan, Bt.

Audacious, Captain Cecil E. Dampier, A.D.C.

Centurion, Captain M. Culme-Seymour, M.V.O.

Conqueror, Captain N. C. Palmer, C.V.O., A.D.C.

Monarch, Captain E. H. Smith.

Thunderer, Captain T. Jackson, C.B., M.V.O.

Light Cruiser: Boadicea, Captain L. C. S. Woollcombe, M.V.O.

 

THIRD BATTLE SQUADRON

Vice-Admiral E. E. Bradford, C.V.O.

Rear-Admiral Montague E. Browning, M.V.O.

Eight battleships, of "King Edward VII" class: 4-12", 4-9.2''

King Edward VII, flag of V.A., Captain Crawford Maclachlan.

Hibernia, flag of R.A., Captain A. Lowndes.

Africa, Captain H. J. O. Millar.

Britannia, Captain H. G. G. Sandeman.

Commonwealth, Captain Maurice Woollcombe.

Dominion, Captain H. L. Mawbey.

Hindustan, Captain J. Nicholas.

Zealandia, Captain W. H. Cowan, M.V.O., D.S.O.

Light Cruiser: Blanche, Captain B. Hyde, M.V.O.

 

FOURTH BATTLE SQUADRON

Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas A. Gamble, K.C.V.O.

First three battleships, 10-12in,

Dreadnought, flag of V.A., Captain W. J. S. Alderson

Bellerophon, Captain E. F. Bruen.

Temeraire, Captain E. S. Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O.

Agincourt (14-12"), Captain D. B. L. Nicholson, A.D.C.

Light Cruiser: Blonde, Captain A. C. Scott.

 

FIRST BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON

(The Grand Fleet cruisers were officially designated "Cruiser Force A," and of this force Sir David Beatty was "Vice-Admiral Commanding".)

Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.V.O. D.S.O.

 

First three, 8-13.5in

Lion, flag of V.A., Captain A. E. M. Chatfleld, C.V.O.

Princess Royal, Captain O. de B. Brook, A.D.C.

Queen Mary, Captain W. R. Hall.

New Zealand (8-12"), Captain Lionel Halsey, C.M.G.

 

SECOND CRUISER SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral The Hon. S. A. Gough-Calthorpe, C.V.O., C.B.

 

Last three 6-9.2in, 4-7.5in

Shannon (4-9.2", 10-7.5"), flag of R.A., Captain J. S. Dumaresq, M.V.O.

Achilles, Captain A. L. Cay.

Cochrane, Captain W. G. E. Ruck-Keene, M.V.O.

Natal, Captain J.F.E. Green.

 

THIRD CRUISER SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham, C.B., M.V.O.

 

All ships (4-7.5", 6-6")

Antrim, flag of R.A., Captain V. B. Molteno.
Argyll, Captain J. C. Tancred

Devonshire, Captain E. V. Underhill.

Roxburgh, Captain S. S. Hall, C.B.

 

FIRST LIGHT CRUISER SQUADRON

Commodore W. E. Goodehough, M.V.O.

 

Southampton (8-6"), pendant of Commodore Goodenough.

Birmingham (9-6"), Captain A. A. M. Duff.

Nottingham (9-6"), Captain C. B. Miller.

Liverpool (2-6", 10-4"), Captain E. Reeves.

Falmouth (8-6"), Captain J. D. Edwards.

Lowestoft (9-6"), Captain T. W. B. Kennedy.

 

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APPENDIX C

MEDITERRANEAN ELEET

Commander-in-Chief: Admiral Sir A. Berkeley Milne, Bt., G.C.V.O., K.C.B.

Chief of Staff: Commodore Richard F. Phillimore, C.B., M.V.O.

 

SECOND BATTLE CRUISER SQUADRON

All three 8-12in

Inflexible, flag of C.-in-C. Captain Arthur N. Loxley

Indefatigable, Captain Charles F Sowerby.

Indomitable, Captain Francis W. Kennedy.

 

FIRST CRUISER SQUADRON

Rear-Admiral Ernest C. T. Troubridge, C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O.

Defence (4-9.2", 10-7.5"), flag of R.A., Captain Fawcet Wray.

Black Prince (6-9.2", 10-6"), Captain Frederick D. Gilpin-Brown.

Duke of Edinburgh (6-9.2", 10-6"), Captain Henry Blackett.

Warrior (6-9.2", 4-7.5"), Captain George H. Borrett.

 

LIGHT CRUISERS

Chatham (8-6"), Captain Sidney R. Drury-Lowe.

Dublin (8-6"), Captain John D. Kelly.

Gloucester (2-6"; 10-4"), Captain W. A. Howard Kelly, M.V.O.

Weymouth (8-6"), Captain William D. Church.

 

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APPENDIX D

 

I

 

In view of the criticism passed upon the then First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Churchill) in connection with the loss of the three "Cressy" or "Bacchante" cruisers (September 22, 1914) and with the action off Coronel (November 1, 1914), it has been thought desirable to reproduce the two following minutes written by Mr. Churchill shortly before the events -

"The force available for operations in the narrow seas should be capable of minor action without the need of bringing down the Grand Fleet. To this end it should have effective support either by two or three battle cruisers or battleships of the Second Fleet working from Sheerness. This is the most efficiently air and destroyer patrolled anchorage we possess. They can lie behind the boom, and can always be at sea when we intend a raid. Battle cruisers are much to be preferred.

 

" The "Bacchantes" ought not to continue on this beat. The risk to such ships is not justified by any services they can render. The narrow seas, being the nearest point to the enemy, should be kept by a small number of good modern ships.

 

"The "Bacchantes" should go to the western entrance of the Channel and set Bethell's battleships - and later Wemyss' cruisers - free for convoy and other duties.

 

"The first four "Arethusas" should join the flotillas of the narrow seas. (These four light cruisers were not immediately available. One had been delivered, but was then under repair; the construction of the others was being accelerated and they were due for completion shortly.)

 

"I see no sufficient reason to exchange these flotillas now that they know their work with the northern ones.

 

"As the 'M' boats are delivered they should be formed into a separate half-flotilla and go north to work with the Grand Fleet.

 

"The King Alfred should pay off and be thoroughly repaired.

(Initialled) 'W. S. C.'

September 18, 1914.

 

 

II

 

Extract of. Telegram from Rear-Admiral Cradock, via Montevideo, to Admiralty. (Received October 12, 1914, 6.15 p.m.)

"Intelligence received re Gneisenau and Scharnhorst. Good Hope revisited Orange Bay October 7, found evidence of presence of Dresden there September 11. Indications show possibility of Dresden, Leipzig, Nurnberg joining Gneisenau and Scharnhorst. Have ordered Canopus to Falkland Islands, where I intend to concentrate and avoid division of forces. Have ordered Glasgow, Monmouth and Otranto not to go north of Valparaiso until German cruisers are again located. Karlsruhe apparently operating in South American waters; suggest therefore Essex be now detached and relieved by Cornwall and remain as S.N.O., Cornwall then proceeding south. With reference to Admiralty telegram No. 74 does Defence join my command?

 

"Do regulations of Panama Canal permit passage of belligerent ships at present time ?"

October 8

 

Mr. Churchill (First Lord of the Admiralty) minuted the above telegram as follows:

"In these circumstances it would be best for the British ships to keep within supporting distance of one another, whether in the Straits or near the Falklands, and to postpone the cruise along the West Coast until the present uncertainty about Scharnhorst and Gneisenau is cleared up.

 

" They, and not the trade, are our quarry for the moment. Above all, we must not miss them."

October 12, 1914.

(Initialled) W. S. C.